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Abstract  
The concept of capital structure and its related determinants has received significant 
attention in academic discussion due to a change in the financial environment allied to 
changes to the economic climate over the last several decades. To mitigate these 
changes and challenges, an understanding of capital structure variances from certain 
aspects of firm, industry and country-specific levels has been the focus of research in 
this area. This has resulted in an emphasis on the financial implications of such capital 
structure variance building an understanding of the influences of its determinants when 
economic environments change. However, results of the research to date is 
inconsistent due probably to the heterogeneity of sampled firm in a changing financial 
market. Therefore, these inconsistent results leave a gap in the literature that needs for 
further investigation.   
The main research aim of the study is to investigate and analyse the determinant of 
capital structure in listed small and medium sized firms in the UK and China. There 
are three specific objectives strategically generated to contribute to the existing 
literature on the subject matter. Firstly, to investigate the impact at firm, industry and 
country-specific levels on capital structure variance of firms using both market and 
book based values in specific sector between 2007 and 2017. Secondly, to analyse the 
relationship between capital structure and its determinants by using panel data fixed 
effect to analyse their direct and indirect influence. Thirdly, to examine using the same 
model, the dummy effects of time, industry and financial systems on capital structure.   
To achieve these research objectives, the study uses two samples, namely, 510 firms 
on the UK Alternative Investment Market (AIM) All Share Index and 759 listed firm 
on the China SMEs Board Market from the period 2007 and 2017. The secondary data 
used in the study is acquired from DataStream, The World Bank and National 
Statistical Bureaux of the UK and China. The analysis initially uses the Haussmann 
test in Stata to determine, within the context of a panel data analysis, whether fixed or 
random effects should be utilised. The evidence predicated the use of fixed effects.  
The need for a heightened awareness of environmental management has been 
highlighted as a results of climate change, global warming and other related 
environmental challenges that have occurred over the last three decades. To mitigate 
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these challenges, efficient environmental processes, strategies, policies, initiatives and 
practices have been adopted by a number of companies and countries. As a result, 
research scholars have highlighted the financial implication of engaging in such 
environmental management activities and research has focussed on advanced 
investigations to understanding the relationship between corporate environmental 
performance (CEP) and corporate financial performance (CFP). However, results to 
date are inconsistent and contradictory thus, leaving a gap in the literature that calls 
for further examination. 
An analysis of descriptive statistics indicate that the Basic Material, Industrial, Health 
and Consumer Services sectors are the most prominent representatives in the AIM 
sample. The Basic Material, Industrial and Consumer Goods sectors are the most 
significant sector in the sample of SMEs Board Market. Several studies indicate that 
firms in the Financial and the Utilities Sectors should not be included in the sample 
because their financing decisions are supervised and regulated by government. The 
capital structure of firms in these sectors have a different composition compared to 
firms in the non-regulated sectors. In order to provide accurate empirical evidence, this 
research investigates the determinants of capital structure excluding the Financial and 
Utilities sectors. On AIM, it is found that the capital structures of the Oil and Gas , 
Technology and Consumer Goods sectors are mainly explained by firm-specific 
determinates. The capital structures of the Industrial sector relies on factors with 
industry characteristics, but the capital structure of the Health Care, Consumer 
Services, Consumer Goods, Industrial and Basic Materials sectors are more influenced 
by macroeconomic change. In the SMEs board, the capital structures of the Health 
Care, Technology, Oil and Gas and Consumer Services sectors are mainly explained 
by determinants related to firm characteristic. The financing decisions of the 
Consumer Goods, Industrial and Basic Materials sectors are influenced more by 
factors arising from the economic environment. Furthermore, industry characteristic 
variables have a stronger explanatory powers in the Industrial, Consumer Services, 
Industrial and Health Care sectors.  
The regression estimators also indicate that the overall difference in capital structure 
variance between the AIM and SMEs board is not significant. Financing structure of 
firms in AIM are explained more by factors with firm characteristic than those in 
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SMEs board with no effect being observed from industry characteristics? However, 
industry characteristics does also play an important role in firm’s capital structure in 
SMEs Board. The short term leverage element of the capital structure of firms on AIM 
is mainly explained by factors firm characteristic with these factors having a lower 
explanatory power in the SMEs board. On the SMEs board, the factors with industry 
and country characteristics have the greatest influence on short term leverage of firms. 
Regarding long term leverage, there is not significant difference between AIM and the 
SMEs board with industry-specific factors affecting the long term rather than the short 
term leverage of firms in AIM.  
Furthermore, using panel data with fixed effects, it is found that the capital structure 
of firms in both the markets is significantly affected by the time, industrial and 
financial system dummy. The effect of the industrial variable plays a significant role 
in the financing decisions of firms on AIM. With no difference being observed 
between short term and long term leverage. However, in the SMEs board, the industrial 
variable only affects short term leverage with no empirical evidence showing any 
significant effect on long term leverage. However, the time variable on capital 
structure shows different results between AIM and the SMEs board. Overall, the effect 
of the time variable on AIM is twice that of its influence on the SME’s board and in 
relation to short term leverage on AIM its effect is four times as significant. In relation 
to the influence of the financial system variable there is no difference in the absolute 
value of its impact between AIM and the SME’s board. 
The study contributes to knowledge and the existing literatures in several ways. The 
primary contribution is the analysis of the hierarchical and dimensional construct of 
capital structure variance. The study analyses the different aspects of financing choice 
made by firms given the influence of time, firm characteristics, industry and country. 
Also, the proxies of capital structure are grouped as short-term and long term leverage 
with both measured in relation to market and book value. For example, there is 
evidence that firm size is positively related to short term leverage in the market value 
of firms on AIM whereas it has a significantly adverse impact on book value. Also, 
the distance from bankruptcy (default risk) is found to be negatively related to short 
term leverage of firms in the SME board, while it positively affects long term leverage. 
These contradictory results suggest that there is a motivation to measure the 
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relationship between capital structure and its determinants to provide more 
explanatory power. Furthermore, the results provide statistical evidence to support 
existing literature on the non-linear relationship between capital structure and its 
determinants in relation to firm characteristics. The study’s distinction of the non-
linear relationship between capital and non-capital intensive firms assists managers in 
utilisation of the marginal effects of conditional variables on financing choice. Finally, 
the study contributes to the capital structure literature by identifying the capital 
structure choice of small and medium sized firms in the developed country of the UK 
and emerging country of China from 2007 to 2017 providing evidence of the 
distinction between UK and Chinese firms, which contributes to the understanding of 
financing preferences in different financial markets. 
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Chapter One: Introduction  
1.0 Introduction  
The variation in capital structure across firms has emerged as a significant source of 
discussion and research in recent years. Capital structure, associated with financing 
decisions, refers to the “sources of financing employed by the firm. These include debt, 
equity and hybrid securities that a firm uses to finance its assets, operations, and future 
growth” (Baker and Martin 2011). Capital structure is a major aspect of financial 
management aimed at contributing towards the maximization of firm value. This is 
because “a firm needs sufficient funds to support its activities arising from its 
investment decisions” and therefore, how the firm allocates the proportion of capital 
sources required including share, debt and retained earnings, plays a significant role 
in the firm’s sustainability (Harris and Raviv 1991).  As Baker and Martin (2011) 
explain, if debt becomes the least costly form of financing, the influence of growing 
leverage in using debt financing increases financial risk. Debt financing not only 
increases the default risk of firms but also the volatility of a firm’s earnings. In this 
instance, the benefit of a lower cost of debt would decrease when leverage rises and is 
associated with growth of financial risk and the probability of financial distress. Myers 
(1977) and Myers and Majluf (1984) succinctly summarise this stating “sources of 
capital have vital consequence for the firm to affect its market value and hence 
shareholder balance” as capital structure is a direct determinant of firm’s overall risk 
and cost of capital. Given the huge changes that have occurred in the economy for the 
past several decades (i.e. banking crisis 1990s, financial crisis 2007), companies, 
industries and economies around the world have been paying attention to capital 
structure and corporate financial decisions. 
The global financial market presents more choices of capital instruments with a vast 
range of new sources and forms of capital for firms. There are three major sources of 
capital for firms, which are “internally generated funds, bank loans and financing 
raised in capital markets” (Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle 2010). As Agarwal (2013) 
describes, firms can be given direct loans and credit from banks and can also raise 
loans in the form of bond issues. Equity issues can be made in the primary market 
which may then be traded in the secondary equity market. The wide circulation of 
instruments within the capital market, with the resulting mix of debt and equity 
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determines that a firm’s capital structure can be more widely based. Due to the wide 
range of capital sources, the determinants of the cost of these can be an essential issue 
for firms. Since the seminal framework by Modigliani and Miller (1958), who devise 
the research paradigm on capital structure and the firm’s value, a large volume of 
academic studies have been focused on the determinant of the explanatory factors for  
capital structure. As explained by Modigliani and Miller (1958), under stringent 
condition of competitive, frictionless, and complete markets, without transaction or 
bankruptcy costs and distortionary taxation, the value of firm is independent of its 
capital structure. According to Bevan and Danbolt (2002), once these fundamental 
assumptions are relaxed, however, capital structure may be relevant to firm value. 
Moreover, there could be restrictions for firms in accessing external financing, and the 
costs of its alternative forms may differ. Under such market imperfections, firms will 
attempt to borrow levels of debt and raise equity in order to reach an optimal capital 
structure (Bevan and Danbolt 2002).  
In his follow up paper Miller (1977) proposes the tax shield as a factor that 
significantly affects the capital structure of firms, however, this was subsequently 
refuted by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) who introduce the factor of a non-debt tax 
shield as a determinant of capital structure. There are number of theories that cover 
capital structure which provide explanatory power to be determinants. Trade-off 
theory relates to profitability and size, agency cost theory covers firm growth and 
volatility in cash flow, pecking order theory addressed both profitability and growth, 
signalling theory is associated with tangibility of assets and market timing hypothesis 
introduces the price of equity. These theories and their relevance to capital structure 
have been covered in the following studies Jensen and Meckling (1976), Ross (1977), 
Myers (1984) and Baker and Wurgler (2002). There is a growing interest amongst 
academic researchers in exploring the rationale for altering the mix of the capital 
structure within firms. The majority of researchers have attempted to explore one of 
the most common questions of whether capital structure has an optimal range that 
maximises firm’s value, given the level of capital necessary to support a firm’s 
activities. Moreover, the critical determinants in setting the leverage ratio is an area 
that attracts a concentration of research.   
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Furthermore, with the change in the economic environment and diversity of the global 
capital market, some studies explore the influence of specific economic conditions 
including GDP, inflation rate and market liberalization on the financing choice of firms 
(Bokpin 2009; Cook and Tang 2010). These studies (Booth et al. 2001; Antoniou et 
al. 2008; Beck et al. 2008; De Jong et al. 2008) contrast the capital structure of firms 
from different countries, and suggest that other than firm characteristics, country 
specific and institutional factors may also influence financial leverage. A number of 
empirical studies making international comparisons (Agarwal and Mohtadi 2004) 
suggest that external financing is “more important in developing countries than in 
developed countries”.  For example, Atkin and Glen (1992) find that for firms in G7 
countries, internally generated funds were dominants, while for firms in developing 
countries, externally generated funds, i.e. bank loans and equity were important. In 
addition, the use of the capital market as a source of external financing in developing 
countries has increased and further growth is expected (Booth et al. 2001). Larger 
firms. within developing countries, are more able to meet the requirements of external 
finance providers (Beck et al. 2008).  
While there are many studies on the role firms and countries play in capital structure, 
the literature neglects industry factors. Although a few studies include dummy industry 
variables representing the effect arising from different industries, it is difficult to find 
studies including variables that characterize each industry, the exception being 
MacKay and Phillips (2005); Kayo and Kimura (2011). Further, although there are a 
number of research studies that address the relationship between capital structure and 
either firm specific or country specific factors, most use data for firms that can be 
classified as large by any definition of business size. This is because small firms are 
confronted with a different set of problems and have different complexities, such as 
“shorter expected life, presence of estate tax, intergenerational transfer problems and 
prevalence of implicit contracts” (Michaelas et al. 1999). Furthermore, another 
possible reason for this limitation is that SMEs data are often scarce and unreliable 
because small firms are not required to disclose the same level of detailed information 
as large companies.  
Regarding the differences in methodologies, it is found that studies investigating the 
relationship of capital structure have adopted different approaches. For instance, using 
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a sample of U.S. firms is a common theme in the study of the impact of firm 
characteristic on capital structure (Huang and Ritter 2009; Lemmon and Zender 2010; 
Graham et al. 2016). Other studies test the capital structure determinants of UK 
companies (Michaelas et al. 1999; Ozkan 2001; Bevan and Danbolt 2002), European 
firms (Bancel and Mittoo 2004; Daskalakis and Psillaki 2008), and Asian firms 
(Deesomsak et al. 2004), international data (Bertus et al. 2008; De Jong et al. 2008; 
Fan et al. 2012; Cho et al. 2014). The theoretical frameworks are widely recognised 
and utilised in these studies and they illustrate different empirical methodologies to 
gain insight into the key elements of the capital structure formation.  
The current study argues that the fundamental gap that has to be addressed is the 
multidimensionality of capital structure and the emphasis on large firms. Along with 
firm characteristic,  De Jong et al. (2008), Daskalakis and Psillaki (2008); 
Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin (2011) focus on the role of country variables in 
influencing the capital structure of firms. Other studies include a number of dummy 
variables to control for the effect of industry, time and country on a firm’s speed of 
adjustment to change in the capital structure of firms (Wald 1999; Hall et al. 2000; 
Deesomsak et al. 2004; De Jong et al. 2008). This study appears to validate the view 
that the dimensions of capital structure determinants should be investigated as one 
single study in order to gain a comprehensive result covering all facets. Therefore, this 
study, based of review of existing literature, seeks to analyse the multidimensionality 
of the determinants of capital structure to provide a more comprehensive picture of the 
factors that influence firm decision making in its make up. Additionally, there is 
limited amount of literature on the capital structure of small and medium (SMEs) and 
it draws substantially on largely unlisted firms. This distorts the equity relationship 
since there is a reluctance amongst SMEs to introduce that type of funding into their 
capital structure due to a lack of qualification for a listing or a loss of ownership 
control. There is therefore a preference to rely on internal funds followed by debt 
(Michaelas et al, 1999). In order to address this distortion this study uses only listed 
SMEs since equity plays major element in the capital structure and therefore eliminates 
the distortion whilst reducing the knowledge gap by examining an under researched 
area namely listed small firms. there is wide literature on the subject of the difference 
in capital structure by country and this study enlarges this fields by both concentrating 
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on SMEs and including firms listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in 
London and the SMEs Board in Shenzhen.  
 
1.1 Relevance of UK and China Context in the study 
The current research explores the capital structure of listed firms in the UK and China 
from 2007 to 2017. Given that the UK has well-developed financial markets and active 
stock trading, it is worth researching the financing preference of listed companies 
based on the UK capital market where there is a legal tradition of long standing and a 
liberal approach to economic activity. This can be contrasted to China where the 
economy has been growing at high speed despite the fact that it has an under developed 
legal system and financial market. This difference in the characteristics of the 
economic environment and legal system, serves as a useful opportunity to produce a 
comparative study of the capital structure preference of firms in the UK and China and 
to explore any differences of approach.  
The primary reason for the chosen period of study is to provide insight on the impact 
of the recent financial crisis on the capital structure of firms in the UK and China, 
including any change in both equity and debt levels of firms during the crisis and post 
crisis periods. The efforts made by the governments of most countries, particularly 
those which play a significant role in global capital markets towards using regulatory 
action to achieve stability in the market to implement a raft of monetary policy of 
initiatives including quantitative are now the subject of research by a large number of 
academics. For example, the programme of asset purchases by the Monetary Policy 
Committee of the Bank of England began in 2009. There was a total of £200 billion 
assets purchased between 2009 and 2010, representing about 14% of UK GDP 
(Kapetanios et al. 2012). In China, the stimulus programme of 4 trillion Yuan (£293 
billion) was adopted by Chinese government in response to the 2008 global financial 
crisis, which represented 16% of China’s GDP (Zheng and Chen 2009). An evaluation 
of the effect of monetary policy could mislead the public into assuming that companies 
which are affected by the crisis during 2007 to 2008 benefitted from the quantitative 
easing policy. However, academic research that evaluated, how the capital structure of 
firms changed during the financial crisis provides a comprehensive insight for 
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government and policymakers. For example, according to Iqbal and Kume (2015), the 
overall leverage ratios of firms in the UK and Germany have been increased from the 
pre-crisis period (2006 to 2007) to the crisis period (2008 to 2009) but subsequently 
decreased in the post crisis period (2010 to 2011). This paper systematically analyses 
the impact of the 2007-2008 financial crisis on firms leverage ratio from a variety of 
perspectives, including the impact of different financial systems, industry capital 
structure ratios and time periods.  
The means by which Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) determine their capital 
structure is the focus of this research. This is partly because the recognition the 
importance of SMEs in the economy in terms of “number of enterprises, employment 
and value added, and also because the acknowledgement that SME financing exhibits 
considerable differences when compared to larger enterprise” (Daskalakis et al. 2017). 
Also, as Porter (1993) and Hussain et al. (2006) indicate that a healthy and growing 
SME sector is perceived to be crucial for sustainable competitive advantage and 
economic development at local, regional and national level. According to Huang et al. 
(2016), the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics concludes that SMEs account for 
about 99 percent of the total number of firms in China and these SME firms contribute 
about 60 percent of the country’s total gross industrial output. Also, as ben be seen 
from statistic data of the UK’s Federation of Small Business (2008), SMEs represent 
99.9 percent of all UK business and account for over half of private sector 
employment. The UK’s 4.8 million SMEs are critical to the economic health of the 
UK, as recognised in the UK Coalition governments programme. However, the capital 
market’s environment in the UK and China has entered its worst period since the 
financial crisis. Therefore, the question of whether and how the financial crisis 
impacted the capital structure of SMEs and was the effect different, for example in 
relation to key determinants, during, pre and post the period is the main focus of this 
study.  
Historically, the Financial Services Authorities (2001) reported that UK companies 
have not made extensive use of the bond market, and particularly the domestic sterling 
bond market. For the most part, they have tended to place far greater reliance on equity 
financing. This partly reflects the fact that the UK has a well-developed equity market 
and that for long periods the UK suffered from a high level of inflation, followed by 
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residual inflationary expectations, which caused the nominal costs of long term debt 
finance to be unattractively high. On the other hand, the financial landscape in China 
is more complicated as it is dominated by the state-owned banking system. The stock 
market and bond market have rather limited roles in corporate financing. According to 
Goodfriend and Prasad (2006), the total amount of deposit in the banking system of 
China are circa take 160 percent of GDP, compared to government stock which is 
about 25 percent of GDP. Comparing the banking system, the corporate bond market 
and stock market in China are relatively small. Only a small number of enterprises are 
permitted to list on the stock market and most of the shares of these listed enterprises 
are owned by the state and these shares are not traded. In briefly, the stock market does 
not play a major role in corporate financing.  
Therefore, a further focus of the research is to investigate whether the financing 
preference of firms in the UK and China differ with particular feature such as any 
difference in the firm characteristics and market conditions have an influence on 
corporate structure. The findings would inform both policy and firm decision making 
when considering investment in the respective countries. The respective influence of 
macroeconomic conditions and government response to both opportunities and crises 
could be major influences on the decisions of both domestic and foreign firms in 
relation to their approach to capital structure and investment.  
1.2 Research Questions 
The study contributes to the literature by examining whether multiple dimensions of 
determinants have an effect on the capital structure of SMEs. To carry out an effective 
investigation, the following research questions are constructed in line with the 
objectives of the thesis.  
First, what are the determinants (i.e., time-, firm-, industry- and country- level or 
financial system) of firm’s capital structure (e.g. market value and book value of short 
term leverage and long term leverage) from a sectoral perspective?  
Second, are the capital structure determinants of UK and China SMEs driven by 
similar factors, and are potential differences driven by time, firm, industry and 
country-specific elements?   
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Third, is the size and structure of their financial market an important factor in 
explaining any cross-country differences on SME capital structure? 
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
In an attempt to answer the research questions, the current study aims to investigate 
the influence of time, firm, industry and country specific level determinants of capital 
structure of firms from the UK and China.  The effect of these determinants will be 
evaluated at varying level in the capital structure process. The study adopts data for 
firms listed on FTSE AIM all shares index in the UK and SZSE SME Board in China 
which will reflect an appropriate mix of debt and equity. The objectives of the study 
are:  
First, to access the relative importance of each determinants level on the variance of 
firm leverage in the various sector from 2007 to 2017.  
Second, to extend this basic model to include fixed effects panel data in order to 
analyse the influence of the characteristics of firm, industry and country on firm 
leverage including a direct and indirect influence.  
Third, using the fixed effects model, to examine the effects of time, industry and the 
financial system on capital structure of firms in the UK and China. 
 
1.4 Research Methodology Structure 
To achieve the aims and objectives discussed above, this study uses multiple samples 
including a sample size of 510 listed firms on the FTSE AIM all share Index and 759 
listed firms on the SZSE SMEs board market from 2007 to 2017. Listed firms in the 
UK and China are the central focus of this study due to the transparent nature of the 
information disclosed regarding the financial and operational performance of firms. 
Further, the AIM and SME Board are the only direct equity financing platform for 
small and medium companies (SMEs) from a wide range of industries. Many of the 
firms on AIM and SMEs Board have been actively trading over the years and have 
large market capitalization. For example, ASOS on AIM has the largest market 
capitalisation of £4.82 billion in 2018 (LSE, 2018) and RSPC on SMEs board has 
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issued capital of 14 billion Yuan in 2018 which became the firms with largest equity 
issuance (SZSE, 2018). These examples provide considerable justification for the 
investigation of these small and medium listed firms’ attitude to capital structure ratios.  
The FTSE AIM all shares Index primarily represents all eligible companies listed on 
the sub-market of the London Stock Exchange (LSE). This comprises of the FTSE 
AIM UK 50 Index, the FTSE AIM 100 Index and the FTSE AIM All share Index. The 
Alternative Investment market is regulated by the London Stock Exchange but with 
less demanding rules than the main market. It comprises the smaller and less viable 
companies that run in a more flexible regulatory system than the main market and no 
capitalisation requirements exist and companies on AIM are not required to issue a 
certain number of shares. Similar to AIM in the UK, the SZSE SME Board is a sub-
board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange founded specifically for small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) to provide lower entry barriers in China. It provides a direct 
financing platform for a growing number of private (non-state) companies from a wide 
range of sectors and include traditional firms as well as firms with significant a hi-tech 
content. However, the listing standards for the SMEs board are stricter than that 
required for AIM in the UK. The requirements applicable to the main board of 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange include companies “information disclosure, IPO and listing 
advice and disclosure of key financial indicators, profitability, size of share capital and 
the ratio of public shares, all of which should be supplied by SME Board companies 
(Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 2004).  
Furthermore, the study includes a representative sample of firms from all sectors as 
listed on the FTSE and SZSE excluding any related to the financial and utilities sectors 
together with any involved in merger and acquisitions. This is predicated on research 
produced by Frank and Goyal (2003),Cook and Tang (2010), Korajczyk and Levy 
(2003), who found that financial firms, regulated utilities and firms involved in 
mergers and acquisitions were obliged to comply with regulatory guidance with which 
influenced the capital structure choice for these firms. The financial data are extracted 
from the companies’ annual reports and Data stream while macroeconomic data are 
gained from the World Bank and the State Statistical Bureaux. There are two main 
prerequisite sample selection criteria adopted in this study to arrive at the panel data. 
Firstly, firms with at least three years of data from 2007 to 2017 available from annual 
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reports are selected. It is imperative to start with this criterion due to limited data 
availability for annual reports. The second criterion is to eliminate firms with missing 
financial data relating to variables such as those related to profitability, size and 
dividend payment over the period 2007 to 2017.  
A total of 718 firms were listed on the FTSE AIM all shares and 821 firms on the 
SZSE SME Board and following the exclusions noted above the sample was restricted 
to 510 firms on AIM and 759 on SME Board. These were included in the unbalanced 
panel data analysis. These are firms that feature across all industry sectors in the 
Industrial Classification Benchmark (ICB) and CNI Industries Classification 
Standards (CNI) sectors excluding the Financial and Utilities Sectors. However, the 
firms within the excluded financial and utility sectors are not ignored but evaluated 
separately.  
This study uses panel data regression analysis containing time series and cross-
sectional dimensions of the data collected. Panel data contains “information on both 
the intertemporal dynamic and the individuality of the entities may allow one to control 
the effect of missing or unobserved variables” (Gaud et al. 2005; Hsiao 2007; Baltagi 
2008; Bollen and Brand 2010).  The study then uses a Fixed Effect approach due to 
the possibility of omitted variables which may be correlated with the variables in the 
model. Additionally, the danger of non-linearity was explored but it was concluded 
that a linear panel model appropriately addressed the research aims. However, it is 
recognised that some studies have identified a degree of non-linearity in the leverage 
ratios within capital structure and this research addressed this by utilising the same 
fixed effect approach but logging firm characteristic variables to recognise the non-
linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables. This also serves 
as a robustness check.  
 
1.5 Contribution of the Study 
The research has both policy and academic relevance due to the role played by 
regulators and policy makers in governments, who would benefit from the study’s 
results and contribute to the aim of maximising SMEs’ wealth and improve their 
financial environment. The study contributes to the significant academic literature on 
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financing related issues and the financial performance of SMEs in both developed and 
developing countries, particularly in the UK and China.  
First, the study contributes to the debate on the relationship between capital structure 
of firms and the factors which might affect it by highlighting results from a multi-
sectoral perspective. A literature review finds that, only a few of studies have been 
conducted in the UK and China which have studied the capital structure of firms based 
on sectoral analysis. The studies to date adopt a variety of approaches using different 
measures of financial performance across a multiple sectors and the results produce an 
uncertain and ambiguous picture with the added complication of the papers being 
dated and written prior to the financial crisis and the current financial environment. 
This research combine eight sectors (excluding Financial and Utilities sectors) 
represented by the ICG and CNI Indices to present a holistic investigation of each 
sector’s performance. Different sectors appear to adopt specific capital structure 
frameworks with evidence that variation in the financial environment elicits a 
particular response from each sector and the firms within them. Recognition of this is 
essential since it predicates differing policies and regulations and also informs the 
capital structure design of individual firms. This research identifies these trends and 
informs both practitioners and policy makers in the optimal solution for capital 
structure.  
A firm’s capital structure will have a hierarchy of financial instruments and this 
research analyse the hierarchical construct of capital structure choice providing an 
additional insight into the influence of time, firm, industry and financial systems on 
the financing decision. Although there is a large number of studies on the multi-
dimensionality of capital structure (Schmukler and Vesperoni 2001; Daskalakis and 
Psillaki 2008; Psillaki and Daskalakis 2009; Jõeveer 2013), the majority focus at the 
firm specific level. To thoroughly grasp the hierarchical relationship, this study 
investigates the influence of time, industry and financial systems, allied to the 
independent variables of firm, industry and country specific observations as the 
determinants of capital structure and applies a linear modelling approach in order to 
assess the relative importance of each of them. As an example, this study found 
evidence that the effects of time dummy variables on capital structure were changing 
over the periods of the financial crisis and economic recovery. Also, the financial 
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system had significant influence on capital structure of firms over the sample period. 
Bank based systems had a negative impact on leverage ratios of firms with the 
exception of the short term leverage in relation to book value whilst the market based 
system showed a positive influence on leverage excluding the short term leverage of 
book value. These findings may encourage managers in various sectors and financial 
systems to advance different policies that apply to their sector to adjust their method 
of financing and leverage ratios.  
Furthermore, the outcomes of the study augments the literature on the non-linear 
relationship between capital structure and the factors affecting it. The identification of 
the non-linear relationship between capital intensive and non-capital intensive firms 
has the capacity to assist managers in those sectors with different capital intenseness 
to adjust their capital structure. The majority of existing studies have concentrated on 
the linear relationship between capital structure and its determinants ignoring the non-
linear adjustment which occurs in relation to debt ratios and the tendency for such an 
occurrence impacts to have a temporary effect and eventually reduce. Though such 
circumstance may result in a U-shaped or inverse U-shaped relationship, the non-linear 
incidence of firm’ debt adjustment this study confirms its existence. Only a few studies 
have empirically investigated the existence of a non-linear relationship (Fattouh et al. 
2005). In response to the curvilinear relationship, Bahng and Jeong (2012) identified 
the existence of non-linear effects between debt ratios and explanatory variables such 
as firm size and profitability. However, this non- linearity is not apparent for the 
independent variables of asset tangibility and non-debt shield. Other papers also 
corroborates the estimated effect of explanatory variables such as firm size, asset 
tangibility and profitability at different points of the distribution (Fattouh et al. 2005). 
Therefore, it can be inferred that this research introduces a new perspective on the non-
linear effect into the capital structure literature and serves subsequently services as a 
contribution to the previous literature in this field.  
Finally, the study contributes to literature by adopting different measures of capital 
structure such as short and long term leverage in both market and book value. Both 
short term and long term leverage are, to some extent, significantly affected by time, 
firm, industry and country level determinants when both market and book value 
measures are used. For example, firm characteristics have a greater influence on short 
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term leverage as opposed to long term leverage. Also, market value is more 
significantly related to country specific variables. These provide statistical evidence 
from differing dimensions that will allow policy makers to holistically comprehend 
the financing strategies of firms and develop suitable policies for firms with different 
capital requirements.  
  
1.6 Structure of the Thesis  
The thesis comprises eight chapters which are structured and grounded on conceptual 
and theoretical basis, with discussion and analytically systematic arguments. The 
current chapter presents an overview of the research which primarily includes the 
introduction, background and purpose of the study. Furthermore, this chapter identifies 
the research aims and objectives which address the research questions. In addition to 
these, the unique contribution to existing research and the policy implication are 
briefly outlined. The limitation of the study and proposition for future research are also 
outlined in the last section of this chapter.  
In chapter two relevant theoretical frameworks are presented together with existing 
literature on the subject of capital structure and corporate financing decision. The 
chapter includes the main underlying theories and their suitability and practicability 
for use in the present study. The theories that are mainly discussed in this chapter are 
the Modigliani and Miller model, Trade-off theory, Agency Theory, Signalling theory, 
Pecking order theory and Market timing theory. Figure 1 below shows the period of 
development of each of the theories employed in this study. Using these theories as 
the basic concepts, Chapter two provides an insight into the extent to which all relevant 
factors relating to firm specific determinants influence changes to the capital structure 
of firm.  
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Figure 1. 1: Theoretical Composition    
       
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, Chapter two reviews the existing empirical literature that investigates the 
relationship between capital structure and the factors arising from these major theories 
on the subject. Industry characteristics and their effects already explored in the extant 
literature are examined in this chapter. One prominent section in this chapter covers 
the limited literature that analyses the determinants of leverage using with industry 
dummy variables that characterize rather than classify the industry specific influence 
on capital structure and the differing results obtained when tested in each industry 
sector. It is also noted in chapter two that capital structure, is analysed separately using 
the different ratios of leverage, namely, short, long term or total leverage ratio. The 
following next section is cover about the nature and relevance of corporate capital 
structure in the global context. In this section, the literature on the international 
comparison of capital structure and the impact of economic conditions are recognised. 
Issues, including specific aspects of the economic environment and performance 
including the bond and stock market together with financial systems which are related 
to capital structure changes in the behaviour of firms are discussed in this section.  
Chapter three introduces the main hypotheses to be tested in this research. These 
hypotheses are discussed and are generated from literature evaluated in chapter two. 
A total of sixteen hypotheses are developed based on three main levels of determinants 
of capital structure. The first level is the firm specific level including firm size, growth 
opportunities, non-debt tax shield, profitability, tangibility and intangibility of assets, 
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Trade-off Theory  
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effective tax rate, default risk, liquidity and dividend payment. The second level is 
industry specific and includes industry market concentration. The third level is country 
specific associated with macroeconomic market changes, including growth of GDP, 
capital formation, development of the bond market and development of the stock 
market. Furthermore, the hypotheses related to dummy variables associated with 
financial systems, time and industry effects are discussed in this chapter.  
Chapter four identifies the specifics of the methodology used in this thesis. The first 
part classifies the research philosophy that underpins the more concrete questions of 
empirical research. The methodological procedures regarding the population of the 
study, sampling criteria, sample space and data descriptions are described in this 
chapter. In this section, the segmentation of dependent variables and independent 
variables together with control variables are introduce. The following section 
introduces the various statistical tests that are undertaken to demonstrates the validity 
of the data and include the Variance Inflation Factor and Pearson correlation matrix. 
Additionally, the procedures for running a panel data analysis including the 
segmentation of regression models are presented after validating the method for 
dealing with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The final section of this chapter 
explains provides the process of how the non-linear relationship is explored to evaluate 
the marginal effect of the dependent and independent variables.  
The analyses of econometric results are discussed in Chapter five, six and seven. 
Chapter five presents the descriptive statistics analysis with two graphs that show the 
distribution of the samples based on the indices of the ICB and CNI sectors. This part 
also shows the descriptive statistical analysis covering to the mean, standard deviation 
and the minimum and maximum values of the observation utilised from the data set. 
Furthermore, the correlation and multi-collinearity tests and analysis are also covered 
in this chapter.  
Chapter Six discusses the panel regression analysis where the results are grouped into 
the various sectors. These results present the relationship between capital structure and 
its determinants according to the different industry sectors and stock markets. Also, 
this section discusses the dummy variables of time, industry and financial system 
which capture their specific influence.  
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Chapter seven primarily shows the robustness test results of analysis. It firstly presents 
the results of the non-linear relationship between firm-specific variables and capital 
structure in the markets of AIM and SME Board. It then presents the results of the 
non-linear relationship in the capital intensive and non-capital intensive sectors. In 
addition to these observations, the robustness checks test the validity of the empirical 
results by utilising alternative specifications that test the measures and processes to 
testify the validity of the empirical results, are showed in this chapter.  
Chapter eight provides a conclusion by outlining the whole thesis with considerable 
focus on the research methodology and results with links back to the literature. It also 
discusses the implications of the results from various aspects and provides the main 
research contribution of the study by applying, linking and extending theoretical 
models of capital structure. The limitation of the research regarding interpreting the 
results are provided in the following section. This chapter also suggests several points 
for future studies to explore further country and firm behaviour in relation to capital 
structure.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
2.0 Introduction  
A critical aspect of research is the underpinning of the theoretical framework on which 
the study’s hypothesis, research results and contribution is based. Grant and Osanloo 
(2014) define a theoretical framework as the entire “blueprint” of research which 
serves as the role that guides the research in order to build a structure based on formal 
theories. In other words, the theoretical framework consists of the selected theory that 
underpins the research’s thoughts and objectives. However, Lovitts (2008) defines the 
criteria for applying or developing the theoretical of the thesis as necessitating a logical 
alignment with the research question. Theories cannot prescribe the specific needs of 
the researchers’ but instead acts as a lens to explore the different possibilities for the 
study from a variety of perspectives.  
The capital structure literature has adopted various theories such as the Modigliani and 
Miller’s model ((Modigliani and Miller 1958, 1963), trade-off theory (Kraus and 
Litzenberger 1973), agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976), signalling theory 
(Ross 1977),  pecking order theory (Myers 1984; Myers and Majluf 1984) and market 
timing model (Baker and Wurgler 2002). Other empirical literature initially relate to 
the effect of the industry environment on capital structure (Bradley et al. 1984; 
Chevalier 1995; MacKay and Phillips 2005) and then the influence of the macro-
economic markets. This research selects the Modigliani and Miller model, trade-off 
theory, agency theory, signalling theory, pecking order theory and market timing 
theory to explain the relationship between the capital structure and firm specific levels 
variables in the UK and China, and uses the empirical theories relating to industry 
effects and macroeconomic condition’s effect to explain the relationship between 
capital structure and the key influences involved. As the current study is not only 
targeted at only establishing the relationships but also in determining causal directions, 
the theories will serve to underpin the explanatory narrative for both.   
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
Before delving into the context and content of the fundamental theories employed in 
this study, it is worth noting the structure and organisation of the sections. The chapter 
covers detailed theoretical discussion and is organised as follows: Section 2.1 covers 
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the theoretical framework relating to capital structure and section 2.2 includes the 
practise framework generating from empirical evidence of capital structure 
investigation. In section 2.1, section 2.1.1 covers the Modigliani and Miller model; 
Section 2.1.2 explores the trade-off theory; Section 2.1.3 discusses the agency theory; 
Section 2.1.4 explains the signalling theory; Section 2.1.5 reviews the pecking order 
theory and 2.1.6 focuses on market timing theory. In Section 2.2, the industry effects 
on capital structure is included in Section 2.2.1, and Section 2.2.2 is about the influence 
of Macroeconomic condition on capital structure. In each section, the researcher first 
discusses the relevance of the theories and their application in the exiting literature. 
After that, the implication of the theories in capital structure are also analysed. In this 
chapter, the different concepts and arguments from literature are explored after 
pointing out the relevance of the theories in capital structure.   
2.1.1 Modigliani and Miller Model  
Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Modigliani and Miller (1963) originally devised the 
MM model in their articles by developing conventional financial views of capital 
structure to a modern theoretical framework. The MM model explores the inherent law 
of the firm’s capital structure, based upon various assumptions, and establishes the 
association between market value of a firm and the composition of financial leverage. 
This theory has also been used in more recent studies as a starting point for the capital 
structure theory as suggested by Eckbo (2011) and Brusov et al. (2015) where they 
state the “theory of corporate finance in the modern sense stem from the Modigliani 
and Miller (1958) and Modigliani and Miller (1963)’s capital structure proposition”. 
Modigliani and Miller model has had a great effect on further framework formulation 
of capital structure. Virtually without exception, the subsequent frameworks of the 
trade-off model, agency theory, pecking order theory, market-timing, and signalling 
theory have been developed based on relaxing the conditions of MM model’s 
assumptions.  
2.1.1.1 The Modigliani-Miller Theory with Taxes 
The essence of the initial MM Model proposed that, under a perfect capital market 
with symmetry information, and in the absence of taxes, transaction cost and 
bankruptcy cost, the market value of a firm is dependent on the capitalization of the 
firm’s expected return at a cost of unleveraged equity, and is invariant with respect to 
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a firm’s capital structure as well as cost of capital. By using a “utility function” which 
is presented in Figure 2.1, Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that the “total cost of 
the firm is determined by the value of profit outcome, discounted with fixed rate, and 
corresponding to total business risk of the firm”. Furthermore, equity cost of a 
leveraged firm is equal to the equity cost of an unleveraged firm in the same risk group, 
plus a premium for risk, the value of which is equal to the production of difference on 
financial leverage level. These two MM propositions indicate that adding more debt 
in the composition of capital has no effect on the market value and the total cost of the 
firm, because the benefit acquired from the debt financing market will be offset by the 
rise in risk and cost of a firm’s equity capital. Therefore, the market value of the firm 
is only dependent on its profitability and risk classes. The irrelevance results of the 
MM theory have also been stated by Stiglitz (1969).  
Miller (1988) critiques that the propositions of initial MM model have been accepted 
in economic and financial theory, however, the “the empirical evidence of MM value-
invariance in organically sphere of corporation finance is less clear”. This is because 
most of Modigliani and Miller (1958) assumptions could not exist in a real situation 
and the conclusions of MM model are unlikely to be empirically proved (Frank and 
Goyal 2008; Brusov et al. 2015) suggesting that some of the prerequisites in the MM 
model (1958) could be removed without altering results except the crucial assumptions 
of no bankruptcy cost and no taxes.  
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Figure 2. 1: MM propositions  
 
 
Source: Brusov et al. (2015) 
 
2.1.1.2 Modigliani-Miller Theory with Taxes 
Subsequently, the issue of taxes in relation to the irrelevance of debt to equity in the 
firm’s capital structure has been specifically considered in Modigliani and Miller 
(1963) who propose that under some conditions, “the market value of leverage firm is 
higher than the market value of a firm that is entirely financed by equity at the same 
risk group, added by the benefit of tax shield which arising from financial leverage, 
and equal to the product of rate of corporate income tax and the value of debt”. Since 
the interest payment of debt financing becomes a tax-deductible expense for the firm, 
the issuing of debt can increase shareholder wealth because the firm can lower its tax 
expense with a rise in debt. Contrarily, issuing stock does not affect corporate tax, and 
thus the optimal capital structure of the firm consists of 100 percentage debt 
(Modigliani and Miller 1963; Kraus and Litzenberger 1973) 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) show the value of financial leverage at a corporate level 
but ignored the question of “how equilibrium is determined when firm’s interest 
expense are tax deductible while outflows to shareholders are not” (Benninga and 
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Talmor 1988). (Miller 1977) further considers the determination of personal tax of 
capital structure and resolved the question that the benefit of debt financing at the 
corporate level is reversed at the shareholder’s personal level. According to Miller 
(1977), the advantage of debt financing was partly overvalued because the expense of 
personal tax offsets the benefit that shareholder gain from equity. This solution has 
also been proved by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) who suggest that the advantage of 
debt financing is completed eliminated if the personal tax rate on bond interest is 
higher than the personal rate on equity income in the form of capital financing. 
Investors at a basic personal tax level are more likely to invest in a taxable bond, 
however, investors at the higher rate are more likely purchase equity (Benninga and 
Talmor 1988). With consideration of both corporate tax and personal tax in capital 
market equilibrium, the capital structure has multiple equilibria in which debt is issued 
by different firms.  
2.1.1.3 Modifications of Modigliani-Miller Theory  
Fundamentally, the Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Modigliani and Miller (1963) 
make a contribution to modern theory of finance by devising capital structures 
irrelevance to the firm’s valuation around the theorem’s conditions. The criticism of 
the MM theorem argues that it is a simplified assumption that cannot hold in a real 
word setting. Based upon propositions of Modigliani and Miller (1963), the optimal 
capital structure of a firm can be completely debt financed due to the preferential 
treatment of debt to equity in the context of a tax. This cannot be achieved under a 
variety of circumstances (Frank and Goyal 2008) 
The subsequent studies of Hamada (1969), Stiglitz (1969), Stiglitz (1974) and Gruber 
and Warner (1977) relax the assumptions of Modigliani and Miller (1958) theory and 
introduce factors of trade-off namely, bankruptcy cost, agency cost and financial 
distress cost to supplement Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Modigliani and Miller 
(1963)’ s model. Stiglitz (1969) extends the propositions of Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) under more general conditions such as with consideration of risk classes and a 
competitive capital market. By using a model of market equilibrium, this article shows 
that the probability of bankruptcy will be increased if a firm places an overwhelming 
reliance on debt financing. After that, Stiglitz (1974) further shows that the maturity 
structure of debt has no relevance to the capital structure of firm, and  the firm’s value 
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can be implied by an optimal capital structure, irrespective of the financial policies of 
firm. Miller (1977) also argues that in market equilibrium the value of a firm has still 
no relevance to its capital structure despite the advantage of tax deduction. This is 
because the price and returns for securities in market equilibrium “account for 
distortion imposed by corporate and personal tax and the company cannot facilitate 
performance by only changing its debt ratio” (Cheremushkin 2011). However, this 
suggestion has been refuted by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), Altman (1984), Andrade and Kaplan (1998) and Graham (2000) who explain 
that the relevance of the tax-deductibility and a firm’s value is compromised by 
concerns relating to the costs of financial distress and bankruptcy. High level of 
borrowing is more likely to result in a firm’s inability to cover interest payments when 
cash flow is insufficient (Graham and Smart, 2012).  
 
2.1.2 Trade-off Theory  
Robichek and Myers (1966) propose the framework of “trade-off” which originally 
stems from Modigliani and Miller’s (1963) seminal work that involved corporate 
income tax. Robichek and Myers (1966) expand the MM hypothesis of perfect 
information and further considered bankruptcy cost, demonstrating that firms have an 
optimal capital structure. Basically, trade off theory of capital structure assumes that 
firms choose debt financing in order to optimally balance the benefit of debt with the 
possible costs of financial distress. The theoretical model of trade-off has also been 
ranged from static models to dynamic versions which considers the firm’s investment 
as exogenous but adding the rebalancing costs of capital structure (Kraus and 
Litzenberger 1973; Brennan and Schwartz 1984; Fischer et al. 1989; Goldstein et al. 
2001). 
2.1.2.1 Static Trade off Theory  
Earlier studies of Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) provide a static formulation to present 
capital structure option, in which the firms are described as setting a target debt ratio 
for their capital structure eventually moving towards the target. This is because using 
debt compared with equity hold both advantages and disadvantages, firms should have 
an optimal capital structure that balanced the tax saving brought about by leverage and 
the financial risk of the enhanced possibility of bankruptcy associated with a high debt 
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at the margin (Scott Jr 1976). According to Scott Jr (1976), firms are unable to provide 
collateral have to pay a higher cost of debt or be forced to issue equity. Consequently, 
a positive relationship between the tangibility of assets and leverage is predicted by 
the trade-off model. Bradley et al. (1984) maintain this as the standard presentation of 
the static trade-off theory. Myers (1977) and Myers and Majluf (1984) investigate the 
link between debt financing and the firm’s value when the emphasis is tax-deduction 
whilst ignoring bankruptcy cost, finding that the amount of debt issuance of firms is 
equal to the maximization of the market value of firm. A firm that complies with the 
trade-off model sets a target debt ratio and eventually moves toward this target. As 
Myers (1984) emphasises, the target is determined by balancing a debt tax shield 
against the cost of financial distress. However, Frank and Goyal (2009) summarize 
several objections to the static trade off model as the main element of a target debt 
ratio, claiming that tax code, bankruptcy cost and transaction cost cannot, in reality, 
be directly captured and achieved in reality.  
 
2.1.2.2 Dynamic trade-off theory  
Compared with the static trade-off theory, dynamic trade-off theory includes 
additional factors of transaction costs, optimality of financing choice in subsequent 
period and asymmetries in taxation (Baker and Martin 2011). This translates into the 
empirical prediction that the leverage ratio in reality will revert toward a target level.  
Fischer et al. (1989) construct a dynamic trade off theory to consider company 
investment as exogenous but adding capital structure rebalancing costs. This version 
has been developed to identify the function of time specifying a number of aspects that 
are ignored in a single-period model (Frank and Goyal 2009). In a dynamic model, 
Fischer et al. (1989) recognize that firms are more likely to stray from their target debt 
ratio even in a trade-off setting with a fixed cost of issuance, adjusting leverage only 
in extreme bounds. This because firm may pay off the debt when it earns profit, 
resulting in a decrease in leverage levels. Based upon Fischer et al. (1989), firm’s 
leverage ratio responds less to short-term equity fluctuations but more to long term 
value change because of the transaction cost. Thus, profitable firms will use less 
leverage if trade-off interpretation is implemented and the cost of rebalancing is taken 
into account. The idea of dynamic trade-off theory has also been extended by Leland 
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(1994) who examines corporate leverage values and capital structure based upon the 
assumption that firms have a fixed debt obligation, finding that  leverage has fluctuated 
over time reflecting accumulated profits and losses, and has not adjusted debt toward 
the target level unless the cost of adjustment over the value is lost. A number of 
subsequent studies (Goldstein et al. 2001; Hackbarth et al. 2006; Bhamra et al. 2010) 
of dynamic capital structure adjustment suggested lower debt ratios than the static 
model; the ratio of most firms is more likely to deviate from the target debt ratio. The 
investigation of mean reversion in companies’ leverage and the speed of adjustment 
have been the concentration of the empirical literature on capital structure (Fama and 
French 2002; Lemmon et al. 2008; Huang and Ritter 2009)  
In conclusion, trade-off theory states that firms have a motivation to use debt financing 
because of the benefit from tax-shield. Similarly, bankruptcy cost is a significant 
characteristic of the trade-off theory that constrains the use of financial leverage.   
 
2.1.2.3 Extension of Static Trade-off Model 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) and Miller (1977), a number of earlier studies 
(DeAngelo and Masulis 1980; Bradley et al. 1984; Haugen and Senbet 1986; Fama 
and French 2002; López-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira 2008) attempt to coordinate Miller 
(1977) model and trade-off theory, and explore the relationship between the effective 
tax rate and level of debt by considering bankruptcy cost. DeAngelo and Masulis 
(1980) demonstrate the irrelevance of Miller (1977) in a complete market model, and 
claimed that existence of non-debt tax shield such as tax credit of investment and 
deprecation deduction will limit the tax-advantage of leverage because they will 
decrease utilization of available interest tax credit. This implies that a firm with high 
levels of non-debt shield is more likely to have a lower level of debt than firms with a 
lower non-debt tax shields. According to DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), the trade-off 
theory predicts a negative relationship between non-debt tax shields and firm leverage. 
Following studies of Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) 
and Myers (1984), Bradley et al. (1984) presents a model where optimal leverage is 
inversely related to expected costs of financial distress, agency cost of debt, and no-
debt tax shields. If the dividend of a share is untaxed, then the marginal tax rate will 
be less than the corporate rate and thus, there will be a positive tax advantage to a 
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firm’s leverage ratio. Additionally, optimal leverage of a firm is negatively related to 
the variability of firm value when the cost of financial distress is significant.  
At the beginning, Haugen and Senbet (1986) summarize that Miller (1977) market 
equilibrium theory interprets redundant tax shelters and endogenous progressive tax 
rate, but argued the extent of financial distress can be restricted as firms can simply 
renegotiate the terms of the debt in order to avoid bankruptcy and associated cost. 
Haugen and Senbet (1986) find that it is resulted in an alternative interpretation of the 
trade-off model that includes the “possibility of optimal internal debt ratio and 
effective tax rate in company’s debt return, which are sustainably less than the 
corporate tax rate.” MacKie‐Mason (1990) test companies with low marginal tax rates 
to determine whether they tended to issue equity, compared to profitable firms with 
full statutory tax rate, and provided clear results of a substantial tax effect on the choice 
between debt or equity issuance. The empirical evidence is consistent with prediction 
of the trade-off model because it presented the fact that most tax shields have a 
negative influence on the marginal tax rate for most companies because tax paying 
firms prefer debt financing. It is also accords with market equilibrium of Miller (1977) 
in which the value of interest on  corporate interest tax rate influence capital gain. 
Furthermore, by using a latent variable approach, Titman and Wessels (1988) find 
mixed evidence for the predictive power of static trade-off theory. According to 
Titman and Wessels (1988), the transaction cost may be a significant determinant of 
capital structure choice of firms, especially for small firms as small firms intend to use 
significantly more short-term funding than large firms.  
In 1990s, with the development of signalling theory and adverse selection in capital 
choice, a number of empirical studies have shown mix evidences to support both trade-
off theory and pecking order theory.  Opler and Titman (1994) conduct research using 
a sample of U.S companies that issue debt and equity between 1976 to 1993 to examine 
their financing behaviour, finding that highly leveraged firms lose market share to their 
more conservatively financed counterparts even in normal times. This directly 
indicates a negative relationship between financial leverage and sales growth of firms, 
suggesting the validity of static trade- off theory. In addition to this, Opler and Titman 
(1994) also find the adverse consequence of leverage for corporate capital structure 
choice, which implies the existence of pecking order theory. Further evidence on the 
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trade-off model has been demonstrated in Graham (1996) who tests that the increased 
long term debt is positively and significantly related to firm specific marginal tax rates 
that account for earning losses. By following Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) provide mixed evidence that target debt might not be an important 
consideration of corporate financing decision. This result demonstrated a significant 
negative relationship between debt ratios and historical profitability of firms. This 
model estimate based upon the trade-off of the tax deduction of debt and the cost of 
financial distress indicates a positive correlation. In line with prediction regarding the 
relationship between debt policy and tax proxies, Graham et al. (1998) shows evidence 
that firms’ tax status is endogenous to financing decisions. In particular, the firm’s 
effective tax rate is positively related to debt ratio, but negatively related to the use of 
operating leases. Moreover, based upon the suggestions of Graham et al. (1998), the 
propensity to use debt financing increases with the expected costs of bankruptcy, and 
debt financing is also affected by personal tax. This is consistent with Miller (1977) 
who proposes that corporate tax advantage of interest deduction can be offset at the 
personal level.  
Since Graham et al. (1998), Graham (2000) finds that firm’s leverage has been 
persistently conservative, in particular for large and profitable firms in stable industries 
that have lower expected costs of financial distress. Additionally, it has been suggested 
in Graham (2000) that firms should relax the use of leverage as the tax benefit of 
interest deduction is more than the increased cost of bankruptcy. Graham and Harvey 
(2001) conduct a survey with 392 CFOs and find that nearly 44% indicate that their 
firms have a target capital structure, and tax deductibility of interest payment was a 
factor in deciding the target leverage ratio. By conducting a sample of 157 U.S firms, 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) have the intention of testing the interpretation of 
static trade off model for capital structure.  The results show the predictive capability 
of pecking order has significantly more time series explanatory power than static trade-
off model. After that, Chirinko and Singha (2000) clearly clarify that it is difficult to 
compare the two seminar frameworks in capital structure if the experimental model of 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) is used.  
In the 2000s, empirical studies (Hovakimian et al. 2001; Fama and French 2002; 
Hovakimian et al. 2002; Hovakimian 2006; de Jong et al. 2011; Hovakimian et al. 
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2011) engage with further investigations of trade-off prediction, and bring more focus 
on the comparison between trade-off theory and other theories for capital structure in 
different countries. Hovakimian et al. (2001) and Hovakimian et al. (2002) 
demonstrate considerable evidence that retained earnings or losses is important in the 
interpretation of debt-equity ratio of firms which aligns with the pecking order theory. 
As Hovakimian et al. (2001) and Hovakimian et al. (2002) demonstrate, the pecking 
order theory examines the effect of the debt ratio of firms in the short term, indicating 
that in the long run, firms are more likely to carry out capital structure decisions that 
move toward target debt ratio which is consistent with dynamic trade-off theory. 
Besides, Ozkan (2001) uses a panel data analysis of 390 UK firms in the period of 
1984 to 1996, finding that those firms with long term target leverage ratios move 
forward to the target ratio relatively quickly. This suggests that the cost of 
readjustment of capital structure is an important factor for firms. Furthermore, as 
indicated by Ozkan (2001), other factors of current liquidity, profitability, growth 
opportunities and non-debt tax shield negatively impact on the adjustment of leverage 
decision. Similar to Ozkan (2001), Adedeji (2002) evaluates a sample of 608 UK listed 
firm to test trade-off theory, showing that the variables of trade-off model (non-debt 
tax shield, growth opportunities, and firm’s size) have more explanatory power on new 
debt issuance than the pecking order hypothesis.  
Mixed evidence has been provided by Fama and French (2002) who investigate pay-
out policies of dividend and leverage levels by carrying out a comparison between 
trade-off and pecking order theory, based upon US firms over the period of 1965 – 
1999. Results indicate that companies with more investments are more likely to have 
less leverage, suggesting that leverage should decrease with portability. However, 
firms with more investment have less long-term dividend pay-out, and dividend will 
not vary to accommodate short-term variation in investment. These are consistent with 
both trade-off prediction and a complex pecking order model. The above mixed 
evidence has been addressed by Gaud et al. (2005) who conducted an analysis of 
capital structure for a panel of 104 Swiss listed firms which showed that Swiss firms 
have a target leverage ratio even though the process of adjustment is much slower than 
other countries. Moreover, the size and tangible assets of Swiss firms have a positive 
impact on leverage, while profitability has a negative effect. This partly suggested the 
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influence of static trade-off theory of capital structure. With use of a dynamic partial 
adjustment model of capital structure, Korajczyk and Levy (2003) empirically test 
trade-off theory from aspects of microeconomic factors, and find that debt issuance is 
pro-cyclical and equity issuance is counter-cyclical for the non-financially constrained 
firms. Another empirical investigation by Zhang and Kanazaki (2007) uses firm’s 
profitability and non-debt tax shields as proxies of static trade off theory and tested a 
sample of 1325 non-financial companies in Japan, demonstrating that the static trade-
off model fail to explain the negative correlation between profitability and firm’s debt. 
This indicates that the static trade-off theory can only be partially relevant to Japanese 
firm.  
In line with the suggestion of Hovakimian et al. (2001), de Jong et al. (2011) test the 
static predictions of static trade-off theory by focusing on an important proposition 
that a firm will increase borrowing until it addresses the target leverage ratio, finding 
that for a sample of US firms, static trade off model can only successfully interpret a 
firm’s capital structure in a repurchase decision. Similarly, Hovakimian et al. (2011) 
examine static trade-off theory by considering the probability of default as a proxy for 
benefits and costs of leverage, proving that firms with higher cost of financial distress 
and bankruptcy have higher probability of bankruptcy. Furthermore, firms with higher 
effective tax rates are more likely to reduce the probability of bankruptcy. These 
results imply that the static trade-off model fails to explain on several different 
dimensions. Besides this, the capital structure of SMEs with lower tangible of assets, 
tend to have less access to capital markets, are more sensitive to positive profitability 
and equity value shocks, resulting in a greater susceptibility to bankruptcy risk. 
Compared with previous research which focused on different countries, Harrison et al. 
(2011) show an analysis of capital structure in real estate investment trust based upon 
a sample of 2409 firms, providing strong evidence for trade off theory in explaining 
real estate investment trust’s (REIT) capital structure decisions. According to Harrison 
et al. (2011), REIT’s seize and tangible assets positively affect the financial borrowing 
of firms, while profitability has negatively related to firm’s leverage. Furthermore, 
Mazen (2012) verifies the validity of the static trade-off theory via uses of a French 
panel data of 122 firms, indicating that the most capital-intensive and large sized firms 
in the sample tend to converge more quickly towards the optimal long term debt ratio. 
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This existence of firm’s capital and size effect seems to support the assumptions of 
static trade-off theory.   
 
2.1.2.4 Extension of Dynamic trade-off theory  
A body of literature on dynamic trade-off of capital structure that build on the studies 
of Fischer et al. (1989) and Leland (1994) propose dynamic model of trade-off that 
emphasizes the cost of rebalancing as a significant determinant of the frequency and 
size of capital structure adjustment. One dividing line is the consideration of 
investment using financing, which is followed by Fischer et al. (1989), Goldstein et al. 
(2001), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Strebulaev (2007), Titman and Tsyplakov (2007) 
and Hennessy and Whited (2005). Another considerable research line of dynamic 
trade-off theory is the tax system assumption, which has been extended by recent 
papers of Goldstein et al. (2001), Titman and Tsyplakov (2007) and Strebulaev (2007). 
According to Frank and Goyal (2009), dynamic trade-off model can also been treated 
as the option values that embedded in deferring debt decision to the next period. This 
implication has also been shown in studies by Goldstein et al. (2001) and Strebulaev 
(2007) 
Goldstein et al. (2001) follow the hypothesis of Modigliani and Miller (1958) that 
consider the firm’s cash flow as exogenous determinants, finding that that low-
leveraged firms have the option to increase debt level. In this prediction, the optimal 
debt level and spread of credit is similar to that found in practise. In particular, the tax 
benefits of an increase in debt have a more significant result than show in the static 
trade-off interpretation. Based on Hovakimian et al. (2001) and Hovakimian et al. 
(2002), Hovakimian et al. (2004) further analyse the dynamic trade-off prediction by 
examining the influence of firm’s operating performance on financing behaviour as 
they determined target leverage of the firm. The conclusion of Hovakimian et al. 
(2004) support the dynamic trade-off proposition that debt issuers offset the deviation 
from  target which result from accumulation of past profits and losses. Additionally, 
the evidence also implies high market-to-book firms tend to have low target leverage 
ratios, that is consistent with market timing hypothesis. Similar to Hovakimian et al. 
(2001) and Hovakimian et al. (2004), Titman and Tsyplakov (2007) develop a dynamic 
model of trade-off in which firm’s value is endogenously influenced by financing and 
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investment choice with consideration of bankruptcy cost and transaction cost, finding 
that whereas pecking order behaviour impact capital structure adjustment, firms, 
eventually, moved toward a target leverage, which is predicted by trade-off hypothesis. 
Another contrarian paper by Hennessy and Whited (2005) develop a dynamic structure 
model to observe trade-off hypothesis with endogenous investment to debt ratio, 
finding that firms that have no target debt ratio can suffer from over leveraging. As 
Frank and Goyal (2009) critically review, the conclusion of Hennessy and Whited 
(2005) is similar to the pecking order theory, showing that firm’s financing structure 
can be indeterminate and depends on financing deficit and anticipated tax regime.   
Other empirical evidence has also been presented by Leary and Roberts (2005) who 
conduct duration analysis to show that firms’ financing behaviour appear to follow the 
dynamic trade-off theory of Fischer et al. (1989) and Mauer and Triantis (1994) that 
firms tend to actively move their capital structure to stay within a target range. This 
result is greatly consistent with the direct evidence of adjustment costs. Additionally, 
Kayhan and Titman (2007), Flannery and Rangan (2006) also prove that firms tend to 
move towards target debt ratio although a firm’s history greatly influence their capital 
structure. Kayhan and Titman (2007) partially measure target capital ratios by focusing 
on non-financial firms, suggesting that firms do have a target debt ratio as the under 
or over leveraged firm tends to rebalance leverage ratios to offset the observed gap. 
This result has been achieved by Byoun (2008) who prove that firms move forward to 
optimal capital ratios when it has a financial deficit or gap. By following the 
propositions of Goldstein et al. (2001), Strebulaev (2007) further develops the model 
that combines both dynamic trade-off model and real investment for debt ratio, 
indicating that firms faced with a choice between the frequency of adjustment and the 
amount of debts indicating that, firms with lower cost of financing have adjusted 
frequently, furthermore, as the cost of adjustment increase, the boundaries of rebalance 
also increased. In a dynamic trade-off model, most papers have paid great attention to 
develop quantitative analysis models to examine whether firms are likely to deviate 
from the optimal debt ratio (Haas and Peeters 2006; Huang and Ritter 2009; Dang et 
al. 2012). Following the studies of Fischer et al. (1989), Leary and Roberts (2005) and 
Strebulaev (2007), Faulkender et al. (2012) emphasizes the impact of transaction costs 
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on firm’s leverage adjustments, showing that firms intend of moving toward a target 
debt ratio with rational adjustment cost.  
Dang et al. (2012) conduct a dynamic panel threshold model of capital structure for 
dynamic trade-off theory based on UK evidence, allowing for asymmetries in 
adjustment of target leverage. The analysis implies that firms have a quicker 
adjustment of debt ratio so as to avoid the potential cost of financial distress caused by 
holding above-target debt ratios, which conform to the hypothesis of dynamic trade-
off theory. As a challenge of dynamic trade-off model, Welch (2004) critiques that the 
adjustment of capital structure can be interpreted using historical stock return, 
suggesting that firms rebalance their capital level slowly to offset the historical impact 
of stock return on leverage. Particularly, almost 40% of US corporations’ capital 
structure could be explained by historical stock return, whilst the classic influences of 
bankruptcy cost, firm’s size and market to book ratio fail to explain the dynamic debt 
ratio. 
Haas and Peeters (2006) examine the dynamic trade-off theory by analysing European 
firms, pointing out that firms have slow adjustment of target leverage ratio while firms 
prefer internal funding rather than external debt. In addition, Ovtchinnikov (2010) 
investigates the capital structure decisions of deregulated industries, indicating that 
financing structure cannot be static but change with operating environment relating to 
exogenous shocks, such as deregulation. Firms’ behaviour in deregulated industries 
tend to be above their target capital structure issue utilising significantly more equity 
in the early of years. Also, proxies of trade-off theory relating to profitability, growth 
opportunities, and expected bankruptcy cost have been demonstrated to be significant 
determinants of capital structure. From microeconomic aspect, Bhamra et al. (2010) 
analyse the impact of time-varying macroeconomic environment on optimal dynamic 
trade-off theory of capital structure based on a cross-section of firms. The finding 
implies that the optimal leverage is more conservative in bad of microeconomic 
conditions, especially, the capital structure of firms which turn counter-cyclical in 
aggregate dynamics.  
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2.1.3 Agency Theory  
The term “agency” is defined as “one in which one or more persons (the Principals) 
engages another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agency” (Ross 1973; 
Jensen and Meckling 1976). Agency theory considers the firm as a nexus of internal 
and external contract. Agency Cost (AO) Theory of capital structure explains these 
contractual relationships between principals and agents in business by positing capital 
structure is determined by agency cost. It is concerned with resolving problems which 
arise from conflicting interest among persons to the institutions, such as management, 
capital contributors, employees, customers and government due to unaligned goals or 
different aversion level of risk (Hill and Jones 1992).  
Within the dominant agency theory of capital structure, the academics identifies two 
perspective of conflicts. The first one is the conflicts between managers and 
shareholders and the second one is the conflict between debt holders and equity holders 
(Eisenhardt 1989). Harris and Raviv (1991) explain that conflict between managers 
and shareholders arise because they might disagree on an operating decision. Manager 
hold less  than 100% of residual claims, therefore, they tend to transfer firms’ assets 
to their own benefits (Fama and Jensen 1983). The shareholder-debtholder agency 
conflict arise because debt contract give shareholders an incentive to invest in a 
manner detrimental to the debt holder’s interest due to the different risk-sharing 
property of equity and debt (Morellec and Smith Jr 2007).  
The agency problem assumes that both principal and agent are self-interested and both 
of them tend to maximize their expected utility. If they have different desires and 
attitudes toward risk, the motivation of agent may not be completely aligned with by 
the principal as the agent may not in the principal’s best interest (Walker and 
Vasconcellos 1997; Tarrade 2012). If the agent’s activities cannot be fully understood 
by the principal, the outcome of agent’s behaviour can be the only benchmark for 
principal to observe. This discrepancy lead to agency problem of moral hazard (hidden 
action) and adverse selection (hidden information) (Reuer and Miller 1997). A moral 
hazard problem arises when agent misrepresent skills and abilities to the principal, 
principal cannot observe the actions of agent and therefore appraise performance based 
compensation contracts on imperfect surrogates of behaviour. An adverse problem 
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arise when managers have private information and use this information to increase 
their welfare at the expense of firm’s welfare (Arrow 1984; Baiman 1990; Chapman 
et al. 2006; Sprinkle and Williamson 2006).  
As stated by Bergen et al. (1992), Shane (1996) and Van Osnabrugge (2000), agency 
theory suggests two solutions available for the principal to mitigate agency problem: 
1) discouraging the agent’s behaviour (Monitoring), and 2) incentivizing the agent to 
reach the expected outcome (Residual Claim). Firstly, the principal can increase the 
amount of information about the agent’s behaviour through monitoring. The more 
information the principal has, the harder it becomes for the agent to shirk or 
misrepresent abilities (Eisenhardt 1989). However, since information is not free, 
monitoring comes at a cost and investing in correcting the agent’s behaviour only pays 
off when the benefit from the correction exceeds the cost of monitoring the behaviour 
(Mitnick 2015). Secondly, the principal can align agent’s preferences by replacing 
compensation contract with hybrid organizational arrangement, such as franchising 
that provided residual claims to managers. This is because residual claim aligns the 
agents’ goals with those of the principals and transfer the risk to agents. Thus, reduce 
the problem of moral hazard and adverse selection (Fama and Jensen 1983; Shane 
1996; Tarrade 2012). Which solution is preference depends on the cost of monitoring 
regarding with cost of establishing a franchise (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
 
2.1.3.1 Agency cost 
As discussed previously, an agency relationship is described as a contract under which 
principals engage the agent to perform service on their behalf which involves 
delegating decision making authority to the agent. Agency cost is the total cost of 
creating and structuring this contract, including monitoring costs by the principal, 
boning cost, and the residual loss of opportunities that can have been beneficial in the 
absence of such conflict of interest (Hill and Jones 1992; Swanson et al. 2003). 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the cornerstone of agency theory is the 
assumption that the interests of principles and agents diverge. As both agent and 
principal to this relationship are expected-utility maximisers the agent will not always 
act in the best interest of the principal, the principal can limit divergence from their 
interest by establishing appropriate incentives for agent, and by incurring “monitoring 
49 
 
cost” designed to limit opportunistic action by the agent (Oviatt 1988; Ang et al. 2000; 
Anderson et al. 2003).  
Further, it may pay the agent to spend resources (bonding cost) to guarantee that they 
will not take certain actions that would mis-present the principal, or to ensure the 
principal will be appropriately compensated if they do take such action (Easterbrook 
1984; Jensen 1986; Hill and Jones 1992). Despite these, the final agency cost is 
residual loss. The agent may not act completely in the principal’s best interest due to 
some divergence between the agent’s action and the principal’s interest may remain, 
insofar as this divergence reduce the welfare of principal, it can be viewed as residual 
loss (Jensen and Smith 1985; Hill and Jones 1992) 
In conclusion, agency cost are not beneficial per se to stakeholder (Estreicher 1992; 
Swanson et al. 2003; Gilson and Gordon 2013). It is reasonable to speculate that the 
contract regarding with agency relationship should be formed and all decision should 
be made to minimize the firm’s total agency cost. The different component of agency 
costs affect firm’s capital structure. The optimal capital structure is determined to 
minimize the total agency cost and asset specificity consideration (Vilasuso and 
Minkler 2001). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the concept of optimality 
applies when there are multiple stakeholder is that of pareto optimality. From the 
economic perspective, capital structure of firm will be optimal if this is not possible to 
increase the utility of any stakeholder without decreasing the utility of at least another. 
In such as, the capital structure that satisfy this criterion is considered optimal from an 
agency perspective (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1982; 
Swanson et al. 2003; Modugu 2013).  
The model based on agency cost focus on how capital structure can help constraint the 
agency costs by aligning the interests of stakeholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Jensen (1986) identity two types of conflicts (discussed in Section 2.7.1): 1) the 
interaction between shareholders and managers involving agency costs and (2) the 
relationship between equity holders and debt holders incurring agency costs.  
 
50 
 
2.1.3.2 Agency Cost of External Equity (Shareholder-Manager’s Conflict) 
Based on shareholder-Management conflict, Jensen and Meckling (1976) states that 
the separation of manager and shareholder has been the essence of agency problem. 
This problem (agency cost of external equity) will be minimized or disappear when 
there is no separation of ownership and control. A number of studies focus on the effect 
of agency cost arising from shareholder-manager conflict on financial decision. 
Section 2.1.3.1 briefly discusses that the agency cost of the shareholder-manager 
relationship arise from two sources: the un-observability of manager’s productive 
effort and the asymmetry of information.  
a) Cost of Moral Hazard  
Firstly, the agency cost is reduced when link the manager’s compensation to a proper 
measure of the performance. However, this linkage will increase uncertainty in 
manager’s compensation that need to be compensated by paying an extra expected 
amount. The investor will balance this cost of inducing higher effort with the benefit 
of higher output. The resulting effort is less the effort without this agency problem 
(called the first best effort). The loss of utility resulting from the reduction of the effort 
is the agency cost associated with moral hazard (Hölmstrom 1979; Harrison and 
Harrell 1993).  
b) Cost of Asymmetric Information  
Furthermore, if managers extract “information rent” from asymmetry of information, 
it constitutes another agency cost, because managers have more information about a 
company’s operation and prospects, including future investment opportunities than 
shareholders (Adverse Selection Problem). At an intuitive level, the agency cost is 
reduced if the manager owns a part of firm If manager’s investment is held constant 
and the proportion of manager’s equity ownership increase, agency cost tend to be 
lower. (Ang et al. 2000; Anderson et al. 2003).  
c) Agency cost of Free Cash Flow Theory  
The free cash flow (FCF) theory of Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) is a slight 
variance of the agency cost theory discussed in the previous section. Agency cost (AC) 
is primarily based on the conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers. 
Jensen (1986) extend the concept of agency cost in capital structure by focusing on 
“free cash flow”, which defined as “free cash flow is cash flow in excess of that 
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required to fund all projects that have positive net present value (NPV) when 
discounted at the relevant cost of capital.” 
Free cash flow of Jensen (1986) states companies with substantial free cash flow are 
confronted with misbehaviour by managers and poor decisions that are not in the 
interest of shareholders. This is because managers endowed with free cash flow have 
an incentive to invest it in negative net present value (NPV) projects which benefit 
them rather than pay it out as dividend to benefit shareholders. This will create an over-
investment problem, and consequently increasing the “over-investment cost” incurred 
by shareholders. Accordingly, shareholders would benefit from the company using 
higher financial leverage because there would be increased external control over the 
management. In hypothesis of free cash flow, debt financing is considered a significant 
means to mitigate the agency cost, reducing the amount of cash holding available for 
managers. Therefore, managers determine capital structure by trading off the benefits 
versus the cost of using debt. This hypothesis is supported by Harris and Raviv (1991) 
who claims that conflict between shareholders and managers arise because they might 
disagree on an operating decision such as project selection. This problem cannot be 
solved through contract based on cash flow and investment expenditure. Hence, debt 
helps to mitigate the problem by giving investors the option to force liquidation if cash 
flow are poor.  
Stulz (1990) formulates a two-period risk neutral model to analyse a similar problem 
arising over free cash flow and the problem of manager manipulation facilitate the 
consumption of perquisite. According to Stulz (1990), managers are likely to over-
invest if free cash flow is substantial and under-invest if there is a shortage of free cash 
flow, resulting in agency cost. Debt financing will alleviate the problem of managerial 
discretion which comprise of both the cost of over-investment and the cost of under-
investment. This will eventually result in a combination of capital structures to 
maximise shareholder’s wealth under managerial control. In Stulz (1990), capital 
structure is determined by trading off the benefit of debt against the cost of debt.  
Another highly regarded research is Harris and Raviv (1991), who reviews capital 
structure based on four distinctive categories of agency cost, asymmetric information, 
market interactions and corporate control consideration. In conclusions of Harris and 
Raviv (1991), leverage is a monitoring device for managers as well as an information 
52 
 
carrier for outside investors. Agency conflict will affect investor’s perceptions of debt 
and equity cost, and consequently, agency cost impact on the rate that investors use to 
discount the firm’s future cash flows. Hence, debt financing in capital structure 
produce valuable information in monitoring the agency behaviour, and for reasons of 
self-interest, mangers are assumed to reluctant to liquidate the firm or provide such 
information which may lead to bankruptcy. In Harris and Raviv (1991), capital 
structure is determined by trading off increasing liquidation decisions versus higher 
information investigation costs. 
In Harris and Raviv (1991) and Stulz (1990), shareholders and managers disagree over 
an operating decision. This conflict cannot be mitigated through contract regarding 
with cash flow and investment expenditure.  Harris and Raviv (1991) assumes that 
manager always continue the firm’s current operations even if liquidation of the firm 
is preferred by investors, because the benefits of control. Debt financing, in this case, 
mitigates the problem arising from agency cost by giving investors the option to force 
liquidation if cash flow are poor. In  Stulz (1990), managers invest all free funds even 
if paying out cash is better for investors. Hence, investors use debt payments to reduce 
available cash flow.  
Hart and Moore (1990) also focus on the agency problem of over-investment by 
managers but shift the concentration from the allocation of cash flows to the allocation 
of control rights. Hart and Moore (1990) considers debt as an optimal security in 
setting control structure. Moreover, Hart and Moore (1994) suggest that debt does not 
prevent over-investment by reducing available free cash flow. Instead, the existence 
of senior debt constrains the amount of external funds that can be raised since the 
outstanding debt represent a prior claim on all asset, including new investment.  
The comparison of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Jensen (1986), Harris and Raviv 
(1991), Stulz (1990) and Hart and Moore (1990) is presented in Table 2.1.  
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Table 2. 1: Comparison of Agency Model on Manager-Shareholder Conflict 
 
Source: Harris and Raviv (1991) 
d) Empirical studies of Agency cost of Equity in period of 1980s  
Several studies have investigated the effects of the conflicts of interest between 
management and stockholders in various perspectives. Earlier study of  Griffin (1988) 
argues that agency problems have played an important role corporate restructuring in 
the petroleum industry. Griffin (1988) tests the petroleum industry in the period of 
1979 to 1985, finding that in a panel data set for 25 firms, firms with high available 
funding invest more in less profitable investments compared to firms with low cash 
flow. Furthermore, Lang and Litzenberger (1989) infers that the over-investment 
problem associated with free cash flow is likely to be severe in stale and profitable 
firms with lower growth opportunities. It demonstrates that the dividends have a large 
impact on agency cost, and thus a large information effect for an over-investment firm 
than for a value-maximizing firm.  
Lehn and Poulsen (1989) use a measure of undistributed cash flow, standardized by 
market value of equity, as a proxy of free cash flow to examine the free cash flow 
hypothesis. Its data for 149 leverage buyout (LBOs) from 1984 to 1987 posits a direct 
relationship between measure of cash flow and premiums paid to pre buyout 
shareholder. It is especially strong among firms where managers owned relatively little 
equity prior to the going private transactions, the firms where agency costs are 
expected to be highest. This is consistent with hypothesis of Jensen (1986).  
Model Conflict Benefit of Debt Cost of Debt 
    
Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) 
Managerial 
perquisites 
Increase managerial 
ownership Asset substitution 
    
Jensen (1986) Overinvestment Reduce free cash Unspecified 
    
Harris and Raviv 
(1990) Failure to liquidate 
Allows Investors option 
to liquidate Investigation Cost 
    
Stulze (1991) 
 
Hart and Moore 
(1990) 
Over-investment 
 
Control Rights 
Reduce free cash 
 
Security of Ownership  
Under-investment  
 
Unspecified  
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e) Empirical studies of Agency cost of Equity in period of 1990s  
Lang et al. (1991) tests hypothesis of Jensen (1986) on a sample of U.S successful 
tender offers in period of 1980 to 1986 by using Tobin’s q (q ratio) 1measurement. 
This method is the ratio between the market value of a company’s asset and its 
replacement cost of asset, In Lang et al. (1991), q ratio is used to recognize firms beset 
by agency problems and expected to invest free cash in negative NPV projects, 
distinguishing between firms that have good investment opportunities and those that 
do not. The evidences show that bidder returns are significantly negatively related to 
cash flow for bidders with low Tobin’s q but not for high Tobin’s q bidders. It supports 
the free cash flow hypothesis that firms with free cash flow tend to grow by 
undertaking project with negative NPV thus reducing wealth for shareholders.  
Hart and Moore (1994) develops a dynamic model to show that shareholder-manager 
conflict change capital structure. It the distinction between junior and senior debt and 
find out the consequences of differing priority of claims for firm behaviour. According 
to Hart and Moore (1994), a mix of short-term and senior long-term debt is necessary 
to prevent management from undertaking negative NPV investment. The issuance of 
senior debt is necessary to discipline the manager. Basically, by extending free cash 
flow of Jensen (1986), short term debt obligation do not put meaningful free cash flow 
disciplinary pressure on management. Furthermore, Lang et al. (1996) conducts an 
empirical analysis relating growth and leverage in panel data set of 143 U.S firms from 
1970 to 1989. Using Tobin’q measurement, it finds a negative relationship between 
leverage and growth opportunities for firms that have poor investment opportunities 
(low q ratio). For firms with good investment opportunities (high q ratio), leverage 
does not lower growth. Accordingly, debt constrains investment only where the market 
consider that opportunities are poor. Jaggi and Gul (1999) based on a sample of non-
                                                             
1 Tobin’s Q was first introduced by Nicholas Kaldor in 1966. It is defined as the ratio of the 
market value of a firm-value of equity to the replacement value of the net fixed assets of the 
firm; profitability is defined as the ratio of the inflation corrected deprecation cash flow to the 
replacement value of fixed assets. The higher the Tobin’s q, the more valuable the firm is 
considered as a going 1 Tobin’s Q was first introduced by Nicholas Kaldor in 1966. It is 
defined as the ratio of the market value of a firm-value of equity to the replacement value of 
the net fixed assets of the firm; profitability is defined as the ratio of the inflation corrected 
deprecation cash flow to the replacement value of fixed assets. The higher the Tobin’s q, the 
more valuable the firm is considered as a going concern and the more value the market thus 
attribute to the ability of management to generate profit from its assets (Stijin et al, 1997)  
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regulated U.S firms, indicates that the relationship between debt and free cash flow is 
positive for low growth firms. This empirical finding supports Jensen (1986)’s control 
hypothesis that firm’s debt will be higher when it has high free cash flow and low 
investment opportunity set. The results also demonstrates that firm size play a role of 
moderating variable on this relationship. This suggests that the manages-shareholders 
conflict concerning free cash flow is more severe in large firms. More recently, 
Kochhar (1996) explains capital structure decision in leveraged buyouts by comparing 
agency cost of free cash flow and transaction cost in economics. The empirical analysis 
of Kochhar (1996) presents that agency cost of debt has an effect on capital structure 
changes. However, the transaction cost perspective to explain capital structure 
decision is more appealing than the agency theory viewpoint.  
In contrast, Howe et al. (1992) and Opler et al. (1999) argue that there is no significant 
evidence to demonstrate agency cost is an important factor that affect cash holding.   
Howe et al. (1992) uses Tobin’s q measurement to test whether Jensen (1986)’s free 
cash flow hypothesis has explanatory power in market reaction to dividend change. It 
examines the free cash flow hypothesis in the situation of self-tender offer and further 
divides sample into over-investing and value-maximizing firms, finding that free cash 
flow theory plays at most a minor role in explaining the price reaction the nonrecurring 
announcement and the agency cost reduction does not appear to be an important 
motive. This is adverse to Jensen (1986). Furthermore, Opler et al. (1999), considering 
U.S firms in the period of 1971 to 1994, find little support for the agency cost of 
manager-shareholder conflict on cash holding. The capital structure decisions of these 
firm was not significantly affected by free cash flow hypothesis. Instead, firms with 
firms with better growth prospects and riskier cash flow tend to hold more cash.  
f) Empirical studies of Agency cost of Equity in period of 2000s  
Jensen (1986)’s viewpoints have been further developed and demonstrated by plenty 
of studies in the period of 2000s. A number of studies use accounting data as proxies 
of investment opportune to observe the effect of agency cost on leverage. Brush et al. 
(2000), who asserts that cash flows will positively affect corporate performance, uses 
sales growth as proxies of investment opportunities to examine the agency cost of free 
cash flow, contending that sales growth in firm with free cash flow is less profitable 
than sales growth in firm without free cash flow. Weak corporate governance arise 
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from the inefficiency in allocation of free cash flow since management was directed 
at the policies in favour of their self-interest at the expense of shareholder’s wealth.  
Similarly, Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) use profit efficiency as a proxy to 
measure the influence of agency cost arising from manager-shareholder conflict. Base 
on a sample of US banking industry, the empirical results of reverse causality test 
describe a negative association between agency cost and leverage ratio. This is 
consistent with the agency cost hypothesis that higher leverage or lower equity capital 
ratio is associated with higher profit efficiency. Additionally, the large institutional 
shareholders in the U.S banking industry take an active monitoring role that decrease 
agency cost. Later, Margaritis and Psillaki (2007) investigates a similar relationship 
with Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) for a sample of more than 12000 SMEs 
firms in New Zealand by using a technical efficiency measure. The findings support 
the core prediction of agency cost hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Jensen (1986) in that higher leverage is associated with improved efficiency of 
performance. This support is further showed in Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) by using 
a sample of French manufacturing firms. Besides,  
The benefits to debt will be greater if managers have a large base of assets in place 
that it can exploit. It can generate cash flow leading to either over-investment or the 
outright diversion of corporate funds (Bolton and Scharfstein 1990; Hart and Moore 
1998). By controlling for assets in place and growth opportunities in analysis, Harvey 
et al. (2004) investigates the effect of capital structure as a governance mechanism in 
emerging market with extreme agency problems. The analysis shows that actively 
monitored debt helps to create value to firms with potentially high agency cost, which 
arise from misaligned managerial incentives and over-investment problems.  
Other research has focused on whether manager-shareholder conflict lead to change in 
debt financing. Morellec (2004) conducts a contingent claims model where manager 
devices perquisites from investment to analyse the explanatory power of manager-
shareholder conflict on leverage. This model shows that manager-shareholder conflicts 
can explain the low debt level observed in practice. Furthermore, it can also explain 
that firms with high growth opportunities tend to reduce debt level.  As Moeller et al. 
(2004) suggests, agency cost of free cash flow occur when a firm no longer has growth 
opportunities, which could be more likely for larges firms than for small firms. This is 
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because mangers in small firms typically have more ownership of firm than managers 
in large firms. Managers in large firms have more prone to contend for control rights, 
which might intensify agency conflict and consequently, increase agency cost. 
According to DeAngelo et al. (2006), firm can use low leverage, substantial equity pay 
outs, and moderate cash holdings to control agency cost while preserving financial 
flexibility. Although high leverage mitigates agency problems, it also reduce financial 
flexibility because the utilization of the current borrowing capacity translate into less 
availability in the future. In addition, Richardson (2006) examines over-investment of 
free cash flow based on a large sample of U.S firms, finding that over-investment is 
concentrated in firm with the highest level of profitable funding. Specifically, for firms 
with positive free cash flow, the average firm overinvests 20 percent of their free cash 
flow. This is consistent with agency cost hypothesis of Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) 
that  the positive free cash flow  is a manifestation of an agency problem, where 
manager in firms with free cash flow may engage in wasteful expenditure.  
Further discussion of capital structure regarding agency conflict is forwarded by 
Hackbarth (2008) on how managerial traits effect financing decisions for single firms 
even without the need to appeal to optimal incentive contracts. The empirical evidence 
shows that over confident managers who underestimate the riskiness of earning tend 
to prefer equity to debt financing. In particular, higher debt ratio decision of biased 
managers restrain them from diverting funds, which increases firm value by reducing 
conflict of manager and shareholder. Additionally, the interaction among firm’s capital 
structure, managerial compensation and investment under uncertainty is an important 
aspect for analysing agency cost of capital structure (Berkovitch et al. 2000; 
Andrikopoulos 2009). Berkovitch et al. (2000) examines the role of management 
compensation in disciplining and monitor the change in leverage. It suggests that the 
combination of leverage and management compensation serves the role to implements 
a better incentive and control system. Moreover, Andrikopoulos (2009) observes that 
agency cost of debt under a policy at maximizes managerial are lower than agency cost 
of debt in a setting of equity maximization. This is because the shareholders’ over-
investment incentive are partly offset by the effects of manager’s reservation income. 
Andrikopoulos (2009) concludes that the influence of managerial ownership on the 
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agency cost of debt is more prevalent when managerial ownership is at low level. This 
suggests there is a decreasing effect of manager’s option compensation on leverage.  
Although several articles have recognized the role of debt in controlling the agency 
problem, using sample of 89 firms from 1986 to 1991, Mikkelson and Partch (2003) 
follows an extreme policy of holding more than 25 percent of assets in cash indicates 
that agency cost of manager-shareholder conflict is not associated with the level of 
cash holding by companies. That persistent extreme cash holdings do not lead to poor 
performance and do not represent conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders. From aspects of quality of governance and cash holding, several studies 
such as Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) finds that the market value of excess cash 
reserves is much lower for poorly governance firms. This implies that debt ratio in 
weak governance firm does not play a disciplinary role in mitigating agency cost. This 
implication is also confirmed by Harford et al. (2008), who uses large investments to 
test the interaction of quality of governance and capital structure choice. It finds that 
firms with high agency cost dissipate their cash holding faster than firms with lower 
agency cost. Managers under poor governed tend to use funding on unprofitable 
acquisition rather than internal investment, such as capital expenditure and R&D. 
Accordingly, it is less likely to finance the acquisition with debt.  
Furthermore, Gregory (2005) uses takeover of listed UK domestic companies in the 
period of 1984 to 1992 and finds little support for free cash hypothesis. Instead, 
Gregory (2005) suggests that greater shareholder monitoring mitigate any agency 
problem associated with high free cash flow. Additionally, firms with lower free cash 
flow having a greater likelihood of being financially distressed.  In addition to this, 
Wang (2010) finds that free cash fow have a signicant impact on agency cost of 
shareholder-manager conflict but the effect is contratry. According to Wang (2010), 
substancial free cash flow can increase the management’s incentive for perquiste 
consumption and shirking, then leading to a grwoth in agency cost. Moreover, free 
cash flow is generated due to management’s operating efficiency. This may lead to a 
negative relationship btween free cash flow and agency cost. Debt financing may not 
reduce the conflict between managers and shareholders.  
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g) Empirical studies of Agency cost of Equity in period of 2010s  
In period of 2010s, several studies test the effect of firm diversification on the cash 
holdings based on agency problems. Using a sample of U.S companies, Duchin (2010) 
finds that multi division firms hold significantly less cash than as a fraction of their 
assets because the agency costs associating with cash holding are diversified in their 
investment opportunities. The findings also suggest diversification primarily reduces 
cash holdings in well-governed firm, where managers are more likely to behave 
optimally. Additionally, Tong (2011) finds that the value of cash holding is lower in 
diversified firms than in single-segment firms. This finding is consistent with the 
interpretation that firm diversification can replace debt to reduces the value of cash 
holding through the hypothesis of agency problem.   
Jiraporn et al. (2012) explores the impact of CEO dominance on variations in capital 
structure. According to Jiraporn et al. (2012), firms tend to use lower leverage, and 
evade the disciplinary mechanisms of debt financing because of the manager-
shareholder conflict. Jiraporn et al. (2012) finds that firms with the stronger 
governance appears to bring lower leverage. One of reason can be the role of debt in 
mitigating agency cost, higher leverage substitutes for weaker governance mechanism 
in alleviating agency conflict. The earlier study Wang (2011) develops a dynamic 
model to examine the influence of agency problems between entrenched managers and 
shareholders on capital structure. In fact, Wang (2011a) observes that the debt ratio is 
significantly less than the target level of firm because of the potential cost of 
bankruptcy arising from over leverage. The analysis shows the shareholder-manager 
conflict over risk level and cash pay-out vary dynamically with a firm’s financial 
health. Thus, the leverage ratio will be decided depend on financial health of firms.  
Further analysis is provided by Morellec et al. (2012), who develop a dynamic model 
to test the importance of manager-shareholder conflict in capital structure decisions. 
Using the model in which financing policy results from a trade-off between tax shield 
contracting, Morellec et al. (2012) finds that agency costs of 1.5% of equity value can 
resolve the conservative debt financing problem and also to explain the leverage ratio 
vary with time series. In this model, monitoring mechanisms of firms significantly 
affect the firm’s financing decisions and value.in addition, by analysing the agency 
cost and disciplinary effect of debt on optimal capital structure, Chang et al. (2014) 
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demonstrates that managers of underleveraged firms with weak governance are more 
unlikely to increase debt due to the disciplinary mechanism of debt financing. This is 
because monitoring costs of debt financing outweigh the benefits of increasing debt. 
In this situation, by weighing the personal benefit that gain from different leverage 
level, managers with self-interest tend to use preferred leverage without concern of 
optimal capital structure, adjusting more slowly toward the target debt ratio, even 
though can increase shareholder’s wealth. 
 
2.1.3.3 Agency cost of Debt Financing 
Conflicts between the shareholders and debtholders could arise because risky projects 
with high expected returns, but also a higher probability of negative returns, are 
symmetrically beneficially to stockholder and costly to debtholders. According to 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), the most severe conflict between shareholders and 
debtholders is the different claims on cash flow. Shareholders have a residual claim on 
cash flows and therefore, the profits and earnings of the projects is the first 
considerations. However, debt holders is more consider the security of their fixed 
claims on cash flow, which is the interest of debt. If an investment gain returns that 
are well above the face value of debt, shareholders acquire most of this gain. However, 
debt holders will standard the negative consequence if an investment turns out to be a 
loss (Galai and Masulis 1976; Myers 1977; Jensen 1986; Swanson et al. 2003). Under 
such situation, debtholders do no participate in the high positive returns and 
shareholder do no participate in the negative returns because of limited liability of debt 
contract. This wealth shifting from debtholders to shareholders will be rationally 
expected by debtholders who will increase the cost of debt, effectively shifting the loss 
from a suboptimal decision to the shareholders. In effect, such debt will be overly cost 
and therefore, the capital structure will change to have higher equity (Green and 
Talmor 1986; Swanson et al. 2003). Further, debt holders may restrict manager’s 
investment on very risky projects even though they may ring high returns (Kalcheva 
and Lins 2007). As the amount of debt financing increase, debt holders’ interferences 
in firm’s investment decisions will increase accordingly (Parrino and Weisbach 1999; 
Margaritis and Psillaki 2007).  
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Shareholder-debtholder’s conflict arises when a firm has risky debt. When the 
possibility of default is virtually zero, debtholder have no interest in income, value or 
risk of the firm (Jiang et al. 2010). To solve this conflict, Smith Jr and Warner (1979) 
suggests that shareholders and debtholders should apply constraints and restrictions to 
management’s decision-making authority. These constrains and restrictions will lead 
to agency cost of debt. The agency cost of debt consists of 1) the opportunity loss of 
wealth caused by the impact of debt on the investment decisions of the firm; 2) the 
monitoring and bonding expenditures by the firm; and 3) the cost of bankruptcy and 
reorganization (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Gavish and Kalay 1983). As Myers (1977) 
states, lenders and investors in well-functioning capital market can foresee these costs. 
Furthermore, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggests that the level of agency costs 
arising from shareholders-debtholders conflict is dependent on the creators of 
originating contract. In particular, it depends on the extent that principal trusts the 
agency. Firm with higher financial leverage will have greater probability of 
bankruptcy, and therefore have higher agency costs. According to Masulis and 
Trueman (1988), managers cannot afford to waste the limited sources under their 
discretion in situation where the burden of debt is heavy. Hence, increases in debt 
should increase the market value of firm as long as the bankruptcy costs are kept at a 
low level (Jensen 1986).  
a) The Risk Shifting Hypothesis  
As previously discussed, shareholders may have incentive to encourage firm investing 
in highly risky projects even though these projects may be value-decreasing for the 
firms. This is because the debt contract gives shareholder incentive to invest 
suboptimal and increase in asset risk is suffered at the expense of debtholder. This 
wealth transfer is one of the incentives to increase agency cost of debt, called “risk 
shifting” or “asset substitution effect” (Merton 1974; Galai and Masulis 1976; Jensen 
and Meckling 1976; Smith Jr and Warner 1979). 
Gavish and Kalay (1983) demonstrates a positive relationship between financial 
leverage and risk-shifting incentive, suggesting that shareholder’ incentive to increase 
the risky investment is not an increasing function of the leverage ratio. This result 
raises questions concerning the agency cost hypothesis. Green and Talmor (1986) 
restate this question in similar model, and tests the incentive for asset substitution by 
62 
 
solving endogenously for the optimal risk policy. The findings consistent with the 
hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling (1976) that more debt aggravates shareholder’s 
incentives to take risk. Accordingly, the conclusion of Gavish and Kalay (1983) is a 
misinterpretation.  
In Jensen and Meckling (1976), greater use of external equity finance reduces the 
amount of effort that firm’s shareholder exerts, and therefore mitigates conflict 
between shareholder and debtholder. However, growth of equity financing will deepen 
agency cost of shareholder-manager conflict (agency cost of equity). Another 
approach of reducing agency cost of debt is convertibles bonds issues. A convertible 
bond give the debt holder the right to exchange the bond for the firm’s common stock. 
When convertible debt is issued, projects that increase firm’ risk may also increase the 
value of convertible debt and thus, part of gains to shareholders from high risky project 
will be shared with debtholders with convertible bonds (Smith Jr and Warner 1979; 
Green 1984)  
Brennan and Schwartz (1978) firstly examines the risk shifting problem under a 
number of environment (secured debt, covenants presence, etc.) and notes that 
convertible debt is used more heavily by firm whose risk is subject to a higher degree 
of uncertainty. This is one of the initial research that work out the asset substitution 
hypothesis based on statistic model. After that, Green (1984) discusses the use of 
convertible debt to control asset substitution problem, and provides explicit prediction 
about how managers should design convertible bonds to mitigate adverse investment 
incentives. The finding of Green (1984) describes that convertible debt is designed to 
mitigate bondholder and shareholder agency costs. This is also supported by studies 
of Lewis et al. (1998). Ortiz-Molina (2007) examines the effect of different types of 
debt in firm’s capital structure and finds out a negative relation between leverage and 
weakens for convertible debt. This addresses the hypothesis that the conversion option 
itself protects against asset subsection. Other discussions of Lewis et al. (1999), 
Abhyankar and Dunning (1999); Lewis et al. (2003); Chang et al. (2004); Lyandres 
and Zhdanov (2014) and Dorion et al. (2014) also support the effect of convertible 
bonds on risk shifting (asset substitutions) problem decreasing.  
Furthermore, the standard debt covenants with different types of bonds can be 
considered as more effective for closely held firms decreasing risk shifting 
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opportunities and thus the agency cost of debt (Brennan and Schwartz 1978; Smith Jr 
and Warner 1979; Jensen 1986; Kim and Sorensen 1986). Smith Jr and Warner (1979) 
provides more detailed analysis of the types of covenant used in U.S corporate bond 
contract and ties these covenants to agency problem of debt financing that designed to 
control, stating that covenants contained in bond contracts restricts dividend and shows 
a direct transfer of wealth from shareholder to debtholders.  
Over the next several decades, a number of studies develop and incorporate asset 
substation hypothesis into financing strategy analysis, by testing usage of debt with 
financing covenants, debt with dividend covenant, asset covenants or binding 
covenants, loan with protective loan covenants, bank debt, and convertible debt or 
warrants (Miglo 2016). In earlier period, considerations of asset substation problem 
are discussed by Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft (1996). Leland (1994) concerns 
bond covenant effect on capital structure optimum and claims that agency problem 
only exist if shareholders may choose the bankruptcy level optimally. This is because 
if a value covenant is enforced, there is no incentive for shareholder to shift risk. 
Additionally, Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft (1996) analyses the impact of debt 
maturity on asset substitutions and firm value. By extending Leland (1994), Leland 
and Toft (1996) finds that agency cost of asset substitution will be lower when shorter 
term debt is used. This is because debt with longer maturity creates greater agency cost 
by giving incentives to shareholder to increase firm’s risky project through risk 
shifting. Short term debt can reduce or eliminate this potential agency cost. Another 
analysis of Childs et al. (2005) demonstrates that short term debt can mitigate the 
agency conflict arising from risk shifting and investment distortion. Firm, however, 
will only choose short term debt when it has the financial flexibility to adjust the debt 
level in the future because short term debt will expose the firm to liquidity risk. Ju and 
Ou‐Yang (2006) also provide the similar detail with this analysis.  
Bradley and Roberts (2004) and Billett et al. (2007) provide empirical evidence on 
types of covenants incorporate into private and public debt contracts. Bradley and 
Roberts (2004) uses a large sample of privately placed corporate debt, finding that 85 
percent of the private debt issues have dividend restriction covenant. The presence of 
covenants have a direct negative effect on yield on corporate debt. Billett et al. (2007) 
uses a sample of public debt issues, finding that nearly 19 percent of public debt issues 
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are secured. This covenant protection is stronger with growth opportunities, debt 
maturity and debt level. The negative relation between leverage and growth 
opportunities is significantly attenuated by covenant protection, suggesting that 
covenants can mitigate the agency costs of debt for high growth firms. Empirical 
studies on asset substation effect focuses on the states where covenants are violated 
(Chava and Roberts 2008; Nini et al. 2009; Roberts and Sufi 2009; Christensen and 
Nikolaev 2012). As discussed in Dichev and Skinner (2002) and Armstrong et al. 
(2010), violation of a debt covenant triggers a transfer of control to the lenders which 
typically enable them to reassess the loan through renegotiations. Additionally, debt 
covenants in private contracts are used in an active monitoring role, with debt holders 
using the covenants as an early warning system to inform them of potential problems 
with firms.   
Chava and Roberts (2008) identify that debt covenants violations have a negative 
impact on both corporate investment and leverage level as creditors use their control 
rights to exert greater influence over policies of firm. The analysis also highlights that 
the state-contingent allocation of control rights can mitigate investment distortions 
arising from financing frictions of agency problems and information problems. Also, 
Roberts and Sufi (2009) test 1000 private debt covenant between U.S public firms and 
financial insinuations, presenting that financial covenant violations lead to large 
decline in debt issuing. This is because debt holders are provided limited rights to 
effect financial policy via changes to the terms of the covenant. Based on a large 
sample of private covenants between banks and public firms to investigate firm’s 
investment and financing behaviour once a financial covenant violating, Nini et al. 
(2009) demonstrate that capital expenditure restrictions cause a reduction in both 
investment and debt level. Debt holder are more likely to use the opportunity of a 
technical default trigger to pressure firms to alter their policies and that reduce credit 
risk.  
More recently, empirical study of Eisdorfer (2008) investigates the risk shifting (asset 
substitution)’s behaviour in the investment decision of financially distressed firms by 
using a large data set of 40 years. The finding presents a positive relationship between 
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volatility of stock return and investment intensify 2 . Particularly, investments of 
distressed firms generate less value during times of high uncertainty. These risk 
shifting behaviours of firms can be mitigated by secured debt. To a lesser extent, it can 
be reduced by convertible debt, short-term debt maturities and managerial ownership. 
Additionally, Pyo et al. (2015) provide empirical analysis of how target debt level can 
eliminate or mitigate the disincentive to investment in firms when firms have risk debt 
outstanding and asymmetric information. Target debt ratio plays a role to offset the 
wealth transfer between shareholder and debt holder. Further, using a financial 
instrument with dynamic variable, Vanden (2009) infers that structured financing 
(multiple capital structure) can be used to solve the asset subsection problem. 
Structured financing induces shareholder to optimally choose the investment strategies 
even though the shareholder’s value function might be locally convex, which can lead 
to overinvestment or underinvestment in risky project.  
There is a number of contradictory studies such as Andrade and Kaplan (1998), Parrino 
and Weisbach (1999) and Graham and Harvey (2001) which find little evidence of risk 
shifting (asset substitution) hypothesis. Conversely, the distortion of risk shifting are 
inconsequential to capital structure choice.  Andrade and Kaplan (1998) search for 
instances in which the distressed firms made large investments in unusually risky 
capital expenditure, finding no evidence in the sample firms. This is supported by 
Graham and Harvey (2001) who finds rare evidence from approximately 4440 firms 
that executives issue short term debt are concerned about asset substitution. This 
comprehensive study contains both large and small firm, finding very little evidence 
that firm use convertibles to protect bondholders against unfavourable actions by 
managers or shareholders.  
Parrino and Weisbach (1999) investigates the distorted investment behaviour arising 
from shareholder-creditor conflicts using the simulation method. Based on a sample 
of large public firm, Parrino and Weisbach (1999) demonstrates that shareholder and 
debt holder conflict become severe as the level of debt. However, one could also argue 
that in perfect market, there is no wealth transfer due to risk shifting. In particular, debt 
holders should demand a compensation for bearing these agency risks at the 
                                                             
2 Investment intensity is measured as capital expenditure/total asset 
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investment stage so that the resulted losses are absorbed ex-ante by current 
shareholders due to higher costs of debt financing.  
Mao (2003) investigates the interaction between the risk shifting and underinvestment 
problem. In effect, the analysis describes that risk shifting by shareholder mitigates the 
underinvestment problem if the volatility of project cash flows increase with the 
investment size. In overall, an implication of this article is that the risk-shifting 
incentives do not necessarily grow monotonically with leverage. Another study of 
Hennessy and Tserlukevich (2008) develop a contingent claim model to analyse the 
choice between hybrid debt instruments, concluding that convertible debt cannot 
reduces the risk shifting (asset substitutions) problem.  
 
b) The Underinvestment Hypothesis  
Myers (1977) suggests a contrasting underinvestment or debt overhang of agency cost 
which is associated with a firm’s debt financing. Under-investment occurs when 
managers acting on behalf of shareholders fail to exercise profitable investment option 
(primarily in intangible assets) because bondholders enjoy a reduction in the 
profitability of default at the cost of shareholder returns. Myers (1977) demonstrates 
that managers who maximize equity value rather than firm value have an incentive to 
defer investment inefficiently. The under-investment problem arises because risky 
debt capture some investment benefits without bearing the cost (Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Myers 1977, 1984; Baker and Anderson 2010).  
As Myers (1977) identifies, firms with greater growth opportunities will have greater 
underinvestment problem that will lead to suboptimal investment decisions. If the debt 
matures before the firm has the opportunity to exercise its real investment options, the 
firm’s potential disincentive to invest is eliminated. Therefore, firms whose investment 
opportunity set contain more growth options should employ a higher proportion of 
short-term debt. Firms use short-term debt rather than long-term debt to minimize the 
underinvestment problem (Barnea et al. 1980; Barclay et al. 2003; Custódio et al. 
2013). Barnea et al. (1980) proposes the use of short-term debt maturing prior to the 
investment needs. Consistent with this result, Guedes and Opler (1996) analyses the 
determinates of the term to maturity of 7369 bonds, finding that risky firms do not 
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issue short-term debt in order to avoid inefficient liquidation. Additionally, firms with 
high growth opportunities are more likely to issue short-term debt.  
Several studies concern that the short maturity of debt mitigates underinvestment 
problem because short-term debt is considered a discipline tool due to the need for 
frequent roll over. For instance, Barclay and Smith (1995) demonstrates that firms with 
fewer growth options, are large or are regulated have more long-term debt in their 
capital structure. This describes that debt maturity is positively related to firm size and 
negatively related to opportunities. Further, Barclay et al. (2003) suggests that short-
term debt financing allows pursing projects with net present value, while suspending 
unprofitable ones. Dennis et al. (2000) provide empirical evidence for a significant 
inversely effect of growth opportunities on debt maturity. Ozkan (2000) provides 
evidence to support the hypothesis that firms with more growth opportunities in their 
investment tend to have more short-term debt. Furthermore, firm size shows a negative 
impact on debt maturity structure. Other studies of Stulz (1990) and Hart and Moore 
(1998) show that firms with few growth options should issue more long-term debt 
because long term debt is more effective at limiting managerial discretion. These are 
partly explain the underinvestment hypothesis.  
Other results on the effect of growth opportunities are mixed. Stohs and Mauer (1996) 
call into question the explanations of Barclay and Smith (1995) because there is no 
consideration of leverage. Using a measure of weighted-average debt maturity 
including variable of leverage, Stohs and Mauer (1996) finds that there is little support 
for a negative relationship between growth opportunities and debt maturity. 
Additionally, Scherr and Hulburt (2001) focus on the capital structure choice of small 
firms and investigates firm’s factors that may influence debt maturity. There is little 
empirical support for the influence of growth options on debt maturity, despite the fact 
that the small firms in sample of Scherr and Hulburt (2001) have much short-term debt 
than do the large firms  
Hennessy and Tserlukevich (2004) uses Tobin’s Q as a proxy for growth opportunities 
to investigate the interaction of debt overhang problem and investment opportunities. 
The results support the fact that debt overhang distorts both the level and composition 
of investment, with underinvestment problem being more severe for long-lived asset. 
Nevertheless, the evidences also against the notion that firms utilize additional secured 
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debt issuance as a device for mitigating the underinvestment problem. Besides, 
Custódio et al. (2013) undertakes Market to Book as a proxy for investment 
opportunities to explore the underinvestment problem, and expects firm with more 
growth options to have more short-term debt. The results describe that decrease in 
corporate debt maturity is concentrated in small firms. For large firm, agency conflict 
is not responsible for the decrease in firm use of long-term debt. In effect, the decrease 
in debt maturity is concentrated among small firm.  
However, several studies do not consider the control for firm leverage, since leverage 
is often positively correlated with debt maturity, their finding could not be due to that 
firm with growth option tend to have lower leverage (Stohs and Mauer 1996; Scherr 
and Hulburt 2001; Johnson 2003). With the interactions among growth opportunities, 
leverage and debt maturity in controlling the underinvestment problem, Leland and 
Toft (1996) find strong evidence that the debt maturity and capital structure decisions 
are interactive. Lang et al. (1996) uses a sample of U.S large industrial firms and 
contends that the negative relationship between leverage and growth of firm only 
occurs in firms with low growth expectation (Tobin’s Q). Moreover, Billett et al. (2007) 
show empirical evidences that although growth opportunities negatively affect the 
leverage, there is a positive relationship between leverage and growth opportunities 
because of covenant protection. Debt covenants may attenuate the negative effect by 
attenuating the agency cost of debt for firms with high growth opportunities.  
In several earlier studies, Diamond (1991) argues that too much short-term debt creates 
significant liquidity risk thereby increasing bankruptcy cost of short-term debt. Firm 
tend to employ long-term debt which reduces its liquidity risk and allows firms to use 
more debt. Accordingly, liquidity risk hypothesis proposes that long-term debt 
maturity and leverage tend to complement each other in mitigating the liquidity risk 
of firm. This proposition is supported by Johnson (2003) who discusses the selection 
of debt maturity and leverage ratio. Using simultaneous model with leverage and 
maturity endogenous, Johnson (2003) examines the hypothesis that short-term debt 
mitigates the underinvestment problem for high growth firm. If leverage and maturity 
considered strategic substitutes, firm using short term debt to sufficiently resolve the 
underinvestment problem have very little incentive to lower leverage. For this reason, 
the proposed negative relationship between leverage and growth opportunities vanish. 
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According to Childs et al. (2005), the relation between growth opportunities and debt 
maturity is determined by the trade-off between the reduced agency cost of 
underinvestment and increased bankruptcy cost of short term debt. As examined by 
Childs et al. (2005), the interaction between financing and investment decisions in a 
contingent claim model, demonstrating that short-term debt completely resolves the 
agency conflict of underinvestment, but firms will only use short-term debt when they 
also have flexibility to adjust the debt level in the future. Due to liquidity constrain, 
mitigating incentive problem is not the first consideration and thereby firms may not 
choose short-term debt when they have less financial flexibility. Based on Johnson 
(2003), Dang (2011) further raises the question whether a low leverage strategy can 
moderate the negative relationship between debt maturity and growth opportunities. 
Using a sample set of UK firms, Dang (2011) finds that high growth firms control 
underinvestment incentive by decreasing leverage but not by shortening debt maturity. 
The liquidity risk proposition over the underinvestment problem through presents a 
positive relationship between debt maturity and leverage ratio.  
Firms are also found to shorten the maturity of debt to preserve future debt capacity if 
future growth opportunities are recognised sufficiently early (Myers 1977). Aivazian 
et al. (2005) examines whether financing decision influences on firm’s investment 
decisions including underinvestment and overinvestment incentives. Based on a 
sample set of 1030 Canadian firms, Aivazian et al. (2005) provides empirical analysis 
that debt is negatively associated with investment, specifically, for firms with few 
growth opportunities. Additionally, when growth opportunities are not anticipated 
sufficiently early and completely, there is even less degree for reducing 
underinvestment incentive. This is because renegotiation with the debtholders is 
costly, hence increasing the transaction cost to firms. These transaction costs will 
prevent firms from adjusting leverage and debt maturity. Thus, firms with high debt 
ratio or long-term debt maturity ex ante are likely to forgo valuable growth 
opportunities, implying a negative influence of leverage level and debt maturity on 
their ex post investment levels (Dang 2011; Mayer et al. 2017). Later, Diamond and 
He (2014) analyse the effect of debt maturity on investment in a dynamic model and 
claim that short-term debt can both increase and decrease underinvestment effects. 
Short term debt can hinder current investment when the volatility of firm value is 
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higher in bad time than in good times. For this reason, risky short-term debt can impose 
an even severe overhang problem in a dynamic setting with future investment 
opportunities, when there is significant reduction of equity value. Besides, when 
profits of investments are intertemporal linked, short term debt will reduce future 
growth arising from earlier future default  (Ulgen 2016).  
The interaction of underinvestment problem, debt renegotiation and leverage is 
explored by Mella‐Barral and Perraudin (1997), Mauer and Ott (2000) and Pawlina 
(2010). In a unified dynamic model of a leveraged firm, Mella‐Barral and Perraudin 
(1997) focus on strategic debt service and investigates how the underinvestment 
problem can be solved through debt renegotiation. Using a continuous time model, 
Mella‐Barral and Perraudin (1997)  demonstrates that the debt renegotiation can 
eliminate both bankruptcy cost and the agency cost of debt arising from 
underinvestment when the firm is in financial distress. Mauer and Ott (2000) 
investigates the interaction between leverage and the investment option when 
renegotiation of debt is not allowed for. As Mauer and Ott (2000) summary, financing 
exercise of the growth option with additional debt can mitigate underinvestment 
incentives. However, reduce debt maturity or allow shareholders to engage in strategic 
debt services cannot by themselves accomplish the task. Similarly, Pawlina (2010) 
analyse the possibility of debt renegotiation at default exacerbates firm’s 
underinvestment problem and that placing the entire bargaining power with creditors 
can eliminate this problem. The results highlights a negative impact of debt re-
negotiability on the relationship between growth opportunities and systematic risk as 
well as leverage.  
 
2.1.4 Signalling Theory   
In the period of the 1970s and 1980s, other theory that has influenced the way capital 
structure has evolved is the signalling theory developed by Ross (1977) and Brealey 
et al. (1977). This theory relaxes the assumption of asymmetric information of the 
Modigliani and Miller (1958)’ model and start to looks at the function of debt as a 
signalling mechanism when there is an asymmetric information problem between 
well-informed inside managers of the firm and the less-informed outside investors. 
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According to Ross (1977), the managers are privy to better information of the firm 
than investors, thus, the capital structure of firms can be used as a valid signal to 
convey information to investors who are not familiar with the firm’s performance. 
Accordingly, well-performing firms choose debt as the risk of bankruptcy is lower for 
them than weak-performing firms. Based on the signalling model, the higher level of 
debt can be considered as a signal of higher firm quality, and the market’s perception 
of the value of the firm can rise with leverage. In this context, financial expenditure 
can decrease by issuing debt. Similar to Ross (1977), Brealey et al. (1977) 
contemporaneously consider the fraction of ownership retained by insider managers 
as a signal of a firm’s quality. This indicate that increasing firm leverage allows 
managers to retain a large fraction of risky equity and this reduces the perquisites to 
managers due to risk aversion. Hence, a risk-averse owner of a well-performing 
corporation can signal this fact by gaining high leverage in equilibrium. However, as 
Ahuja et al. (2015) argue, management may misuse the signal theory and deliberately 
send false signals to raise the market share prices in the short term, and they can 
dispose-off their shareholding at higher prices before the public realizes the hoax 
signal.  
According to the signalling theory of capital structure, firm value should be positively 
related to the debt ratio. The earlier empirical studies of Heinkel (1982), Miller and 
Rock (1985) and Blazenko (1987) present evidences to support the prediction of the 
signalling model. The empirical results are similar to the hypothesis of Brealey et al. 
(1977) and are maturely achieved by Downes and Heinkel (1982) who tests the 
signalling hypothesis based on a sample of U.S IPOs. As showed by Downes and 
Heinkel (1982), firms in which entrepreneurs retain stronger fractional ownership have 
higher value, providing a strong support for Brealey et al. (1977)’s hypothesis.  
Since that, Miller and Rock (1985) construct a model of the interaction between 
dividends and earnings, finding that firms raising external equity financing signal a 
negative implication for internal funds. This means that debt issuing has a positive 
implication for high quality. By concentrating on the return aspect of signalling 
information, Blazenko (1987) summarizes that  if manager know more about project 
quality than investors and if they are sufficiently risk averse, they can signal a high-
quality project using debt. This implies that the managers of high value firms are more 
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likely to issue debt as the lower risk position. Poitevin (1989) provides a similar 
consequence that the low cost entrant will adopt debt to signal its quality even though 
debt increase the probability of bankruptcy. More recently, Ravid and Sarig (1991) 
analyse signalling models in which firms signal their quality by using financial policies 
to commit to cash outflows. The finding showed that better firms are more highly 
leveraged than lower quality firms. Besides, Loughran and Ritter (1997) document the 
long-term operating performance of firms and suggested that new equity offering can 
be considered as a forecast of poor subsequent operating performance. In addition, 
Brick et al. (1998) test the signalling prediction where only variance of return is the 
motivation of the signalling equilibrium, indicating that if manager has private 
information of the firm, lower debt levels signal lower stock return of the firm.  
Recent empirical papers (Miglo 2007; Hennessy et al. 2010) develop dynamic 
extensions of a signalling model on debt to equity ratio. Based on Chinese listed firms, 
the signalling model deriving from asymmetric information is tested by Chen (2004) 
to explain capital structure. The evidences suggest that managers use leverage to signal 
firm prospects to poorly inform outside investor who believe these signals. Other study 
Deesomsak et al. (2004) observe that signalling theory predict a negative relationship 
between ownership concentration and leverage because of the role of debt in 
mitigating both moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Besides these, Miglo 
(2007) conducts a dynamic model that focused on a firm’s performance over time and 
the impact on debt ratio levels. Firms issuing equity have better operating performance 
at the moment of issue or soon after but have lower operating performance in the long-
term. Overall, leverage has a negative relationship to firm value in long-term. 
However, Hennessy et al. (2010) construct a dynamic model of firms with repeating 
hidden information, finding that firms signal positive information by substituting debt 
for equity. This shows the inverse relationship between a firm’s debt and net value. 
Several studies by Antweiler and Frank (2006) and Hommel (2011) argue that the 
signalling theory could not be supported by empirical evidence. Antweiler and Frank 
(2006) document that there was insignificant change in share price in response to a 
firm’s debt issuance. Hommel (2011) further emphasizes that signalling prediction 
cannot be accurately proved as it has not been tested in the quantity of academic studies 
enjoyed by the trade-off theory stemming from Modigliani and Miller (1963). This is 
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because the assumptions of a signalling model are critiqued as being simple. 
Furthermore, signalling hypothesis based upon a model that comprised the prediction 
of asymmetric information and agency theory (Noe and Rebello 1996). In fact, a large 
number of recent studies have majored on pecking order which highlights asymmetric 
information, and agency theory.  
 
2.1.5 Pecking Order theory  
The concept of optimal capital structure is also expressed by Myers and Majluf (1984) 
and Myers (1984) based on the notion of asymmetric information. Grounding on the 
concept of information asymmetry, Myers and Majluf (1984) sequentially ranked 
internal funding source as being the first preference where the firm refrains from 
market visibility, with external financing as a source of debt being the second 
preference associated with a lower cost of information. Accordingly, the external 
funding of equity is the least preferred. In contrast to a trade-off model that a firm’s 
leverage behaviour is formulated by a target capital structure with trade-off between 
costs and benefits of additional debt, the asymmetric information of the pecking order 
theory implies the cost of adverse selection. This predicts that insiders normally 
capture more information than outsiders. As Myers and Majluf (1984) show, if 
outsiders are less informed than firm insiders, equity will be mispriced by the market. 
If a firm is required to raise equity funding for the business, the mispriced market will 
consider it as ineffective and high risk, resulting in the equity being undervalued. 
Consequently, the new investors will acquire more than the net present value of firm 
which indirectly causes a net loss to existing shareholders. In order to avoid this market 
distortion, firm issues equity only as a last resort. According to pecking order theory, 
firms have no well-defined optimal capital structure (Myers 1984).  
The proposition of pecking order theory was extended by Krasker (1986) who tests the 
function relating to the number of new shares issued by a firm to the resulting change 
in the firm’s stock price, and the consequence of this paper is similar to Myers (1984) 
and Myers and Majluf (1984). Several earlier empirical papers (Narayanan 1988; 
Baskin 1989; Heinkel and Zechner 1990; Korajczyk et al. 1991; Allen 1993; Klein and 
Belt 1994; Rajan and Zingales 1995; Helwege and Liang 1996) present a similar result 
to support the pecking order hypothesis. By investigating the influence of asymmetric 
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information on debt and equity, Narayanan (1988) presents that debt is more 
advantageous than outside equity even if it is risky, because debt issuance is less 
attractive to unprofitable firm. Baskin (1989) constructs a statistical model for 
examining whether US firms adhere to the pecking order theory. This finding provide 
empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis of pecking order. Heinkel and Zechner 
(1990) analyse the optimal mix of debt and equity in a model with asymmetric 
information, finding that an all-equity financed firm will overinvest whilst existing 
debt reduces any overinvestment problem compared to equity financing. Korajczyk et 
al. (1991) and Korajczyk et al. (1992) documents the impact of time-varying adverse 
selection and costly project deferral on the market for equity issues, and proved that 
firm time their equity offering after reporting earnings. This finding has indirectly been 
in favour of pecking order theory. Similar to Baskin (1989), Allen (1993) tests the 
impact of past dividend return and growth on firm’s leverage level in Australia, and 
consequently, the negative correlation between past return and debt ratio indicated the 
rejection of static trade-off model but accept of pecking order interpretation. Further, 
Klein and Belt (1994) conduct a logit model to measure the behaviour of a firm with 
internal funding as opposed to an external sources, in relation to the probability of 
choice between debt and equity. The sample in this study was of non-financial and 
financial firms in the US and it was indicated that the most efficient firm preferred to 
choose debt over equity.  Among others, Rajan and Zingales (1995) provide similar 
results of pecking order theory for a sample of the seven large industrialized countries 
(G7).  
In consistent with pecking order theory, Helwege and Liang (1996) directly examine 
the existence of pecking order theory by evaluating the financing of firms that went to 
public in 1983, indicating that the probability of gaining external financing is unrelated 
to the internal funds deficit. Firms that access the capital market have not followed the 
pecking order theory since they selected the type of security to offer, that can be 
indirect evidence for the theory. By using regression equations, Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999) empirically tested pecking order theory in a sample of 157 firms in the 
U.S. The results strongly suggest that pecking order interpretation explain most firm’s 
financing behaviour better than the static trade-off model. As noted by Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers (1999), this is an attractive and influential results because the pecking order 
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is offered as a highly parsimonious empirical model of corporate leverage that is 
descriptively reasonable, although this sample is a small proportion of the set of all 
publicly traded firms. 
 Similarly, Graham and Harvey (2001) show mixed evidence in a survey of 392 chief 
financial officers to support the pecking order model. The consequence shows that the 
marginal benefit of tax shields seems to be bigger than the marginal costs of 
bankruptcy for almost all the firms in the sample, and thus, firms should fund more 
debt as it was under-leveraged. To some extent, Graham and Harvey (2001) find the 
financing preference for small firms in the absence of information asymmetry. Further 
empirical works of the pecking order model is conducted by Graham and Harvey 
(2001) a debt over equity preference for small firms in the absence of information 
asymmetry. Further empirical examination of the pecking order model has also been 
implemented by Aybar-Arias et al. (2003) who mainly investigate the leverage of firm 
in small and medium size. The evidence provides a strong support for the growth 
opportunities and cash flow hypothesis, indicating more debt in firms’ capital 
structure. Sánchez-Vidal and Martín-Ugedo (2005) examine the empirical 
implications of the pecking order theory in the Spanish market by using a panel data 
analysis, showing that pecking order theory holds for most subsample analysed, 
particularly for the small and medium sized firms and for the firms with high growth 
opportunities and highly leveraged. Further, both the more and less leveraged firms 
tend to converge toward more balanced capital structure and finance their funds flow 
deficits with long term debt.  
Recent empirical research has emphatically looked at the comparison of trade-off and 
pecking order behaviour in firms, by conducting panel data analysis to study the 
dynamic nature of capital structure decisions at the firms’ level. Gaud et al. (2005) 
build up a dynamic model based on 104 listed Swiss companies, and find that the size 
and tangible assets of firms are positively associated with firm’s debt, while growth 
and profitability of firms are negatively correlated with firm’s leverage. This suggests 
that the capital structure of Swiss companies can be explained by both trade-off theory 
and pecking order theory. Analysing the findings of Allen (1993), Baskin (1989) and 
Adedeji (1998)’s models, Tong and Green (2005) who further test the predictions of 
pecking order and trade-off based on a sample of Chinese companies, present three 
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illustrations. The data analysis from the three models presented contradictory results, 
but in overall, the findings showed a significant negative sign of leverage and 
profitability, plus, a positive correlation of past dividends and leverage. This favours 
of the pecking order proposition.  Compared with Allen (1993) who uses a sample of 
Australian firms, Qiu and La (2010) conduct an unbalanced panel data to debt ratio of 
Australian firms and find that leverage is positively related to asset tangibility but 
inversely related to growth prospects and business risk. Also, firms with higher 
leveraged are more profitable than unleveraged firms, however, profitability decreases 
the debt ratio of levered firms. As presented, these results are consistent with pecking 
order theory but contradict the trade-off theory.  
In several empirical papers, the pecking order and the trade-off theory are found to be 
not mutually exclusive. Hovakimian et al. (2001) conclude that the impact of 
profitability on the debt and capital structure choice seems to be complied with pecking 
order behaviour in the short-term and a subsequent revision to target in the long run. 
Furthermore, Fama and French (2002) present evidence to support both predictions of 
the pecking order and trade-off theory. For instance, the negative relationship of 
leverage and profitability support the pecking order prediction while the negative 
effect of volatility on dividend pay-out ratio support both trade-off and pecking order 
model.  
More especially, large firms presented greater pecking order behaviour than smaller 
firms. Cotei and Farhat (2009) emphasize that in U.S firms, trade-off theory plays a 
significant role in determining the proportion of debt to be issued or repurchased based 
on the assumptions of the pecking order theory, while pecking order factors affect the 
rate of adjustment under an assumption of trade-off. By analysing a sample of US 
firms, de Jong et al. (2011) demonstrates that the pecking order theory is a better 
descriptor of firms’ issue decision than the static trade-off theory. However, the 
prediction of trade-off is a stronger descriptor when focusing on repurchase decisions.  
Consistent with Fama and French (2002), Lemmon and Zender (2010) investigate the 
impact of debt capacity on pecking order behaviour, finding that the coefficient on 
funding deficit in net debt regression is larger for firms with rated debt and smaller for 
firms with no debt rating. As found by Lemmon and Zender (2010), firms without a 
debt rating are both small and high-growth firms and they generally carry equity to 
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finance deficits. A few studies have looked at pecking order behaviour a using sample 
of firms in developing countries and emerging markets. Qureshi (2009) focus on 
manufacturing firms in Pakistan to investigate the level of debt of these firm, and the 
evidences present a reasonable support for the pecking order theory. Conversely, Singh 
and Kumar (2012) provide evidences that with a sample based on 10 industries in 
India, firms’ financial preferences were compared with a trade-off model. Dereeper 
and Trinh (2015) also indicate that the pecking order behaviour might not be applied 
in Vietnam when internal funds and equity issuance are independent of the leverage 
levels. Moreover, there is no target debt ratio in the long run Vietnamese market as 
firms rapidly adjust their level of leverage.  Matemilola et al. (2015) affirms both 
pecking order theory and trade-off theory in corporate financing by analysing the 
relationship between cash flow and debt for South African firms.  
In several studies, however, there is not empirical results presented to support the 
prediction of pecking order theory. Adedeji (1998) critiques previous studies of Baskin 
(1989) and Allen (1993) who explain the pecking order prediction by testing the 
impact of dividend payment and investment on financial debt, suggesting that the 
results of these studies have not indicated the influence of dividend pay-out ratios and 
dividend yield. Based on sample of UK firms, Adedeji (1998) argues that there was 
insufficient interaction between debt issues and financing deficits. In contrast to 
Graham and Harvey (2001), de Jong and Veld (2001)  focus on capital structures of 
Dutch companies and their results do not support the proposition of Myers and Majluf 
(1984)’s pecking order theory. Similarly, Qiu and Smith (2007) suggest that pecking 
order theory might not be the primary choice for most U.S companies because small 
internal financial gaps (less than 10% of total assets) were filled by debt, while large 
internal financial gaps (larger than 20% of assets) were funded by equity issuance. 
This reconciles the different results of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). Conducting 
the capital structure of SMEs in seven countries, Bell and Vos (2009) summarize that 
SMEs will generally choose not to utilise debt if given the unconstrained choice 
between internal funds and external debt, as there is a preference for independence, 
control and financial freedom. Moreover, Rahman and Arifuzzaman (2014) also 
consider a sample of UK firms and demonstrate that the model of Shyam-Sunder and 
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Myers (1999) is not appropriate for providing conclusive results for the behaviour of 
capital structure.  
In fact, these studies (Frank and Goyal 2003; Bunn and Young 2004; Leary and 
Roberts 2010) show firms are more likely to gain a substantial amount of funds 
through equity issuance. Frank and Goyal (2003) demonstrate that based on a large 
cross section of U.S. publicly trading firms over long time periods,  net equity issuance 
track the funding deficit more closely than net debt issuance. Accordingly, equity was 
more important than debt. This suggestion has also been proved by Bunn and Young 
(2004) who undertake a similar approach to Frank and Goyal (2003) ) but selected a 
sample of UK firms. Bharath et al. (2008) robustly claim that the pecking order theory 
could partially explain the capital structure of firms even though the information 
asymmetry affects the financing decision of the US firm. Seifert and Gonenc (2008) 
examine the pecking order hypothesis using sample of firms from four countries-U.S, 
U.K, Germany, and Japan, finding no support for this hypothesis. Firms in these 
countries are more likely to finance deficit primarily with equity, especially, firm with 
major asymmetric information issues and dividend paying firms continually issue 
equity. In addition to this, Leary and Roberts (2010) question the ability of the pecking 
order to predict financing decisions. They found insufficient evidence to support 
pecking order behaviour from the data, even for subsamples of firms for which they 
argue the pecking order should be most likely to hold. Compared with studies of Frank 
and Goyal (2003) and Leary and Roberts (2010), Autore and Kovacs (2005) provide 
more emphasis that firms with high level of information asymmetry are more likely to 
undertake a financing strategy of issuing equity after its decline. 
 
2.1.6 Market Timing theory  
Over recent years researchers have extensively tested the market-timing theory of 
capital structure which emerged after the publication of Baker and Wurgler (2002) as 
a separate theory of capital structure. In fact, the theoretical aspect of market timing 
theory are considered as underdeveloped (Baker and Martin 2011).  
The essence of Baker and Wurgler (2002) principally described that “capital structure 
develop as the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market”. Baker 
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and Wurgler (2002) use the fundament of market timing hypothesis from previous 
studies of Taggart Jr (1977),  Marsh (1982), Stein (1996), La Porta et al. (2000) and 
Hovakimian et al. (2001) who investigated the irrational behaviour of investors and 
managers in capital markets, and argue that managers of firms prefer to issue equity 
after the mispricing of the share price. According to hypothesis of market timing, 
managers would be reluctant to readjust the target capital structure of firm, and share 
price movement would permanently reduce a firm’s capital structure. In addition to 
this, the subject of “firm time equity issues” is presented by Myers (1984), who 
devised pecking order theory with an evaluation of asymmetric information in a firm’s 
financial decision making. This further research argues that managers would rather 
issue equity after information disclosure because this can decrease the negative 
influence of asymmetric information on the share price (Korajczyk et al. 1991; Bayless 
and Chaplinsky 1996). Following the prediction of Myers (1984) and that of market 
timing, Baker and Wurgler (2002) put forward a market timing model that firms are 
more likely to raise funds through equity when share value is perceived to be 
overvalued and adopt a buyback programme when the market value is believed to be 
undervalued. In a review by Parsons and Titman (2009), they found that firms prefer 
equity when the relative cost of equity is low, and rely on debt financing otherwise. 
Thus, when the market value of a stock is low, firm may tend to take advantage of 
mispricing by issuing equity.  
Most of studies on market timing theory that have been developed and empirically 
tested concentrate on the influences of market timing on equity financing, debt 
financing and  hybrid financing. Empirical evidence provided by Graham and Harvey 
(2001) shows that two thirds of CFOs advocate that “the amount by which stock is 
undervalued or overvalued is an important or very important consideration” in issuing 
equity, and “if stock a price has recently increased, the price at which it can be sold is 
high”. Baker and Wurgler (2000) explores whether equity issuance with total equity 
and debt issuance, can predict aggregate market return in period of 1927 to 1997. As 
found by Baker and Wurgler (2000), when the equity share studied is in the top 
historical quartile, the average value weighted market return in the  next year has been 
below the average return. Since this, Welch (2004) investigates the inter-relationship 
between volatility of stock price and firm’s capital structure, demonstrating that firms 
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have re-adjusted capital structure slowly thus the influences of historical equity shocks 
on debts ratio have been effectively permanent. Further evidence is presented by 
Huang and Ritter (2009) that firms have a  the tendency to fund a financing gap when 
equity decreases with influence of proxies for the cost of equity capital. As reconciled 
by Huang and Ritter (2009), the market timing theory has increasingly challenged both 
the static trade-off and pecking order propositions. Under the market timing theory, 
equity issues are not necessarily more expensive than debt issues when the equity risk 
premium is low. Furthermore, firms may raise fund when the cost of equity is low in 
in order to build a stockpile of internal funds. However, a number of recent paper, 
challenge Baker and Wurgler (2000) evidence that securities issued  in a year have a 
long-lived effects on capital structure.  
By investigating the market timing model based on sample of Japan, Chang et al. 
(2006) find that the weighted average market-to-book ratio has significant negative 
correlation with the capital structure of firms. In addition, Chang et al (2006) also 
applied a dividend payment dummy to capture information asymmetry patterns which 
combined with the market to book ratio, indicated that firms in Japan with low 
information asymmetries are more likely to be mis-valued, this further strengthen the 
market timing interpretation of capital structures. These results are consistent with 
market timing behaviour associated with information asymmetry. Additionally, 
empirical studies (Chazi and Tripathy 2007; Elliott et al. 2007; Arosa et al. 2013; 
Setyawan 2015) show the evidence linking the impact of market timing and capital 
structure. Elliott et al. (2007) include the intrinsic value ratio, estimated by using the 
earning-based valued model, to observe share price as a timing measure. It is showed 
that firms whose equity is overvalued are significantly more likely to fund with equity. 
Chazi and Tripathy (2007) re-examine the market timing interpretation by using 
insider trading as a metric to the market to book value ratio, and indicate that the real 
mispricing of the share price rather than any perceived mispricing is the best 
explanation for manager timing equity issuance. Arosa et al. (2015) analyse the impact 
of market reception to on capital structure from a cultural dimension and find that firms 
who engaged in market timing by reducing their debt ratio when the share price 
showed a tendency to increase. Setyawan (2015) concentrates on Indonesia firms and 
implied that when the growth of earning achieve a certain level, the stock price will be 
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overvalued, and that would be the best time for firm to carry out equity financing. 
Furthermore, Lewis and Tan (2016) demonstrates that managers tended to issue more 
equity relative to debt when analyst are relatively optimistic about a firm’s long term 
growth prospects. Furthermore, firm issuing equity gain less return than debt issuance 
at subsequent earnings announcements. This finding suggests that market timing, in 
the form of debt-equity timing issuance, plays a role in driving financing anomalies.  
Recent studies (Hovakimian et al. 2004; De Bie and De Haan 2007; Kayhan and 
Titman 2007; Mahajan and Tartaroglu 2008) make an effort to develop market timing 
measures, but only partially support the market timing hypothesis for capital structure. 
Several of these argue that the negative correlation between market-to-book value and 
the debt ratio of firm could be short lived. De Bie and De Haan (2007) selected Dutch 
listed non-financial companies as a sample and showed that the effect of share price 
rises on the financial decisions regarding the issuance of securities is consistent with 
market timing hypothesis. However, the findings of the Dutch sample only present the 
strong and persistent effect of market timing on capital structure in the short-term. This 
has also been suggested by Kayhan and Titman (2007) that market timing has only a 
short-term effect on capital structure of firms and dissipates significantly after a few 
years. Furthermore, Mahajan and Tartaroglu (2008) show that the issuance of equity 
has only a weak influence on the leverage ratios of listed firm in industrialized 
countries (G-7 countries) with the exception of Japan, and that the historical market to 
book value ratio in industrialized countries excluding Italy has negative relationship 
to firm leverage. Moreover, Brendea (2012) subsequently proves that the impact of 
market timing on the capital structure of listed companies in Rome are not very 
consistent over time. Specifically, the tendency of these listed firms to increase equity 
when their market value is high is not a constant feature due to the influence of market 
conditions. Similar to Brendea (2012), Russel and Hung (2013) conduct an 
investigation that market timing in the Chinese stock market plays a significant role in 
firms’ capital structure, however, the impact is not constant and disappears within 
three years.  
Baker and Wurgler (2002) argue that the negative relationship between market-to-
book value and the level of financial leverage is more likely to be caused by growth 
opportunities rather than market timing (Hovakimian et al. 2004; Alti 2006; 
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Hovakimian 2006; Mahajan and Tartaroglu 2008). Hovakimian et al. (2004) 
investigate the role of target leverage in debt issuance and stock repurchases, finding 
that unlike debt issuance and reductions, equity issues and repurchases have no 
significantly lasting effect on capital structure. Besides, Hovakimian et al. (2004) and 
Hovakimian (2006) recognize that the power of the market timing including 
information of growth opportunities is a significant potential determinant of target 
leverage ratio and specifically, the importance of historical average market-to-book 
ratios in determining the debt regressions is not due to past equity market timing. 
Accordingly, Hovakimian (2006) emphasizes that the impact of pure equity issuance 
does not have a lasting influence on capital structure. Additionally, Leary and Roberts 
(2005) also challenge the market timing theory, showing that the persistent effect of 
shock on debt is more likely to be due to the presence of rebalancing costs than an 
indifference toward capital structure. This view is inconsistent with market timing, 
however, consistent with pecking order theory. This has also been supported by 
Kayhan and Titman (2007) and Flannery and Rangan (2006) who suggest that firms 
re-adjust toward a target leverage. Moreover, Bruinshoofd and De Haan (2012) present 
comparative evidences by processing panel data using U.S, UK and European firms, 
and demonstrated that historical market-to-book ratios and corporate debt level 
negative correlation does not extend to UK and continental European firms. Firms in 
the UK and European market tend to issue debt when the stock price is high and that 
is closer to pecking order interpretation in which debt is preferred over external equity. 
A major criticism of the market timing model is that the market/book value used as a 
measure of misevaluation is public information. Managers may have private 
information that helps them time the issue of equity issues (Parsons and Titman 2009) 
Recently, Öztekin (2015) explores the market timing hypothesis considering influence 
of macroeconomic environment and financial development. It is found that after 
controlling these two institution factors, the impact of equity cost on the level of 
leverage is not statically significant, although the equity cost significant decrease the 
adjustment speed. Further, Bonaimé et al. (2014) view market timing as altering the 
cost of adjusting to a target, and the presence of market timing behaviour by firms does 
not preclude the trade-off theory. As analysed by Bonaimé et al. (2014), firms will 
benefit from the capital structure adjustment achieved by repurchasing stock when a 
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firm’s equity is undervalued. The market reactions to open market value share 
repurchase are magnified if the firm is under levered and undervalued or overlearned 
and overvalued. In results, managers are found that have discretion over their firm’s 
leverage choice and that they adopt capital structure with the value-maximizing level 
of debt. According to Asif et al. (2018), each time a deficit firm will spawn their funds 
through equity and mis-evaluation will strengthen managers’ tendency to raise 
financing through equity. These findings are in line with Baker and Wurgler (2002) 
and Alti (2006) that firms alter their capital structure using market timing theory. In 
recent works, as the performance of stock market has become a crucial factor in the 
development of an economy and accordingly, the growing reputation of stock market 
is found that play a significantly institutional role in influencing the market timing 
behaviour of firms across stock markets and countries.  
 
 
2.2 Practice framework  
The seminal work by Modigliani and Miller (1958) on capital structure presented the 
fundamental concept for the development of various theories in the field. Their initial 
theory of capital structure irrelevance suggests that financial leverage does not affect 
the firm’s market value. However, Modigliani and Miller (1963) revise their position 
by incorporating tax-shield benefit as a critical determinant of firm’s capital structure. 
The concept of capital structure further expressed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
based on the conflict of shareholder-manager’s interest and conflict of shareholder-
bond holder’s interest, Ross (1977) and Myers (1984) and based on notion of 
asymmetric information, Baker and Wurgler (2002) based on time-varying mispricing. 
Besides these, the possible explanatory variables arising from the existence of macro 
conditions are further analysed by a number of empirical works. Having established 
the most important factors that are likely to explain capital structure decision and the 
variation in leverage ratios, attention in this section focuses on how to explain 
financing decision of firms in different industries and different markets, and provides 
provide a comprehensive study of the macro determinants of capital structure. In fact, 
there is no consensus on the determinant of capital structure due to the different sample 
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based, time serious, and different empirical definitions of leverage that contained 
empirical frameworks.  
As different views have been put forward regarding the financing choice, this section 
focuses on two major sets of factors that influence a firm’s leverage decision: (1) 
industry-specific factors, (2) macro-economic specific factors. By analysing firm 
financing behaviour, this section provides a unique window into how changing 
incentive structure influence financial choice of firms.  
2.2.1 Industry  
A number of summaries have been given with respect to the fact that the industry in 
which a firm operate will have a significant impact on its capital structure (Talberg et 
al., 2008, MacKay and Phillips, 2005). Titman (1984) initially argues the effect of 
industry on capital structure based on an agency relationship between a firm and its 
customers who suffer costs if the firm liquidates. According to Titman (1984), firms 
would choose a leverage ratio that can maximise the liquidation cost. It is assumed 
that the increasing probability of liquidation might reduce the current income stream 
of firm. The after-sale services of the firm will effectively disappear because of the 
post-liquidation and consumer are less likely to purchase durable goods from the firm 
at risk as the expected increase in maintenance costs of the product. A cross-sectional 
implications developed in Titman (1984) is that the more specialized the product firm 
producing, the lower is the liquidation value of the firm, because the harder it is to 
replace the after-sales services. For instance, firms within industries of computer and 
automobile companies which can impose high costs on their customers and business 
associates that they liquidate choose capital structure with relatively low debt ratios. 
Conversely, firms in hotel and retail establishment sector which impose relatively low 
costs on their customers and business associates that liquidate choose high debt ratios. 
This suggests that there is inter-industry differences in leverage across industries, as 
firms producing more specialized product seeks a leverage ratio to help offset their 
lower liquidation cost. It also stands to implication that firms in different industries 
exhibit different level of debt in their capital structure.  
Harris and Raviv (1991) provides a summary that firms within an industry are more 
similar than those in different industries and that industries would retain their relative 
leverage ratio ranking over time. Early studies, for example, Bradley et al. (1984) finds 
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that drug, instrument, electronic and food industry sectors have consistently low 
leverage whilst paper, textile, mill products, steel, airline and cement industries have 
consistently high leverage. Also, highly regulated firms in telephone, electric and gas 
utilities and airline have consistently among the most highly firms and this arise the 
probability that difference of leverage ratio between regulated and unregulated. Miller 
(1995) admits that the notion that Modigliani and Miller (1958) propositions might not 
apply to banks as demand deposit are the major sources of funds for most banks. 
However, Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) notes that banks are subject to the 
same type of agency costs and other influences on behaviour as other industries though 
banking is a heavily regulated industry that restrict capital structure choice. As 
summarised by Degryse et al. (2012), leverage can exhibit intra-industry 
heterogeneity, driven by industry competition, the degree of agency conflict, and the 
heterogeneity in employed technology.  
Other early works on the interaction of financing choice and product market (Brander 
and Lewis, 1986, Maksimovic, 1988) analyse the symmetric firms’ in concentrated 
industries and does not provide the explanation of why firms in competing market 
would choose different financial structure. In oligopolies there is a tendency for firms 
to reach implicit agreement with their rivals to limit competition. In this context, firm 
in concentrated industries can maintain collusion while supporting higher levels of 
debt. Other works examines how product-market competition is affected when firms 
have asymmetric financial structure (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990). As implied, 
certain types of product market competition can increase managerial incentive 
problems within the firm. The reliance on external financing exposes firm to cut 
through competition, forcing the firm to rely more on internal sources of capital than 
on external sources of financing. However, this reduces the extent to which outside 
investors monitor the firm and increases the possibility of managerial slack.  
A more recent line of research by Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) shows how 
financial decision are jointly determined within competitive industries. It is assumed 
that there is a link between technology choice and financial structure. Within an 
industry, firm can choose between a safe technology with a certain marginal cost, and 
a risky technology with an uncertain costs. As implied by Maksimovic and Zechner 
(1991), firms that choose the technology followed by the majority of firms generate 
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higher expected earnings before interest and taxes and less leveraged than firms that 
deviate and adopt a technology which is only chosen by few firms. This suggests that 
the debt-equity ratio is likely to be high in highly concentrated industries and in highly 
fragmented industries, and low in moderately. Williams (1995) extend the model by 
characterising the equilibrium industry distribution of debt and firm characteristic and 
explain firm heterogeneity within industries.  By allowing for entry, Williams (1995) 
interprets an asymmetric equilibrium industry structure characterized by a core of 
large, stable, profitable, capital-intensive, financially-leverage firms and a competitive 
fringe of small, risky, non-profitable, labour-intensive firms.  
As MacKay and Phillips (2005) concludes, Maksimovic and Zechner (1991), Williams 
(1995) and gain additional insight relating to partial-equilibrium model that firms 
make their individual financial decisions in reference to the collective decision of 
industry peers, and the outcomes of model imply intra-industry delivery rather than 
industry-wide target. Based on these studies, MacKay and Phillips (2005) test the 
importance of industry to firm’s financial decisions and find that industry fixed effect 
in explaining the variation of capital structure is less than the firm fixed effects. Other 
industry-related factors can explain part of the wide intra-industry variation in capital 
structure in competitive industries. For instance, firms with capital labour ratios close 
to the industry median use less leverage than firms that depart from the industry 
median capital labour ratio. The variables of firm specific are more dispersed in 
competitive industries, consistent with the intra-industry diversity predicted in models 
of competitive-industry.   
The similar results of industry fixed effects are also exhibited by Balakrishnan and Fox 
(1993) who find that 52% of capital structure variation is explained by firm effects and 
11 by inter-industry difference. Further, Michaelas et al. (1999) uses industry fixed 
effect to test whether the industry effect have an influence on SMEs capital structure 
and finds that though there are significant industry fixed effect, the impacts are 
primarily on short-term debt. In recent studies, Kayo and Kimura (2011) demonstrates 
that the industry level characteristic account for 12% for leverage variance but 42% of 
capital structure variance is explained by intrinsic firm characteristic. Focusing on the 
role of intra-industry characteristics, Degryse et al. (2012) find that firm fixed effect 
are important in all industries, suggesting that within-industry heterogeneity is 
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important. As noted, within industries, firm fixed effects which pick up the individual 
variability in leverage ratios are important. This shows that industry competition, the 
degree of agency conflict, and the heterogeneity in employed technology are important 
drivers of capital structure.  
Nevertheless, studies on capital structure often employ dummy variables to control the 
effect of industry on leverage (Michaelas et al., 1999, MacKay and Phillips, 2005, 
Talberg et al., 2008, Cheng and Shiu, 2007). Few studies analyse determinants of 
leverage that characterize rather than classify each industry. Simerly and Li (2000) 
indicates that the specific characteristic of a given industry could also influence the 
firm capital structure. Using the leverage as moderate role between environmental 
dynamism of the industry and firm performance, Simerly and Li (2000) demonstrate 
that firms working in more dynamic or less predictable environment have smaller 
levels of debt. Specifically, the interaction variable between dynamism and leverage 
show a negative and significant influence on firm return on asset. In more recent 
works, Miao (2005) explores the influence of industry dynamic on capital structure, 
suggesting that there is an interaction effect between industry and determinant of 
capital structure. For instance, industries with high technology growth or good starting 
distribution of technology have relatively lower average leverage. Second, industries 
with risky technology, higher bankruptcy cost and higher fixed operating cost have 
relatively less leverage. Besides, industries with high entry cost have higher average 
leverage. According to Ferri and Jones (1979), the industry dynamism, from a certain 
point of view, is related to the concept of an individual firm’s business risk. As 
business risk can be defined as the expected variability in future income, it is predicted 
that the larger the business risk, the smaller the level of firm leverage. In a word, the 
larger the industry dynamism, the smaller the level of industry average leverage 
because profit variability is an estimate of the firms’ ability to pay for their fixed 
obligation (Kayo and Kimura 2011).  Kayo and Kimura (2011) investigate that as a 
determinant of capital structure, industry dynamism show negative and significant 
relationship with leverage, representing the instability or volatility of an industry that 
lead to a lower average leverage of industry. In a word, companies working in 
industries with larger risk because of more dynamic environment tend to use leverage 
with less intensity.  
88 
 
Another characteristic that derive from the industry specific is munificence, which 
defined as the environment’s ability to support sustained growth of firm or industry. 
Dess and Beard (1984) asserts that environments with high munificence have abundant 
resources, low level of competition and as a consequence, high profitability. Given 
this type of environment, according to Kayo and Kimura (2011), it is reasonable to 
expect that companies in munificent industries tend to have high levels of profitability 
and therefore, the hypothesis regarding the influence of firm profitability on leverage 
to an aggregate industry would be generated. Boyd (1995) measure the munificence 
by using a standardized measure of industry sales growth over a 5-year period. 
Following this measurement, Kayo and Kimura (2011) construct a variable of 
munificent representing the abundance of resource in a given industry, and present 
evidence that companies in industries with good growth opportunities tend to use less 
leverage. However, In recent work, Smith et al. (2015) uses the similar measures and 
observe various results by classifying the degree of munificence. For instance, firms 
in both highly munificent industries, which are able to produce excess resources, and 
in less munificent industries, which less ability to generate such resource, may see 
opportunities to increase or reduce their funding level while adjusting to target debt 
ratios at a relatively low cost. For firms in highly munificent with above target debt, 
the greater the industry munificence and the more their leverage exceeds their target 
ratio, and the more likely firms are to adjust towards their target debt ratios. 
Nevertheless, for firms in highly munificence with below-target debt, the greater the 
munificence of the industry firms in, the more leverage falls below their target debt 
ratios, the more likely firms are to adjust toward their target debt ratios.  
As Kayo and Kimura (2011) explain, it cannot define an a-priori relation between 
industry munificence and leverage because there are two theoretical streams compete 
in their hypothesis reading the influence of profitability on leverage. The pecking order 
theory proposes a negative relation of profitability and leverage, whereas the trade-off 
prediction suggest a positive sign. The other industry characteristic that focused on 
this section is the influence of industry concentration on firm leverage, based on the 
using of the traditional Herfindahl-Hirshman (HH) index which used to determine 
market competitiveness. MacKay and Phillips (2005) presents empirical results that 
financial leverage is higher and less dispersed in concentrated industries, where 
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strategic debt interactions are also stronger, in contrast to low concentrated industries 
in which leverage is lower. As MacKay and Phillips (2005) describes, this is mainly 
due to different characteristics of these two types of industries: i.e., higher 
concentrated and lower concentrated industries. In higher concentrated industries, 
profitability and size are also higher as well as firm risk. Due to the agency cost 
associating with equity holder and bond holder conflict, the higher risk to the incentive 
of equity holder can be related to pursue risker strategies when debt is high (Brander 
and Lewis 1986). Thus, the hypothesis of a positive relationship between HH index 
and firm leverage is suggested (Kayo and Kimura 2011). However, with agency 
problem, debt may decrease investment expenditures and product market competition 
when equity holders cannot receive full benefit from firm investment, especially in a 
harsh scenario and high likelihood of bankruptcy. Therefore, Clayton (2009) indicates 
that debt is motivated by issues outside of product market concerns to solve an agency 
problem.  
By using the Herfindhal index, Almazan and Molina (2005) find that intra-industry 
capital structure dispersion is greater in industry that are more concentrated, use 
leasing more intensively, and exhibit looser corporate governance. In more recent, 
Guney et al. (2011) uses HHI as a subsidiary measurement of product market 
competition to investigate the interaction between industry concentration and 
financing decisions of firms. The findings suggest that at low and high end of product 
market competition, leverage is increased with lower competition, whereas at the 
medium intensity of competition, leverage and product market competition move 
together. As Guney et al. (2011) interpret, the relationship between leverage and 
product market competition is non-linear, depending on industry type, company size 
and firm’s growth opportunities. Besides, Kayo and Kimura (2011) uses HH index as 
a proxy of market concentration and HH index is found to be negatively related to 
leverage, suggesting that high concentrated industries may lead their firms to have a 
lower debt. Similarly, Xu (2012) adopts Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to measure the 
impact of domestic market concentration on leverage of firms, obtains that the market 
concentration on both book and market leverage of firms are strong and positive. This 
suggests that firms in industries with stronger market concentration tend to have more 
debt. As higher market concentration corresponds to low product market competition, 
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these results are consistent with negative effect of industry competition on leverage 
ratios. Accounting for nonlinearity in the leverage and industry concentration 
relationship, Fosu (2013) uses the HH index as measure of competition and proves that 
firms in less concentrated industries significantly benefit from leverage whilst those in 
concentrated industries would suffer adverse effect of leverage. In conclusion, the 
marginal effect of leverage is positive across the relevant range of product market 
concentration.   
In summary, industry effect reflect a set of correlated, but otherwise omitted factors. 
Firms in an industry experience common forces that affect capital structure decision. 
These can show a product market interaction or the nature of completion, and also 
suggest industry heterogeneity in the asset structure, business risk, or technology and 
regulations (Myers, 1984, Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993, Maksimovic, 1988, MacKay 
and Phillips, 2005). Industry factors do not have a unique interpretation. Other 
interpretation proposed by Gilson (1997), Flannery and Rangan (2006) show that 
managers use industry medium leverage as a benchmark as they contemplate their 
leverage level. Thus, industry medium leverage is usually employed as a proxy for 
target capital structure. More formal models are presented in Lemmon et al. (2008) 
that as a determinants of capital structure, medium industry leverage ratio has the 
greatest explanatory power in explaining the capital structure variance of firms. 
Hovakimian et al. (2004) provides evidence consistent with firms actively adjusting 
their debt ratios toward the industry median leverage level. In these empirical works, 
industry average leverage are found as an economically important determinant of 
firm’s capital structure (Welch 2004; Frank and Goyal 2009; Leary and Roberts 2014; 
Faccio and Xu 2015). Welch (2004) shows a strong negative coefficient on industry 
deviation, indicating that firms are eager to move toward their industry’s average debt 
ratio. Also, firms that have engaged in mergers and acquisitions activity tend to 
increase leverage and that firms that wander away from their industry average debt 
ratio seek to return it. DeAngelo et al. (2011) provide evidence indicating that the 
industry leverage has stronger explaining power in capital structure variation. Besides 
it, Leary and Roberts (2014) and Faccio and Xu (2015) find that peer’s leverage  (i.e., 
industry average leverage) is an important determinant of capital structure choice. In 
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contrast, DeAngelo and Roll (2016) find that there is no systematic connection 
between leverage of firm and industry median leverage.  
Other works on a relation exiting between the industry average debt ratio and firms’ 
debt ratio due to the industry competition claiming that models of competition set up 
firm aggression as a function of financial and operational leverage. Chevalier (1995) 
finds that firms increase their prices after a leveraged buyout if other firms in the 
industry also have high leverage. If other firms in the industry have little debt ratio or 
are concentrated, they can afford to be more aggressive in pricing policy towards an 
entrant with high leverage. However, Lyandres (2006) states that the relationship 
between industry median leverage and firm leverage does not have an agreed upon 
interpretation. One of the interpretation is that industry leverage proxies for omitted 
factors. The competitive structure of the industry might be one of these factors.  
 
2.2.2 Macroeconomic Conditions 
Since Modigliani and Miller (1958), economists have contributed much effort to 
understanding firm’s financing policies. While most of the early literature analyses 
financing decisions within firm specific level, macroeconomic conditions have been 
found to be important factor in analysing firm’s financing decisions. Several studies 
raise a consideration to especially firm level characteristics and controlled for 
macroeconomic factors. For instance, among these theories, Levine (2002) 
summarises that better developed financial systems eases external financing 
constraints of firms. Hackbarth et al. (2006) claim that financing decisions reflect the 
state of economy. Since information regarding security issues is contemporaneous, it 
may be more useful in describing economic conditions than, infrequently reporting 
information in earning release.  In more recent research, Levy and Hennessy (2007) 
develops a computable model explaining financing over the business cycle and notes 
that firm exhibiting low degree of financial constraints that have pronounced counter-
cyclical leverage with much of the variation attributed to varying macroeconomic 
conditions. Further, firms that exhibiting higher degree of financial constraints do not 
exhibit these high pronounced counter-cyclical leverage or debt issue patterns. As 
suggested by Levy and Hennessy (2007), financing choices of firm vary systematically 
with macroeconomic conditions. However, despite the substantial development of 
92 
 
literatures deriving from analysing traditional capital structure theories, the role of 
macroeconomic factors in capital structure and particularly, the impact of 
macroeconomic conditions on the adjustment speed of capital structure toward targets 
have been largely ignored.  
As summarized by Kayo and Kimura (2011), the study on capital structure in a global 
perspective has at least two streams. In one of these stream, several studies compare 
the influence of financing policies of multinational and domestic firms on capital 
structure variance. However, results are mixed. Lee and Kwok (1988) tests a set of 
international environmental variables of political risk, international market 
imperfections, complexity of operations, opportunities for international 
diversification, foreign exchange risk and local factors of host countries on the firm 
related determinants, finding that multinational companies tend to be less leveraged 
than domestic companies and this is because of the higher cost of capital due to agency 
problems. Burgman (1996) indicates the similar results that multinational corporations 
appears to have lower target debt ratios than purely domestic firms and the 
international diversification does not appear to lower earnings volatility. Further, the 
specific international factors of exchange rate risk and political risk are found to be 
positively related to leverage. Other study of Chen et al. (1997) focus on a direct 
relation of international activities and capital structure finds that multinational 
companies have a lower debt ratio than domestic companies beyond the commonly 
accepted capital structure determinants. In addition, the level of international activities 
is positively related to the debt ratio, suggesting the more internationalization of firms, 
the less leverage the firms. The proposition of trade-off model, multinational 
companies should be able to carry more debt in their capital structure as they are able 
to diversify several less than perfectly correlated national economies. According to 
studies above, this proposition is not valid.  According to Desai et al. (2004), 
multinational companies are financed with less external debt in countries with 
underdeveloped capital market or weak creditor rights, reflecting significantly higher 
borrowing cost arising from informational asymmetries, government policies, and 
poor constricting environment or agency problems across countries. However, Mansi 
and Reeb (2002) find the opposite that international activity increase firm leverage. 
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Akhtar (2005) demonstrate that the leverage level are not significantly different 
between multinational companies and domestic firms.  
A more recent works Low and Chen (2004) tests the effects of international and 
product diversification on capital structure with 30 countries and shows that the more 
international diversification the firm has, the less leverage level the firm has. However, 
this results is mainly attributable to the U.S. Firms. For another, the product 
diversification is found to be positively related to firm leverage, indicating that firms 
with higher level of product diversification would be allowed to reduce their risk and 
thereby firms carry higher debt level. Other works Chkir and Cosset (2001) find that 
multinational companies with a high level of international and product diversification 
face a lower level of default risk that enable multinational companies to achieve higher 
level of leverage than domestic companies.   
More recently, several studies Rajan and Zingales (1995), Booth et al. (2001), 
Antoniou et al. (2008), Beck et al. (2008) analyse the role of country characteristic as 
determinant of firm leverage. One important observation is that financing policy 
appears to have similar patterns of behaviour around the world, despite the evident 
institutional differences (Booth et al., 2001). For instance, Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
investigate the determinants of capital structure choice by selecting the sample in the 
major industrialized countries, G7 and finds that firm leverage is fairly similar across 
the G7 countries. This is especially in the influence of tangibility, market to book ratio, 
size and profitability thought the institutional differences between G-7 may be 
responsible for differences in capital structure. Booth et al. (2001) uses a new data set 
associating with developing countries to whether capital structure is portable across 
countries with different institutional structure. Similarly, the variables that are relevant 
for explaining capital structure in the United States and European countries are also 
relevant in developing countries (e.g. Brazil, India, Jordan, Pakistan, Thailand, 
Turkey, South Korea), despite the profound difference in institutional factor across 
thesis developing countries. In particular, profitability is one of the firm-level variable 
that shows high convergence in the comparison between countries.  
Wald (1999) also analyse the factors correlating to capital structure by conducting a 
cross-country comparison of five countries, using empirical data from France, 
Germany, japan, the UK and the US. As noted, factors of risk, growth, firm size and 
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inventories show different effect in countries, although variables associating with 
moral hazard, tax deduction, R&D, and profitability are similarly affecting the 
leverage across countries. This indicates that institutions differences between countries 
may be significant determinants of capital structure and the different agency conflict 
across countries may be significant in explaining difference in capital structure.  
Mahajan and Tartaroglu (2008) investigates the equity market timing hypothesis of 
capital structure in major industrialized G-7 countries and indicates that the leverage 
of firms is negative related to the historical market-to-book ratio in all G-7 countries. 
Also, firms in all G-7 countries except Japan, undo the effect of equity issuance and 
the impact of equity market timing attempts on leverage is short lived. This shows the 
common capital structure behaviour relating to market timing theories.  
In addition, a number of studies emphasize that country macroeconomic or 
institutional factors and even culture difference may have a marked influence on 
capital structure. The link between bond market development and firm’s access to 
capital market is one of the significant area that has been showed by a number of 
literature. These researches principally focused on firm’s reliance on debt financing 
and its related agency problem and bankruptcy cost in accessing external financing. 
For instance, De Miguel and Pindado (2001) provide evidence that in countries where 
the bond market is inadequately developed, the advantage provided by private debt, 
which lessens the agency cost of debt, is not as great as the advantage provided by 
access to the bond market. Besides, financial intermediaries (e.g., banks) may have an 
advantage over bond markets after the capital is provided as ex post monitoring raises 
the probability of success and then they may be the preferred source of capital 
(Faulkender and Petersen, 2005). However, according to Faulkender and Petersen 
(2005), firms that have access to the public bond market as measured by having a debt 
rating, have significant more leverage than firms that need to borrow from financial 
intermediaries. This is because the costs of monitoring and imperfect financial 
contracting between firms and financial intermediates raise the costs of debt capital 
and thereby firms lower their desired leverage.  
Further, De Jong et al. (2008) demonstrates that  when bond market in a given country 
is highly developed with better protection of creditor right, and better legal 
enforcement, the roles of bankruptcy cost variables (tangibility, business risk and firm 
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size) can be mitigated as the bond market structure provides protection for both 
creditors and borrowers. In this context, issuing and trading these bonds are easier and 
therefore firm leverage tends to be higher. In more recent works, Lemmon and Zender 
(2010) report that firms that can access the bond market have sufficiently stable cash 
flow, sufficiently large pools of exiting collateral and sufficient information 
transparency to allow access to relatively large amount of arms-length debt. As 
hypothesized by Myers (1984), firms that are able to issue arms-length debt most 
closely conform to the assumptions underlying the pecking order. Firms without the 
ability to access public debt market do not share these characteristics and have to 
borrow from banks and other financial intermediaries. Fan et al. (2012) find that firms 
in countries with larger government bond markets have lower debt ratios and shorter 
maturity debt. This indicates government bonds can influence the supply of debt 
capital that is available to the corporate market, implying that government bonds tend 
to crowd out long term corporate debt.  
Other significant variable is equity market development associating with 
macroeconomic factors that has been analysed in the empirical literatures and theories 
rather more through the bond market development in macroeconomic conditions. 
According to Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996), the initial improvement in the 
functioning of developing stock market produce a higher debt-equity ratio for firms 
and thus more business for banks. In developed stock markets, further development 
leads to a substitution of equity for debt financing. In developing stock markets, large 
firms have more leveraged as the stock market develops. In more recent studies, 
Korajczyk and Levy (2003) provide evidence of how macroeconomic conditions affect 
capital structure choice. After correcting for the run-up in the equity market and the 
variation in the expected price reaction to an equity issue announcement, deviations 
from target leverage ratios that vary with macroeconomic conditions account for a 
significant amount of variation in issue choice. Deesomsak et al. (2004) presents 
evidence that as stock market activity increases, firm’s preference for equity over debt 
also increase. Therefore, stock market’s activity is expected to be inversely related to 
debt. Additionally, De Jong et al. (2008) explains that in contrast to the bond market, 
when stock market developed, firm leverage is lower because the broader supply of 
funds decreases the cost of equity. Considering the variables of growth opportunities 
96 
 
and tangibly arising from agency cost theory, it is expected that when stock market are 
further developed, agency problems among different stakeholders can be mitigated as 
the developed stock market with security laws better protect both shareholders and 
creditors.  
However, Booth et al. (2001) finds that there is no strong relation between bank and 
stock market development, broad macroeconomic factors and aggregate capital 
structure. This probably because the sample of developing countries encompasses a 
wide range of institutional characteristics. Bokpin (2009) also presents the findings 
regarding with the impact of macrocosmic factors on capital structure of firms and 
shows that development in the stock market has insignificant impact on firm’s capital 
structure choices.  
In addition to these direct effects of bond market and stock market development on 
firm leverage, the analysis of direct impact of country-specific factors has been used 
to explain the variation in capital structure across countries. Hackbarth et al. (2006) 
analyses that firms’ restructuring thresholds are lower in good states than in bad state. 
Therefore, the adjustment speed should be faster in good macroeconomic conditions 
than in bad conditions. A set of macroeconomic factors including term spared, default 
spread, GDP growth rate and market dividend yield are employed by Cook and Tang 
(2010) to study the impact of macroeconomic conditions on the speed of capital 
structure adjustment, finding firms tend to adjustment faster toward target leverage 
when GDP increase. As one of the certain factors representing macroeconomic 
condition, GDP growth rate has been analysed in empirical studies. In these studies, 
the quality of the countries’ institutions (GDP growth rate) affects leverage and the 
adjustment speed toward target leverage in significant (Drobetz and Wanzenried, 
2006, Haas and Peeters, 2006). Öztekin (2015) asserts that high quality institutions 
results in faster leverage adjustment, whereas laws and traditions that safeguard debt 
holders relative to stockholders lead to a higher leverage.   
Huang and Ritter (2009) employs contemporaneous measures of the statutory 
corporate tax rate and the GDP growth rate to deal with biases in estimates of the speed 
of adjustment toward target leverage, and find that the real GDP growth rate controls 
for growth opportunities. This indicates firms are more likely to fund their current 
growth opportunities with debt when GDP growth increase. Further, Bokpin (2009) 
97 
 
selects inflation, GDP growth rate and central bank discount rate as proxy for 
macroeconomic condition, and shows that GDP per capita may portray growth for 
firms and an increase in retained earnings hence GDP per capita has a negative 
relationship with the capital structure variables. Kayo and Kimura (2011) analyse the 
influence of several macroeconomic variables on mean leverage of 40 different 
countries, find statically significant results with the fact that GDP growth has a 
negative relationship with debt. As showed by Kayo and Kimura (2011), GDP growth 
as an aggregate to the munificence of a given country, and provides investors with a 
good growth opportunities. Similarly, Jõeveer (2013) introduces GDP growth rate, 
inflation rate and corporate tax rate representing the country characteristics, finds that 
as a proxy for growth opportunities, the effect of GDP growth rate on leverage is 
negative. This suggest the growth of GDP would reduce the leverage of firms. Other 
studies provide opposite results. Hanousek and Shamshur (2011) documents that the 
GDP growth has a positive and significant relation with capital structure. Beside it, 
Mokhova and Zinecker (2014) find that the influences of GDP growth on capital 
structure in all countries that investigated are weak and non-significant.  
Other studies analyse the direct impact of country specific factors, certain factors of 
inflation rate, corporate tax, interest rate, credit rating and other considerable country 
factor that significantly explain the variation in capital structure across countries. 
Frank and Goyal (2003) verify that there is no strong evidence support the fact that 
inflation rate affect leverage of firms. This result has been emphasized in Frank and 
Goyal (2009). Also, Desai et al. (2004) find that inflation does not appear to affect 
leverage. In recent works, Bastos et al. (2009) and Daskalakis et al. (2017) also obtain 
the evidence support that inflation is insignificant in capital structure variation. 
However, other studies find a great influence of inflation on leverage. Mokhova and 
Zinecker (2014) segments the macroeconomic factors as two groups represents fiscal 
and monetary policy of a country. The inflation rate belonging to the momentary 
policy is found to be strongly and negatively affect the total and short-term leverage 
of firms. As can be found, firms in economies in higher inflation are more likely to 
have higher bankruptcy cost (Jõeveer, 2013). Öztekin (2015) implies that higher 
expected inflation makes debt issuance chapter, and more debt in a firm’s capital 
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structure, indicating that the inflation rate is strongly affect the leverage. (Bokpin, 
2009, Hanousek and Shamshur, 2011).  
In analysis of macroeconomic factor of interest rate, Bokpin (2009) shows that 
inflation positively influence the choice of short-term leverage level while interest rate 
positively influences firms to substitute long term debt for short term debt over equity. 
As the cost of debt, external factor of interest rate positively influences the short term 
leverage as the profit-motivated bank have tendency to increase loan to private sector. 
Earlier study Frank and Goyal (2004) provide empirical results that higher interest rate 
are correlated with less equity but more debt. Conversely, Bancel and Mittoo (2004) 
find a negative relationship between interest rate and debt. More corporate debt is 
issued when equity valuation level is low or interest rate are low (Halling et al., 2016). 
This finding is supported by Jõeveer (2013) that suggest a negative impact of interest 
rate on leverage. Mokhova and Zinecker (2014) reveals that in different countries, 
growth in interest rate may lead companies to increase their debt ratio because of tax 
benefit or decrease financial leverage in order to reduce bankruptcy risk. The interest 
rate both short term and long term has strong positive significant impact on capital 
structure in Germany and France while that has negative relationship with capital 
structure in Slovakia. The long-term rate and capital structure have weak relation in 
Poland, Hungary and Greece. Karpavičius and Yu (2017) assert that firms do not adjust 
their capital structure based on interest rate, except when they expect a recessionary 
period. During periods of recession, interest rate tends to be lower due to interventions 
by the Central Bank’s monetary policy, but firms also lower their demand for external 
financing.  
In addition to these direct impact of country factors, financial system comprising of 
bank-based country and market-based country is found to be associated with capital 
structure. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) summarize that the banking system 
and market system affect firm’s ability to obtain financing in different ways, especially 
at lower levels of financial development. The development of market-based system is 
more related to long-term financing while the banking system is more related to the 
availability of short term financing. Later, Lööf (2003) claims that the speed of 
adjusting capital structure is faster towards the target in the equity-based system. This 
indication has been investigated by Haas and Peeters (2006) that better banking system 
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enable firms to adjust capital structure easier towards their targets. Further, as 
Antoniou et al (2008) reminds, the capital structure is heavily influenced by the 
economic environment and its institutions, corporate governance practices, tax 
systems, the borrower-lender relation and especially the financial system. Firms in the 
market-based countries (UK, US) are found to have a less concentrated ownership 
structure, while in bank-based countries (German, Japan and French) the concentration 
is higher. This is probably because the agency perspective debt plays an important 
disciplinary role against manager’s opportunistic behaviour and firms leverage would 
be higher in market-based countries. Ampenberger et al. (2013) further claims that 
firms in bank-based system, especially family firms, have lower leverage than firms 
in market-based system due to the concentrated ownership pattern with firms. 
However, Deesomsak et al. (2004) provide opposite argument that the close 
relationship between borrowing firms and lenders in bank-based system is more 
important determinant than market-based explanations. Thus, firms borrow easier in 
bank-based system.  
Deesomsak et al. (2004) better legal environment encourage the development of 
capital markets and decrease the cost of capital, this leads to a positive relationship 
between legal environment and leverage. According to Fan et al. (2012), countries’ 
legal system and tax system, the level of corruption and the preference of capital 
supplier explain a significant proportion of the variation in leverage and debt maturity 
ratio. Based on results, firms in countries that are viewed as more corrupt tend to use 
less equity and more debt, especially short term debt. While firms operating within 
legal systems that provide better protection for financial claimant tend to have capital 
structure with more equity, and relatively more long term debt. Beck et al. (2011) 
employ cost of property registration, property rights, credit information index and cost 
of contract enforcement as proxy of legal system, claiming that these several of legal 
and institutional environment across countries can explain the differences in the type 
and pricing of lending of firms. For instance, the lower share of loans in firms of 
developing countries caused by a higher cost of registering property, worse credit 
information environment, higher costs of enforcing contracts and worse protection of 
property rights. Tchakoute Tchuigoua (2014) uses legal origin, creditor rights index 
and corruption index representing the legal tradition of countries, and finds that has 
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positive influence on capital structure but this influence is limited. Further, the 
leverage appears to be more important in common-law countries. According to several 
studies Daher (2017), Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009) , De Jong et al. (2008), Psillaki 
and Daskalakis (2009), Li et al. (2009), with better legal enforcement, capital suppliers 
are able to contain the risk of supplying capital because the assurance that in the event 
of default they can claim collectivized assets and preserve the value of their claims. 
This plays an important role in giving capital supplier incentive to extend more debt 
and equity, and impose more favourable term since contract ex-ante, knowing their 
rights are enforced by the law. In countries where laws are not strongly enforced and 
the subject to corrupt institutions, creditors resort to cutting credit facilities and arguing 
strict contract term to control risk of default (Chen, 2004, Öztekin, 2015, Giannetti, 
2003). However, Cho (2014) and presents that strong creditor rights are associated 
with low long term leverage,  
Other studies Daskalakis et al. (2017) find that the main determinants of the debt ratio 
is its lagged value across all three forms of leverage, indicating that the remaining firm 
and macroeconomic factors play a secondary role in their dynamic determination.  
 
2.3 Corporate, Financial and Public Policy on Capital Structure  
Many factors contributed to the capital structure variation of firms. This section 
reviews one important aspect of that variation, which referred to corporate, financial 
and public policy. Political news has dominated financial markets recently because 
government financial policies affect the markets (Stiglitz and Uy 1996; Pástor and 
Veronesi 2013). In earlier literature, the interest rate controls and directed credit 
programmes were found to impede the process of financial deepening (McKinnon 
1993). Moreover, there are literatures which emphasize financial market imperfection,   
including asymmetric information and imperfect competition, that address conclusion 
that substantially qualify the predictions of the financial liberalizations thesis (Gertler 
1991; Stiglitz 1993). The empirical literature on the effect of financial policies has 
been recently growing. Existing macro-econometric studies investigate a number of 
Asian economics, and reveal that the effect of financial restraints may be very large 
but vary considerably across countries (Arestis et al. 2002). In study of Asian, Rossi 
(1999) claim that given the bank’s central role in the payment system and in the 
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mobilization and distribution of financial resources, the financial restraints, with the 
exception of effective regulation and supervision, may hamper financial development.  
Stiglitz and Uy (1996) identified that government’s financial policies have three 
elements: creating markets and financial institutions; regulating them; and providing 
rewards to firms that undertake priority activities in an exemplary manner. Based on 
the East Asian experience, Stiglitz and Uy (1996) describe that most governments’ 
public policies relating to financial markets promoted savings and the degree of 
success determined how efficiently capital was allocated. In the study, there are five 
of the more important interventions are pointed out, which are promoting savings, 
regulating banks to fortify their solvency, creating financial institutions and markets, 
enforcing financial restraints, and intervening directly in the allocation of credit.  
These policies therefore led to high national saving rates in the East Asian countries. 
In a study of Finland, Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005) demonstrate that public policy 
can complement capital markets when capital-market imperfections retard innovation 
and growth. By studying the effect of government funding on R&D investment and 
the growth orientation of SMEs, Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005) show that firms are 
more reliant on external financing when they have more government funding.  
 
Uncertainty of Economic Policy  
Political news has been dominating financial markets recently (Pástor and Veronesi 
2013). Due to the nature of policy decision making and implementation process, 
economic policies typically generate a large amount of uncertainty, which can impose 
profound impacts on the financial market and firm behaviour. Literature in relation to 
corporate finance has explored the association between economic policy uncertainty 
and asset prices, corporate and IPO activities (Brogaard and Detzel 2015). However, 
an understanding towards the effect of economic policy uncertainty on firm’s capital 
structure choice, is still limited. Furthermore, prior research in this area has rarely paid 
attention to emerging or transition economies, where the financial markets tend to be 
highly regulated and prone to being influenced by government policy (Zhang et al. 
2015).  
Capital structure policy deals with the financing of firm’s activities, with debt, equity 
and intermediate securities. In relation to economic policy, there are two alternative 
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steams that are categorized by Zhang et al. (2015) as the supply effect and the demand 
effect. Supply effect of economic policy on capital structure is that uncertainty in 
policies can deteriorate the external financing environment. When economic policy 
uncertainty increases, the information asymmetry between borrowers and creditors 
becomes more severe and moreover, firm’s future cash flows are more volatile because 
of the higher default risk. In this instance, according to Zhang et al. (2015) firms will 
lower their leverage ratios in order to seek financial flexibility because the uncertainty 
of policy can lead to higher external financing costs.  
Based on this, empirical research on the financial market investigate that economic 
policy uncertainty increase the risk premium of municipal bonds (Gao and Qi 2012). 
For example, the offering yields of municipal bonds issued during election periods are 
higher than those of bonds issued during non-election periods in the.  Gao and Qi 
(2012) state that the impact of polities on public financing costs varies with local 
economic conditions. Moreover, Francis et al. (2014) examines whether and how 
policies influence on a firm’s cost of bank loans, given that political uncertainty greatly 
impacts firm level investment decisions. Firms with higher idiosyncratic political 
exposure face higher of debt and on the supply side, creditors with higher political 
exposures lead to additional loan price.  As this paper noted, economic or public 
policies with uncertainty that imposes additional costs and more stringent non-price 
term on bank loan contracts at both aggregate and firm level (Francis et al. 2014).  
 
In perspective of demand effect of policy, firms reduce their financing demands in face 
of increasing policy uncertainty (Bloom et al. 2007). Prior research examines when 
firm face high political uncertainty or restriction on financing channel, firm will be 
more conservative in making investment decision. According to Bloom et al. (2007), 
investment, in particular, for large manufacturing firm will respond more cautiously 
to a given demand shock at higher level of uncertainty and will have a convex response 
to positive demand shocks. Other studies tests that with policy uncertainty or 
restriction, firm will lower their investment level (Wang et al. 2014; Gulen and Ion 
2015).  
Based on Chinese listed companies, Wang et al. (2014) find out that when the degree 
of economic policy uncertainty is higher, firm stand to lower their investment, and 
therefore keeping the transparency and stability of the implantation of economic 
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policies can improve corporate investment efficiency. However, Kang et al. (2014) 
argues that the effect of economic policy uncertainty on firm-level investment is 
greater for small and medium firms than very largest firms. In conclusion, both supply 
effect and demand effect assert a negative impact of economic policy uncertainty and 
restriction on capital structure of firm.  
 
2.3 Conclusion  
Chapter Two reviews the developments of the theoretical and empirical research of 
capital structure. It starts with highlighting the five main theoretical models of capital 
structure from the lately 1950s. Extant literature on capital structure analyse its 
determinants from various angles. A number of studies investigate why firms’ 
financing strategy are affected by various financial factors including profitability, tax 
shield and market to time ratio. Other studies focus on the effect of economic and 
social on leverages of firms. This chapter reviews the fundamental theories that have 
been pointed out to be crucial in investigating the relationship between capital 
structure and its determinants.  
Modigliani and Miller (1958) has been mentioned in studies of capital structure to be 
a fundamental model that initially provides the concept of capital structure. The 
various theories of capital structure differ according to richness of their assumption. 
In the scenario of Modigliani-Miller (MM) model, there are no taxes including 
personal and corporate, no risk and capital market that are perfect. This assumptions 
imply that real economic decisions are independent of capital structure. Therefore, the 
assumption regarding with tax irrelevance has been relaxed in later studies. When 
corporate taxes are introduced, a tax advantage for debt is created, since interest 
payments are deductible, and profit are not. In this case, the optimal capital structure 
consists of 100% debt  (Modigliani and Miller 1963). In addition to corporate taxes, 
firms have to consider personal taxes in their decision about capital structure (Miller 
1977; DeAngelo and Masulis 1980).  
During the 1960s and 1980s, various economic studies introduced several theories of 
capital structure including trade-off theory, signalling theory, pecking order theory and 
agency theory. Based on Modigliani and Miller model, trade-off theory is introduced 
by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) that firm balances the tax benefits of debt against 
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the deadweight costs of financial distress and bankruptcy. As firms are allowed to 
deduct interest paid on debt from their tax liability, they favour debt over equity and 
this increases firms’ value. This tax shield implies full debt financing of firms if 
without any additional and offsetting cost of debt.  
The pecking order theory, proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984), is 
based on the assumption of asymmetric information between firm insider and outsiders 
and the resulting adverse selection problems. Managers of firms have more 
information than outside debt holders and shareholders and thus debt holders and 
shareholders observe financing decisions to infer information of a firm’s prospects. 
Therefore the pecking order theory ranks financing sourcing depends on the degree 
they are affected by information asymmetry, where internal funds shows lowest, debt 
has the second and equity has the highest adverse selection costs. In pecking order 
theory’ proposition, there is no predictions about an optimal capital structure and 
firm’s capital structure is the results of the firm’s financing requirements over time 
and its attempt to minimize adverse selection costs.  
The signalling theory is another model of capital structure that developed by Ross 
(1977) based on the assumption of asymmetric information. It suggests that when there 
is information between the managers of companies and shareholders, changes in the 
capital structure by management are concerned by shareholders as signals of the future 
prospects of firms. Debt financing, according to signalling theory, is treated as a 
positive signal of better future prospects as debt financing would impose financial 
discipline on the management. Therefore, a new project with debt financing may have 
a positive signalling effect and shareholders will receive signal that the managers 
consider equity price of firms to be under-valued. This is way the firm decide to have 
debt financing rather than equity issuing when price of equity lower than their intrinsic 
value.  
In 1970s, Jensen and Meckling (1976) introduce an entire area of study called “agency 
theory” that focus on the conflicts between different groups of shareholders, 
managements and debt holders. This model presents a further theoretical development 
that support the influence of diversification strategy on capital structure. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) points out the disciplining role of debt on managerial behaviour in 
that it decreases manager’s discretion regarding free cash flow. Therefore, agency 
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theory supports the positive role of debt in reducing the strategy of manager to expand 
their own benefit. In addition, shareholder have incentive to transfer wealth from debt 
holders to shareholders through a strong increase in dividend or by issuing more senior 
debt, firms can alleviate the differences in information and interests between the 
shareholders and the debt holders due to the underinvestment problem and asset 
substitution problem. For instance, giving lenders a direct equity stake, convertible 
bonds or debt contract are the way firms to hedge the conflict between shareholders 
and bondholders arising from debt overhang, risk shifting and asset stripping.  
In period of 2000s, Baker and Wurgler (2002) based on market timing hypothesis, 
summaries market timing theory of capital structure that explain a broader set of 
phenomena than current exists. According to Baker and Wurgler (2002), market timing 
theory primarily advocates that capital structure evolves as the cumulative outcome of 
past attempts to time the equity market. Thus, firms prefer equity when the relative 
cost of equity is low and prefer debt otherwise. There are two versions of market 
timing.  
Evidences reviewed in this chapter usually confirm the prediction of trade-off theory 
and pecking order theory. Trade off theory proposes that leverage should be inversely 
related to bankruptcy cost but ignore the correlation between debt and profitability. 
Pecking order model provides the explanation for this relation. Agency theory is useful 
in explaining the effect of consequences arising from conflicts of shareholders, 
managers and bondholders on leverage. Furthermore, empirical evidence on signalling 
theory which predicts the positive market reaction on debt issuing are not significant 
and strongly support. There are strongly support for market timing theory that 
managers will issue securities until market conditions getting better.  
There are several conclusions emerge from the development of macroeconomics and 
industrial conditions. a significant relationship between change in debt level at the 
micro conditions including GDP, inflation, interest, market competition and average 
industrial leverage. Firm specific factors arising from fundamental theories might not 
explain capital structure various in completely. Factors such as corporate governance, 
political conditions, economic development and other macro conditions are also 
empirically tested to be significantly affect capital structure. However, most evidences 
affirming that firm effects are more important than country or economic effects in 
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capital structure decision although country-specific factor are significant in explaining 
differences between corporate financial structure and system.  
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Chapter Three: Hypothesis Development  
This chapter explains the hypotheses set out in the research and the reasons behind for 
them based on the empirical and theoretical literature discussion in the previous 
chapter.  
Based on an early study by Balakrishnan and Fox (1993), in recent research 
developments in transaction cost economics suggest that capital structure of a firm’s 
may have more correlations with control factors of strategic and microeconomic 
importance than those that are purely financial. The preponderance of the studies on 
capital structure focus on an analysis of firm characteristics. More recently, the role of 
countries and industries in capital structure decisions have been analysed (Antoniou et 
al. 2008; Kayo and Kimura 2011). These studies provide details that, along with firm 
characteristics and macroeconomic determinants (e.g. GDP, capital formation, the 
development of capital market and financial systems) may also influence capital 
structure variations. Therefore, this chapter develops the hypotheses relating to 
regarding involved at a firm-specific level, an industry-specific level and a country-
specific levels.  
3.1 Firm Specific Factors 
Capital structure decisions are primarily determined by a combination of factors that 
are significantly linked to the factors of firm characteristics. Having discussed the past 
studies of capital structure, this sector takes a more structured approach to identifying 
factors of capital structure on the firm specific level. According to an early study by 
Harris and Raviv (1991), “leverage increases with fixed assets, non-debt tax shield, 
investment opportunities, and firm size, and it decreases with volatility, the probability 
of bankruptcy, profitability, and asset intangibility”. Drobetz and Wanzenried (2006) 
explain that observable factors of leverage should be related to capital structure 
theories as these factors are assumed to be a proxy for the fundamental forces that 
drive these theories. However, the results of empirical research are ambiguous and do 
not always follow the interpretations of theories. More recently, empirical research has 
provided more detail of leverage factors that relate to a specific economic 
environment.  
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This section discusses the hypothesis developed from firm characteristics. These 
factors are firm size, growth opportunities, non-debt tax shield, profitability, asset 
structure, liquidity, product uniqueness, tax shield, default risk and dividend pay-out. 
Concerning firm specific level, the trade-off theory, the pecking order theory and the 
agency cost theory are the three major theoretical frameworks that significantly 
influence capital structure.  
Table 4.1 displays a summary of predictions of the trade-off theory, pecking order 
theory and agency cost theory regarding the relationship between leverage and major 
capital structure factors on a firm specific level.   
Table 3. 1 Predictions of Capital Structure Theories 
Factor 
Trade-Off 
Theory 
Pecking Order 
Theory 
Agency cost 
Theory 
Firm size + - + 
Growth 
Opportunities - +/- - 
Non-debt tax shield + - - 
Profitability + - + 
Asset Structure + - + 
Liquidity + - + 
Product Uniqueness - + - 
Tax Shield +   
Default Risk  - -  
Dividend Pay-out  + - 
 
3.1.1 Firm Size  
The influence of firm size on capital structure is ambiguous in the research studies. 
Titman and Wessels (1988) assert that firms with larger size are more diversified and 
less likely to be susceptible to financial distress. As bankruptcy cost comprises of a 
large fixed and proportional component, it is more likely to be relatively higher in 
firms with smaller size (Haas and Peeters 2006). Therefore large firms should have 
more leverage than smaller firms and firm size should be positively correlated with 
leverage. According to predictions of trade-off, there is an inverse correlation between 
firm size and the probability of bankruptcy, and hence there is a positive relationship 
between firm size and leverage (González and González 2012). Additionally, large 
firms may have a reputation in the debt market and consequently lead to a lower 
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agency costs of debt, relatively lower monitoring costs, less volatility of cash flow, 
and more benefits from the tax shield (Deesomsak et al. 2004). Due to the 
consideration of agency cost, the leverage level may be positively related to firm size.  
It has been argued in pecking order theory that firm size is negatively related to 
leverage level. This is that larger firms have been around longer and have greater 
popularity. Adverse selection may be more important for these large firms based on 
greater assets and greater capital accumulations. Therefore, large firms will have less 
debt financing than small firms (Ozkan 2001). There is an important caveat that firm 
size can be identified as a proxy for information asymmetry between firm insiders and 
outsiders (Balakrishnan and Fox 1993). According to Parsons and Titman (2009) and 
Frank and Goyal (2003), large firms have lower adverse selection costs. Smaller firms 
may spend relatively higher cost to resolve information asymmetries with lenders and 
shareholders. In consequence, the cost of capital is higher for smaller firms that 
discourage the use of outside financing. Larger firms can issue equity more easily than 
small firms where severe adverse selection problem that result in a higher cost of 
adverse selection (Cassar and Holmes 2003). Accordingly, the pecking order theory 
predicts a negative relationship between leverage and firm size, “with larger firms 
exhibiting increasing preference for equity relative to debt” (Drobetz and Wanzenried 
2006). In addition in this model, the transaction cost may affect the approach to 
financing as transaction cost is most likely a function of scale, with smaller scale 
financing resulting in relatively higher transaction cost  (Cassar and Holmes 2003).  
The measure of firm size is mixed in empirical research. Firm size is generally 
measured as the logarithm of total assets or sales and the maturity of the firm. 
Alternatively, size is captured by another batch of studies (Flavin and O'Connor 2010; 
Kurshev and Strebulaev 2015)  as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
firm has been listed on the stock market for more than a certain period, and 0 if less 
than a given period.  
Similar to the empirical evidence of trade-off, the hypothesis is that  
HF1: there is a significant positive relationship between firm size and leverage 
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3.1.2 Growth Opportunities  
Myers (1977) suggests that the managers of firms with leverage have a motivation to 
engage in investments of underinvestment and asset substitution. The agency cost 
relating to debt is higher for firms with fewer growth opportunities because there is a 
stronger incentives for firms to avoid problems of underinvestment and asset 
substitution arising from shareholder and manager conflicts. Accordingly, the level of 
debt issued by a firm is negatively correlated to the growth opportunities including 
future investment opportunities, which will increase the value of firm when undertaken 
(Ozkan 2001). However, as Mason and Merton (1985) identify, “firms with more 
growth options are those that have relatively more capacity expansion projects, new 
product lines, acquisition of other firms and maintenance and replacement of existing 
assets”. It is argued by Ozkan (2001) that, to some extent, firms raise funding with 
substantial risky debt will pass up many of valuable investment opportunities. Titman 
and Wessels (1988) also point out that firms in fast growing industries cause higher 
agency costs because of the flexibility in taking future investment.  
Growth opportunities are treated as capital assets in Titman and Wessels (1988) who 
add value to the firm although they cannot be collateralized as well as fixed assets. In 
addition, growth opportunities cannot generate current taxable income. Thus, a firm 
with more growth opportunities would offset taxable income with only an appropriate 
amount of debt (Parsons and Titman 2009). This description is consistent with trade-
off theory which explains that asset tangibility significantly affects the cost of financial 
distress. Also, according to Parsons and Titman (2009), a firm with growth 
opportunities is more likely to invest heavily in the future and then choose to keep 
financial slack for financing these investments. In this situation, firms with future 
growth opportunities, which can be a form of intangible assets, in other words, will 
have less debt than firms with more tangible assets because growth opportunities 
cannot be collateralized (Myers and Majluf 1984; Williamson 1988; Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers 1999). Additionally, according to these studies, the value of growth 
opportunities will drop precipitously when the firm enters bankruptcy, implying that 
expected bankruptcy cost for firms with more growth options will be higher.  a large 
expected cost of bankruptcy will consequent in lower leverage in turn (Ozkan 2001).  
111 
 
The pecking order theory suggests a positive relationship between leverage and growth 
opportunities of a firm (Myers and Majluf 1984), which is the inverse of the agency 
cost and trade-off model. Firms with higher growth opportunities suggests a greater 
demand of capital. According to pecking order theory, debt will typically increase if 
capital on investment exceeds a firm’s retained earnings, and will decease if capital is 
less than retained earnings. Hence leverage is predicted to be higher in firms with more 
investment opportunities (Frank and Goyal 2003). Alternatively, firms with high 
growth opportunities will be overvalued and thus have a motivation to attract more 
equity financing due to the favourable price of equity (Moeller et al. 2004). 
In a number of studies, growth opportunities are suggested using the market to book 
ratio (Myers 1977; Rajan and Zingales 1995; Hovakimian et al. 2012). Other studies 
(Goyal et al. 2002; Kumar et al. 2017; Dang et al. 2018) use the change in the logarithm 
of total asset value , sales growth (Lang et al. 1996) or capital expenditure to assets 
(Harvey et al. 2004) to capture the future growth.  
Similar to the empirical evidence of agency cost, the hypothesis is that  
HF2: there is a significant negative relationship between growth opportunities and 
leverage 
 
3.1.3 Non-Debt Tax Shield  
A number of investments could have non-debt tax benefits that are uncorrelated to the 
approach of how firms finance these investment (Ozkan 2001). It is known that the 
reduction of tax liability increases the firm’s free cash flow (after tax) due to the 
interest deducibility. In the absence of personal taxes, the interest tax shield increases 
the value of a firm (Graham and Harvey 2001). Hence, using debt has more advantage 
in tax deduction than equity. In practice, empirical studies of Bradley et al. (1984) and 
Delcoure (2007) provide evidence that a firm also has a non-debt tax shield available 
to it. For instance, depreciation and carry forward losses, similar to interest payment, 
are also widely used to shield tax. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) devised a model 
where the non-debt tax shield “serves as a substitute for the payment of interest that is 
deductible in the calculation of corporate tax”. Firms with larger amount of non-debt 
tax shields are predicted to have lower debts as these firms may not have sufficient 
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taxable profits to achieve benefit from interest deduction. Accordingly, an inverse 
relationship is expected between the level of the non-debt tax shield and leverage. This 
prediction is consistent with relevant studies (de Miguel and Pindado 2001; 
Deesomsak et al. 2004; Delcoure 2007). In other research line, Bradley et al. (1984) 
involve investment tax credit and annual depreciation charges as a proxy of the non-
debt tax shield, and find leverage positively impacted by the non-debt tax shield.  
Titman and Wessels (1988) and Ozkan (2001) use the annual depreciation expense 
ratio to total assets as a proxy for a non-debt tax shield. Both studies find that the 
simple correlation between a non-debt tax shield and the measures of leverage is 
negative. However, there is a highly correlation between the non-debt tax shield and 
asset tangibility as firms with higher amount of depreciation may also correspondingly 
have large numbers of fixed assets, which act as collateral against debt.  
The proxy of tangibility is not included in this hypothesis. Alternatively, the ratio of 
investment tax credit over total assets and the ratio of non-debt tax shield over total 
assets are also used to explain capital structure.  
Similar to the empirical evidence of trade-off, the hypothesis is that  
HF3: there is a significant negative relationship between non-debt tax and leverage 
 
3.1.4 Profitability  
The traditional trade-off theory of capital structure suggests a positive relationship 
between leverage and profitability with consideration of the bankruptcy costs and taxes 
(Modigliani and Miller 1963).  Firms with greater profit are less likely to decline the 
leverage because the costs of financial distress and transaction are relativity lower in 
profitable firms. In addition to this, the more profitable a firm is, the more the firm is 
likely to shield its profit from taxes, especially by issuing debt. Thus, firms with more 
profit will borrow more as the likelihood of paying off the loans is greater (MacKie‐
Mason 1990; Gill et al. 2011). However, the dynamic trade-off model of capital 
structure (Fischer et al. 1989; Leland 1998; Hovakimian et al. 2004; Gaud et al. 2005) 
takes into consideration adjusting cost toward the target debt ratio and demonstrates 
that probability has a negative impact on leverage. This is because the dynamic 
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adjusting of cost is offset when firms reset their capital structure. One reason for the 
difference between traditional trade-off tests and the dynamic trade-off model is that 
studies use past profitability while the model focuses on expected future profitability. 
Xu (2012) suggests that the debt ratio is affected by the balance of the present value 
of expected bankruptcy cost and the present value of the expected debt tax shield, both 
of which, depending on expected future profitability, may not be impacted by realized 
past probability. Therefore, a dynamic model of trade-off which assumes the cost of 
bankruptcy and tax shields to be adjusted in time, might resolve it with accurate 
measure.  
The agency cost model proposes a positive relationship between profitability and 
leverage since the higher debt “helps to control agency problems by forcing managers 
to pay out more of the firm’s surplus cash” (Jensen 1986). A stronger commitment to 
using a large fraction of pre-interest earning for debt payment suggest that profitable 
firms, which may have substantial free cash flow, will have more debt to equity ratio. 
This notion is also suggested by Ross (1977) in the signalling theory of capital 
structure that managers increase level of debt to show an optimistic future for the firm 
to external investors.  
The hypothesised negative relationship between firm profitability and capital structure 
is developed in the pecking order theory of Myers (1984). Due to the information 
asymmetries between insiders and outsiders of firm, there is a “preference for inside 
financing over outside financing” (Cassar and Holmes 2003). Thus, a firm with higher 
profitability may have access to retained profit and then use it for internal financing 
rather than acquiring external financing sources (Fama and Jensen 1983; López-Gracia 
and Sogorb-Mira 2008; de Jong et al. 2011). Consequently, higher earnings lead to 
less leverage. The leverage of SMEs is found to be consistent with pecking order that 
is negatively associated with profitability (Hall et al. 2000; Forte et al. 2013).  
There are several common measures for profitability that are frequently used in the 
literature. For instance, the return before interest, tax and depreciation (EBIT) to total 
assets (ROA) is used in recent studies of Hovakimian et al. (2004), Delcoure (2007) 
and López-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira (2008). Another proxy of the gross margin, which 
is the ratio of operating income to sales, is also frequently used (Gharaibeh 2015).  
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Similar to the empirical evidence of pecking order prediction, the hypothesis is that 
HF4: there is a significant negative relationship between firm’s profitability and 
leverage 
 
3.1.5 Asset structure: Asset Tangibility/Liquidity  
Titman and Wessels (1988) consider asset structure as a significant determinant of the 
capital structure, especially of a new firm. The degree that “the firm’s assets are 
tangible and generic results in the firm having a greater liquidation value” (Harris and 
Raviv 1991). For instance, the tangibility of asset such as property, plant and 
equipment (PPE) can be described as an approach to measure the level of collateral 
that a firm can show to debtors. A high degree of asset tangibility provides debtors 
with a high level of guarantee since fixed assets can be liquidated in the situation of 
bankruptcy. Nevertheless, assets with low levels of tangibility have little collateral for 
debt holders if the firm was facing bankruptcy. In the perspective of static trade-off, 
tangibility has a significant effect on the costs of financial distress.  
From the perspective of agency cost, pledging the tangible assets of firms as collateral 
or arranging a fixed charge that directly refers to the tangible assets of a firm may 
mitigate the agency cost of adverse selection and moral hazard. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Galai and Masulis (1976) note that shareholders of the firms with leverage 
are prone to over-invest with an incentive of asset substitution that leads to shareholder 
and bondholder conflict. However, creditors can improve the guarantee of repayment 
when debt is secured against assets, resulting in a higher rate of interest. In brief, firms 
with high tangibility of assets will “have greater liquidation value and relatively easier 
access to finance and lower cost of financing, leading to firms absorbing a high level 
of debt” (Cassar and Holmes 2003).     
Based on the agency problems of managers’ and shareholders’ conflict, Grossman and 
Hart (1982) argue that managers of firms with lower levels of asset which can be used 
as collateral will consume more perquisite. Managers of firm with high leverage will 
be less able to use excessive perquisites because of the disciplinary role of debt. 
Therefore, this disciplinary role of debt depends on firms with few tangible assets 
(Jensen 1986). This adverse relationship is also supported by the pecking order 
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interpretation which predicts that firms with tangible asset are more sensitive to 
information asymmetries. Based on an interpretation of pecking order, firms with more 
tangible assets will be less likely to have an asymmetric information problem between 
insiders and outsiders and therefore this low information asymmetry associated with 
tangible assets will make issuing equity less costly. Therefore, leverage will be lower 
for firms with greater tangible assets (Graham et al. 2015)  
The relevant studies suggest a positive relationship consistent with arguments between 
asset tangibility and leverage for SME firms (Cassar and Holmes 2003; Sogorb-Mira 
2005). It has also empirically demonstrated that SMEs have a negative relationship 
between asset tangibility and debt ratio (Daskalakis and Psillaki 2008).  
Tangibility of asset generally can be measured by using a variety of proxy variables, 
including the ratio of net property, plant and equipment (PPE) to total assets (Cassar 
and Holmes 2003; Delcoure 2007; González and González 2008; Margaritis and 
Psillaki 2010; Campello and Giambona 2013), the ratio of research and development 
(R&D) to sales and the ratio of capital expenditure to sales.  
Similar to trade-off theory and agency cost theory, the hypothesis is that 
HF5: There is a significant positive relationship between a firm’s asset structure and 
leverage 
 
3.1.6 Debt Tax Shield  
Firms have a motivation to increase debt due to the benefit from the tax shield arising 
from interest deductibility (Modigliani and Miller 1963). The seminar work of  
Modigliani and Miller (1963) devises a trade-off model of capital structure positing 
that firms will exploit the tax deductibility of interest payment to reduce their tax 
payment and determine the leverage ratio by trading-off these benefits gained from tax 
against the shortcoming of debt financing (the cost of financial distress). For this 
reason, firms will prefer more debt financing to other financing resources when 
corporate tax rates are higher and hence the effective tax rate will be positively related 
to debt and, as Modigliani and Miller (1963) predict, the firm value will also increase 
with use of debt.  
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However, use of debt also increases the cost of financial distress. Kraus and 
Litzenberger (1973) and Graham (2006) show in a framework of state preference that 
“firms trade off bankruptcy cost with the tax advantage of debt to meet an optimal 
capital structure involving less than 100 percent of debt”. Kim (1978) states that in a 
perfect capital market with friction of corporate income tax and bankruptcy cost, firms 
have a debt capacity that should be less than 100 percent and firms’ debt ratio should 
be less than their debt capacity. In a word, the relationship between effective tax rate 
and debt ratio presents a non-linear curve based on the balancing between tax 
advantage and bankruptcy cost.  
Furthermore, costs of non-bankruptcy which can be also be traded off against the tax 
benefits of debt are introduced in other studies. Jensen and Meckling (1976) posit 
agency cost of equity and agency cost of debt that relates to deadweight cost. Taxation 
is mostly concerned with having a deadweight cost as it gives firms an incentive to 
perform untaxed activities at the expense of taxed activities (Graham 2006) According 
to Smart (1998), a higher tax rate causes higher deadweight cost than a lower tax rate. 
Additionally, Myers (1977) refers to the cost of under-investment arising from agency 
problems of equity due to substantial debt overhang. These costs might have impacts 
on the association between effective tax rate and leverage.  
Regardless of the type of cost, firms with other tax shields of operating loss carry-
forward, depreciation expenses and investment tax credit decrease the demand of 
exploiting the debt tax shield (González and González 2012). DeAngelo and Masulis 
(1980) build up a model of corporate tax and various personal taxes debating that, if 
non-debt tax exists, a firm is likely to depreciate the full use of the debt tax shield. As 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) demonstrate, “the non-debt tax shield suggests a unique 
interior optimum leverage decision for each firm in market equilibrium”, without 
being concerned with whether cost associated with debt is present or not. For this 
reason, firms with greater non-debt tax may have less motivation to increase debt from 
a tax shield perspective thus suggesting a negative relationship between leverage and 
effective tax rate.  
Based on DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), Ross (1985) further explains that firms with 
an excessive amount of borrowing may become tax exhausted in the sense that the 
firm cannot use all the potential tax shield. With non-tax shield increase, the expected 
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value of the tax shield will relatively decline and the incentive to use debt financing 
will diminish. Accordingly, another prediction based on a framework of trade-off 
proposes a negative relationship between effective tax rate and debt.  
3.1.7 Liquidity  
The impact of liquidity on the optimal leverage ratio of firms is another factor in 
explaining capital structure decision. Similar to tangible asset, “liquidity is the degree 
to which asset can be traded in the market without affecting its price” (Sharma and 
Paul 2015). According to Lipson and Mortal (2009), a more frequent trading activity 
and relatively smooth transitions in price characterize liquid asset. The necessity of 
liquidity as a factor of capital structure is showed by two groups of studies, one 
explaining the effect of transaction costs based on cost of equity and the other line 
explaining capital structure choice based on frameworks of trade-off , agency cost and 
pecking order theory (Morellec 2001; Myers 2001; Lipson and Mortal 2009).  
As higher liquidity may increase the value of a firm in liquidation, the proposition of 
trade-off theory is that liquidity increases debt capacity because firms with higher 
liquidity ratio will have greater ability to pay off short-term obligations of liabilities. 
This implies a positive relationship between a firm’s liquidity position and its debt 
ratio (Shleifer and Vishny 1992; Ozkan 2001). According to Williamson (1988) and 
Shleifer and Vishny (1992),  there is a positive relationship between asset liquidity and 
optimal leverage. Additionally, liquid source including free cash flow may give an 
incentive for managers to engage in overvalued investment, resulting in an agency 
problem of shareholders’ and managers’ conflict. The agency cost of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) suggest that leverage is positively associated with liquidity as 
leverage can serve in a disciplinary role on management. However, firms with higher 
liquidity may use these assets to invest in new projects and, consequently, the liquidity 
ratio of firms will exert a negative impact on their leverage level (Ozkan 2001). As 
Myers and Rajan (1998) infer, the liquidity assets imply the extent to which these 
assets are manipulated by shareholders at the expense of bondholders. The lower asset 
liquidity may reduce the cost of debt, and as a result firms with lower liquidity use 
more debt.  
The third implication is a hierarchy among sources of financing consistent with the 
explanation of the pecking order model. This hierarchy is a function of investment 
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conditions. The hierarchy of financing is internal fund first, short-term debt second 
and external equity third. In accordance with the pecking order theory, liquidity is 
inversely related to leverage (Myers and Rajan 1998; Morellec 2001). However, if 
there is a shortage of internal funds, firms will avoid short-term debt and turn to issue 
equity due to the bankruptcy cost (Anderson and Carverhill 2011). Hence the effect of 
liquidity on leverage is relatively positive (Anderson and Carverhill 2011).  
Other studies (Lipson and Mortal 2009) find that the liquidity of a firm’s asset is 
correlated with the ease with which  firms can raise external capital through stocks 
offering. According to Butler et al. (2005), shareholders have to be compensated for 
the transaction cost when trading shares. This transaction cost is viewed as an inclusion 
of the cost of equity financing and, based on transaction cost, Hennessy and Whited 
(2005) explain that lower liquid stocks are more likely to have a higher cost of issuance 
and then a higher cost of equity financing. In other words, firms which have more 
sufficient liquid equity may have a lower cost of equity than firms which have less 
liquid asset to the extent that capital structure decisions weigh the tax benefit and the 
cost of equity, and more liquid firms will use relatively more equity financing due to 
the lower transaction cost and naturally have less leverage (Udomsirikul et al. 2011).  
Liquidity ratio have a mixed measure; the ratio of current assets to current liabilities is 
mostly used as a proxy for the liquidity of the firm's assets.  
Similar to the empirical evidence of pecking order prediction, the hypothesis is that 
HF6: there is a significant positive relationship between liquidity and leverage 
3.1.8 Product Uniqueness  
Firms generally invest in their specific assets in order to enhance their uniqueness and 
competitive advantage in markets (Foss and Mahnke 2002). This asset specific also 
heavily affects the firm’s ability to borrow (Balakrishnan and Fox 1993). The specific 
asset of firms is mostly treated as an intangible asset is difficult to measure and 
evaluate. As Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) claim, the intangible asset comprising of 
research and development (R&D) and advertising cannot be redeployed to other 
purposes and also cannot be “used as collateral for borrowing debt”. In the situation 
of bankruptcy and liquidation, the more specialized assets a firm has, the greater the 
loss in value the firm will face. The pre-emptive claims of the lender against such asset 
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afford limited protection, and the cost of debt financing naturally increases. Therefore, 
intense investment in tangible assets has been prone to be associated with lower 
leverage as these assets cannot serve as collateral (Long and Malitz 1985; Simerly and 
Li 2000; Vicente-Lorente 2001). This interpretation is also consistent with the static 
trade-off model which predicts a negative relationship between leverage and 
intangibility of asset.  
Intangible assets increase both the agency cost of shareholder-managers conflict 
arising from hidden information and hidden action, and the agency cost of shareholder-
bondholder conflict such as asset substitution and under-investment problems (Myers 
1977). Firms and industries with a high level of intensify in intangible assets will be 
subject to greater discretionary investment by the manager and which thus increases 
risks for the firm’s specific assets. This is one of the factors which increases the 
expected agency cost of the firm and shortens its funding duration. Additionally, as 
assets become more specific, investors cannot recover their investment while debt 
holders cannot recover their lending. Shareholders and debt holders prefer to use 
physical assets to secure investment and loans rather than intangible assets which is 
mostly embedded in human capital. Therefore, firms with higher levels of specific 
asset should use less debt, as asset specificity significantly negatively affect liquidation 
value (Gompers 1995). Williamson (1988) proposes that redeployable asset are more 
suitable to the governance structures associated with debt.  Alderson and Betker (1995) 
find that the liquidation cost and intangible assets of R&D is positively associated 
across firms. This means that the costs associated with knowledge asset investment is 
more than that for ordinary investment. Finally, firms whose value mostly relies on 
investment in specific asset (e.g. future growth option, R&D, advertising) will use less 
debt because shareholders or managers can choose investment strategies that are 
specifically detrimental to debt holders. Accordingly, with agency cost, a negative 
relationship between leverage and asset tangibility is expected in firms.  
Another important implication from empirical studies is the proposition in favour of 
the pecking order hierarchy of financing sources devised by Myers and Majluf (1984). 
The pecking order hierarchy of capital structure suggest that internal sources are the 
first preferred option of firms for financing new investment, and debt financing is the 
second choice. As transaction of specific assets will be affected by information 
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asymmetry between firm’s insiders and outsiders, the firm may be reluctant to publish 
information to outside investors. Pecking order theory suggests that high level of 
leverage is associated with tangible asset. A firm will increase debt ratio when there is 
growth of intangible assets. As Aghion et al. (2004) who provide controversial results 
claim, although firms with specific assets (R&D) tend to increase more debt than firms 
with lower level of specific asset investment, the debt ratio declines with the scale of 
asset specification and the most R&D knowledge-based firms issue equity. This means 
a possible non-linear relationship (U-shape) between asset specification and debt ratio 
(Bartoloni 2013).  
Titman and Wessels (1988) use three measure of asset specificity and the ratio of 
selling expenses over sales is the first one. This means that the more unique products 
the firm has, the more intensive selling effort the firm requires. The second one is the 
ratio of research and development (R&D) over sales, which measures the development 
of more unique products (Aghion et al. 2004; Faccio and Xu 2015; Fauver and 
McDonald 2015). The third is the rate at which employees resign their jobs. This is 
because employees of firms in the industries whose products are more highly technical 
and unique have less transferable skills and it is costly for them to leave their job 
(Teixeira and Queirós 2016; Peters and Taylor 2017).  Myers (1977) considers a firm’s 
market to book ratio as a measure of intangibility of asset as specific asset is considered 
as highly related to growth opportunities.  
Overall, the degree of firm specificity characterizing the firm’s aggregate assets makes 
a difference with regard to financing the cost of maintaining a certain capital structure.  
Similar to the empirical evidence of trade-off theory and agency cost model, the 
hypothesis is that  
HF7: There is a significant negative relationship between asset intangibility and 
leverage 
Similar to the empirical evidence of trade off theory, the hypothesis is that  
HF8: There is a significant positive relationship between effective tax rate and 
leverage 
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3.1.9 Distance from Bankruptcy (Bankruptcy cost)   
The trade-off theory posits that firms use less debt when the expected costs of financial 
distress are at high level because the default risk will increase as the debt ratio rises. 
The benefit from debt will be constrained by the existence of bankruptcy costs that 
enable firms to pay their debt and meet their ongoing commitments (Scott 1977; 
DeAngelo and Masulis 1980).   
According to Öztekin (2015), “the higher volatility of profit may imply a the greater 
probability of firms being unable to achieve their contractual claims as these claim 
come due”. Capacity of debt of firms also decreases with a growth of earnings 
volatility that implies s negative correlation between earnings volatility and leverage 
(Ahmed Sheikh and Wang 2011). Several studies (Wald 1999; Fama and French 2002) 
use earning volatility as a proxy of distance to bankruptcy or default risk and explain 
that the financial distress cost is ultimately related inversely to a firm’s debt level. 
Delcoure (2007), uses the standard deviation of the ratio of the earnings before interest 
and tax (EBIT) divided by total asset as the default risk. Nevertheless, this measure is 
argued by Joliet and Muller (2013) to be flawed, specifically for companies or 
industries where the value of EBIT is sometimes negative.  
Another group of studies uses the Z-score as a multidimensional measure of 
bankruptcy risk which proposed by Altman (1968). As Chkir and Cosset (2001) show, 
this is a surrogate for a firm’s expected bankruptcy cost. Graham (2000) uses the Z-
score of Altman (1968) as modified by MacKie‐Mason (1990) to represent the 
expected cost of financial distress, and the modified model is set out as:  
            Z score = 3.3 earnings before interest and tax EBIT+1.0 Sales+1.4 Retained   
Earnings+1.2 Working Capital)/Total Assets  
The financially healthy companies with lower expected cost of bankruptcy or lower 
default risk will have smaller levels of debt. Corresponding with this interpretation, 
Byoun (2008); Kayo and Kimura (2011) provide evidence that the greater the value of 
the Altman Z score, the smaller the leverage a firm has, and thus the longer the distance 
from bankruptcy and smaller probability of default.  
Similar to trade-off theory, the hypothesis is that 
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HF9: There is a significant negative relationship between distance from bankruptcy 
and leverage 
3.10 Dividend  
Dividend policy is one of the factors of capital structure while several determinants 
discussed above are also shown to affect capital structure. Easterbrook (1984) shows 
that there are dividends because firms are induced to float new securities suggesting 
that a firm’s dividend decisions are correlated with the firm’s financing decision. As 
Aggarwal and Kyaw (2010) explain, it is observed that a firm’s dividend pay-out ratio 
influences its retention ratio and, thus, its capital structure.   
Agency models assert that dividend payment and debt financing can reduce the agency 
problem correlated with information asymmetry. Based on the free cash flow 
hypothesis of Jensen (1986) and Jensen and Meckling (1976), paying dividends and 
issuing debt serve as a mechanism to reduce cash flow under management and 
therefore prevent agency problems. In view of agency costs and transaction costs, 
Rozeff (1982) summarizes that leverage is inversely associated with paying dividends. 
Chang and Rhee (1990) demonstrate that, when the effective capital gain tax rate is 
lower than the dividend tax rate, firms with higher pay-out ratios may issue debt more 
than firms with lower dividend payments. However, Antoniou et al. (2008) argue that, 
if increased dividend is a sign of increased future earnings, the firm’s cost of equity 
will be consequently lower, favouring equity to debt. This presents a negative 
relationship between leverage and dividend payment, partially consistent with the 
interpretation of signalling theory and pecking order theory.  
According to signalling theory, firms with a constant stream of paying dividends may 
have less asymmetric information when they enter the equity market. Given that 
dividend payments show a signal of increased financial health, more debt will be 
issued (John and Williams 1985; Miller and Rock 1985). Bhaduri (2002) shows that 
dividend payments reduce the level of internal earnings and increase the demand for 
external financing, including debt and equity.  
Myers (1984) devised the pecking order theory of capital structure which arises if the 
costs of new securities issuance are higher than other costs and benefits of dividends 
and debt. Under this circumstance, dividend is less attractive for firms with a lower 
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level of profitable asset in place, large current and expected investments, and high 
leverage (Fama and French 2002). Given the support of pecking order theory, Fama 
and French (2002) find that firms with higher profitability will pay more of their 
earnings as dividend payout ratio is negatively associated with investment 
opportunities and leverage. Adedeji (1998) describes another situation when firms 
borrow to pay dividends responding to an earning shortage because of reluctance to 
cut dividends, and hence leverage may be positively affected by dividend payment.  
In addition, the impact of dividend policy on capital structure is also impacted by the 
nature of the company and the country-specific and institutional features factors which 
are under the control of the firm. Aggarwal and Kyaw (2010) posit that multinational 
firms that are large and diversified have higher debt capacity associated with lower 
dividend. Antoniou et al. (2008) found that the signalling value of dividend payments 
is higher in the U.S. and the U.K. than in France and Japan, where share ownership is 
concentrated and firms have closer ties with their lenders. Also, the tax provision 
affects the impact of payout policy on capital structure.  
Similar to the empirical evidence of pecking order theory and signalling theory, the 
hypothesis is that  
HF10: There is a significant negative relationship between dividend payment and 
leverage 
 
3.2 Industry Effects  
Previous studies suggest that a firm’s characteristic of size, profitability, growth and 
age have a significant influence on its firm’s capital structure. In addition, a number 
of studies (Bradley et al. 1984) argue that debt ratio of a firm is strongly related to 
industry classification even when regulated firms are excluded. Titman and Wessels 
(1988) explain, that the type of assets firm hold is influenced by debt levels. Hussain 
and Nivorozhkin (1997) show that several industries may assess loans with support 
from government policy.  According to empirical studies (Darrat and Mukherjee 1995; 
Campello 2003; MacKay and Phillips 2005; Kale and Shahrur 2007), there is an 
industrial dummy variable that can control the effect of the inter-industry distinction 
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in capital structure because firms belong to the similar industries that operates under 
the similar economic conditions.  
Inter-industry effects are significant determinants of capital structure. Degryse et al. 
(2012) indicate that the trade-off theory of capital structure declares that firms have a 
target capital structure and this may be different between industries due to the 
evaluations of industry fixed effects. In view of the pecking order supposition, industry 
classification only affect capital structure if it serves as a proxy for a firm’s financing 
deficit and there is no prediction can be inferred with respect to specific rules and 
regulations (Baker and Wurgler 2002). Industry specific factors can strongly explain 
the observed differences in leverage ratio among firms under different industries 
although several studies (Maksimovic and Zechner 1991; Balakrishnan and Fox 1993; 
MacKay and Phillips 2005) show a question that firm-specific characteristic is more 
significant than aggregate industry-level factors. As Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) 
declare, 53 percent of capital structure variation can be explained by firm specific 
effect and 11 percent by inter-industry difference. MacKay and Phillips (2005) show 
that industry-fixed effects can explain 13 percent of the capital structure variation a 
among firms.  
“Industry effect is a significant factor for capital structure decisions either because 
firms use industry medium leverage as a benchmark for their own leverage ratio or 
because industry effect reflects a set of related but otherwise indirect factors” (MacKay 
and Phillips 2005). Harris and Raviv (1991) posit that the industrial classification of 
firms is an indispensable determinant of leverage and declare that “the leverages of 
industries in drug, instruments, electronic and food are consistently low while 
leverages of paper textile mill product, steel, airlines and cement are high”. 
Additionally, firms in regulated industries (e.g. utility, telecommunications, banking 
and railroad) will have more stable cash flows and less expected cost of financial 
distress because the industry-specific regulatory structure governs the behaviour of 
regulated industries (Bradley et al. 1984; Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti 2006; Graham 
et al. 2015). Graham et al. (2015) provide evidence that aggregate leverage of firms 
and leverage of the regulated industries remain quite stable over time while leverages 
of unregulated sectors significantly increase, approaching the level of indebtedness of 
regulated firms. Accordingly, the sectors including regulated firms (financial 
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institutions and utilities), are mostly excluded in the sample from empirical studies 
because these sectors are regulated by specific rules and, in consequence, as 
“exogenous factors uncorrelated to financing activities that severely affect leverage 
level” (Bevan and Danbolt 2002).  
A relation exists between the industry medium leverage level and a firm’s debt level 
due to industry competition. Industry concentration which the degree of competition 
within the industry is one of the significant determinants affecting the leverage of the 
firm. If concentration is low, then the industry is considered to be competitive, while 
the industry is treated as monopolistic if concentration is high.  According to MacKay 
and Phillips (2005), highly concentrated industries have higher leverage level and 
lower intra-industry dispersion. In a highly concentrated industry, there is greater risk 
level and more dispersion in risk than in a lower concentrated industry due to the lower 
market competition. However, portability and asset level are both substantially greater 
for concentrated industries implying that concentrated industries are collusive. In this 
situation, debt will be used by shareholders as a “disciplining mechanism to prevent 
managers from using the free cash flow for their own empire building purposes” 
(Baker and Wurgler 2002). Additionally, higher and more stable profitability and less 
dispersion in risk provide the prerequisites for increasing borrowing (Chevalier 1995; 
Kovenock and Phillips 1997; MacKay and Phillips 2005; Mitani 2014).  
In contrast to highly concentrated industries in which leverage might be greater, Sanyal 
(2011) highlights the fact that concentrated industries with more intense competitors 
are more likely to hold lower debt while a lack of competition can result in a high level 
of debt. As Sanyal (2011) explains, intense rivalry relates to lower leverage ratio 
because firms may “present their toughness with a low debt level in order to avoid 
being preyed upon by other firms” (Brander and Lewis 1986). This influence may be 
greater in higher concentrated industries where the gain in market share is larger. 
Secondly, if there is a strong market competition among firms in a higher concentrated 
industry, stronger competition of market and higher performance will discipline 
managers. as Fosu (2013) claim, firms in industries with strong market competition do 
not have to use debt as a disciplinary mechanism and hence use less leverage.  
Other determinants of industry specific levels such as the degree of technology or 
product innovation, and the existence of entry barriers have impacts on a firm’s capital 
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structure decisions. Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) investigate the correlation 
between the degree of technology and leverage, and declare that firms at the 
technological based industry have risk of cash flow and may have less debt ratio than 
firms at the technological fringe sector. This suggests that firms with higher 
technological ability use less debt. This result is supported by Almazan and Molina 
(2005) and MacKay and Phillips (2005) who observe that in industries where 
companies have different technologies, they will have more diversions of leverage. 
Furthermore, the nature of the assets (Shleifer and Vishny 1992), and industry 
dynamism and munificence (Kayo and Kimura 2011) are also treated as industry level 
impacts on capital structure.  
Similar to the empirical evidence on the influence of industry concentration on capital 
structure is proxied by the traditional Herfindahl- Hirshman (HH) index as a measure 
of industry concentration, the hypothesis is that  
HI1: There is a significant positive relationship between industry concentration and 
leverage 
 
3.3 Country Effects  
Previous research (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 1999; Booth et al. 2001; De Jong et al. 
2008) find that capital structure variation of firm cannot only affected by factors at 
firm-specific level but also by factors at country-specific level. There are distinctions 
in the way leverage is impacted by country-specific factors even though the firm-
specific factors are the same or similar (Booth et al. 2001). According to De Jong et 
al. (2008), factor with the country characteristics affect leverage choice through two 
channels. The first is the direct impact, that country specific factors determine the debt 
level of the firm in direct way. The second is the indirect effect, suggesting that factors 
in country specific levels affect the way “in which a firm’s specific factors determine 
a firm’s capital structure”.  
Many studies claim that more analysis needs to be done to gain insight into the effect 
of institutional factors on a firm’s capitals structure (Desai et al. 2004; Fan et al. 2012). 
This study incorporates three different country specific variables including the 
financial system, capital market development and macro-economic conditions. The 
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financial system is one of the factors that define if the country is market or bank based. 
According to  Antoniou et al. (2008), the concentrated ownership of firms in market-
based countries is lower, while the concentration of firms in bank-based countries is 
higher. Based on a perspective of agency, debt plays a disciplinary role, positing that 
firm leverage is higher in market-based countries. Capital market development is 
another factor including stock and bond market development on the debt level. De 
Jong et al. (2008) suggest that “when a bond market in a given country is highly 
developed, issuing and trading a bonds are easier”. Conversely, when the stock market 
is developed in a given country, the aggregate leverage is lower as the broader supply 
of funding lowers the cost of equity.  Microeconomic conditions relating to GDP and 
capital formation are also proved to have significant impact on leverage levels (De 
Jong et al. 2008; Cook and Tang 2010).  
3.3.1 Financial System  
A number of studies (Schmukler and Vesperoni 2001; Antoniou et al. 2008; Kayo and 
Kimura 2011) examine the “efficiency of different financial systems in the 
intermediation between saving and investment that affects capital structure variation”. 
The comparison of bank-based and market-based models of organization is the focus 
of several studies. According to Schmukler and Vesperoni (2001), , banks provide the 
majority of credit to the economy in countries with bank-based systems. In countries 
based on market-based systems, firms raise funds in a capital market. The 
controversies surrounding the bank-based and market-based financial systems 
primarily relate to fewer countries. In the bank-based financial systems of France, 
Germany and Japan where markets have lower transparency and investor protection, 
banks serve as a major function in “mobilizing saving, allocating capital, overseeing 
the investment decision of corporate managers, and in providing risk management 
vehicles” (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 1999). In the market-based systems of the US 
and the UK where the market has high transparency and investor protection, “securities 
market shares centre stage with bank in terms of getting society’s saving to firms, 
exerting better corporate control, and facilitating risk management” (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Levine 1999).  
Schmukler and Vesperoni (2001) put forward the idea that these two systems are better 
at providing capital for different firms. The bank-based system is better suited to 
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establishing a long-term relationship between intermediaries and the borrower. In this 
situation, banks are interested in providing capital for start-up firms. As Stulz (2000) 
conjectures, banks are more effective in providing external funding to emerging and 
innovative firms that require staged financing as the bank can credibly commit to 
making additional capital available as the firm develop. This long-term relationship 
between firms and lenders has the potential advantage of insider monitoring. As 
Levine (2002) indicate, market-based systems are prone to offering liquid financial 
instruments to investors. Public markets, conversely, are better funding sources of 
established firms, typically those with plenty of tangible assets (Schmukler and 
Vesperoni 2001; Beck and Levine 2002). Therefore, an understanding of the market-
based and bank-based systems’ influence on the way that provide financing courses is 
crucial because they have direct influences that affect the sources of funds to firms 
(Schmukler and Vesperoni 2001; Levine 2002).  
Based on the effects of financial systems, Antoniou et al. (2008) examine the factors 
of capital structure and express the option  that the variables at firm specific level, in 
particular, the variable regarding with the agency cost of growth opportunities and 
tangibility, are more relevant for a firm’s capital structure in market-based countries 
than for firms in bank-based countries. For example, the role of asset tangibility is 
expected to be more important in bank-oriented systems (France, German and Japan) 
than in capital market-oriented countries (the U.S and the U.K) since the demand for 
collateral is more pronounced in bank credit. Also, as Antoniou et al (2008) declare, 
firms in market-based countries are less concentrated in ownership structure, while in 
bank-based systems the ownership concentration is higher. Firm leverage will be 
higher in market-based countries, based on the understanding of the agency cost theory 
that debt plays an important disciplinary role against the managers’ opportunistic 
behaviour. Empirically, there is little research which considers the effect of market or 
bank-based systems on leverage. The earlier studies of Schmukler and Vesperoni 
(2001) show that the difference between the influence of bank-based and market-based 
on capital structure variance is less important than other variables.  
Similar to the empirical evidences of previous papers, the hypothesis is that 
HE1a: there is a significant negative relationship between market-based system and 
leverage 
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HE1b: there is a significant positive relationship between bank-based country and 
leverage  
3.3.2 Macroeconomic Conditions 
There are several studies focusing on the relationship between macroeconomic 
conditions and capital structure variations. One of the most widely tested external 
macro-determinants of capital structure is Gross Domestic Product (GDP). As Bastos 
et al. (2009), Bokpin (2009) and Moradi et al. (2016) claim, there is a significant  
negative relationship between GDP and the capital structure variation of firms. Kayo 
and Kimura (2011) show that GDP growth has a negative relationship with debt ratio, 
considering GDP growth as an aggregate to the munificence of a country that is 
providing investors with good growth opportunities. To summarise, the boost in 
economic conditions and consequently growth in GDP leads to an increase in the 
company’s profit, reducing the company’s debt ratio.  
Similar to the empirical evidence, the hypothesis is that  
HE2: there is a significant negative relationship between GDP and leverage 
The next variable associated with macroeconomics is the capital formation that is 
defined as the level of gross domestic capital mobilization. The variable of capital 
formation has an impact on corporate financial decisions since the increase in capital 
formation implies a more retained earnings that will be accumulated (De Jong et al. 
2008). As pecking order theory suggests, leverage will decline during the expansion 
of economic since internal funds increase during expansion (Frank and Goyal 2003). 
However, the impact of this variable is not widely tested. De Jong et al. (2008) claim 
that capital formation has a negative effect on leverage because the capital formation 
mitigates the effect of bankruptcy costs on leverage.  
Similar to the empirical evidence, the hypothesis is that  
HE3: there is a significant negative relationship between capital formation and 
leverage 
3.3.3 Debt Market Conditions  
As a major sources of long-term capital, the development of bond market is concerned 
as one of the instrumental variables that determine capital structure of firms (Bolton 
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and Freixas 2000; Kayo and Kimura 2011). In recent studies (Brigham and Houston 
2012), conditions in the bond markets with short term and long term changes that can 
bear on a firm’s optimal capital structure. For instance, a more access to bond markets 
can shift the leverage ratio of a company toward a higher level of debt, which results 
in a lower average cost of financing. Faulkender and Petersen (2005) contrast the firms 
which are able to raise funds from the bond market with firms that cannot, and they 
find that firms with boarder access to the bond market have higher debt level. This 
indicates a positive relationship between leverage and bond market development. This 
suggestion is supported by earlier research Booth et al. (2001) that “highly developed 
debt markets are associated with higher private sector debt ratios”.  
A developed debt market which facilitate the issuing and trading of public bonds may 
cause the higher leverage level in a country, while a developed stock market may have 
the opposite influence (Kayo and Kimura 2011). However, Kayo and Kimura (2011) 
show that bond market development has a negative effect on leverage while leverage 
is expected to be positively linked to bond market development. As Mittoo and Zhang 
(2010) explain, bond market development has influence on capital structure decision 
of a firm due to a potentially lower cost of debt financing and boarder accessing to 
debt financing. The cost of bank loans and private debt can be substantially more than 
the cost of debt in bond market due to the higher cost of active monitoring, information 
collecting, contracting, and suboptimal liquidation. These costs are suffered by 
borrowers, and thus, compared to firms which have broader bond market access, firms 
which depend on bank loan would remain a lower debt ratio.  
Similar to the empirical evidence, the hypothesis is that   
HE4: there is a significant positive relationship between bond market and leverage  
 
3.3.4 Stock Market Conditions 
The impact of stock market development on the capital structure choice of firms is 
also one of the macroeconomic determinants of capital structure that has been 
documented in a number of studies (Booth et al. 2001; Agarwal and Mohtadi 2004; 
Bokpin 2009). Welch (2004) asserts that “firms do not rebalance change in the market 
value of equity induced by stock returns”. As Welch (2004) explains, the stock market 
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is more important than all other factors affecting capital structure, at least in the short 
term. This is because, based on the assumptions of the market timing model, managers 
will not respond passively to counterbalance the valuation effects of market-driven 
factors but will pursue an active financing strategy and exploit “windows of 
opportunities” via equity issuance after an increase in stock price.  
In line with the time-varying adverse selection interpretation, there is a negative 
relationship between stock price and leverage. A firm is more likely to issue equity 
when stock price is high and, therefore, this high stock price coincides with low 
adverse selection (Baker and Wurgler 2002). According to Bessler et al. (2011), if 
there is time-varying in the degree of information asymmetry, the magnitude of the 
resulting cost of adverse selection is to some extent under the firm’s control, and 
therefore the firm would issue shares when relatively less information asymmetry and 
lower adverse selection cost are expected by a firm (Lucas and McDonald 1990; 
Michaelas et al. 1999). Accordingly, in macroeconomic conditions, the market timing 
theory posits that the stock market performance has a negative impact on aggregate 
market leverage (Bokpin 2009). The degree of the development of stock market in a 
given country is defined as the stock market capitalization over the GDP (Bokpin 
2009; Kayo and Kimura 2011).  
Similar to the empirical evidence of market timing theory, the hypothesis is that 
HE5: there is a significant negative relationship between stock market and leverage 
3.4 Conclusion  
Chapter Three discusses the various hypotheses of firm, industry and country 
characteristics. A total of sixteen hypotheses have been selected for this research to 
test capital structure and its various relationship to key determinants. These hypotheses 
explore the relationship between the leverage ratio and firm size, growth opportunities, 
non-debt tax shield, profitability, tangibility, tax shield, liquidity, intangibility, the 
distance from bankruptcy, dividend, industry market competition, financial system, 
GDP, capital formation, debt market development and bond market development.  
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Chapter Four: Research Methodology  
4.0 Introduction  
As Silverman (1988) defines it, a research methodology is a general approach to 
studying research topics that establishes how to go about studying any phenomenon 
and how the research should be designed. Saunders (2013) also defines “research 
methodology as the theory of how research should be undertaken rather than specific 
techniques used to obtain and analyse data”. In order to conduct research, Saunders et 
al (2000) develop a term for research methodology called a “research onion” to 
describe the different stages that need to be considered when planning an effective 
research philosophy. There are six multiple layers of the research onion that display 
the overall strategies of research methodology:  research philosophy, approaches to 
the research, strategies to be used, the time horizon, and the data collection methods 
involved. These aspects of research methodology are considered in detail in this 
chapter.  
Figure 4. 1: The Research Onion 
  
Source: Saunders et al. (2009) 
 
133 
 
This chapter discusses the framework of the proposed methodology and the design that 
the research adopted in reaching the research objectives outlined in the preceding 
chapter. This chapter is outlined in four sections: section 4.1 describes the research 
paradigm and research philosophies strengthening this research. Section 4.2 discusses 
the data sources and data samples that are employed in this research. The descriptions 
of the variables including the dependent variable and explanatory variables are 
displayed in this section. Section 4.3 refers to the statistics and analysis methods that 
have been adopted to progress the data. Section 4.4 is the final section summarizing 
the whole chapter.  
 
4.1 Research Philosophy  
According to Bryman (2016), “a research philosophy refers to the fundamental set of 
beliefs concerning the nature of the reality being investigated”. The research 
philosophy defines assumptions constructed about the phenomena of interest and thus 
predefines the ontological (i.e. realism versus nominalism), epistemological (i.e. 
positivism versus post-positivism or anti-positivism) and methodological scope of the 
study (Guba and Lincoln 1994; Lewis and Ritchie 2003). Morrison-Saunders and 
Hobson (2013) also suggest that the investigation philosophy implies the knowledge 
development and the nature of such knowledge. Therefore, a research with a 
philosophical stance, to some extent, helps the researcher to determine the assumptions 
created for a particular research (Flick 2011; Bryman 2012).  
It is crucial to identify the extensive range of different philosophical assumptions. 
According to Burrell and Morgan (2017), the ontology and epistemology are two 
major philosophical assumptions that are widely used by social science research. 
Ontology including realism and nominalism is the philosophical study of nature of 
being or existence, and the epistemology including positivism and anti-positivism is 
the study of the theory of knowledge, considering the nature, scope and limitations of 
it (Walsh 2014). These two research philosophises are described in this section.  There 
is another research philosophy, axiology, which is the study of quality, concerning 
with ethic and value. As this data analysis is dependent on quantitative method, 
axiology is not presented in this section. The relationship between the branches of 
research philosophies and methodology is displayed in Fig. 4.2.  
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According to Marsh and Furlong (2002), researchers’ orientation to their research is 
shaped by their ontological and epistemological positions. Researchers distinguish and 
acknowledge their ontological and, epistemological position and accordingly, should 
be able to defend these positions against the critiques of others.   
Figure 4. 2: The relationship between philosophy, methodology and outcomes 
 
Source: Adapted from Schlegel (2015)  
4.1.1 Ontology  
Ontology is concerned with philosophical assumptions about the nature of reality 
(Easterby-Smith et al. 2008; Saunders et al. 2009). There are two positions that are 
identified by research regarding realism and nominalism. According to Holden and 
Lynch (2004), realism argues for the existence of a mind-independent reality while 
nominalism challenges this assumption and proposes the social world to be a product 
of labels and constructs to provide a basic reality structure. In brief, reality is a product 
of human interaction and collective actions, whereas nominalism is the world of social 
construction (Neve, 2015). In this situation, a study with ontological nominalism is 
required to recognize a precise objective based on real structure.  
In the literature on research philosophy, a wide range of various philosophical 
positions and paradigms are discussed. As Niglas (2001) defines it, positivism and 
positivism are two big paradigms. Monette et al. (2013) recognise between positivist 
and non-positivist approaches. Saunders et al. (2009) contrast positivism, realism and 
interpretivism. Therefore, “positivism and interpretivism are briefly contrasted as two 
extreme poles on a continuum of philosophical direction” (Schlegel 2015).   
According to Sharma (2011), Monette et al. (2013) and Hammersley (2010) and 
Schlegel (2015), “positivism is based on the ontological assumption of objectives, such 
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as the notion that there is an externally existing world and things exist independently 
of people’s beliefs and perceptions about them”. Based on this proposition, positivism 
in research as is used in the social sciences, usually refers to a philosophical orientation 
that applies the method of the natural science to the social sciences (Rosenberg 2018). 
Positivist research aims to build up “casual explanation in the form of universal law 
by means of controlled observation and measurement and deductive theory testing” 
(Rose et al). Thus, it largely relies on quantitative method and research design such as 
experiment, survey and statistical analysis (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008). Another 
important paradigm, interpretivism subsumed under ontology, is classified as a form 
of idealism. It believes that social reality is “created from interpretation of human 
perceptions and the exchange of meanings during a social interaction process” 
(Monette et al. 2013; Schlegel 2015). 
 
4.1.2 Epistemology 
Collins (2017) describes “epistemology as the study of the theory of knowledge, 
including the nature, scope and limitations of it”. It is primarily concerned with 
propositional knowledge as it exists at the present moment in social reality. More 
diverse explanations of epistemology are found in the relevant literatures. Gill and 
Johnson (2002) define epistemology as “the branch of philosophy concerned with the 
study of the criteria by which we determine what does and does not constitute 
warranted or valid knowledge”. Moreover, Saunders et al. (2009) and Bryman (2007) 
claim that epistemology concern the question of “what is regarded as acceptable 
knowledge is a discipline”.  
According to Burrel and Morgan (2006), epistemology is divided into philosophical 
aspects of positivism and anti-positivism. Positivism implies “the understanding of 
universal laws and the causality between variables”. For social research, positivism 
uses deductive hypotheses for knowledge acquisition and testing by measuring reality. 
Research with positivist viewpoint should be objective and hence attempt to produce 
generalizable results (David and Sutton 2011). Anti-positivism, conversely, is loosely 
comprised of those approaches “which utilise qualitative research phenomenology, 
interpretivism or social constructionism, which represents the understanding of 
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subjective meanings that the particular individuals involved create” (Burrel and 
Morgan 2006; Wang 2015).  
Interpretivism, a form of epistemological philosophy, rejects the positivist assumption 
and integrates views from different intellectual traditions, “assuming a critical position 
towards the positivist idea that the model of the natural sciences can be applied to the 
social world” (Saunders et al. 2009; Monette et al. 2013; Schlegel 2015). According 
to Burrel and Morgan (2006),   humans actively interpret the social world around them 
and do so within a specific socio-cultural context. Thus, understanding of the social 
world “requires an understanding of it from the point of view of the people directly 
involved in the social progress”. This implies that the “interpretivist gains a deeper 
understanding of human thinking and behaviour and interprets people’s action from 
their point of view” (Bryman et al. 2008). Therefore, interpretivism adopts an approach 
to acquiring knowledge which largely depends on developing an understanding of 
phenomena through deep-level investigation of those phenomena (Remenyi et al. 
1998; Saunders et al. 2012). According to Saunders et al (2009), interpretivism does 
not suggest generality of outcomes, but rather provides results that are limited to a 
certain context.  
Given that this research is based on the study of the relationship between capital 
structure and variables of specific levels of firm, industry and country, the positivism 
paradigm which relies specifically on scientific evidence, such as experiments and 
statistic, is primarily applicable.  
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Table 4. 1 Positivism and interpretivism: Ontology, Epistemology and Methodology, adapted from Carson et al. (2001) 
 
Issue Positivism Interpretivism 
   
Ontology Nature of "being"/ nature of the world Nature of "being"/nature of the world 
 . Direct access to real world . No direct access to real world 
 Reality Reality 
 . Single external reality . No single external reality  
   
Epistemology 
Ground of knowledge/relationship between reality and 
research 
Ground of knowledge/relationship between reality and 
research 
 . Possible to obtain hard, secure objective knowledge . Understood through 'perceived' knowledge 
 . Focused on generalization and abstraction . Focused on the specific and concrete 
 . Thought governed by hypotheses and stated theories  . Seeks to understand specific context  
Methodology 
 
Focus of research 
 
Focus of research 
 . Description and explanation  . Understanding and interpretation 
   
 Role of researcher Role of researcher 
 . Detached, external observer . To experience what they are studying 
 . Clear distinction between reason and feeling . Allow feelings and reason to govern action 
 
. Aim to discover external reality rather than creating the object 
of study 
. Partially create what is studied, the meaning of the 
phenomena 
 . Strive to use rational, consistent, verbal, logical approach . Use of pre-understanding 
 
. Seek to maintain clear distinction between fact and value 
judgements . Distinction between facts and value judgements less clear 
 . Distinguish between science and personal experience . Accept influence from both science and personal experience 
   
 Techniques used by researchers Techniques used by researchers 
 . Formalized statistical and mathematical methods . Non-quantitative  
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4.2 Development of Research Design  
In the thesis, the research questions are the starting point of designing the framework 
and therefore a combination of a descriptive and quantitative approach are chosen to 
answer the research question which was introduced in Chapter one: “ what is the 
determinants of capital structure”, “ are the capital structure determinants of UK and 
China SMEs driven by similar factor” and “is the size and structure of financial market 
an important factor in explaining any cross-country differences on SME capital 
structure”.  
4.2.1 Research Approach  
As discussed in first section, the research based on a broadly positivist paradigm. 
Collis and Hussey (2009) point out that a positivist study is more likely to be concerned 
with ensuring that concept can be progressed, which hypothesis can be measured. Due 
to the nature of the objective being researched and sufficient literatures identified, the 
most appreciate approach in the research is an deductive approach. This method allows 
studies use a theory to develop a proposition and then design a research framework to 
test the proposition (Collins, 2010). In previous chapter, there are sixteen hypotheses 
generating from past studies that are tested in chapter five. As explained by Collins 
(2010), the explanation in causal relationship between variables is one of the important 
characteristic of research approach of deduction.  
4.2.2 Research Strategy  
The strategy identified is the “general plan” of how the research questions is answer 
(Saunders et al, 2003). In this thesis, an experiment approach is seen to be the strategy 
that undertaken to answer research questions. The reasons for this is that experiment 
strategy is usually associating with the deductive approach. Due the highly nature 
sciences of this research, a deep analysis of collected quantitative data by using 
descriptive and inferential statistics is adopted to answer the research questions. As 
pointed out by Hakim (2000), the purpose of an experiment is to study causal links; 
whether a change in one independent variable produces a change in another dependent 
variable. In the research, the links between multiple variables based on two sample set 
are progressed and the size of the change between variables are also considered and 
discussed. These needs, as well as the use of the deductive approach identified in 
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previous section, suggested that an experiment approach is the appreciate strategy to 
take in this case.  
The information required is gathered using a longitudinal approach. This is due to the 
data sample sets comprise both cross section and time series. As Menard (2002) states, 
longitudinal research designs can be showed by contrasting them with cross-sectional 
research designs. In cross-sectional design, data are collected on one or more variables 
for a single time. In longitudinal research, data are collected on one or more variables 
for two or more time period. In the research, data regarding with variables are collected 
for different times for different cases. This allow the measurement of change and 
explanation of change in variables. In addition to this, based on longitudinal strategy, 
a more in depth information can be gathered by facilitating a large number of data. 
This support the research aims by providing broader knowledge of context, allow more 
precise results to be made. Figure 4.3 shows the overview of research design in this 
research.  
Figure 4. 3: Overview of Research Design 
 
   
           
Source: Author 
4.3 Sample and Data Description  
This study uses the annual reports of companies over a period of 10 years from 2007 
to 2017 by utilizing the FTSE AIM (Alternative Investment Market) All Share index 
of 780 firms and the SZSE (Shenzhen Stock Exchange) SME Price of 800 firms as the 
sample space for this study. The Alternative Investment Market (AIM) is a market 
regulated by the London Stock Exchange but with less demanding rules than the main 
market of the FTSE All Share Index. It is the combination of the primary 50 companies 
(FTSE AIM UK 50 Index), the second largest 100 companies (FTSE AIM 100 Index) 
and the FTSE AIM All-Share Index in the all range market capitalisation. Thus, the 
sample is based on listed firms of varied range but mostly medium listed firms. In the 
UK, the aim of the AIM is to provide an easy route to market for smaller companies 
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but it has also attracted larger companies searching for a looser regulatory ride 
(Stevenson, 2012). In addition, the SZSE SME Price Index set up the Small and 
Medium-Size (SMEs) listed firms with lower entry barriers. The FTSE AIM All Share 
and the SZSE SME Price are choice samples for this study due to the international 
characteristic of capital structure data. 
Data in this study consist of heterogeneous firm specific, industry specific and country 
specific levels for the period 2006 to 2017. For the firm specific level, this research 
chose firms from all sectors as listed on the FTSE and SZSE. To consistent with 
previous literature which discussed the need for separation of financial firms and non-
financial firms, this research shows results of the sample space including and 
excluding financial firms (Rajan and Zingales 1995). The sample firms in the FTSE 
are divided into sectors as defined by the Industrial Classification Benchmark (ICB). 
The firms in the SZSE follow the standard of the CNINFO Industry Classification 
Benchmark. These classifications aid in the sectoral analysis that the research aims to 
undertake in this thesis.  
The use of the sample years 2007 to 2017 in the study is to capture all the available 
data disclosed by these listed firms. The SZSE SMEs Price Index establish was 
formally established with a ceremony at the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2004. The 
gap between the years 2004 to 2006 provides at least three years of available data. As 
suggested by De Jong et al. (2008), the selection of this time-period “involves a trade-
off between the number of countries that can be included in the study and the 
availability of enough firm-specific data”. Moreover, as Adrian and Shin (2010) 
summarize, leverage increases when a subprime boom exists. The financial crisis of 
2007 was the opposite of a subprime boom and that was one of the reasons why firms 
changed their capital structure. The sample year in the study aids in the analysis of 
capital structure change after the financial crisis.  
The sample data is constructed in the following manner. Firstly, as Fama and French 
(2002) show, firms in the financial sector (banks, insurance companies and investment 
trusts) are removed from the sample set. This is because financial services industries 
have the potential bias associated with heavy regulation. Secondly, all firms with 
missing financial data for variables in the regression model during the sample period 
are withdrawn. This aims to address a relatively balanced panel data analysis that 
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avoids the multicollinearity problem among variables and increases the degree of 
freedom and efficiency. Due to these considerations, firms are chosen that have at least 
three years continuous time series observations during the period 2007-2017, resulting 
in a final sample of firms and observations. Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 below illustrate 
the industries and the number of firms on the FTSE AIM All Share index and the SZSE 
SMEs Price index under each sector, their total space of the net market capitalisation 
in GBP Million, and the average price-earnings ratio.   
 
Table 4. 2 Summary of FTSE AIM All Share Companies by ICB Code 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: LSE, FTSE AIM All share constituents in May, 2018  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
FTSE AIM All-Shares  
ICB 
Code 
ICB Industry No of Firm Market Cap 
(£ m) 
0001 Oil and Gas 101 7801.64 
1000 Basic Materials 132 6241.04 
2000 Industrials 158 17734.67 
3000 Consumer Goods 56 12023.41 
4000 Heath Care 87 13148.06 
5000 Consumer Services 101 19172.97 
6000 Telecommunications 9 1,814.73 
7000 Utilities 10 462.94 
8000 Financials 153 19,927.59 
9000 Technology 121 12,927.45 
Total  929 111,319.68 
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Table 4. 3 Summary of SZSE SMEs Board Companies by CNI Code 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CNI, Shenzhen Market SME Board in May, 2018 
4.3.1 Data Sources  
This study uses secondary data sources to collect economic and financial accounting 
data for analysing. Following Ozkan (2001), Harvey et al. (2004) and Antoniou et al. 
(2008), the data source for leverage and firm-specific variables analysis in the study is 
the Datastream database which provides both financial performance data on firms and 
the market value of shares for quoted firms in a number of countries. Data on country-
specific variables are collected from a variety of sources, mainly from World 
Development Indicators, UK Office for National Statistics, China State Statistical 
Bureau and the Financial Structure Database of the World Bank (De Jong et al. 2008). 
The additional country-specific variables such as GDP growth rate are taken from the 
Datastream and Thomson One database.  
4.3.2 Dependent Variables  
The existing literature investigates firms’ capital structure as a multidimensional 
construct dependent variable that is used to appraise a firm’s financing approach and 
financial performance capacity (Shleifer and Vishny 1992; Kochhar 1996; Cassar and 
Holmes 2003; Lemmon and Zender 2010; Margaritis and Psillaki 2010). Following 
the studies of Titman and Wessels (1988), Berger et al. (1997) and Lemmon et al. 
  
SZSE SME Board   
CNI 
Code 
CNI Industry No of 
Firm 
Static PE 
C01 Energy 15 19 
C02 Materials 169 23.6 
C03 Industrials 241 30.59 
C04 Consumer Discretionary 161 29.35 
C05 Consumer Staples 66 31.82 
C06 Heath Care 65 42.5 
C07 Financials 22 14.03 
C08 Information Technology  139 34.83 
C09 Telecommunication Services 25 45.33 
C10 Utilities  8 16.84 
Total  911  
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(2008), capital structure in the research is measured by using both accounting based 
value and market based value. The distinction between these two general categories of 
variable remuneration is important for the design of incentives in the research as they 
represent different aspects of capital structure of firms (Berger et al. 1997; Gentry and 
Shen 2010; Verbeke and Merchant 2012).  
Early empirical studies (Rajan and Zingales 1995; Cook and Tang 2010) consider the 
book value of leverage ratio as the main measure of capital structure. According to 
Nakano and Purevdorj (2014), book value which is based on accounting data is better 
suited to represent short-term reference value as it interprets historical information. 
Furthermore, a measure of leverage based on accounting data is widely used due to 
easy accessibility and availability from financial statement, especially for the data of 
quoted firms. However, investors are more concerned about the market value of a 
company’s debt and equity even though the accounting based measures are important 
(Brigham and Houston 2012), because leverage ratios based on market value are likely 
to explain long term trends in financing decisions (Nakano and Purevdorj 2014). 
Furthermore, the ability of accounting based value to explain and estimate the 
economic or business event and market reaction is limited  (Hall et al. 2007; 
Chattopadhyay et al. 2016); market based models have more explanatory power than 
strictly accounting based models (Hillegeist et al. 2004; Welch 2004) and, therefore, 
capital structure should be based on the future market value.  
A distinction can be made between the market value and book value of debt and equity 
when measuring capital structure (Gossy 2008a). Book value, as Getzmann et al. 
(2014) state, shows a better reaction to the manager’s target capital structure. Market 
value model is unable to reflect fundamental alternations caused by a firm’s decision 
making as it is more concerned with market reaction which does not directly affect the 
firm (Frank and Goyal 2009; Uysal 2011; Hovakimian et al. 2012). Bowman (1980) 
and Titman and Wessels (1988) state that “the misspecification arising from using the 
book value measure is fairly small”. Secondly, “values of the variables of capital 
structure can be measured as a “point-in-time-value” at the end of the research period 
or by an arithmetic average of the annual value over the period of the research” (Gossy 
2008a). The advanced measurement in studies of Barton and Simko (2002) is “capable 
of capturing the target capital structure mix of the firm that is independent of random 
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year-to-year fluctuations”. Despite the criticism for and against the use of accounting-
based models, most of the papers use several measures to account for both the market 
and the book value of capital structure.  
Previous studies use either gearing (i.e. debt over equity), or leverage ratio (i.e. debt 
over the sum of debt and equity) to empirically measure capital structure. According 
to Gossy (2008a), the formula for “leverage ensures that the measure is constrained 
within the range zero (0) to one (1), while that for gearing guarantees a non-negative 
value”. Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that the most relevant measure depends on 
the objective of the research. For instance, when a study analyses the association 
between agency problem and debt, the appropriate measure of leverage may be the 
total debt of the firm. Nevertheless, if the study measures the factor of financial distress 
to debt, the interest coverage ratio may be relevant. According to Hooy et al. (2013), 
the proxy to capital structure should have a clear-cut definition relating to how the firm 
is financed. Other studies define leverage to include debt-to-total assets, debt-to-net 
asset, debt-to-capitalization and total liabilities-to-total assets, measures in both book 
and market based models (Titman and Wessels 1988; Chung 1993).    
Following De Jong et al. (2008), Degryse et al. (2012) and Titman and Wessels (1988), 
the dependent variables of this research are the measures of short-term leverage and 
long-term leverage which are measured as the ratio of total short-term debt to total 
firm value and ratio of total long-term debt to total firm value. For long-term debt, firm 
value is the sum of total long-term debt and firm equity market value. For short-term 
debt, firm value is the sum of total short-term debt and firm equity market value. 
Dependent variables in the research are grouped into short-term leverage and long term 
leverage rather than an aggregate measure of total leverage.  
As De Jong et al. (2008), claim, as short term debt consists largely of trade credit which 
is influenced by different determinants, the examination of total debt may generate 
results that are difficult to interpret. However, Titman and Wessels (1988) argue that 
“small firms may be more leveraged than large firms and may borrow short term loans 
rather than long-term due to the lower fixed costs associated with this alternative”. The 
sample space of this research covers the companies of the FTSE AIM All Share and 
the SZSE SMEs Price Index, which primarily offer an easy route to market for smaller 
companies. Besides, short-term debt is a significant variable in examining the presence 
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of agency cost and information asymmetries. Thus the inclusion of short-term debt in 
the composition of capital structure aid in the sectional analysis that this research aims 
to make. As Titman and Wessels (1988) indicate, the equity value of debt ratio is 
scaled by both book value and market value that may then make it possible to separate 
the impact of capital structure suggested by theory.  
4.3.3 Independent variables  
Theoretical and empirical studies have shown a number of different financial 
management performance measures in investigating the determinants of capital 
structure. From the review of this literature on capital structure determinants, 
particularly of those studies focusing on quoted SMEs firms, this study selected ten 
(10) variables on a firm specific level.   
As discussed in Chapter Two, the literature review, there are several variables arising 
from theoretical analysis that are associated with trade-off theory, pecking order 
theory, signalling theory, agency cost theory and market time theory. These variables 
have been empirically examined and considered by previous studies as the main 
proxies to determine the capital structure of a firm. These are: 1) Firm size, which 
comprises elements such as total assets, total sales and market capitalization (Lemmon 
et al. 2008). The size of the firm can be measured by the log of the firm’s total asset; 
2) Growth opportunities, which is the investment or project with potential opportunity 
to grow significantly, acquiring profit for the investor (Myers 1977). This is expressed 
by the market to book value (price-earnings ratio); 3) Non-debt tax shield (NDTS), 
which comprises of investment tax credit, advertising expenses and others that cannot 
claim allowable deduction (DeAngelo and Masulis 1980). It can be measured as the 
depreciation of fixed assets by total assets; 4) Profitability, the ability of a company to 
use financial resources to generate revenues in excess of expenses (Titman and 
Wessels 1988). It is illustrated as earnings before interest and taxes (IBIT) divided by 
total assets; 5) Asset tangibility (Tang), the percentage of property, plant and 
equipment (PPE) within a company (Bevan and Danbolt 2002; Antoniou et al. 2008). 
It is described as the ratio of PPE to total assets; 6) Effective tax rate (EATR), which 
involves personal tax on capital income having the advantage of deduction in tax (Fan 
et al. 2012). It can be considered as the total defined as tax/earnings before tax; 7) 
Liquidity, which is also defined as current ratio, including cash, market securities, and 
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inventories. It is measured as the ratio of current assets divided by current liability; 8) 
Product Uniqueness, which is an effective method for attracting consumers and 
inciting them to purchase the company’s product, relating to the asset tangibility of a 
company.  It can be the ratio of research and development (R&D) expenditure over 
sales. Research and development (R&D) is the capital that the company spent on 
innovation of new products and services each year. It is crucial for survival and 
competitiveness of firms with specific industries. According to Antoniou et al. (2008), 
research and development expense is a common proxy for both the firm’s tangibility 
and debt-substitute to benefit from the tax-shield  (DeAngelo and Masulis 1980); 9) 
Distance to bankruptcy or default risk, which explains the “distance between the 
expected value of the assets of the company and the default point and then splits this 
difference by an estimation of the volatility of the company” (De Jong et al. 2008). 
The research uses Z-score by Altman (1968) as the proxy of distance to bankruptcy.  
For empirical analysis of capital structure in practice, there is a determinant associated 
with specific characteristics that has been examined and 10) Dividend pay-out ratio, 
which should be determined by its impact on the shareholder value. It stands for the 
sustainability of a company’s dividend and the potential for it to grow. It is a measure 
of the percent of a company’s earnings that are paid out as dividend.  
4.3.4 Control Variables  
Following most of the literature, this study includes variables that indirectly to affect 
the short-term debt ratio and long-term debt ratio of firms in the regression models. To 
review the findings and discussion in past studies (Bancel and Mittoo 2004; Frank and 
Goyal 2009; Psillaki and Daskalakis 2009; Kayo and Kimura 2011; Degryse et al. 
2012), six variables have been employed as control variables that have a significant 
impact on the overall firm’s capital structure decisions as they “provide a mean to 
control for variation in variables that are correlated with both the violation event and 
the propensity to issue debt” (Roberts and Sufi 2009). Using these variables also 
enables this study to ascertain a comparative analysis of the influences on capital 
structures of a firm.  
This study groups the control variables according to industry characteristics and the 
economic environment. Regarding the variable of industry characteristics, this 
research uses the traditional Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH) index to analyse the 
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influence of industry concentration on a firm’s leverage. Kayo and Kimura (2011) find 
that factors of industry play a significant role in determining a firm’s leverage in 
countries that include the UK and China.  
Firms in concentrated industries significantly benefit from leverage whilst firms in less 
concentrated industries are more likely to have adverse effects of leverage (Opler and 
Titman 1994). Thus, analysing the relevance of industry characteristics and capital 
structure is included in the research. According to previous literature (McEachern 
2011), the Herfindahl-Hirschman index measures “all firms based on the distribution 
of the firm’s sales across its various business segments”.   
In global perspective, the study on capital structure has at least five country variables, 
which are stock market development, bond market development, financial systems, 
GDP growth and capital formation. As Chui et al. (2002) emphasize, factors of country 
macroeconomic and even cultural differences may have a significant influence on 
capital structure. De Jong et al. (2008) present evidence that the more developed a 
country’s bond market, the larger the leverage of the firm. Nevertheless, a firm’s 
leverage will be lower when the stock market is developed because the boarder sources 
of financing decreases the cost of equity. The study tests these two effects of stock 
market and bond market on a firm’s capital structure choice, hypothesising that the 
more developed the stock market of a country, the less the firm’s debt ratio and the 
more developed the bond market of a country, the higher the firm’s debt level.  
In addition to stock market and bond market development, the study also follows Kayo 
and Kimura (2011) to test the variable of financial systems that determine whether the 
country is market or bank based. According to Antoniou et al. (2008), firms in the 
country where is market-based have a lower concentrated ownership structure, while 
firms in bank-based countries have a higher ownership concentration. As the agency 
theory which proposes a significant disciplinary role of debt in manager’s 
opportunistic behaviour is important for analysing a firm’s financing choice, this 
research uses financial systems as factors to assume that firm leverage is higher in 
market-based countries. Following previous studies, the financial system is a dummy 
variable in the study equal to 1 if the country’s financial system is market-based and 
zero if it is bank-based.  
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This study also includes the role of gross annual capital formation (CAPITAL) that 
can have significant impact on capital structure decision of firms. De Jong et al. (2008) 
claim that, “with a higher level of available funds from capital formation, high 
profitability and liquidity further decrease the use of debt among domestic firms”. 
Firms in the countries which have a better environment and healthy economic 
conditions, are given multiple source of financing. Additionally, an increase in 
domestic capital formation implies more opportunities to accumulate and more 
retained earnings to be accumulated. The indirect effect of domestic capital formation, 
eventually, occurs when factors of macroeconomic and institutional features influence 
the determinant of leverage (Delcoure 2007; De Jong et al. 2008; Cook and Tang 
2010). GDP growth is the fourth country as GDP growth is an important prerequisite 
to the capital market development (Booth et al. 2001; Psillaki and Daskalakis 2009; 
Fan et al. 2012).  
Table 3.4 below presents the construction of dependent variables, independent 
variables and control variables. In this table, the name, description and measures of 
the variables based on the firm specific level, industry specific level and country 
specific level are presented in detail. This list of dependent variables, independent 
variables and control variables are based on based on Kayo and Kimura (2011) Titman 
and Wessels (1988), Booth et al. (2001)
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Table 4. 4: Summary of Dependent Variables Used in the Regression Model 
 
Variables Acronym Description 
   
Dependent Variables -Leverage (Market value and Book value) 
   
Long-term debt   
Market leverage 
LTDMV 
Ratio of long-term debt to total firm value, where total firm value is the sum of long term debt 
and market value of firm equity 
Book leverage  
LTDBV 
Ratio of long-term debt to total firm value, where total firm value is the sum of long term debt 
and book value of firm equity 
 
  
Short-term debt   
Market leverage 
STDMV 
Ratio of short-term debt to total firm value, where total firm value is the sum of short term 
debt and market value of firm equity 
Book leverage 
STDBV 
Ratio of short-term debt to total firm value, where total firm value is the sum of short term 
debt and book value of firm equity 
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Independent Variables (Firm Level) 
   
Firm Size SIZE Log of firm’s total assets 
Growth Opportunities GROWTH Market to book value 
Non-debt Tax shield NDTS Deprecation of fixed assets by total assets 
Profitability  ROE Earnings before interest and taxes (IBIT) divided by total assets 
Asset Tangibility TANG The percentage of property, plant and equipment (PPE) within a company 
Effective tax rate TRATE Total defined as tax/earnings before tax 
Liquidity LIQUIDITY Current assets divided by current liability 
Product Uniqueness InTANG Research and development (R&D) expenditure over sales 
Distance to bankruptcy DBKRT Z-score 
Dividend Pay DIV Dividend payout ratio: Dividend pay/firm’s net income 
Control Variables  
Industry HH Market concentration: Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
GDP Growth  GDP Annual growth of gross domestic product 
Capital Formation CFMT Average of annual gross capital formation as a proportion of GDP in each country  
Bond Market BOND Ratio of private and public bond market capitalization to GDP 
Stock Market STK Ratio of Stock market capitalization to GDP 
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4.4 Data Analysis Method 
This section aims to briefly describe the analytical method for addressing the 
study. According to Gacitúa-Marió and Wodon (2001), a methodological 
approach for accessing research include a theory on how a research question 
can be achieved. This research method is a way of implementing research 
design that included collecting, organizing and analysing data. Andrew et al. 
(2011) state that specification of the data analysis method and strategy made 
by a particular study is a key task of the research design process which helps 
to connect the research question and objective. In a word, data collection and 
analysis method of analysis is unique to the research project.  
The process of data analysis starts by collecting raw data from various data 
sources with secondary data sources. The second process is transforming raw 
data into meaningful information with the application of analytical method 
that can be managed for purposes of planning, decision making, evaluation 
and audit (Hinton 2006). To obtain the findings, it is essential to select the 
most suitable method of data analysis to achieve the research objectives. 
Therefore, this research set out several research objectives for analysing data 
depending on the research questions.  
Firstly, to investigate the impact of characteristics of firm, country and 
economic level on the capital structure in various industries from 2007 to 
2016. Secondly, to examine the correlation between capital structure and 
factors affecting it in the form of linear or non-linear regression. Finally, an 
improvement in the financial environment can play a role of mediation in 
creating the context to make better relations between a firm’s specific level 
determinant and the capital structure decision. Then, to understand the role of 
mediation in the relationship between corporate capital structure and 
economic determinants is another objective (e.g. financial system).  
This study follows the process of descriptive statistics, bivariate data analysis 
and multivariate data analysis to answer research questions.  
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4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
The first step in achieving the objectives described above is to get an insight 
into the use of descriptive statistics to aid analysis of data from an elementary 
viewpoint. According to Zikmund et al. (2013) and Collis and Hussey (2013), 
descriptive statistics are the statistical procedures used to describe the main 
features of the sample data for quantitative items. This statistical procedure 
describes the relationship between variables in a sample or population through 
the measures of central tendency (i.e. mean, mode and median), the variability 
of the data relative to position and relationship. According to Filler and 
DiGabriele (2012), “descriptive statistics attempts to summarize a data set 
quantitatively rather than being used to support inferential statements about the 
population that the data are thought to represent”. As Ali and Bhaskar (2016) 
state, the formal analysis are generally along with descriptive analysis when it 
presented in the study, particularly when data analysis draws its main results 
with use of inductive statistical analysis.  
4.4.2 Bivariate Analysis  
In univariate analysis, there is only one variable is analysed at a time. In 
bivariate analysis, the analysis of a relationship between two variables or 
parameters (called x and y) is described at the same time (Comuzzie et al. 1997). 
Parameter x is generally defined as the independent while y is identified as the 
dependent variable. The method of bivariate statistics describes the “strength of 
the relationship between the two variables, either by a single parameter such as 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient for linear relationships, or by equation 
obtained by regression analysis” (Trauth et al. 2006). As Trauth et al. (2006) 
explain, the equation which describes the relationship between x and y is can 
be used to estimate and “predict the y-response from arbitrary x’s within the 
range of the original data value used for regression”. This is especially 
importance if one of the two parameters is difficult to measure. Hence, the 
relationship between the variable of x and variable of y is mainly predicted by 
regression analysis on data with a small training set.  
The study uses Pearson’s correlation in estimating the magnitude of the linear 
relationship by calculating a regression analysis equation. According to 
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Randolph and Myers (2013), Pearson’s correlation coefficient, or Pearson’s r 
ranges from -1 to +1, signifying the value between a perfect positive linear 
correlation and a perfect negative linear relationship. It is important to 
recognize that the correlation coefficient of 0 means no linear relationship. The 
further the coefficient is from 0, the stronger the association of the variables x 
and y. To summarize, the closer the value of the coefficient is to +1, the stronger 
the positive direction between two variables. “The closer the value of the value 
is to -1, the stronger the negative direction”. The closer the value is to 0, the 
weaker the link between variables (Tavakoli 2012). The formula for Pearson’s 
correlation display is as below: 
 
                                    
 
where Xi is the value of the variable of the observation. Yi is the value of the 
dependent variable for the 𝑖𝑡ℎ observation; X̅ is the mean value of the 
independent variables, Y̅ is the mean value of the dependent variables; n is the 
number of observations in the sample (Anderson and Carverhill 2007). In 
regression model, if there is an established correlation between X and Y, it may 
or may not be because X influences Y or vice versa. The study also selects the 
correlation matrix to test the multicollinearity problem through the inclusion 
and exclusion of variables in the model.  
 
4.4.3 Multivariate Analysis  
When the observation involves three or more variables at a time, a multivariate 
technique is used to examine those sets of variables. The multivariate analysis 
consists of a collection of methods that aims to describe the mutual relationship 
between the given variables where the independent variables explain one or more 
of the dependent variables (Rencher and Christensen 2012). In this form of 
analysis, all the independent variables may be represented by continuous data or, 
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alternatively, represented by mixed continuous and nominal data (Krzanowski 
2000; Neelankavil 2015).  
The multivariate analysis involves the format of multiple regression, 
discriminant analysis and factor analysis (Schuerman 2012). Regression analysis 
is used in this research because it allows the investigation of the relationship 
between capital structure and factors affecting capital structure (e.g. firm specific 
level, country specific level) to be described in a multi-dimensional approach. 
According to Wang (2011b) , regression analysis involves multiple possible 
causes and the multivariate analysis which considers joint impact of multiple 
causes aids in accessing the overview maps.   
4.4.3.1 Panel Data  
Panel data is a form of longitudinal data which consists of a cross-sectional 
dimension with the subscript of i as an indicative sign and the time series 
dimension with a subscript of t containing repeated observations of a selection 
of variables (Pedace 2013; Cuadras and Rao 2014; Biorn 2016). According to 
Hsiao (2007); Harris and Sevestre (2008), panel data of econometrics is one of 
the most exciting recent developments in the field as analysis of panel data has 
the major advantage of “double dimension”. This enables research to account for 
unobservable factors as long as these factors can be captured during a fixed time. 
It is noted by past studies (Hsiao 2007) that panel data analysis provides more 
accurate inference of model parameters that improve the efficiency of 
econometric estimates in the case where time-series tend to infinity (T→∞). 
Panel data has more degrees of freedom and sampling variability than cross-
sectional data with panel T=1 or time series data which with panel N=1 (Hsiao 
2007). Second, according to Hsiao (2007), panel data analysis provides more 
capacity for capturing the complexity of behaviour than does a single cross-
section or time series data through controlling the impact of omitted variables 
and uncovering dynamic relationships. This form of analysis allows examination 
of the effects of missing and unobserved variables from the explanatory variables 
(MaCurdy 1981; Matyas and Sevestre 1996; Andreß et al. 2013). Also, it 
simplifies the computation and statistical inference associated with 
nonstationary time series analysis by “invoking the central limit theorem across-
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sectional units to show that the limiting distributions of many estimators remain 
asymptotically normal” (Levin et al. 2002; Hsiao 2007).  
A widely used panel data model, according to Hsiao (2007),  is to “estimate the 
effects of observed explanatory variables 𝑥, are identical across cross-sectional 
unit i, and over time t, while the effects of omitted variables can be decomposed 
into the individual-specific effects 𝜇𝑖 , time specific effects 𝜆𝑡 , and individual 
time-varying effects, 𝛿𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖𝑡", as follows:  
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑥′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑖 = 1 … . , 𝑁 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡 = 1 … … , 𝑇 
 
where i denotes the cross-section dimension regarding space such as industries, 
countries and regions, and t is the time series dimension of year, month, quarter 
and daily. In this linear regression model, 𝑥𝑖𝑡  is a vector of observations K 
explanatory variables, β is a k vector of unobserved coefficients. This equation 
can be estimated using the approach of 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 or 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖+ 𝜆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.  
Various types of panel data analysis are estimated among relevant studies. 
Balanced panel data, in which the same individual is observed in all periods 
under consideration, is one of the most popular panel data analysis. The coverage 
of balanced panel data sets can be described as 𝑖 = 1, … . . , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1, … . . , 𝑇 
where i is the subscript for the unit of observation and t is the subscript for the 
time-period, and one sample contains N units and T time-periods. The second 
category is unbalanced panel data analysis which presents non-equal unit 
observations in all periods. For instance, unbalanced panel data at firm level may 
have only one or two annual observations available for particular firms in time. 
According to Andreß et al. (2013), “regression models for unbalanced panel data 
are considered as extensions of regression models for balanced panel data. All 
statistical software packages which can estimate panel models can also deal with 
unbalanced data”. The panel data analysis is performed as either a random effects 
model or fixed effects model. Whether random effects or fixed effects is 
econometrically more appropriate primarily depends upon the correlation of the 
individual effects with regressors. Thus, to identify whether the cross-section 
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effects of each individual are constant, fixed or random is the first objective in 
this section.  
To select an appropriate model, the study refers to Dougherty (2011) who 
proposes a panel data selection technique (Figure 3.6 ). This graph illustrates in 
which circumstances a particular model should be followed. The selection of 
the model is decided after the utilization of statistical tests and all the models 
are discussed in the next sections.  
Figure 4. 4: Choice of Regression Model For Panel Data 
 
 
Sources: Adapted from Cuong and Canh (2012) 
 
4.4.3.1.1 Pooled OLS Regression  
In panel data analysis, the pooled OLS regression is one of the typical regression 
models which can be used if observations are independent. As Mertens et al. 
(2016) explains, pooled means treating all individual years or combinations of 
unit and time data as unique and independent observations. In other words, there 
is no distinction between cross-section and time-series that combines all the data 
together. Thus, this combination can resort to normal OLS (ordinary least 
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squares) estimation as in a cross-sectional analysis. In pooled OLS regression, 
both the intercept and the slope parameters are assumed to be homogeneous. 
Under certain assumptions, the pooled OLS estimator can be used to obtain a 
consistent estimator of , by adding data over the period t and cross-section i 
into a single long regression model. The pooled OLS model is written as follows: 
 
                                         𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  α + 𝑥′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡   
 
If E(𝑥′𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑡) = 0, 𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇., then pooled OLS estimation is consistent.  
The pooled OLS model assumes that the error term 𝑢𝑖𝑡is uncorrelated with all 
values of regressors 𝑥𝑖𝑡. The regression of 𝑦𝑖𝑡  on 𝑥𝑖𝑡 and an intercept leads to an 
inconsistent estimator of  if the individual effect which included in error item 
𝑢𝑖𝑡  is correlated with the regressors.  
In this case, a pooled OLS estimator cannot be used since the fixed effect model 
is appropriate. In conclusion, pooled OLS regression is a straightforward 
approach to simply analyse the estimators by assuming that all parameters are 
the same for each cross-section (e.g. firm, region). However, it does not 
recognize potential within individual variation as it treats all variability as 
between variables, ignoring the fact that observations are nested within 
individuals (Melguizo et al. 2011). This, as Gossy (2008b) argues, leads to 
inflated sample size, biased coefficients, and underestimations of errors. Mostly, 
the results become restrictive and unrealistic. This study considers unbalanced 
panel data as a sample and requires that it generate unbiased and consistent 
parameters. Thus, two other models of Fixed Effect (FE) and Random Effect 
(RE) are more appropriate to use (Cameron and Trivedi 2005).  
 
4.4.3.1.2 Fixed Effect Model (FE) 
In the fixed effect model, the slope coefficients  for all sampled observations 
are assumed to be fixed parameters throughout but there are variations in the 
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intercepts. The correlation between individual specific effects and the 
independent variables is allowed in the fixed effect model and, therefore, it is 
always consistent in the absence of endogeneity or errors 𝜀𝑖𝑡  in the variable 
(Snorrason 2012). 
The fixed effect model is estimated as follow: 
                                                     𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡  
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡  is the tth observation at tracking section i (i=1,2,3), 𝛾𝑡  is a time-
varying intercept that captures all of the variables that affect 𝑦𝑖𝑡  and that vary 
over time but are constant cross-sectionally (Arellano and Honoré 2001). It is 
noted that the fixed-effect models are used t to control for unobservable 
heterogeneity that is constant over time.  
In the fixed effect model, each 𝜇𝑖  and 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡  is considered as an unknown 
parameter that needs to be estimated.  The residual 𝜇𝑖𝑡 (idiosyncratic error) is 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variable in each time period, thus 
independently and identically distributed as:  
 
                                     𝑐𝑜𝑣 (𝜇𝑖𝑡 , 𝜇𝑖𝑡′) = 0, ∀𝑡
′ ≠ 𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜇𝑖𝑡,𝜇𝑗𝑡) = 0, ∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑖. 
                              
Egger (2002) and Baltagi (2008) suggest that, when the focus of a study is on 
the causes of changes within units of firms, regions or countries, the fixed effect 
model is an appropriate design for sample examination. To summarize, fixed 
effects panel data regressions is suitable to distinguish the cross-sectional and 
intertemporal effect. Despite the wide use of fixed model, the disadvantage is 
noted that there are plenty of parameters to be estimated resulting in loss of 
degrees of freedom. Also, the time-invariant variables (e.g. price,) are removed 
in fixed effect panel regression that causes the instability of the regressors (mean 
values and deviations from mean values). Another shortcoming is the problem 
of multicollinearity arising when individual and time explanatory variables 
combine with heterogeneity.  
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4.4.3.1.3 Random Effect Model 
Unlike the fixed-effect model, the random effect model can be used to choose 
the value of a variable by being randomly selected from the population of all 
possible levels. In the random effect model, the individual effect follows an 
unknown distribution and thus takes part in the random disturbance term. Also, 
the explanatory variables are not correlated with the individual specific effect, 
in contrast to the fixed-effect model. In the random effect model, the Generalized 
Least Square (GLS) is designed for the analysis. A model is interpreted as 
                                                𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
In the random effect model,  is still an overall mean, which is an unknown 
constant, and the intercepts for each cross-sectional unit are assumed to arise 
from this common intercept  (Brooks 2014). Also, there is a random variable 
𝑒𝑖 that varies cross-sectionally but is constant over time. The intercept in the 
model is assumed to be away from individual observation error term 𝑢𝑖𝑡  and 
explanatory variable 𝑥′𝑖𝑡  (Verbeek 2008; Brooks 2014). It is noted that the 
random effect model assumes the strict exogeneity of the explanatory variables, 
where  
E (𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑖𝑡 , … , 𝑋𝑖𝑇 , 𝑐𝑖, ℊ𝑖) = 0 
The random effect model is considered a more efficient estimation tool as it 
provides greater degrees of freedom (Baltagi 2008). Thus, a better use of the 
information value of patent data is made under random effect estimators. 
Another advantage is generating a coefficient estimate of both time-variant as 
well as time-invariant explanatory variable that complement the limitation of the 
fixed effect model (Kennedy 2003). Nevertheless, the random effect model may 
be a problem when the explanatory variables are dependent on the error item, 
which is usually the case in producing a biased estimator. The random effect 
model may generate inconsistent results as the model assumption is violated. 
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4.4.3.1.4 Econometric Model Analysis  
The model below is designed to investigate the relationship between capital 
structure and the determinants affecting it. Based on the discussion of data 
analysis, the general multivariate regression estimation is described as: 
                                    𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡𝑘𝑙 = 𝛿 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝐷𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 +                𝛽5𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝐵𝐾𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽10𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 +                𝛽11𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where i is the firm unit; t is the time period; 𝛿 is the constant; Size represents 
firm size; Grow is growth opportunities of firm; NDTax is non-debt tax shield; 
Prof is profitability; Liquidity is current ratio; Tang is tangibility; RD is research 
and development expenses; DBKRT is distance from bankruptcy; Div is 
dividend payment; CapExp is capital expenditures; Industry is HH index, Eco is 
all economic variables of the country;  𝜇𝑖 is the unobservable individual effects 
which is different and specific to each firm within the sample group; 𝜆𝑡 is the 
parameters of time dummy variables; 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the standard error item.  
Under this model, each intercept is considered as the outcome of a random 
deviation from the mean intercept. The intercept here is assumed to be free from 
any error related to any particular observation as it is drawn from distribution for 
each unit. The RE model also assumes strict exogeneity where 
                                              𝐸(𝑒𝑖𝑡|𝞦) = 0, 𝐸(𝑢𝑖|𝞦) = 0 ⇒ 𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑡|𝞦) = 0. 
 
4.4.3.1.5 Hausman Test  
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test generally called the Hausman Test is the 
most widely used examination to choose between a random effects and fixed 
effects approach by firstly testing whether unobserved heterogeneity of each unit 
𝜀𝑖 and explanatory variables 𝑥𝑖𝑡 are correlated. According to Hausman (1978), 
since a fixed effect is consistent when unobserved heterogeneity 𝜀𝑖𝑡  and 
explanatory variables 𝑥𝑖𝑡 are correlated, but a random effect is inconsistent, a 
statistically significant difference is interpreted as evidence against the random 
effects assumption. The Hausman test for correlated random effects examines if  
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                                                                𝐜𝐨𝐯(𝒁𝒊𝒋𝒕𝜶𝒊𝒋) = 𝟎 
The Hausman test can be estimated as follow:  
                      H = (βFE − βRE)′[var(βFE) − var(βRE)] −1(𝛽𝐹𝐸 − 𝛽𝑅𝐸)~𝑋2𝑘 
where βFE = (𝛽0
𝐹𝐸 , 𝛽1
𝐹𝐸 , … , 𝛽𝑘
𝐹𝐸) is a vector of fixed effect estimates and k is the 
dimension of the slope vector β.  
Thus 𝐻0 = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜂𝑖: 𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 0 
         𝐻1 = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜂𝑖: 𝑥𝑖𝑡 ≠ 0 
The null hypothesis is that the individual and time effects are not correlated with 
the regressors 𝑥𝑖𝑡 (Ullah 1998).  Firstly, it assumes that both the FE and RE are 
consistent under the null hypothesis (𝐻0). If the test statistic rejects the null 
hypothesis when the fixed effects dummy variable is close to zero, then a random 
effect model is more efficient and should to be applied. Secondly, if the rejection 
of the null hypothesis due to a large value of the Hausman test statistic implies 
that the individual specific effects are uncorrelated with regressors then fixed 
effect is presented.  
In briefly, the Hausman test tests “whether the difference between parameter 
estimator of fixed effect or random effect models is statistically meaningful” 
(Snorrason 2012). According to Erçetin (2015), the difference of fixed and 
random effect models is about the relationship between the fixed-time effects 
and descriptive variables. The estimator of fixed effect should not be preferred 
over the random effect estimator except all fixed time factors which relate to 
other descriptive variables can be measured (Gunasekara et al. 2013).  
Random effects will be unbiased if the unobserved heterogeneity and the 
explanatory variables are uncorrelated, and it will be more efficient as irrelevant 
variables do not exist. However, if the correlation between the explanatory 
variables and the unobserved heterogeneity is stronger, then a fixed effect 
estimate is used. Fixed effect estimators can be used to access the consistent 
estimation of the intercepts.  
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4.4.3.1.6 Reverse Causality  
After deciding on the regression analysis model, it is important to discuss a 
potential problem of capital structure and the factors affecting it. This is the 
matter of reverse-causality bias which assumes that the hierarchical determinants 
of firm, country and macroeconomic level affects capital structure and vice. It is 
known that firms with higher leverage or lower leverage over equity may be 
involved in activities that change the firm and country characteristics. In general, 
explanatory variables in 𝑥𝑖 that are correlated with the equation’s error term 𝜀𝑖 
are defined as endogenous. The reverse causality is a form of the endogenous. It 
is essential to test whether this assumption is valid because virtually all relevant 
empirical studies that attempt to clarity the connection between capital structure 
and determinants of firms and country potentially suffer from significant 
endogeneity problems.  
Börsch‐Supan and Köke (2002) provide a detailed description of” how 
endogeneity problems can arise from reverse causality (where the direction of 
causality is unclear), sample selectivity, omitted variables, or measurement error 
of explanatory variables”. The consequence of endogeneity is that the OLS is 
biased and inconsistent, which in turn implies that both the point estimates of the 
coefficients and interference will be invalid. To some extent, Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) alleviate the endogeneity problem by taking the explanatory variables as 
past years’ average of the factors. However, the use of panel data can be a more 
appropriate method to reduce this problem. According to Verbeek (2008), “a 
panel data set contains repeated observations for the same firms over a period of 
time. The availability of repeated observations on the sample firms allows 
estimating more realistic model than a single cross-section series can do”.  
More precisely, panel data covers the change in leverage on the firm unit over a 
time serious. As studies (Ozkan 2001; Campello 2003; King and Santor 2008) 
claim, the reason that individual firms choose different leverage ratios can be 
explained by panel data. Also, it is suitable to show the model based on a given 
firm that has different leverage ratios at different points in time. According to 
Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and Bollen and Brand (2010), if the omitted 
variables are time invariant, there is a simple estimator of fixed effect panel that 
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can present robust results of regression. Problems of endogeneity can be reduced 
as panel data provides instrumental variables which are not available in cross-
section data.  
As this study uses a form of panel data as a sample, the consideration of reverse 
causality or endogeneity problems are not included.   
4.4.3.1.7 Sensitive Analysis  
Sensitivity analysis (SA) is the research of how much the “uncertainty in the 
input data of a model is reflected in the accuracy of the output results” (Dimov 
et al. 2017). According to Petty et al. (2015), sensitivity analysis is developed to 
classify the most significant forces that ultimately affect the success or failure of 
a project by determining how the variance of one particular input variable affects 
the distribution of possible net present values or internal rates of return.  This is 
measured by changing one input variable’s value but remaining all other input 
variables’ value constant (Hamby 1994). A number of sensitivity analysis 
techniques are developed and used to test for the presence of errors, accuracy 
and validity of a model (Pannell 1997). These models heavily rely on special 
hypotheses that associated with the behaviour of the model. For instance, the 
“linearity, monotonicity and additivity of the relationship between input and 
output parameters of the model” are all included in the model (Saltelli et al. 
2004). Among the quantitative methods, variance-based methods are most often 
used. According to Dimov et al. (2017), the main idea of sensitivity analysis 
techniques is to appraise how the variance of model input contributes to the 
variance of model output.  
For the study, sensitivity analysis has the advantage of revealing the degree of 
robustness of the results obtained by the change in the value of a variable or a 
set of them, and comparing the results with those obtained in the deterministic 
analysis (Loucks and Van Beek 2017). As sensitivity analysis is important for 
obtaining reliable results, it holds especially for outlier detection and problem of 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.   
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The problem with outliners 
An outlier is an unusual data point that happens within a pattern regime. An 
outlier is not pattern change but an aberrant data value caused by a one-time 
shock to a system, a data collection error, or simply an extreme value by chance 
(Armstrong 2001). Outliers are known to bias estimated model parameters. 
Sensitivity analysis is a commonly suggested approach for outlier detection and 
the criteria include deleting observations and the effect of their absence on an 
average (Ancev et al. 2017). In a sensitivity analysis, the technique of Box Plot 
which provides a clear picture of statistical information including features of 
medians, quartiles, ranges and outliers is used in this study for detecting outliers 
in the panel data to access the cleaning and lining sample collection (Scheiner 
and Gurevitch 2001). Winsorization used to derive a robust estimate of the error 
terms on the sensitivity means is the most common approach to addressing the 
problem of outliers (Wilcox 2011). The advantage of winsorizing is that it 
preserves the information that replaces the highest or lowest value in a data 
distribution but protects against the negative effect of outliers. Secondly, 
trimming of data is an alternative widespread approach of handling the problem 
of outliers in a distribution of data, in which outlier values are removed instead 
of being transformed to other value (Salkind 2010). Winsorization and trimming 
both fall within a field known as robust statistics. For the study, it is important 
to remove invalid data from the unbalanced panel because the elimination of one 
extreme observation will not influence on other section and time series.  
 
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation (Serial Correlation) 
The general assumption of the linear regression model is homoscedasticity or 
constant. This explains that the variance in the values of the independent 
variables are assumed not to affect the variance of the dependent variables. As 
Washington et al. (2003) conclude, the assumption of homoscedasticity is not 
always present in the model. The failure of this assumption is heteroscedasticity. 
In this view, the variance of the distribution of the dependent variables of the 
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model, corresponding to each set of values of the independent variables, is not 
constant (Seddighi et al. 2000).  
The Breusch-Pagan test is widely used to verify the problem of 
heteroscedasticity. Breusch and Pagan (1979) built up this test as a Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) test for the null of homoscedasticity versus the general 
alternative that error variance depends in linear form on some regressors. It tests 
the model’s null hypothesis (𝐻0: 𝛼 = 0) of homoscedasticity against the 
alternative hypothesis  (𝐻0: 𝛼 ≠ 0 ) that variance is some function of more than 
one explanatory variables. Since heteroscedasticity is caused by measure error, 
the non-existence of constant variance after the test signifies heteroscedastic, and 
the existence of constant variance in the Breusch-Pagan test predicts 
homoscedasticity. There are two alternative tests for solving the problem of 
heteroscedasticity, White’s test (White 1980) and the Goldfeld-Quandt test. 
These two tests are also widely used but have more limited utility (Lim 2011; 
Kaufman 2013) and therefore this study adopts the Breusch-Pagan test to 
uncover the problem of  heteroscedasticity. Once standard errors are obtained, 
the Roust Standard Errors instrument is adopted in the research to control 
heteroscedasticity (Chevalier 1995).   
The autocorrelation, also known as the serial correlation test is also conducted 
since the penal data estimation normally violates the condition of independent 
error and is identically distributed with constant variant (Elhorst 2014). This 
problem occurs when in a regression, the error term observations of different 
cross sections in different time series are correlated. There are two types of serial 
correlations that affect the efficiency of the estimators. “With first-order serial 
correlation, errors in one time period are correlated directly with errors in the 
ensuing time period and, with positive serial correlation, errors in one time 
period are positively correlated with errors in the next time period” (Wooldridge 
2010; Baum et al. 2017). The existence of serial correlation in panel data 
aggravate the standard errors and causes the results of regression to be less 
efficient. The Wooldridge Test for diagnosis of autocorrelation is applied in the 
study as it has become increasingly attractive due to the relativity few 
assumptions and ease of implementation (Drukker 2003). For this reason, 
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Drukker (2003) claims that the Wooldridge Test might be less powerful than the 
more highly parameterized test; however, it will be more robust when testing for 
serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors of a linear panel data model because 
it can fit both the Fixed and Random Effects models together under any general 
conditions (Wooldridge 2010).  
 
4.4.4 Non-linearity Test 
The non linearity model is a continous nonlinear multivariate approximation to 
the real form of the response (Erçetin 2015). This relationship implies that an 
independent variable does not have a constant effect on the dependent variable. 
In nonlinear regression, the independent variables are assumed to interact with 
each other in a multiplicative fashion to dependent variables (Franzese and Kam, 
2009; Eby and O’Neill, 1977;Tsai, 2013 ). In general, nonlinear estimation 
involves finding the best fitting relationship between the value of a dependent 
variable and the values of a set of one or more independet varaibles (Hill et al. 
2006). The nonlinear model can be interpreted as:  
                                                           E(𝑌𝑖) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖
2 
Where Y is the dependent variables and X is the independent varaible with a 
squre term to present as nonlinear relationship. Using non-linearity is widely 
exitence in studies of Fattouh et al. (2005) who consider a non-linear relation 
between firm’s leverage and their detminnants. The traditional view of 
Modiglian and Miller focues on the cost of equity have a non-linear relatsionip 
with the gearing ratio. The non-lienear relationhip can illustrated as U-Shaped 
or inverted U-Shaped depending on the parametor 𝛽. To test the direction of U-
shape, studies test to observe whether within the invervial, there are values that 
decrease at low interval value and increases at high interval value. The U-Shape 
relationship is presented as quadratic form of panel data model as:  
                                       𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑓𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜁𝑧𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑖 = 1, … . . 𝑛 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the dependnent vairable (leverage), 𝑥𝑖 is the independentt variable 
(firm size, growth opportunities, liquidity), 𝑧𝑖 is the control variables (Bond or 
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Stock based market), 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error item, f(𝑥𝑖𝑡) is the quadratic 𝑥𝑖
2 that make the 
equation curved (Managi 2011; Hussen 2012).  
Non-linear models have an advantage in examing the relationhip between two 
variables due to the parameter coefficient which explains “a few signficant 
increases or reductions in a variable which will influence other variables. It not 
only explains the direction of the existing relationship but also helps in 
explaining how far the change in performance go in relationship to the variables” 
(Warner 2008). However, Lind and Mehlum (2010) argues that the use of the 
quadratic term alone to test non-linear relationships may encounter a problem 
when the responses are monotonically increasing or decreasing implying that 
linear and quadratic terms may be highly correlated (Hocking 2013).  
 
4.5 Conclusion  
Chapter four provides a discussion on the research methodology proposed for 
this research.  It provides a comprehensive discussion of the various and 
progressive procedures that the study uses to answer to the research questions. 
The FTSE AIM All Share Index of 610 listed firms is selected as the UK sample 
and the SZSE SMEs Index of 608 listed firms are selected as the Chinese sample 
of the study covering the period from 2007 to 2017. The underlying reason for 
the period selection is that it captures the determinants of capital structure 
decisions within the environment of financial crisis and economic recovery. This 
is motivated by Deesomsak et al. (2004) who carries out a similar exploration 
this tendency on companies’ leverage levels in from the Asia Pacific region 
during the financial crisis of 1997.  
The financial data and information of firms’ characteristic are sourced from the 
Datastream, and economic data is collected from the World Bank Database. The 
second section of this chapter describes the dependent variables, the independent 
variables and the control variables associated with the analyses undertaken. 
Additionally, there is a discussion of the methodology of panel data quantitative 
analysis that is adopted in the study with a detailed introduction of various tests 
relating to a suitable model. The mediation test and associated steps of the 
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mediation test are also explained in the following section. For the robustness of 
the model, the sensitivity analysis of all the diagnostic tests is explained in this 
chapter.  
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Chapter Five: Descriptive Analysis and Discussion of 
Results  
5.0 Introduction  
This chapter investigates and examines the relationship between the variables 
including dependent and explanatory variables in the economic models which 
have been specified in the previous chapter. The first section presents the 
analysis of the descriptive statistics of the variables describing the basic features 
of the data and providing simple summaries and explanations relating to the 
sample data and the measures. This section describes the taken from the UK AIM 
market and China’s SMEs Board.  
This chapter also analyses the descriptive statistics obtained from the data that 
will form the platform for the conduct of this research and discusses various 
aspects of the two stock markets under study. The second section performs 
hypothesis testing to establish a correlation matrix and ensure that there are no 
impediments to running, the panel regression analysis in relation to multi-
collinearity.   
5.1 Descriptive Analysis of the Sample 
After following thoroughly the sample selection criteria outlined in chapter Five, 
514 firms listed on the FTSE AIM All Share and 760 firms listed on the 
Shenzhen SME Board Market qualified to be used for analysis in this study. In 
Figure 5.1, the sampled firms in the AIM and their distribution across the 8 ICB 
sectors (excluding the Financial Sector and Utilities Sector) are presented. The 
most dominant sector is the Industrial Sector having 108 firms and weighting 
21.01% of the total firms sampled. The second large sectors in the sample are 
Technology which has 86 firms (16.73%) and the Basic Materials with 81 firms. 
The smallest sectors in the sample are the Consumer Goods and 
Telecommunication sectors with 44 firms and 4 firms respectively. The Oil & 
Gas Sector, Heath Sector and Consumer Services Sector have 10.3%, 10.3% and 
8.18% firms respectively. 
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         Figure 5. 1: Sampled Firms in the FTSE AIM All Share 
 
 
Figure 5.2 represents the sampled firms in the Shenzhen SME Board Market 
based on distribution across the 8 CNI sectors (excluding the Financial Sector 
and the Utilities Sector). The largest sector in the SME Board Market is the 
Industrial Sector with 288 firms weighting 37.89% out of the total firms in the 
sample. The second most sectors are Consumer Staples which has 182 firms 
(23.95%) and Material with 134 firms (17.63%). The Telecommunication, 
Energy and Consumer Discretionary sectors occupy the least proportion in the 
sample with weights 0.26%, 1.84% and 4.21% respectively. In addition, the 
Heath care and Information Technology sectors also comprise 6% and 8.03% in 
the sample after criterial procedure of sample selection. Compared with the ICB 
Sectors in the AIM, the distribution of sectors in the SME Board Market is 
uneven. From Figure 5.2, it can be seen that firms in the SME Board Market are 
mostly concentrated in the manufacturing sectors of Industrials, Consumer 
Staples and fundamental sector of Basic Materials. The distributions of firms in 
tertiary industries (Telecommunication; Technology) and high-end service 
sectors (Heath care; Consumer Discretionary) are far below.  
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Figure 5. 2: Sampled Firms in the SZSE SME Market 
 
 
5.2 AIM Consolidated Descriptive Statistics  
Given that one of the objectives of this thesis is to investigate the hierarchical 
determinants of capital structure that exist in several ICB and CNI sectors, the 
summarised descriptive statistics are consolidated and presented in Table 5.1 and 
Table 5.2 in appendix. As explained in previous section, the data selected in this 
thesis is unbalanced as not all the information from the period of 2007 to 2017 
is captured due to the missing data on variables. From Table 5.1, the highest 
observation of 4100 is filtered for the Industrial Sector in AIM while the 
Telecommunication sector in AIM with the lowest observation of 153 is 
represented.  
In the Industrial Sector, the average value of the variable DBKRT (distance to 
bankruptcy) is 0.24 with a minimum score of -1062.13 and a maximum score of 
9.81. The scores of DBKRT in Industrial Sectors is one of lowest by comparison 
with DBKRT in other ICB sectors. The quantity recorded for variables of LIQTY 
(liquidity) and InTANG (asset intangibility) are on the lower side. In this sector, 
the average percent of liquidity is 2.45% while the minimum number is 0.04% 
and the maximum number is 214.78%. The mean value of asset intangibility is 
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27.02% with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 95.42%. Additionally, the 
Industrial Sector has the highest average dividend payout ratio with 15.95% 
while the maximum payout ratio is 98.84 and the minimum is 0. From quantity 
recorded, it can be seen that the average value of the industry market 
concentration index is 0.33 with a minimum of 0.51 and a maximum of 0 over 
the period of the sample years. This means that the Industrial Sector in AIM is a 
highly concentrated market. For dependent variables of leverage, the short term 
debts in market value and book value have an average value of 70.18% and 
5.24% respectively. It suggests that the short term debts in this sector are the 
highest across all the ICB sectors. With long term debts, the average level among 
the firms over the sample year are also far greater (next to the 
Telecommunication Sector). The records for the mean value of long term debt 
in market value and book value are 66.52% and 7.31% respectively.  
The Technology Sector has 3262 observations out of the total observations in 
the period of the sample. The variable of GROWTH (growth of opportunities) 
has a mean of 4.91% and the variable of InTANG (intangibility of asset) has an 
average record of 39.31%. The mean value of these two variables are higher than 
the other sectors. However, the variables of TANG (asset tangibility) has a mean 
value of 7.01% which is the lowest among all the sectors. This is explained by 
the fact that the Technology Sector has more intangible assets such as intellectual 
property rights, patent rights, talents reserve and brand perception rather than 
fixed assets. In addition, the recorded mean value of the variable LIQTY 
(liquidity) is 2.41% with a minimum of 0.15% and a maximum of 81.58%. The 
variables of DBKRT (distance to bankruptcy risk) in Technology has an average 
score of 0.43 with a minimum score of -19.86 and a maximum of 7.88. It is noted 
that the mean value of liquidity in the Technology sector is at a lower level while 
the average level of distance to bankruptcy is one of the highest across all sectors. 
It can be inferred from this result that lower asset tangibility and liquidity do not 
produce the problem of bankruptcy in the Technology Sector. Also, the 
Technology Sector has lower leverage level in both the short term and long term. 
The maximum leverage of short term in book value recorded is 66% and the 
minimum is 0% with an average level of 5%. It is provisionally deduced that the 
Technology Sector generally does not rely on short term debt.  
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The Basic Material Sector has 2870 observations for the sampler years which is 
the third largest sector represented in this descriptive statistics table. Due to the 
concentration of heavy industries under the Basic Material Sector, the problems 
of capital turnover can be the greatest consideration for them, and the recorded 
maximum value of 99.83% and minimum value of 0 for the variable of Liquidity 
with an average value of 8.91% are normal. Nonetheless, the recorded values for 
variables of ROE (profitability) and DBKRT (distance to bankruptcy) are the 
lowest with mean values of -141% and -1.58 respectively. The minimum 
profitability in Basic Material Sector is -26234.8% while the maximum 
profitability is 104% with a standard deviation of 1504. It can be inferred that 
profit margin in this sector might be slashed to the bone in an attempt to keep 
turnover moving. Also, the quality level between firms in this sector is uneven. 
This is further supported by the higher quantity for the variable of industry 
market concentration with a mean of 0.22.  The Basic Material Sector in AIM 
might be an oligopoly market. Additionally, growth opportunity is recorded as 
2.44% which is the highest in all AIM sectors. For the variables of leverage, both 
short-term debt and long term debt are lower than other sectors. The average 
short term debt in market value is 35.97 with a highest level of 100% and lowest 
level of 0. The average long term debt in market value and book value are 29.3% 
and 3.18% respectively which is far below the second lowest debt in Oil & Gas 
Sectors. It is likely that the Basic Material Sector does not rely on debt financing.   
Though the Telecommunication Sector has 153 observations that are captured in 
the period of the sample year, the average level of firm specific variables of 
InTANG (intangibility of asset) is far above. The recorded values for InTang in 
the Telecommunication Sector is 37.5% with a minimum of 0 and a maximum 
of 98.56%. The average asset tangibility is 27.97% with a maximum of 86.46% 
and a minimum of 0. The lower level of physical assets might cause difficult 
financing due to the lack of pledge. The recorded for variable of liquidity shows 
1.66% in mean value and 5.64% as the maximum value suggesting that the firms 
in the Telecommunication Sector do not have strong paying ability for short term 
debts. The industry variable of market concentration has a mean of 0.01 while 
the minimum market concentration is 0 and maximum market concentration is 
0.11. Thus, the Telecommunication sector may not be a captive market with such 
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lower indices. For variables of leverage, the mean recorded for short term 
leverage in market value and book value are 62% and 1.8% respectively. For 
long term leverage, the mean of the market value is 76% and short term value is 
20%. In a word, the quantity recorded for leverage in Telecommunication sectors 
are at the higher range of all AIM sectors. Also, it is notable that the level of long 
term leverage in this sector is slightly higher than that of short term leverage, 
which might increase the financial risk of firms. As recorded in Table 5.1, the 
average score of distance to default is 2.28 indicating that firms were not likely 
to go bankrupt over the sampler year.  
The Consumer Goods sector has the second fewest observations with 1528 
among all the sectors over the period. The variable of growth opportunities has 
a mean of 0.54% with a maximum of 63.36% and minimum of -885.85%. The 
lowest quantity recorded for growth opportunities indicates a slow growth of 
industry development. The average value of ROE is on the negative side at -
8.68% with maximum of 938% and minimum of -1270%. Such a huge range 
between maximum and minimum profitability indicates uneven development of 
the sub sector under the Consumer Goods. The quantities for short term leverage 
are the highest across all the sectors as average leverage in market value is 
70.82% and in book value is 7.72%. Long term leverage on the other side 
recorded the mean of 57.93% in market value and 7.58% book value. An 
explanation could be that the firms in the Consumer Goods sector rely on debt 
finance especially short liquidity loans. However, the lower average liquidity 
with 2.51% in this sector represents a weak ability for paying short term debt. 
One other sector with the third least observations is the Heath Care Sector which 
has 2091 observations. The value for the variable of ROE is the lowest across all 
the sectors with a mean value of -40% while the maximum is 945% and 
minimum is -2727%.  The variable of TANG (asset tangibility) has the second 
lowest mean value of 7.93% and the smallest value and largest value range from 
0 to 93.39%. Correspondingly, the recorded data for the variable of InTANG 
(asset intangibility) is the second highest among all the sectors with an average 
value of 32.62%. Similar to the Technology Sector, the intangible assets in the 
Heath Care Sector is more to be considered than the fixed assets, as the sub-
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sectors under heath care (Heath Care Equipment and Services, Pharmaceuticals 
and Biotechnology) may have more patent rights and intellectual property rights. 
The lowest quantity for industry market concentration is 0.01 with a maximum 
of 0.02 and minimum of 0.006. 
The number of observations in the Oil & Gas Sectors is 2320; the quantity 
recorded for the firm specific variable of ROE (profitability) and DBKRT 
(distance to bankruptcy) are significantly lower than the others. For instance, the 
average recorded value of ROE is -52.7% with a minimum of -5429% and 
maximum of 1810% and the average score of distance to default is -3.87 with a 
minimum of -699 and maximum of 13. From these results, it can be inferred that 
firms in the Oil & Gas industry are heading for bankruptcy and there is a 
downturn in the sector. With regards to the recorded data for HH (industry 
market concentration index), the mean is 0.1 while the minimum market 
concentration within the Oil & Gas industry is 0 % and maximum market 
concentration is 1.11. Compared with other sectors, the recorded value for HH 
in the Oil & Gas Sectors is at the medium range.  It is noted that the recorded on 
leverage levels in the sector is far behind the other sectors. The short term 
leverage has a mean value of 40% in market value and 4% in book value. The 
mean of long term debt in market value is 32% with a minimum of 0 and a 
maximum of 100%. The long term debt in book value has an average of 4%. It 
can be concluded that the firms in the Oil & Gas sector may rely on equity 
financing.  
The final sector to be considered based on the descriptive statistics is the 
Consumer Services sector with 2465 observations. As recorded in the Consumer 
Services sector, the average growth is 4% while the maximum is 1310% and the 
maximum is 81.2%, showing fast growth of this sector. It could be deduced that 
firms in this sector are fast growing. The mean of short term leverage in the 
market value is 63.24% and in book value is 4.07%. The average long term 
leverage in market value is 59% while that in book value is 7.9%. It is noted that 
the average leverage ratios in this sector are at the higher range of all. Regarding 
records of liquidity, the mean value of 2% suggests a problem of debt paying in 
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the short term. However, the average percentage of tangible assets is 21% and 
this can be the collateral for borrowing.  
5.3 SMEs board Consolidated Descriptive Statistics  
Table 5.2 displays the descriptive statistics analysis of CNI Sectors of the SME 
Board Market. It can be seen that the Industrial Sector has the highest 
observations of 9704 after filtering the sample space while the 
Telecommunication Sector has the fewest observations of 78. This is similar to 
the descriptive statistics analysis of the ICB Sectors of AIM.  
The Industrial Sector recorded 9704 observations out of the total observations 
over the period of sample. The recorded values for most variables in the 
Industrial Sectors are at the average level of all sectors. The variable GROWTH 
has a mean of 3.79% while the maximum is 834.46% and minimum is -0.95%. 
Profitability has an average percent of 7.52 with a minimum of -193.53% and a 
maximum of 48.69%. The mean values of these two variables are slightly below 
the average level of all sectors while the standard deviations are higher than the 
average level. It could be inferred that the profit distribution under the Industrial 
Sector remains highly unequal. Also, the market competition of the Industrial 
Sector is stronger than other sector as the industry market concentration index is 
the lowest with an average value of 0.01, a maximum of 0.02 and minimum of 
0.008. For dependent variables, the short term leverage has a market value has a 
mean of 88.58 and short term leverage in book value has a mean of 12.28%. The 
long term leverage have average value of 47.09% for market value and 3.3% for 
book value. Considering the higher level of leverage, it could be suggested that 
the Industrial Sector in the SME board market may be inclined to debt financing.  
The Consumer Staples Sector has the second largest number of among the 
sectors with 5867 units. The average level of ROE is 7.52 which is also at the 
average level of all sectors. The minimum and maximum value of ROE is -
591.18% and 48.69% respectively showing the largest standard deviation of 
21.51. The variable of asset tangibility recorded the second highest average value 
of 27.79% with a maximum of 77.35% and minimum of 0.1% by the firms in 
this sector. It can be inferred that the Consumer Staple Sector relies on a large 
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amount of fixed assets which is in accordance with the characteristics of 
manufacturing. The average market concentration of the Consumer Staple Sector 
is 0.03 with a largest value of 0.1 and smallest of 0.02. This shows the 
competition in this sector is intense. Additionally, the average level for both 
short term and long term leverage are at the medium range. The short term 
leverage in market value and book value has a mean of 85.5% and 12.89% 
respectively. The average level of long term leverage in market value is 47% and 
in book value is 3.4%.  
The third sector to be considered based on the descriptive statistics is the Basic 
Materials Sector which is the third largest sector represented with 4664 
observations. It is noted that the quantity for variables of growth opportunities, 
profitability and asset intangibility are quite close to the lowest records of all 
sectors. The variable of GROWTH has a mean value of 3.27% with a maximum 
of 61.10% and minimum of -79%. The mean value of ROE is 6.88% while the 
maximum is 55.66% and minimum is -271.42%. For the variable of dividend 
payout ratio, an average of 21% is recorded with a maximum of 99.46 and 
minimum of 0. These may give investors the signal in a negative signal. 
Additionally, the Basic Materials sector has the highest recorded value for the 
variable of asset tangibility with mean value of 36% as the manufacturing relies 
on large amounts of equipment, machinery and other fixed assets. The average 
market concentration is 0.02 which is on the lower side of all sectors. From the 
leverage, it can be seen that short term leverage in market value and book value 
are 95.03% and 17.26% respectively. The long term leverage in market value is 
57.8% and in book value is 4.52%. The quantities for leverage are significantly 
higher than other sectors, indicating that the borrowing requirement in the Basic 
Material sector is huge.  
In addition to these three sectors that firms are mostly concentrated in, 
Information Technology ranks fourth to discuss descriptively with 2076 
observations. Between the mean values of leverage in short term and long term, 
the data recorded the highest average value of 77.52% for short term leverage in 
market value while book value has a mean of 8.12%. The average leverage of 
long term values is lower compared to those of the short term, the recorded data 
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for market value is 35.66% and for book value is 2.33%. The overall leverage 
level in the Information Technology sector is similar to the Heath Care sector. 
Regarding the quantity recorded for firm specific variables, the mean, minimum 
and maximum value of profitability, liquidity and dividend payout ratio are at 
the average range of all the sectors. The mean of asset tangibility is 17.95% 
which is the second lowest compared to other sectors. The average asset 
intangibility however represents a higher level of 9.51%. These indicate that the 
firms in the Information Technology sector might have difficulty with debt 
financing due to the lack of collateral. 
The sector with the fewest observations is the Telecommunication Sector which 
has 78 units. Due to the uniformity of the sub-sector under the 
Telecommunication sector, recording the average short term leverage in market 
value of 22.82% and in book value of 0.57% is not extraordinary. The mean of 
long term leverage in market value is 8.59% and in book value is 0.08% which 
are the lowest mean values across all the sectors. Additionally, the industry 
market concentration has the highest mean value, 0.57, with the highest 
maximum value 0.68 and highest minimum value 0.52. It can be deduced that 
the market in the Telecommunication sector has a strong monopoly. The 
recorded data for variables of liquidity is an average of 13.69% with the smallest 
and largest values ranging from 0 to 57.96%. Such a high level of liquidity (the 
second highest mean is 6%) in this sector suggests a strong short term solvency 
for firms. Also, the variable of InTang (intangible asset) records the largest mean 
value in this sector of 11% with a maximum of 56.97% and minimum of 0.05%. 
It appears that the firms in the Telecommunication sector have plenty of 
intellectual property.  
Though the number of observations for the Oil & Gas sector is 450, the quantity 
recorded for both short term and long term leverage are on the higher side. For 
short term leverage, the mean values are 93% and 13.95% for market value and 
book value respectively. The long term leverage has a mean value of 58.72% in 
market value and 5.77% in book value. From these results, it can be seen that the 
Oil & Gas sector rely on a high level of debts. Also, the quantity recorded for 
variables of profitability, liquidity and distance to default are the lowest of all 
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sectors. For example, the mean of ROE is 4% with maximum of 41.89% and 
minimum of -368.76%, which is even lower than the average level of all sectors. 
The mean of distance to bankruptcy is 1.13 and liquidity is 2.25% but both of 
them are not far behind the average levels of all sectors. The industry market 
concentration index is 0.25 with a maximum of 0.37 and minimum of 0.2. It can 
be concluded that some firms in the Oil & Gas sector are virtually monopolizing 
the market.  
The Consumer Discretionary sector is one of the fasting-growing sectors in the 
SME Board market. From the descriptive statistical analysis, it can be seen that 
this sector has the highest average value of growth opportunities with at 4.63% 
and the highest maximum value of growth opportunities with at 422.89%. On 
average, this sector might have a brighter outlook according to the value 
recorded. For the other firm specific variables, the average values of profitability 
and asset tangibility are 7.51% and 26.85% respectively which are in the medium 
ranges. It is notable that the Consumer Discretionary sector has the lowest 
liquidity which is 1.9% with a maximum of 19.11% and minimum of 0.23%, 
indicating a weak debt paying ability. Additionally, the average score of variable 
of distance to bankruptcy is 1.52 with maximum 6.17 and minimum -2.43, which 
are the highest of all sectors. Nevertheless, the score of 1.52 which is less than 
1.8 suggests a strong probability of bankruptcy. The average level of leverage 
for the short term in market value is 80.9% with the maximum of 100% and the 
minimum of 0 whereas in book value it is 9.85% with the maximum of 39.27% 
and minimum of 0. The average records for long term leverage are on the higher 
side of all sectors. The long term leverage in market value has a mean of 45% 
while book value has a mean of 3.69%. From these results, it can be seen that 
the firms in the Consumer Discretionary sector might rely more on long-term 
leverage than short term leverage.  
In the Heath Care sector, 1543 observations are recorded over the sample period. 
From the Table 5.2, it appears the sector has a higher mean value of GROWTH 
at 4.51% indicating a brighter industry outlook. Correspondingly, the average 
profitability in the sector is the highest of all the sectors. This is a recorded mean 
of 11.73% with maximum profitability of 51.16% and minimum of -52.46%. 
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Also, the mean value of 6.2% in this sector with maximum of 190.87% and 
minimum of 0.52% indicates a strong ability to pay short-term debt. Regarding 
the average level of leverage, this sector has a mean value of 74% and 9.5% for 
short term leverage in market value and book value respectively. Also, the 
average level of long term leverage in market value is 38.37% and in book value 
is 2.37%. Among all the sectors, the leverage ratios in the Heath Care sector are 
on the lower side.  
5.4 Correlation and Multi-collinearity  
The Table below displays the variance inflation factor (VIF and tolerance) test 
used to determine the possibility of multi-collinearity and correlation between 
the variables in this study. The VIF test is programmed to measure how much 
the estimated variance of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ regression coefficient is increased above what 
it would be if 𝑅𝑖
2  equalled zero and a situation in which the 𝑖𝑡ℎ  variable is 
orthogonal to the other variables in the analysis (O’Brien 2007). As noted by 
O'brien (2003), VIF provides a reasonable and intuitive indication of the effects 
of multi-collinearity on the variance of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ  regression coefficient. In the 
Tables below, Table 5.3 shows that the highest value of VIF for the independent 
variables for the sample of AIM is 1.87. Table 5.4 shows the highest value of 
VIF for the independent variables for sample of the SME Board Market is 1.78. 
These highest values of VIF are still below the standard threshold of VIF of 5. It 
is an indication that there is no evidence of multi-collinearity in the independent 
variables for both samples.  
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Table 5. 1: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test for Multi-collinearity with 
AIM 
  
SQRT 
 
R- 
Variable VIF VIF Tolerance Squared 
     
SIZE 1.49 1.22 0.67 0.33 
GROWTH 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
NDTS 1.57 1.25 0.64 0.36 
ROE 1.02 1.01 0.98 0.02 
TANG 1.71 1.31 0.58 0.42 
TRATE 1.32 1.15 0.76 0.25 
LIQUIDITY 1.06 1.03 0.95 0.05 
InTANG 1.74 1.32 0.57 0.43 
DBKRT 1.12 1.06 0.89 0.11 
DIV 1.24 1.12 0.80 0.20 
GDP 1.87 1.37 0.54 0.46 
CFMT 1.27 1.13 0.79 0.21 
BOND 1.45 1.20 0.69 0.31 
STK 1.72 1.31 0.58 0.42 
HH 1.06 1.03 0.94 0.06 
STDMV 2.51 1.58 0.40 0.60 
STDBV 1.56 1.25 0.64 0.36 
LTDMV 2.61 1.62 0.38 0.62 
LTDBV 1.66 1.29 0.60 0.40 
     
Mean VIF 1.53 
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Table 5. 2: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test for Multi-collinearity with 
SMEs Board Market 
  
SQRT 
 
R- 
Variable VIF VIF Tolerance Squared 
     
SIZE 1.49 1.22 0.67 0.3292 
GROWTH 1.08 1.04 0.92 0.0772 
NDTS 1.21 1.10 0.83 0.174 
ROE 1.37 1.17 0.73 0.2712 
TANG 1.38 1.17 0.73 0.2746 
TRATE 1.15 1.07 0.87 0.134 
LIQUIDITY 1.36 1.17 0.73 0.2661 
InTANG 1.32 1.15 0.76 0.2448 
DBKRT 1.65 1.28 0.61 0.3943 
DIV 1.13 1.06 0.89 0.1148 
GDP 1.01 1.01 0.99 0.0132 
CFMT 1.72 1.31 0.58 0.4169 
BOND 1.78 1.33 0.56 0.4388 
STK 1.51 1.23 0.66 0.3394 
HH 1.05 1.02 0.96 0.0446 
STDMV 1.66 1.29 0.60 0.3959 
STDBV 1.78 1.33 0.56 0.437 
LTDMV 2.16 1.47 0.46 0.5369 
LTDBV 2.01 1.42 0.50 0.5035 
     
Mean VIF 1.46 
   
 
Before progressing all the variables in a regression model, the Pairwise 
Pearson’s correlation matrix is also carried out. Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 in 
appendix present the Pearson’s correlation between independent variables, 
control variables and dependent variables. As per the hypothesis in Chapter 4, 
leverage is positively correlated with firm size, asset tangibility, effective tax 
rate, liquidity, industry market concentration and net debt to GDP. Also, the 
leverage is negatively correlated with growth opportunities, non-debt tax shield, 
profitability, asset intangibility, distance to bankruptcy, dividend, GDP, gross 
capital formation and stock market capitalization.  
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Table 5.5 shows from the sample of AIM that both short term and long term 
leverage are positively correlated to the variables of No-debt tax shield, 
profitability, asset tangibility, effective tax rate, intangible assets, and dividend 
pay-out ratio, gross capital formation and industry market concentration, and are 
negatively associated with liquidity and stock market capitalization. From these 
results, it can be seen that the correlations between all the leverage and the 
variables of non-debt tax shield, profitability, asset intangibility, dividend 
payment and gross capital formation are not in accord with the hypotheses. The 
positive association between all the leverage and the variables of asset tangibility 
and effective tax rate, and the negative association between all the leverage and 
the variable of stock market capitalization are in line with conditions of 
hypotheses.  
Further, several correlations are found to have mixed results. The short term 
leverage and long term leverage in market value are negatively related to growth 
opportunities while the long term leverage in book value is positively correlated 
with growth opportunities. Also, the short term leverage are all negatively related 
to GDP and conversely, the long term leverage are all positively correlated to 
GDP. Also, some significant correlations between the independent variables and 
dependent variables are marked with star (*).  
 
Table 5.6 presents the sample of the SME Board market. The leverages including 
short term and long term are all positively related to the variables of firm size, 
asset tangibility, and stock market capitalization, and all negatively associated 
with the variables of growth opportunities, non-debt tax shield, profitability, tax 
effective rate, liquidity, asset intangibility, distance to bankruptcy, dividend pay 
out, GDP and capital formation. Besides the effective tax rate and liquidity, other 
correlations in the Table meet the assumptions. Also, the correlations between 
leverage and variables of net debt to GDP and industry market concentration are 
mixed. The short term leverage in market value is positively associated with net 
debt to GDP while the short term leverage in book value and the long term 
leverage are all negatively related to net debt to GDP. The correlation between 
the long term leverage in book value and industry market concentration is 
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negative while the long term leverage in market value and short term leverage 
show a positive relationship with industry market concentration.  
 
Table 5.7 shows the differences between the hypothesis and the results. From 
Table 5.5 and Table 5.6, the most significant correlations are found between 
explanatory variables and explained variables with the highest absolute value at 
0.29 in the sample of AIM, and 0.27 in the sample of the SME Board Market. 
These are not seen as problematic as the maximum threshold is 0.9 in the Pearson 
correlation. With regard to VIF tests under the Pearson correlations, it can be 
concluded that there is no problem of multi-collinearity in samples and therefore 
data analysis can proceed.  
 
Table 5. 3: Hypotheses and Pearson's Correlation 
 
HYPOTHESIS 
(LEVERAGE) 
AIM 
(LEVERAGE) 
SME  
(LEVERAGE) 
SIZE + + + 
GROWTH - MIX - 
NDTS - + - 
ROE - + - 
TANG + + + 
TRATE + + - 
LIQUIDITY + - - 
INTANG - + - 
DBKRT - MIX - 
DIV - + - 
GDP - MIX - 
CFMT - + - 
BOND + MIX MIX 
STK - - + 
HH + + MIX 
    
 
5.5 Conclusion  
The chapter presents analyses and results and analyses based on the secondary 
data being utilised to address research questions that are developed in this thesis 
associated with the capital structure and its determinants. Using a sample of 510 
firms from AIM All Share index and a further sample of 759 firms from SMEs 
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Board market index between 2007 and 2017, the regression models selected have 
been the subject of Poolability, Hausman selection, heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation tests to confirm their suitability and these include Pearson correlation 
coefficient analyses and fixed effect panel data analysis to establish the use of 
the fixed effects model. The descriptive statistics have been analysed and 
indicate that the average short-term leverage and long term leverage varies 
according to the sectors. For instance, the Consumer Goods sectors of AIM has 
the highest average short-term leverage ratios whereas the Basic Materials sector 
has the lowest average short term leverage ratios. In the SMEs Board, the Basic 
Material sector has the highest average short-term leverage ratios and the 
Telecommunication sectors has the lowest value. It is also observed that 
independent variables relating to capital structure in the various sectors have 
been fluctuate within the period of the sample. For example, the mean of 
profitability in AIM’s business sectors shows a significantly difference over the 
period but, the mean of firm size remains constant. In the context of SMEs 
Board, the mean of firm size within the sectors remains at almost in the same 
level but the mean of tangibility shows a different values.
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Chapter Six: Panel Regression Test Results and Discussion 
This chapter uses an unbalanced panel data model to examine the linear relationship 
between capital structure and its key determinants and tests the validity of the model 
and seeks to answer research questions posed. Initially, the chapter uses Poolability 
and Hausman tests to establish the validity of using a fixed effects model and to test 
for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. The regression analysis, first, discussed 
the sectoral results which are essentially industry related. The second element of the 
empirical analysis covers the full sample and examines the dummy variable effects 
of industry, time and financial system. The regressions are run separately for the 
AIM and SMEs Board data and the results discussed with appropriate comparative 
interpretation. The sectoral results show a differing response to the explanatory 
variables dependent on specific sectors. However, the aggregate results indicates 
that the industry-specific variable has a strong influence on capital structure. 
Additionally, the results indicate that industry, time and country dummy variables 
have a significant effect on both market and book value leverage in the period 2007 
and 2017. Overall, the results show significant relationship when capital structure 
and its determinants are designed as a multi-dimensional construct.  
 
6.1 Poolability and Hausman Tests  
“One of the major issues for models using panel data is whether or not the parameters, 
intercepts and slope coefficients are the same for all cross-sections, since these 
parameters represent cross section specific characteristics (Baltagi 2008). The 
Poolability test essentially widens the database of the time series of cross sections that 
test the stability of the parameter estimates. The simplest Poolability test has as its null 
hypothesis the OLD model: 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡. while the alternative hypothesis is 
the Fixed Effect (FE) model estimated as: 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 . Also, the 
presence of individual effects is tested in this section with consideration of F statistics. 
The Hausman Test is also used to distinguish between Random Effect (RE) and Fixed 
Effect (FE) models in the panel data. The results of samples of the AIM and the SME 
Board Market are shown in Table 6.1 
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    Table 6. 1: Hausman Test 
 
AIM  SME Board Market 
STDMV Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
STDBV Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
LTDMV Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
LTDBV Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
 
The data shows Prob>Chi2=0.0000 indicating that the Fixed Effect model is the 
optimal model to progress unobserved heterogeneity and provide the best linear 
unbiased estimates in BLUE 
 
6.2 Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation Results  
After deciding on the Fixed Effect (FE) model, the issues of heteroscedasticity and 
serial correlated are also tested in the model. This section tests the heteroscedasticity 
and serial correlation by carrying out the modified White test for heteroscedasticity. 
It is found that Prob>chi2-0.0000, indicating the presence of heteroscedasticity and 
that the null hypothesis is rejected. The serial correlation test which is performed by 
using the Wooldridge Test leading to a Prob>F=0.0000, shows that there is no serial 
correlation in the model and thus the null hypothesis is accepted. As used in studies 
(Hoechle 2007), the section uses fixed effect regression with Driscoll and Kraay 
standard error (XTSCC) to correct for heteroscedasticity. According to Hoechle 
(2007) , XTSCC is effective in panel data with a shorter period compared to the 
number of panels (i.e., T<N).  
6.3 Sectoral Result Analysis  
Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 below show the consolidated panel regression model of 
fixed effect covering all the sectors in the ICB and CNI apart from the Financial and 
Utilities Sectors which are omitted due to the particularity of these two sectors. The 
results of both independent variables and control variables are included in the Table 
because the differences in coefficient and direction between control variables are 
significant in the sectors. The standard errors which are presented in parentheses are 
the panel corrected standard errors. The problems of heteroscedasticity which was 
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discussed in the preceding section are corrected in the Tables. It can be seen from 
Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 that firm specific variables, industry specific variables and 
country specific variables are tested to identify the association with capital structure. 
This section aims to investigate the capital structure decisions of each sector 
regarding this relationship and therefore the results below are presented to achieve 
this objective.  
6.3.1 Oil & Gas Sector  
The Oil & Gas Sector based on AIM 
Table 6.2: The Sectoral Regression Results on Oil & Gas Sector in AIM 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ICB Sectors VARIABLES STDMV STDBV LTDMV LTDBV 
       
          Oil & Gas SIZE 17.02*** -0.353 17.85*** 3.061*** 
   (2.744) (1.244) (3.791) (0.543) 
  GROWTH -0.0878** -0.0135 0.00271 -0.0119* 
   (0.0393) (0.0143) (0.00792) (0.00624) 
  NDTS 0.230*** 0.0114 0.297** 0.0261 
   (0.0737) (0.0260) (0.120) (0.0210) 
  ROE -0.00564*** -0.000229 0.00245 -0.00351*** 
   (0.00184) (0.00135) (0.00213) (0.000914) 
  TANG 0.398*** -0.00970 0.400*** 0.0701*** 
   (0.0550) (0.0103) (0.0555) (0.0140) 
  TRATE 0.174 0.105*** 0.0860 -0.00754 
   (0.138) (0.0343) (0.156) (0.0274) 
  LIQUIDITY -0.00952 -0.00214 0.000600 0.000817 
   (0.0128) (0.00140) (0.00796) (0.00121) 
  InTANG 0.259*** 0.00135 0.196*** 0.0175 
   (0.0628) (0.0103) (0.0664) (0.0141) 
  DBKRT -0.0499* -0.0897*** -0.0643* -0.0834** 
   (0.0290) (0.0242) (0.0376) (0.0368) 
  DIV -0.411 -0.111*** 0.0662 0.00544 
   (0.256) (0.0323) (0.139) (0.0326) 
  GDP -1.605 -0.0754 -2.221*** -0.110 
   (0.971) (0.207) (0.768) (0.0894) 
  CFMT -1.385 0.671 -0.0630 0.324** 
   (1.992) (0.479) (0.886) (0.137) 
  BOND -0.0652 0.0145 -0.238*** -0.00425 
   (0.0954) (0.0264) (0.0480) (0.00926) 
  STK -0.242 -0.0369 -0.294* -0.00196 
   (0.205) (0.0438) (0.149) (0.0235) 
  HH -4.119 -0.132 -17.74*** -0.305 
   (8.256) (1.756) (5.511) (0.884) 
  Constant -1.774 -2.217 -13.48 -17.01*** 
   (48.30) (11.25) (25.26) (3.559) 
       
  R2 61 61 61 61 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Starting with the Oil & Gas Sector, it is found that all the dependent variables of 
leverage including market values and book values have a positive relationship with 
firm specific variables of firm size, non-debt tax shield and asset intangibility. These 
results are complicated as the variable of firm size is hypothesised (see H1) that to 
be positively associated with leverage, and the variables of non-debt tax shield and 
asset intangibility are assumed (see H3 and H8) that to be negatively related to 
leverage. Non-debt tax shield and asset intangibility do not meet the assumptions 
which have been discussed in the preceding chapter. The positive association 
between firm size and leverage shows that relatively large firms tend to be more 
diversified and less prone to bankruptcy, and therefore large firms should be more 
highly leveraged (Ang et al. 1982; De Jong et al. 2008). According to Titman and 
Wessels (1988), tax deductions for depreciation and investment tax credits are 
regarded as substitutes for the tax benefits of debt financing. Consequently, firms 
with more non-debt tax shields relative to their expected cash flow include less debt 
in their capital structure. However, the relationship between debt tax shields and 
non-debt tax shields is not substitutional. In income statements, the expense of 
depreciation is recognized before income tax and, therefore, the tax benefit of debt 
financing and non-debt tax shields can be the a parallel or a successive relationship. 
In this case, firms with large non-debt tax shields might not reduce debt financing 
in capital structure as they can gain benefit from both tax benefits of debt financing 
and non-debt tax shields. Furthermore, the positive association between asset 
intangibility and leverage goes which against the hypothesis.  
In addition, negative relationship between all the dependent variables of leverage 
and distance from default, GDP, stock market capitalization and industry market 
concentration are recorded. The results of the variables of distance from default, 
GDP and stock market capitalization support the studies of Booth et al. (2001), De 
Jong et al. (2008). The results of industry concentration (HH index) indicates that 
highly concentrated industries may lead their firms to have lower debt, which is in 
contrast to the hypothesis and the results of MacKay and Phillips (2005).  
As expected, growth opportunities in this sector have a negative relationship with 
short term leverage in market value, short term leverage in book value, and long 
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term leverage in book value but a positive relationship with long term leverage in 
market value. These negative relationships are demonstrated in the studies of Rajan 
and Zingales (1995); Booth et al. (2001); Bevan and Danbolt (2002) and explain the 
disciplinary role of debt in decreasing the conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders caused by excessive free cash flow (Jensen 1986). However, based on 
the measures build variable, growth opportunities are defined as market to book 
value in the research. In Myers (1984), Villalonga and Amit (2006), the ratio of 
market to book is also defined as a proxy for the intangibility of firms. Either way, 
both theoretical hypotheses predict a negative relationship to market.   
Profitability also shows a negative relationship with leverage excepting long term 
leverage in market value in the Oil & Gas sector. Similar to growth opportunities, 
different predictions can explain the influence of probability on leverage. While 
pecking order hypothesised a negative relationship, trade-off suggests a positive 
relationship (Kayo and Kimura 2011). In this study, the hypothesis of pecking order 
prevails as an explanation for the lower level of debt in the most profitable firms in 
the Oil & Gas sector within AIM.  
Another firm variable, tangibility, shows a positive relationship with leverage 
excluding short term leverage in book value. The positive influence of tangibility 
suggests that the collateral aspect of fixed assets is a significant driver for the firms 
in the Oil & Gas sector in AIM. Studies of Rajan and Zingales (1995),  Bevan and 
Danbolt (2002) find the same relationship for firms in the UK.  
For the country macroeconomic variables, stock market development significantly 
reduces the long term leverage in market value. Similar to analysis of Kayo and 
Kimura (2011), as firms in this sector have an alternative to “finance investments 
and growth through a more flexible source of capital (e.g. equity), they prefer to 
have less leverage”. However, bond market development also shows a negative 
relationship with leverage in this sector. Besides, GDP has a negative influence on 
debt especially a significant negative relationship with long term leverage.  
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The Energy Sector based on the SMEs Board  
Table 6. 3 The Sectoral Regressions Results on Oil & Gas Sector in SMEs Board 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ICB Sectors VARIABLES STDMV STDBV LTDMV LTDBV 
           
Energy SIZE 24.55** -0.742 58.88*** 11.69*** 
   (8.074) (3.053) (10.50) (1.254) 
  GROWTH -0.430 -0.205 -0.395 0.350* 
   (0.369) (0.175) (1.273) (0.175) 
  NDTS -1.299** -0.591*** -2.315*** -0.264** 
   (0.573) (0.172) (0.591) (0.106) 
  ROE -0.0217 0.0214 -0.178* -0.0626*** 
   (0.0328) (0.0135) (0.0916) (0.00855) 
  TANG -0.456*** -0.137** -0.375 0.261*** 
   (0.0910) (0.0509) (0.261) (0.0364) 
  TRATE 0.201* -0.0359 -0.719** -0.0687*** 
   (0.106) (0.0282) (0.296) (0.0180) 
  LIQUIDITY -4.574*** -1.843*** -5.374*** 0.296** 
   (0.457) (0.373) (0.877) (0.103) 
  InTANG 2.248*** 0.00811 -1.687* -0.278** 
   (0.496) (0.111) (0.902) (0.100) 
  DBKRT -2.463 -1.006 -0.668 1.820** 
   (2.616) (0.941) (4.095) (0.785) 
  DIV -0.000284 -0.0171 -0.176 -0.0401 
   (0.0479) (0.0174) (0.175) (0.0228) 
  GDP 0.0543 0.0145 -0.0412 -0.000578 
   (0.0328) (0.0168) (0.0894) (0.0118) 
  CFMT -9.390*** 1.153 -10.26* -1.157** 
   (2.265) (1.033) (5.745) (0.382) 
  BOND -0.567** -0.0685 0.257 -0.0148 
   (0.208) (0.0806) (0.483) (0.0532) 
  STK -0.212 0.331*** -0.754 -0.132*** 
   (0.231) (0.0899) (0.459) (0.0427) 
  HH 29.38 2.268 295.9*** 7.836 
   (17.20) (5.825) (47.61) (4.958) 
  Constant 86.25* 18.88 -229.5** -63.97*** 
   (42.00) (18.85) (78.76) (7.279) 
       
  R2 0.5972 0.5972 0.5972 0.5972 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
With regarding to the Energy Sector of the SMEs Board Market, it is found in Table 
6.3 that all the leverage including market value and book value has a significant 
negative relationship with the non-debt tax shield. This is different from results of 
the Oil & Gas sector in AIM where a positive relationship between non-debt tax 
shield and debt is present. The negative influence of a non-debt tax shield is 
significant suggesting that firms with a high level of non-debt tax shields can deduct 
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from taxable income. This relationship is in line with studies of DeAngelo and 
Masulis (1980) which predict an inverse relationship between the amount of the 
non-debt tax shield and leverage. However, the studies (DeAngelo and Masulis 
1980; Ozkan 2001) present a capital structure model where non-debt tax shield 
serves  as a substitute for the interest expenses which are deductible in the 
calculation of corporate tax. As discussed in the previous section, the non-debt tax 
shield and the debt tax shield are not substitute and therefore the interpretation of 
this literature are not correct.  
The positive and significant relationship is that between the variable of firm size 
and debt except for short term leverage in book value. This is similar to the results 
in the sample of AIM. A positive relationship is based on the hypothesis that large 
firms are more transparent and are able to suffer the costs of debt financing through 
a higher volume, or because large firms are more diversified and this therefore 
reduces the bankruptcy risk (Titman and Wessels 1988). According to Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), a negative relationship corresponds to the hypothesis that a smaller 
level of asymmetric information in larger firms can allow them to issue new equity 
without a concomitant decrease in market value. As expected, profitability shows a 
negative relationship with leverage except for the short term leverage in book value. 
In particular, the negative relationship of long term leverage to both market value 
and book value and profitability is at a significant level. This is in line with the 
pecking order prediction but contradicts the trade-off interpretation.  
As can be seen from Table 6.3, the analysis provides evidence of a significant 
negative relationship between leverage except for long term leverage in book value 
and firm variables of tangibility and liquidity. The negative influence of tangibility 
suggests that the collateral aspect of fixed assets might not be a leverage driver for 
the firms in the SME Board Market. Also, the positive coefficient of tangibility for 
long term leverage in book value is consisted with the pecking order theory which 
suggests fixed assets have a significant influence on long term leverage rather than 
short term leverage in the Energy sector. Similar to tangibility, a high level of 
liquidity can be the guarantee for paying short term debt and therefore it can be 
regarded as a leverage driver for firms. The significant negative influence of 
liquidity on leverage is consistent with the interpretation of Ozkan (2001) that 
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liquidity can be manipulated by shareholders at the expense of bondholders. 
Intangibility is another firm variable that has a significant positive relationship with 
leverage. It could be inferred that the collateral value of the intangible asset is 
becoming more significant, especially the value of business licenses or a special 
permit (e.g. oil concessions, mining rights) in the Energy Sector.    
With regarding to the macro-economic conditions, the variable of capital formation 
has a significant negative impact on leverage excluding the short term leverage in 
book value. This is consistent with De Jong et al. (2008) who claim that, with a high 
level of available funds from capital formation, high profitability and liquidity 
further reduce the use of debt among the firms in the energy sector. Additionally, 
bond market development only has a significant negative relationship with short 
term leverage in market value. This implies that the in countries with a higher bond 
market development, firms in the Energy sector are not likely to take more debt, but 
the effects of firm variables are also reinforced. However, the stock market 
development has a significant positive relationship with short term leverage in 
market value and a significant negative relationship with long term leverage in book 
value. With the development of the stock market, firms tend to mitigate the use of 
debt in the long term. For industry variables, the only leverage ratio that is 
significantly influenced by industry market concentration is the long term leverage 
in market value that shows a negative relationship.   
 
6.3.2 The Basic Material Sector and the Material Sector Analysis 
The Basic Material Sector based on AIM 
By analysing the results from the Basic Material sector of AIM in Table 6.4, all the 
leverage in both market value and book value has a significant and positive 
relationship with firm size, asset tangibility, effective tax rate, but a negative 
relationship with liquidity, distance from bankruptcy, and industry market 
concentration. The positive influence of firm size on all the leverage ratios is in line 
with Ozkan (2001), Bennett and Donnelly (1993); Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009) 
who present evidence that large firms have a higher debt ratio due to the diversified 
lower probability of bankruptcy. The positive influence of asset tangibility can 
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explain why a firm with a high level of fixed asset will issue as much secured debt 
as possible. Also, as a result of effective tax rates, firms with high effective 
corporate tax rates have a higher proportion of debt at their capital structure level. 
This is in line with the hypothesis of Modigliani and Miller (1963), DeAngelo and 
Masulis (1980) that firms with high effective corporate tax have a higher leverage 
ratio.  
Table 6. 4 Regression Results on Basic Material Sector of AIM 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ICB Sectors VARIABLES STDMV STDBV LTDMV LTDBV 
            
     Basic Material SIZE 24.69*** 2.793*** 20.21*** 2.527*** 
   (2.753) (0.838) (2.434) (0.850) 
  GROWTH -0.0646 -0.0106 -0.101* -0.0562** 
   (0.0700) (0.0323) (0.0601) (0.0231) 
  NDTS 0.136 0.113* 0.103 0.0225 
   (0.113) (0.0587) (0.117) (0.0681) 
  ROE 0.00136*** 0.000338** 0.000490 2.42e-05 
   (0.000506) (0.000155) (0.000720) (0.000150) 
  TANG 0.0176* 0.0159*** 0.0163* 0.0165*** 
   (0.0102) (0.00394) (0.00944) (0.00566) 
  TRATE 0.0106*** 0.00129** 0.0106*** 0.00179*** 
   (0.00295) (0.000509) (0.00235) (0.000665) 
  LIQUIDITY -0.218** -0.0233* -0.159** -0.0199** 
   (0.104) (0.0128) (0.0691) (0.00897) 
  InTANG -0.554** -0.0595 0.0632 0.0551 
   (0.245) (0.106) (0.312) (0.107) 
  DBKRT -0.444*** -0.278*** -0.380*** -0.191** 
   (0.134) (0.0700) (0.137) (0.0866) 
  DIV -0.452 0.163 0.943 -1.164*** 
   (0.762) (0.344) (0.863) (0.325) 
  GDP 0.779 -0.122 -0.559 -0.111 
   (0.652) (0.132) (0.523) (0.148) 
  CFMT 3.782*** 0.961*** 0.708 0.345 
   (0.970) (0.264) (0.818) (0.251) 
  BOND 0.130** 0.0273 -0.173*** -0.0400*** 
   (0.0634) (0.0175) (0.0338) (0.0108) 
  STK -0.0490 -0.0519*** 0.120*** 0.0235** 
   (0.0561) (0.0113) (0.0393) (0.00970) 
  HH -6.800*** -1.360** -6.521*** -1.577*** 
   (1.974) (0.565) (1.358) (0.428) 
  Constant -128.8*** -19.95*** -65.40*** -12.28* 
   (23.37) (5.647) (19.09) (6.371) 
       
  R2 0.1423 0.1423 0.1423 0.1423 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In this sector, firms with greater liquid equity have lower leverage and prefer equity 
financing when raising capital. The preceding reviews show that liquidity may have 
a mixed impact on capital structure. For instance, firms with higher liquidity ratio 
may support a relatively higher debt ratio because of the greater ability to pay short 
term obligation (Ahmad et al. 2012). This will imply a positive relationship between 
a firm’s liquidity ratio and debt ratio. However, the negative relationship in this 
sector could infer that firms with greater liquidity may use these assets to finance 
their investments and, consequently, use less debt (Ozkan 2000). The second 
negative and significant relationship is that between distance from bankruptcy and 
all the leverage. Thus, the financially heathy firms in the Basic Material sector tend 
to have lower levels of debt which corresponds to the explanation of trade off 
(Byoun 2008).  
Industry market concentration also plays a significant role on all the leverage. In 
contrast to the study of MacKay and Phillips (2005) which claims that highly-
concentrated industry has higher levels of leverage and lower intra-industry 
dispersion, the relationship between the industry concentration and all the leverage 
are significantly negative. This could be mainly due to the characteristics of the 
Basic Material sector.  
The results considering the other variables are mixed. For instance, the variable of 
firm size only has a significant negative relationship with long term leverage while 
the profitability of the firms in this sector shows a significant positive relationship 
with short term leverage. Regarding country variables, capital formation and short 
term leverage show a significant positive relationship. The bond market 
development has a significant positive relationship with short term leverage in 
market value, and a significant negative relationship with long term leverage in both 
market value and book value. By contrast, the stock market development has a 
significant positive relationship with long term leverage in market value and book 
value, but has a significant negative relationship with short term leverage in book 
value. It can be concluded that the influences of bond market and stock market on 
capital structure in the Basic Material sector have opposite effects.  
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The Material Sector Based on the SMEs Board market 
Table 6.5 Regression Results on Basic Material Sector in AIM 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ICB Sectors VARIABLES STDMV STDBV LTDMV LTDBV 
           
Materials SIZE -2.009* 0.426 55.23*** 7.321*** 
   (1.082) (1.348) (4.827) (0.936) 
  GROWTH -0.402*** -0.169*** -2.362*** -0.112 
   (0.0944) (0.0499) (0.456) (0.0720) 
  NDTS 0.166 0.133* -0.718 -0.0391 
   (0.143) (0.0732) (0.526) (0.0858) 
  ROE 0.0503*** 0.0176 0.172* -0.00361 
   (0.0111) (0.0148) (0.103) (0.00824) 
  TANG -0.0260 -0.0249 0.242* 0.0854*** 
   (0.0339) (0.0342) (0.135) (0.0161) 
  TRATE 0.158* -0.0292 -0.469*** -0.0468*** 
   (0.0825) (0.0192) (0.106) (0.00918) 
  LIQUIDITY -2.758*** -0.804*** -1.225*** 0.00483 
   (0.132) (0.0956) (0.385) (0.0474) 
  InTANG -0.0353 -0.244*** -0.238 -0.000575 
   (0.0563) (0.0286) (0.147) (0.0188) 
  DBKRT -1.663*** -4.637*** 2.415 0.938** 
   (0.601) (0.427) (3.278) (0.377) 
  DIV -0.0311** -0.0306*** -0.154*** -0.0187*** 
   (0.0145) (0.00405) (0.0580) (0.00677) 
  GDP 0.00344 0.00154 -0.0367 -0.00597 
   (0.00826) (0.00449) (0.0381) (0.00513) 
  CFMT -5.713*** 3.356*** 42.61*** 6.006*** 
   (1.502) (0.694) (6.863) (1.079) 
  BOND -0.0988*** -0.00699 0.393** 0.0705*** 
   (0.0313) (0.0197) (0.167) (0.0229) 
  STK -0.159*** 0.0907*** 2.345*** 0.237*** 
   (0.0541) (0.0249) (0.195) (0.0364) 
  HH -256.0*** 192.2*** 2,141*** 276.9*** 
   (68.17) (38.59) (289.0) (49.46) 
  Constant 193.4*** -17.07 -859.8*** -125.1*** 
   (24.62) (18.18) (105.1) (18.56) 
       
  R2 0.1104 0.1104 0.1104 0.1104 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In the Material sector of the SME board market, the statistical analysis shows more 
complicated results. Firstly, it can be seen from Table 6.5 that only the variables of 
dividend payment, capital formation, stock market development and industry 
concentration show significant relationships with all the leverage ratios in both 
market value and book value. It appears that the overall influence of country 
variables on leverage in the Material sector are more significant than firm variables. 
The significant and positive relationship of leverage ratios and dividend payout is 
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consistent with the interpretation of Bhaduri (2002), Frank and Goyal (2003) that 
dividends are the signal of financial heath to outsiders. In this sector, firms with a 
constant stream of dividends may have less asymmetric information in the equity 
market. Dividend payments lessen internal funds and increase external financing. 
With regard to significant country variables, capital formation shows a negative 
relationship with short term leverage in market value but a positive relationship with 
short term leverage in book value and long term leverage. This suggests that the 
firm tends to have external financing of debt even though the level of gross domestic 
capital mobilization is increasing. Similar to capital formation, the stock market 
development has a positive relationship with short term leverage in market value 
and a negative relationship with the other three. The positive relationships are not 
consistent with the hypothesis suggesting that, with the development of the stock 
market, firms in these sectors still prefer to have debt financing. Furthermore, the 
influences of industry concentration on firm leverage are mostly negative which 
indicates that the Energy sector with a higher concentrated market will have lower 
leverage.  
Secondly, variables of firm size, growth opportunities, effective tax rate, liquidity, 
distance from default and bond market development have a significant relationship 
with three of the leverage ratios. In the Energy sector, firm size has a significant 
negative relationship with short term leverage in market value and a significant 
positive relationship with long term leverage. The positive association of firm size 
is consistent with the hypothesis of trade-off theory that large firms may be able to 
incur lower transaction costs associated with debt (Psillaki et al. 2010). The negative 
influence of firm size may be consistent with indications that size can be a proxy 
for the information outside investors have, and therefore should increase their 
preference for equity relative to debt (Rajan and Zingales 1995).  
The negative relationships between growth opportunities and the leverage ratios are 
consistent with the studies of Rajan and Zingales (1995), Bevan and Danbolt (2002) 
and Booth et al. (2001) which point out the “disciplinary role of debt in alleviating 
the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders caused by excessive 
free cash flow”. By comparison with the Basic Material sector, the significant 
relationships between effective tax rate and leverage excepting the short term 
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leverage in market value in the Energy sector are negative. Also, the significant 
relationship between the liquidity and leverage ratio excepting the long term 
leverage in market value are negative. Additionally, the distance from bankruptcy 
has a negative relationship with short term leverage but a positive relationship with 
long term leverage.  
Considering the macroeconomic conditions, the short term and long term debt 
measuring in both market and book value are significantly associated with 
macroeconomic factors excepting GDP growth. An explanation for these results can 
be the high sensitivity of the sector to the change in business environment and the 
diversified financing channels. This is probably because companies in the Basic 
Material sector supply materials for construction or other service industries which 
depend on strong economy. In these macro factors, capital formation has the largest 
value of coefficients, suggesting that the accumulation of capital is the greatest 
motivation for the Basic Material sector to increase leverage. Along with this, with 
the bond market developed, firms in this sector would reduce short term loans but 
borrow more long term loans. It can be noted that firms in the sector that obtain 
leverage at low costs will benefit over the long term. In addition, debt financing in 
the sector is greatly related to market concentration. The outcomes obtained in this 
sector are consistent with MacKay and Phillips (2005) that high-concentrated 
industries have higher level of leverage and lower intro-industry dispersion. This 
explains why firms in the sector gaining a large market share would borrow more 
especially long term debt.  
6.3.3 Industrial Sector Analysis   
The Industrial Sector based on AIM 
The Industrial sector is one of those sectors that is expected to have a great impact on 
the capital structure. As seen from the results, most of the relationships between the 
variables of firm specific; industry characteristics and country characteristics and the 
leverage ratios are significant to varying degrees. Firstly, the coefficient of variables 
of firm size, growth opportunities, tangibility and dividend payout all accord with 
hypotheses at a statistically significant level. For instance, the positive impact of firm 
size and tangibility on leverage indicates the prediction of trade-off theory and 
signalling theory, while the negative association of growth opportunities and 
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dividend payout demonstrate the assertions of trade-off and agency theory. Also, 
liquidity shows a significantly negative correlation to all the leverage ratios. This 
may be possibly because the firms in the sector with more liquid equity prefer equity 
financing due to the lower cost of equity (Lipson and Mortal 2009).  
Table 6. 6 Regression Results on Industrial Sector of AIM 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ICB Sectors VARIABLES STDMV STDBV LTDMV LTDBV 
            
  Industrials SIZE 16.04*** -1.484* 9.952*** 2.475*** 
   (3.542) (0.878) (3.612) (0.931) 
  GROWTH -0.00313 -0.0147** -0.0259 -0.00696 
   (0.0117) (0.00649) (0.0566) (0.00711) 
  NDTS -0.0326 -0.0242 -0.0518 0.0978*** 
   (0.0724) (0.0238) (0.101) (0.0196) 
  ROE 0.00522* -0.00526*** -0.0151** -0.00127 
   (0.00300) (0.00163) (0.00635) (0.00145) 
  TANG 0.166 0.0614*** 0.283** 0.118*** 
   (0.145) (0.0184) (0.120) (0.0249) 
  TRATE -0.0732 -0.0526*** 0.137 0.00451 
   (0.129) (0.0136) (0.101) (0.0190) 
  LIQUIDITY -0.557*** -0.0671** -0.220*** -0.00595 
   (0.125) (0.0298) (0.0701) (0.00881) 
  InTANG 0.114 -0.0128 0.368*** 0.126*** 
   (0.0856) (0.0138) (0.0848) (0.0125) 
  DBKRT 0.0225 0.00503** -0.0472*** -0.00364** 
   (0.0200) (0.00251) (0.00952) (0.00170) 
  DIV -0.0813** -0.0155* -0.106*** -0.0441*** 
   (0.0406) (0.00795) (0.0326) (0.00769) 
  GDP 0.202 -0.312*** -0.177 -0.147* 
   (0.481) (0.0719) (0.371) (0.0746) 
  CFMT -1.911** -0.510*** 0.616 -0.334*** 
   (0.909) (0.139) (0.703) (0.120) 
  BOND -0.228*** -0.0487*** -0.0455 -0.0535*** 
   (0.0556) (0.00833) (0.0436) (0.00808) 
  STK 0.00668 0.0194*** 0.0540** -0.00689 
   (0.0410) (0.00676) (0.0258) (0.00549) 
  HH 23.45 1.307 12.25 -22.69*** 
   (42.13) (5.631) (34.30) (6.949) 
  Constant 35.92 21.60*** -7.014 8.189 
   (34.77) (6.034) (35.13) (6.372) 
       
  R2 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Other notable variables with firm characteristics are profitability and distance from 
bankruptcy. Profitability has a significantly positive relationship with short term 
leverage in market value but a significantly negative relationship with short term 
leverage in book value and long term leverage in market value. This could be linked 
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to the problems of underinvestment and new projects being mispriced so pecking 
order hypothesis may not be the only reason. The distance from bankruptcy shows 
a positive relationship with short term leverage but a negative relationship with long 
term leverage. This suggests that the trade-off hypothesis might only be supported 
over the long term. The financially heathy companies with low bankruptcy 
likelihood in the sector might have stronger ability for paying short-term debt and 
therefore might have a higher level of short term debt.  
Regarding the macroeconomic, the capital formation and bond market development 
are the most significant variables that have huge influence on capital structure in the 
Industrial sector. With respect to capital formation, the results indicate that the more 
retained earnings at country level are accumulated, the less leverage firms have. 
From the results, it can also be concluded that the more developed the UK bond 
market, the smaller the leverage of firms in the Industrial sector. In contrast, the less 
developed the UK stock market, the larger the leverage of firms in this sector even 
though the findings are not strong. This result is consistent with the empirical 
analysis of  Kayo and Kimura (2011) who use more than 20 countries including the 
UK as sample space.  
The Industrial Sector based on the SMEs Board Market  
Similar to the Industrial sector of AIM, the coefficient of firm size, growth 
opportunities and industry market concentration in this sector are accord with the 
hypothesis to a significant level. Furthermore, all the leverage ratios are also 
significantly influenced by the variables of dividend pay-out and capital formation 
as expected from the hypotheses. Other variables with significant coefficients are 
tangibility, liquidity, distance from bankruptcy, dividend payout and bond market 
development. The tangibility in this sector is negatively related to short term 
leverage but positively related to long term leverage. This could be linked to the 
fact that, as non-debt portion of liabilities does not need collateral, tangibility is 
therefore expected to affect long term debt rather than short-term debt. In addition, 
the coefficient of liquidity in statistical analysis is contrary to expectations. The 
significant negative sign of liquidity indicates that the stronger the ability of short-
term debt paying the firm holds, the less leverage the firm hold. This may be 
possibly because firms in this sector show a greater reliance on equity financing. 
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Similar to AIM, the variable of distance from bankruptcy has a significant negative 
relationship with short term leverage. Regarding variables of country characteristics, 
the bond market development and stock market development are the two factors that 
have inverse influences on leverage which are contrary to the anticipated findings. 
Consistent with the Industrial sector in the UK, firms in the Industrial sector of the 
SMEs board market reduce the level of debts when the bond market is developed. 
Further, firms tend to increase their long term leverage with the development of the 
stock market.  
Table 6. 7 Regression Results on Industrial Sector of SMEs 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ICB Sectors VARIABLES STDMV STDBV LTDMV LTDBV 
           
Industrials SIZE 7.866*** 1.529* 38.17*** 4.285*** 
   (2.585) (0.780) (7.527) (0.915) 
  GROWTH -0.152*** -0.0688*** -0.120*** -0.00962* 
   (0.0280) (0.00391) (0.0368) (0.00491) 
  NDTS 0.0842 -0.106*** 0.428 0.0585 
   (0.128) (0.0251) (0.263) (0.0488) 
  ROE -0.0716** 0.00880 -0.282** -0.00196 
   (0.0297) (0.0104) (0.112) (0.0155) 
  TANG -0.0624* -0.0554*** 0.236*** 0.101*** 
   (0.0329) (0.0101) (0.0746) (0.0201) 
  TRATE -0.0415 -0.0409*** -0.133** -0.00692 
   (0.0528) (0.00593) (0.0531) (0.00496) 
  LIQUIDITY -3.885*** -0.889*** -1.423*** 0.0200 
   (0.246) (0.0791) (0.382) (0.0351) 
  InTANG -0.0407 -0.164*** -0.0135 0.0206 
   (0.0747) (0.0159) (0.152) (0.0223) 
  DBKRT -2.039** -3.688*** 1.884 -0.351 
   (0.982) (0.197) (2.690) (0.469) 
  DIV -0.0170 -0.0299*** -0.161*** -0.0135*** 
   (0.0192) (0.00621) (0.0489) (0.00470) 
  GDP -0.00652 0.00363 -0.00672 0.00410 
   (0.0178) (0.00360) (0.0478) (0.00580) 
  CFMT -4.630*** -2.030*** -15.61*** -1.237*** 
   (1.535) (0.396) (4.588) (0.471) 
  BOND -0.151** -0.0663*** -0.413** -0.0531** 
   (0.0643) (0.0163) (0.183) (0.0257) 
  STK 0.199 0.00912 0.947*** 0.0962*** 
   (0.123) (0.0211) (0.258) (0.0294) 
  HH -822.0*** -306.5*** -3,025*** -207.4** 
   (241.8) (57.17) (818.8) (92.50) 
  Constant 120.6*** 43.42*** 20.47 -8.760 
   (17.34) (4.012) (55.17) (6.851) 
       
  R2 0.0895 0.0895 0.0895 0.0895 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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6.3.4 Consumer Goods Sector Analysis  
Consumer Goods sector based on AIM 
Table 6.8 Regression Results on Consumer Goods Sector 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ICB Sectors VARIABLES STDMV STDBV LTDMV LTDBV 
       
  Consumer Goods SIZE -4.196 -4.964*** -13.11** -10.75*** 
   (8.879) (1.746) (5.986) (2.824) 
  GROWTH 0.0777*** 0.0183** 0.0952** 0.0164 
   (0.0189) (0.00902) (0.0453) (0.0125) 
  NDTS -0.0106 -0.0778 -0.115 0.0306 
   (0.143) (0.0469) (0.179) (0.0683) 
  ROE 0.00576 0.00447 -0.0190* 0.00211 
   (0.0109) (0.00343) (0.0108) (0.00430) 
  TANG 0.392* 0.00530 0.320** 0.0169 
   (0.223) (0.0427) (0.153) (0.0597) 
  TRATE 0.0247 -0.136*** 0.0839 0.0353 
   (0.110) (0.0319) (0.202) (0.0396) 
  LIQUIDITY -2.318*** -0.547*** -1.836** -0.0897 
   (0.707) (0.184) (0.785) (0.172) 
  InTANG 0.347** -0.0431 0.0681 0.178*** 
   (0.136) (0.0416) (0.114) (0.0630) 
  DBKRT 0.0313 -0.431*** 0.735** -0.00596 
   (0.286) (0.0987) (0.302) (0.223) 
  DIV 0.0238 -0.0343*** -0.0628 -0.0759*** 
   (0.0440) (0.00689) (0.0631) (0.0141) 
  GDP -0.0978 -0.351* 1.322 0.203 
   (1.005) (0.175) (1.019) (0.244) 
  CFMT -2.591* -0.609** -0.817 0.0204 
   (1.432) (0.254) (1.399) (0.311) 
  BOND 0.00285 -0.0302* 0.111 0.0878*** 
   (0.0873) (0.0167) (0.0833) (0.0203) 
  STK -0.0564 0.00335 -0.0482 0.0299 
   (0.0510) (0.0140) (0.0538) (0.0188) 
  HH -11.44 2.943 61.64 2.285 
   (49.42) (8.286) (44.92) (14.27) 
  Constant 133.6** 45.16*** 94.83** 41.47** 
   (60.06) (10.74) (36.47) (18.80) 
       
  R2 0.1221 0.1221 0.1221 0.1221 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In the Consumer Goods sector, the general influences of variables at firm level and 
country level on capital structure are not significant. A number of traditional 
theoretical variables such as profitability, tangibility, effective tax rate and 
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intangibility do not have large influences as anticipated by studies. Furthermore, the 
impact of macro-economic conditions is not statistically significant in the model, 
which indicates that the firms in the Consumer Good sector are almost unaffected 
by the change in the macro-economic environment.  
The Consumer Goods Sector is one of the few sectors where the variable of firm 
size is significantly negatively related to leverage. Theoretically, the relationship 
between size and leverage is expected to be positive because large firms may be 
more diversified and thus less exposed to the risk of bankruptcy (Chkir and Cosset 
2001; Modugu 2013). The negative impact of firm size may be possibly because the 
larger firms in the Consumer Goods sector have a more centralized ownership, and 
therefore have more control over managers. In line with theoretical suggestion of 
Friend and Lang (1988), that “managers do not need to increase debt to reduce the 
risk of personal loss resulting from bankruptcy”. Additionally, when firm size is 
used as a proxy for the probability of default, it should not be strongly positively 
correlated to leverage in countries where the cost of financial distress is in the lower 
range (Rizov 2008). Another probable cause for the negative relationship is the 
information asymmetries between insiders within a firm and the capital market that 
are expected to be lower for large firms. Thus, large firms should be more capable 
of issuing information sensitive securities (Titman and Wessels 1988).   
In the Consumer Goods sector, the impact of the liquidity is completely opposite to 
that expected. The findings are in line with the view of Ozkan (2001), that the 
“liquidity of firms exerts a negative impact on a firm’s borrowing decisions”. The 
coefficient estimates of the liquidity ratio are significant at 1% level. This negative 
influence on leverage could be a potential conflict between shareholders and 
bondholders of firms. As noted, the liquidity of a firm can be taken as evidence to 
suggest the extent to which these assets can be manipulated by shareholders at the 
expense of bondholders (Ozkan 2001). As a consequence, the positive influence of 
the liquidity of a firm’s leverage could not be shown.  
Consumer Goods sector based on SME Board  
The Consumer Goods sector in the SME Board market shows different statistical 
estimates to the Consumer Goods sector in AIM. In this sector, the coefficient 
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estimates of most variables are significant at 1%, showing greater influences of 
these variables on capital structure. It is also clear from the results that the impact 
of country variables in this sector are stronger than that in the Consumer Goods 
sector of AIM. For instance, the capital formation, development of bond market and 
stock market all have significant relationships with leverage.   
Table 6.9 Regression Results on Consumer Goods Sector of SMEs 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ICB Sectors 
VARIABLE
S 
STDMV STDBV LTDMV LTDBV 
           
Consumer Stamples SIZE 9.571*** 1.367 29.59*** 3.469*** 
   (3.153) (1.131) (8.466) (0.400) 
  GROWTH -0.117 -0.0840** -0.398 -0.00674 
   (0.126) (0.0348) (0.246) (0.0119) 
  NDTS -0.177 -0.0814* -0.0756 0.00402 
   (0.128) (0.0435) (0.164) (0.0142) 
  ROE -0.00733 -0.0182** -0.0865 -0.0222*** 
   (0.0303) (0.00810) (0.0583) (0.00478) 
  TANG 0.155*** -0.0156 0.395*** 0.0730*** 
   (0.0487) (0.0246) (0.0921) (0.0114) 
  TRATE -0.0831 -0.0670*** -0.495*** -0.0278** 
   (0.0746) (0.0183) (0.127) (0.0126) 
  LIQUIDITY -1.417*** -0.325*** -0.353*** -0.00425 
   (0.217) (0.0754) (0.133) (0.0127) 
  InTANG -0.0403 -0.125*** 0.726*** 0.0833*** 
   (0.0672) (0.0188) (0.113) (0.00870) 
  DBKRT -2.495** -3.705*** 6.658*** 0.684** 
   (1.205) (0.477) (2.123) (0.263) 
  DIV -0.103*** -0.0463*** -0.303*** -0.0273*** 
   (0.0186) (0.00895) (0.0335) (0.00283) 
  GDP 0.00868 0.0158** 0.0257 0.00261 
   (0.0224) (0.00695) (0.0468) (0.00308) 
  CFMT -1.844 -2.139*** -6.516* 0.118 
   (1.865) (0.775) (3.637) (0.165) 
  BOND -0.336*** -0.193*** -0.671*** -0.0476*** 
   (0.104) (0.0408) (0.217) (0.0115) 
  STK 0.483*** 0.0197 0.681* 0.0301* 
   (0.185) (0.0595) (0.408) (0.0174) 
  HH 25.32 -3.829 -70.93* -9.205*** 
   (16.44) (5.366) (39.71) (2.223) 
  Constant 63.20*** 47.98*** -50.43 -20.04*** 
   (24.05) (8.126) (44.13) (1.797) 
       
  R2 0.0903 0.0903 0.0903 0.0903 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As anticipated, the relationships between the variable of firm size and leverage are 
all positive while that in the Consumer Goods sector of AIM shows negative 
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relationship. In addition to this, the coefficient of growth opportunities, non-debt 
tax shield, profitability, tangibility, dividend pay-out and capital formation are all 
in line with the hypotheses. Other variables such as effective tax rate show a 
negative relationship with all the leverage ratios. As Chen (2004) describes, tax 
effects predicted by the trade-off model are rather limited in China as the state is 
the controlling stakeholder of firms and the owner of banks as well as the 
beneficiary of tax. This is induced that firms in this sector use equity finance as 
much as possible. Therefore, equity finance in this sector is preferred to debt.  
It is notable that the influences of bond market development and stock market 
development on leverage ratios in the Consumer Goods sector of the SME board 
market are similar to the Consumer Goods sector of AIM. The firm will reduce the 
level of leverage with development of the bond market, and increase the level of 
leverage with development of the stock market.  
6.3.5 Heath Care Sector Analysis  
Heath Care Sector Based on AIM 
From the results, the variable effects on both the short-term leverage ratio and the 
long-term leverage ratio are discrepant. In the Heath Care sector of AIM, the short-
term leverage is generally more affected than long-term leverage to the effect of 
these variables. Following the contracting hypothesis, the results associated with 
growth opportunities indicate that firms in this sector with more growth 
opportunities are likely to issue more short-term debt and less long-term debt. 
According to Titman and Wessels (1988), the cost resulting from agency 
relationships is likely to be higher for firms in growing industries, which have more 
flexibility in their decisions for future investment. Expected future growth should 
be negatively associated with long-term leverage. However, the agency problem 
will be mitigated when firms have short-term debt rather than long term. In other 
words, the short-term debt might be positively related to growth rate if growing 
firms substitute short-term financing for long-term financing. This is supported by 
Michaelas et al. (1999).  
For the country variables, it can be seen that the capital formation, bond market 
development and stock market development show a significant relationship with 
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both short-term leverage and long-term leverage. It is notable that the sign of stock 
market development is in line with the hypothesis that firms are likely to issue less 
debt with development of the stock market.  
Table 6. 10 Regression Results on Heath Care Sector of AIM 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ICB Sectors VARIABLES STDMV STDBV LTDMV LTDBV 
       
      Heath Care SIZE 14.55*** -3.509*** 19.46*** -3.422*** 
   (3.107) (1.010) (4.024) (0.984) 
  GROWTH 0.0220** 0.0116** -0.0100 -0.000233 
   (0.00945) (0.00471) (0.00934) (0.00239) 
  NDTS 0.156 0.0289 0.0906 -0.0228 
   (0.116) (0.0271) (0.107) (0.0263) 
  ROE 0.00751* 0.00120 -0.00803 0.000353 
   (0.00387) (0.000976) (0.00614) (0.00184) 
  TANG 0.782** 0.105*** 0.551** 0.143*** 
   (0.297) (0.0290) (0.274) (0.0349) 
  TRATE 0.0156 -0.0661*** -0.232 -0.0714** 
   (0.129) (0.0229) (0.215) (0.0279) 
  LIQUIDITY -0.746*** -0.0455*** -0.725*** -0.00823 
   (0.102) (0.0151) (0.0987) (0.0524) 
  InTANG 0.198*** 0.0242* -0.00592 0.0457** 
   (0.0654) (0.0138) (0.0604) (0.0196) 
  DBKRT 0.227 0.491*** -0.796 -0.614* 
   (0.666) (0.171) (0.573) (0.348) 
  DIV -0.322*** 0.0419*** -0.535*** -0.0560** 
   (0.107) (0.0136) (0.106) (0.0219) 
  GDP -1.774*** -0.472*** -0.411 0.0302 
   (0.487) (0.103) (0.522) (0.0837) 
  CFMT -4.640*** -0.407*** -2.469** -0.137 
   (0.763) (0.106) (1.070) (0.191) 
  BOND -0.578*** -0.0488*** -0.441*** -0.0245 
   (0.0456) (0.00611) (0.0935) (0.0181) 
  STK -0.0110 -0.0188** -0.119* -0.0224 
   (0.0597) (0.00765) (0.0609) (0.0135) 
  HH -639.5*** -4.740 30.29 -115.2*** 
   (165.2) (30.07) (284.4) (38.92) 
  Constant 98.68*** 28.78*** 44.16* 24.18*** 
   (27.92) (4.982) (25.36) (5.098) 
       
  R2 0.1214 0.1214 0.1214 0.1214 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Heath Care Sector Based on the SMEs Board Market 
In the SMEs Board market, the leverage is generally more affected by the variables 
with firm characteristics than the variables with country characteristics. With 
regarding to the firm variables, the firm size, growth opportunities, tangibility, 
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effective tax rate, liquidity, intangibility and dividend pay-out ratio are all 
significantly related to short term leverage and long term leverage. The effect of 
growth opportunities on capital structure in the Heath Care sector is positive and 
significant for AIM but it is negative and significant for the SMEs Board Market. 
The negative and significant effect of growth opportunities is in line with the 
hypothesis which proposes that the agency conflict between shareholder and 
bondholders arises from asset-substitution and underinvestment (Rajan and 
Zingales 1995; Booth et al. 2001). Also, the effect of tax rate on leverage are all 
negative for both panel regressions but it is significant for the SMEs board and non-
significant for AIM. A possible explanation is that firms in this sector may have 
already found a stable source of financing which provides them with a new pecking 
order of retained profit, then equity finance, and lastly debt (Chen 2004).  
The firm variables of liquidity and intangibility are two significant factors that do 
not support the hypotheses. As the results show, firms with more liquidity tend to 
borrow less while firms with a high level of intangibility have more debt. According 
to the hypothesis, firms with more liquid and reversible assets are more leveraged 
because they have enough liquid assets to can cover the arrears if they are not able 
to repay the short-term liabilities. However, Williamson (1988) also adds that the 
level of debt is limited by the liquidity and it depends on the average usage of the 
debt in the particular industry. In the Heath Care sector of the SMEs board market, 
the negative coefficient of liquidity can be explained by the fact that firms with 
more liquidity might be financed by their internal resources. Furthermore, the 
intangible assets in this sector play an increasingly important role as most of the 
sub-sectors (Medical Devices, Equipment and Hospital Supplies; Medical 
Insurance; Pharmaceutical & Related Segments) under the Heath Care sector are 
knowledge-based. It is important to investigate the impact of intangible assets on 
capital structure decision with empirical data (Lim et al. 2018). Examples of 
intangible assets in the sector might include intellectual property, medical 
certification, medical patent and state licensure that have strong effects on the 
leverage of technology firms with low tangible asset intensity. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that intangible asset influence leverage level in this sector as much as 
tangible assets.  
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Leverage in the Heath Care sector is also heavily influenced by the industry 
concentration. The results show a support to hypothesis  that “firms in concentrated 
industries cluster around higher leverage, whereas firm in competitive industries 
carry less leverage and are more widely dispersed” (MacKay and Phillips 2005). 
This is not consistent with recent theory and evidence by Kayo and Kimura (2011) 
but supports the evidence by Lyandres (2006).  
Table 6. 11 Regression Results on Heath Care Sector of SMEs 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ICB Sectors VARIABLES STDMV STDBV LTDMV LTDBV 
       
Heath care SIZE -1.134 3.257*** 28.55** 2.973** 
   (7.024) (1.105) (11.69) (1.220) 
  GROWTH -0.807** 0.0302 -3.315*** -0.0953* 
   (0.397) (0.0741) (0.885) (0.0539) 
  NDTS 0.790 0.754*** 0.189 -0.257** 
   (1.057) (0.133) (1.040) (0.117) 
  ROE 0.00754 -0.0344 -0.640*** -0.0412** 
   (0.174) (0.0584) (0.192) (0.0159) 
  TANG 0.458*** 0.0300 0.653** 0.0844*** 
   (0.139) (0.0398) (0.267) (0.0290) 
  TRATE -0.367* -0.100*** -0.460 -0.0849** 
   (0.200) (0.0206) (0.356) (0.0321) 
  LIQUIDITY -0.849*** -0.136*** -0.481*** -0.0455*** 
   (0.279) (0.0494) (0.160) (0.0164) 
  InTANG 0.478*** 0.104** 0.664*** 0.00326 
   (0.173) (0.0441) (0.190) (0.0227) 
  DBKRT -8.601* -3.227** 2.552 -0.268 
   (4.640) (1.370) (4.915) (0.461) 
  DIV -0.128** -0.0311*** -0.240*** -0.0205*** 
   (0.0496) (0.00907) (0.0627) (0.00617) 
  GDP -0.0246 0.00517 0.0466 0.000824 
   (0.0315) (0.00694) (0.0501) (0.00358) 
  CFMT -3.258** 0.566 9.237 1.283** 
   (1.306) (0.385) (6.261) (0.495) 
  BOND 0.0337 -0.136*** -0.310 0.0248 
   (0.163) (0.0318) (0.346) (0.0215) 
  STK 0.577*** 0.0352 0.0612 0.00465 
   (0.178) (0.0470) (0.383) (0.0370) 
  HH 50.08 94.30*** 600.8*** 45.51** 
   (72.71) (13.09) (190.3) (21.15) 
  Constant 113.0*** -13.51*** -249.6** -31.74*** 
   (39.63) (4.609) (106.9) (10.97) 
       
  R2 0.1781 0.1781 0.1781 0.1781 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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6.3.6 The Telecommunication Sector Analysis  
The Telecommunication Sector based on AIM  
The Telecommunication sector in both AIM and the SME board market is 
considered as a special sector as the observations in this sector are significantly 
fewer than in other sectors. The Telecommunication sector in AIM appears to have 
a mixed significant relationship between explanatory variables and leverage ratios. 
For instance, as Deesomsak et al. (2004) indicate, the relationship between leverage 
and firm size, while positive as expected, is not statistically significant with the 
exception of long term leverage in book value. However, this is consistent with the 
prediction of trade-off theory which suggests a positive relationship between firm 
size and leverage. Also, the impact of growth opportunities on leverage excluding 
the long term leverage in book value is significant and negative. This supports the 
prediction of agency theory that high growth firms use less debt since firms do not 
expect to expose themselves to restrictions imposed by creditors. It is also consistent 
with studies on the same topic (Michaelas et al. 1999).  
The estimated coefficient of the non-debt tax shield does not have the predicted 
negative direction and but has a statistically positive association with leverage 
ratios. There is no significant evidence that the non-debt tax shield has heavy 
influence on leverage in the Telecommunication sector as the estimated coefficients 
for this variable are not significant at the 10% level. Nevertheless, one explanation 
could be the measure of the variable that may be for some other effects. For instance, 
“firms with higher depreciation ratios are more likely to have a higher proportion 
of tangible assets and fewer growth opportunities in their investment opportunities 
set” (Ozkan 2001). This in turn implies a positive effect of non-debt tax shield on 
leverage. Also, the prediction of a positive relationship between tangible assets and 
leverage is not confirmed by the statistical analysis. All the leverage in the 
Telecommunication sector is negatively influenced by the growth of tangibility. 
From the perspective of pecking order, firms with few tangible assets are more 
sensitive to information asymmetries and thus issue debt rather than equity when 
there are external financing demand (Harris and Raviv 1991). The negative 
relationship between tangibility and leverage shows a support for pecking order 
theory prediction and indirectly explains the positive sign of the non-debt tax shield.  
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Table 6.12 Regression Results on Consumer Services Sector of AIM 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ICB Sectors VARIABLES STDMV STDBV LTDMV LTDBV 
       
Telecommunication SIZE 14.87 -0.650 0.198 12.68* 
   (7.756) (1.319) (0.124) (4.455) 
  GROWTH -7.155* -0.512* -0.0261* 0.692 
   (2.635) (0.197) (0.0101) (0.483) 
  NDTS 0.231 0.0115 0.000945 0.0421 
   (0.296) (0.0186) (0.00165) (0.0605) 
  ROE 0.0231 0.0120 0.000825 -0.146** 
   (0.0914) (0.00770) (0.000486) (0.0302) 
  TANG -0.959 -0.0513 -0.00249 -0.264* 
   (0.452) (0.0483) (0.00273) (0.0862) 
  TRATE 0.213 0.0126 0.000545 0.0603 
   (0.252) (0.0179) (0.00120) (0.0492) 
  LIQUIDITY -5.238 -0.495 -0.00890 -1.300 
   (2.475) (0.339) (0.0183) (0.626) 
  InTANG 0.479 0.0303 0.000359 0.147** 
   (0.239) (0.0164) (0.00123) (0.0380) 
  DBKRT 0.118 -0.0935 -0.000762 0.903** 
   (0.590) (0.0455) (0.00310) (0.187) 
  DIV       -0.132 -0.0261** -0.00510** -0.104* 
   (0.195) (0.00699) (0.00150) (0.0404) 
  GDP 1.426 0.200 -0.0122 -0.529 
   (1.636) (0.207) (0.0131) (0.638) 
  CFMT 1.863 -0.591 0.0186 2.167** 
   (2.407) (0.316) (0.0103) (0.563) 
  BOND 0.149 0.0311 0.000117 0.156* 
   (0.246) (0.0182) (0.00141) (0.0507) 
  STK 0.00563 -0.0139 0.000151 0.0137 
   (0.124) (0.0122) (0.000501) (0.0411) 
  HH -658.2*** -15.85** 0.0366 -13.85 
   (100.9) (4.659) (0.408) (15.08) 
  Constant -14.87 16.10 75.22*** -85.66** 
   (65.78) (8.597) (0.546) (24.10) 
       
  R2 0.5554 0.5554 0.5554 0.5554 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In this sector, other variables that have significant impacts on leverage are 
profitability, intangibility, distance from bankruptcy, dividend payment, capital 
formation, development of the bond market and industry concentration. The 
coefficient of profitability is positive but not significant excluding the long term 
leverage in book value which shows a negative relationship with profitability. The 
positive sign of profitability is consistent with trade-off and signalling theory and 
the negative sign of profitability is accordance with the prediction of the pecking 
order model (Rajan and Zingales 1995; Wald 1999). The positive coefficient of 
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intangibility goes against the suggestion of Myers (1984) who claims that firms 
holding valuable intangible assets tend to borrow less than firms holding mostly 
tangible assets. One explanation for this could be that  the market for intangible 
assets in the Telecommunication sector such as trademarks, patents, licenses and 
other highly technical property have developed significantly in the period of the 
sample years, making the most of intangible assets that traded as tangible assets 
(Botta 2014). Moreover, the variable of dividend payout has a significantly positive 
relationship with leverage. Consistent with signalling theory, the increase dividend 
is used as a mechanism for financial signalling to outsiders regarding the stability 
and growth prospects of the firm. Firms in the sector with higher dividend payout 
ratios tend to have more external financing of debt.  
Considering the industry and country variables, the industry concentration only has 
significant influence on short term leverage with a negative coefficient. This was 
firstly demonstrated by MacKay and Phillips (2005), Kayo and Kimura (2011) who 
reported that firms in highly concentrated industries will have lower debt. Besides, 
the long term leverage in book value is significantly positively influenced by both 
the bond market development and the capital formation. According to De Jong et 
al. (2008), an increase in capital formation implies greater retained earnings to be 
accumulated and the usage of this source of equity negatively affects leverage. This 
interpretation is not supported by the results. In addition, the development of the 
bond market seems to encourage the growth of leverage ratio particularly the long 
term ratio. It seems likely that when the bond market in the UK is highly developed, 
using and trading these bonds is easier.   
 
The Telecommunication Sector based on the SME Board Market 
In the Telecommunication sector of the SME board market, there is no statistically 
significant coefficient for either firm variables or country variables. One 
explanation could be that the sample observations in this sector are only based on 
two firms and this might not provide sufficient data sources to test the relationship 
between those variables and capital structure. Even so, a brief description of 
estimated coefficients is indispensable in this sector.  
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Table 6. 13 Regression Results on Telecommunication Sector of SMEs 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ICB Sectors VARIABLES STDMV STDBV LTDMV LTDBV 
 
Telecommunication 
 
SIZE 164.0 5.514 20.51 -0.146 
   (52.18) (2.078) (22.66) (0.311) 
  GROWTH -1.892 -0.0413 -0.527 -0.00159 
   (1.166) (0.0305) (0.447) (0.00326) 
  NDTS 1.828 0.0434 -0.659 -0.00547 
   (3.174) (0.101) (1.037) (0.0141) 
  ROE 4.905 0.217 1.585 0.0268 
   (1.960) (0.0622) (0.585) (0.00961) 
  TANG 2.108 0.0717 -0.244 -0.00802 
   (0.590) (0.0225) (0.144) (0.00201) 
  TRATE 1.370 0.0498 0.357 0.00477 
   (0.905) (0.0342) (0.142) (0.00178) 
  LIQUIDITY 2.682 0.108 0.289 0.00112 
   (1.004) (0.0350) (0.252) (0.00357) 
  InTANG -0.542 -0.0663 0.721 0.00742 
   (1.173) (0.0362) (0.409) (0.00555) 
  DBKRT 5.504 -0.474 -10.31 -0.315 
   (47.12) (1.575) (14.53) (0.220) 
  DIV -0.629 -0.0245 -0.137 -0.00232 
   (0.344) (0.0122) (0.0721) (0.00104) 
  GDP -0.0655 -0.00324 0.0465 0.000491 
   (0.102) (0.00365) (0.0434) (0.000475) 
  CFMT -6.242 -0.156 2.194 0.0976 
   (8.618) (0.332) (2.494) (0.0342) 
  BOND 1.123 0.0485 -0.497 -0.00752 
   (0.903) (0.0323) (0.200) (0.00238) 
  STK 0.663 0.0128 0.0672 -0.00529 
   (1.709) (0.0557) (0.462) (0.00585) 
  HH -99.02 -3.853 89.25 2.177 
   (139.5) (4.098) (35.18) (0.511) 
  Constant -1,014 -34.09 -163.7 -0.585 
   (304.4) (11.28) (137.5) (1.871) 
       
  R2 0.9658 0.9658 0.9658 0.9658 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Firstly, it can be seen that the influence of country variables on short term leverage 
is contrary to that on long term leverage. The macroeconomic variables of GDP, 
capital formation, and industry concentration are found to be negatively related to 
short term leverage and positively related to long term leverage. The bond market 
development is positively correlated to short term leverage but negatively correlated 
to long term leverage. Additionally, stock market development has a positive 
relationship with leverage excepting for the long term leverage in book value. The 
differences between the impact on short term leverage and long term leverage 
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probably reflects the high transaction cost or risky factors that firms have in the 
Telecommunication sector when they issue debt. With the growth of GDP and 
capital formation, firms are more a willing to use a higher level of equity to finance 
new investment in the short term but prefer more debt in longer term investment. 
Also, according to Titman and Wessels (1988), by borrowing more short term, firms 
are particularly sensitive to temporary economic condition that use longer term 
financing.  
For the firm variables in this sector, it appears that the coefficient of non-debt tax 
shield, profitability and intangibility show inverse results by comparing the 
hypotheses. For instance, profitability has a positive relationship with all the 
leverage in both market value and book value, supporting the suggestion of pecking 
order theory that firms prefer raising capital firstly from retained earnings, secondly 
from debt and thirdly from issuing new equity (Myers 1984). Furthermore, the 
positive relationship between intangibility and long term leverage can explain the 
fact that the Telecommunication sector has intangible assets including patents, 
license and trademarks which can be considered as tangible assets.  
 
6.3.7 Consumer Services Sector Analysis  
Consumer Services Sector Based on AIM 
The panel regression results analysis presents six firm variables of firm size, 
tangibility, liquidity, intangibility, distance from bankruptcy, and dividend pay-out 
ratio that significantly influence the leverage level in the Consumer Services sector. 
The relationships between tangibility and leverage are positive except for the 
coefficient of tangibility with short-term leverage in book value. Further to this, the 
intangibility in the sector also has a positive relationship with leverage ratios apart 
from short-term leverage in book value. This is possibly because the sub-sectors 
under the Consumer Services sector including Retail, Media, and Travel & Leisure 
are typical service sectors. In these sectors, firms are more likely to have intangible 
assets due to their reliance on intellectual property. It can be inferred that firms with 
higher tangibility and intangibility have on average higher financial leverage in the 
Consumer Services sector.  
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Table 6. 14 Regression Results on Consumer Services Sector of AIM 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ICB Sectors VARIABLES STDMV STDBV LTDMV LTDBV 
       
Consumer services SIZE 31.63*** 0.832 18.30*** 1.954* 
   (4.689) (0.570) (5.627) (1.026) 
  GROWTH 0.000589 -0.00878*** 0.00472 0.0133*** 
   (0.0110) (0.00209) (0.00745) (0.00356) 
  NDTS 0.0249 -0.117*** 0.0854 -0.00832 
   (0.120) (0.0265) (0.102) (0.0240) 
  ROE 0.00570 0.00500 -0.0203* 0.000938 
   (0.0141) (0.00302) (0.0103) (0.00245) 
  TANG 0.341** -0.0288* 0.350*** 0.0335* 
   (0.133) (0.0147) (0.117) (0.0191) 
  TRATE 0.0851 -0.0240** 0.280** 0.00924 
   (0.0736) (0.0112) (0.124) (0.0170) 
  LIQUIDITY -0.763** -0.0780 -0.438* -0.0973* 
   (0.301) (0.0826) (0.224) (0.0545) 
  InTANG 0.459*** -0.0500*** 0.356*** 0.0172 
   (0.0945) (0.0168) (0.0620) (0.0147) 
  DBKRT -0.482*** -0.259*** -0.290*** -0.305*** 
   (0.0641) (0.0241) (0.0435) (0.0219) 
  DIV -0.154* -0.0170** -0.232*** -0.0624*** 
   (0.0830) (0.00701) (0.0547) (0.00741) 
  GDP -1.459* -0.468*** -0.0290 0.0981 
   (0.860) (0.0956) (0.725) (0.226) 
  CFMT -5.802*** -0.512** -1.689** -0.855*** 
   (1.245) (0.224) (0.795) (0.318) 
  BOND -0.0470 0.00731 -0.0949 -0.0382** 
   (0.0796) (0.0135) (0.0724) (0.0149) 
  STK 0.0690 0.0253** 0.103 -0.0191* 
   (0.0769) (0.0108) (0.0864) (0.0109) 
  HH -367.1*** -42.81*** 22.17 -60.38* 
   (125.2) (15.49) (100.5) (35.14) 
  Constant 8.522 11.27** -18.53 20.07** 
   (36.96) (4.632) (17.60) (7.865) 
       
  R2 0.1595 0.1595 0.1595 0.1595 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The capital structure decisions in this sector are found to be negatively linked with 
distance from bankruptcy. These findings could be explained by trade-off prediction 
that financially healthy companies in this sector tend to have a smaller level of debt 
(Byoun 2008; Kayo and Kimura 2011). Moreover, the dividend pay-out ratio is 
negatively associated with all the leverage ratios. As the signal of financial health 
to outsiders, a firm with a constant stream of dividend is considered to have less 
asymmetric information when entering the stock market (Bhaduri 2002). The 
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negative relationship indicates that dividend payment of firms in this sector 
decreases the amount of internal funds and increases the need for external financing.  
From the country variables, it can be seen that only the capital formation is 
significantly correlated to leverage ratios. Besides this, the GDP only has a 
significant negative relationship with short-term leverage. The empirical evidence 
shows the stock market development and bond market development have little 
impact on the capital structure choice of firms in the Consumer Services sector. 
Furthermore, strong evidence is found against the hypothesis of industry 
concentration effects on capital structure that shows that highly-concentrated 
industries (HH index) have higher levels of leverage and lower intra-industry 
dispersion (MacKay and Phillips 2005). This is probably due to different 
characteristics of the sector.  
The Consumer Services Sector Based on the SMEs Board Market 
In the SMEs Board market, the Consumer Services sector is greatly affected by the 
factors of firm size, profitability, tangibility, liquidity, intangibility, distance from 
bankruptcy and industry concentration. In comparison, the variable of profitability 
has a significant and negative relationship with leverage in the SMEs Board market, 
while the influence of profitability on the leverage level of firms in the Consumer 
Services sector of AIM are not strong. There is a positive relationship between 
profitability and leverage.   
From table 6.15, it can be inferred that tax considerations are of little interest to 
firms in SMEs Board. One of the explanation can be that firms are not interest in 
generate high profits and therefore less likely to debt or non-debt items for tax shield 
(Pettit and Singer, 1985). However, as Daskalakis et al. (2017) claim, for those 
small firms which have higher level of difficulty to access debt financing, the use 
of non-debt tax shields (NDTS) could be the main alternative to reduce any tax 
burdens. Thus, non-debt tax shields can be either not related or negatively related 
to debt (Titman and Wessels, 1988). In studies, NDTS is measured as the ratio of 
total depreciation expenses to total assets. 
 
 
216 
 
Table 6. 15 Regression Results on Consumer Services Sector of SMEs 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ICB Sectors VARIABLES STDMV STDBV LTDMV LTDBV 
 
Telecommunication 
 
SIZE 164.0 5.514 20.51 -0.146 
   (52.18) (2.078) (22.66) (0.311) 
  GROWTH -1.892 -0.0413 -0.527 -0.00159 
   (1.166) (0.0305) (0.447) (0.00326) 
  NDTS 1.828 0.0434 -0.659 -0.00547 
   (3.174) (0.101) (1.037) (0.0141) 
  ROE 4.905 0.217 1.585 0.0268 
   (1.960) (0.0622) (0.585) (0.00961) 
  TANG 2.108 0.0717 -0.244 -0.00802 
   (0.590) (0.0225) (0.144) (0.00201) 
  TRATE 1.370 0.0498 0.357 0.00477 
   (0.905) (0.0342) (0.142) (0.00178) 
  LIQUIDITY 2.682 0.108 0.289 0.00112 
   (1.004) (0.0350) (0.252) (0.00357) 
  InTANG -0.542 -0.0663 0.721 0.00742 
   (1.173) (0.0362) (0.409) (0.00555) 
  DBKRT 5.504 -0.474 -10.31 -0.315 
   (47.12) (1.575) (14.53) (0.220) 
  DIV -0.629 -0.0245 -0.137 -0.00232 
   (0.344) (0.0122) (0.0721) (0.00104) 
  GDP -0.0655 -0.00324 0.0465 0.000491 
   (0.102) (0.00365) (0.0434) (0.000475) 
  CFMT -6.242 -0.156 2.194 0.0976 
   (8.618) (0.332) (2.494) (0.0342) 
  BOND 1.123 0.0485 -0.497 -0.00752 
   (0.903) (0.0323) (0.200) (0.00238) 
  STK 0.663 0.0128 0.0672 -0.00529 
   (1.709) (0.0557) (0.462) (0.00585) 
  HH -99.02 -3.853 89.25 2.177 
   (139.5) (4.098) (35.18) (0.511) 
  Constant -1,014 -34.09 -163.7 -0.585 
   (304.4) (11.28) (137.5) (1.871) 
       
  R2 0.9658 0.9658 0.9658 0.9658 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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6.3.8 Technology Sector Analysis  
Technology Sector based on AIM 
The Technology sector of AIM is found to be significantly related to firm specific 
variables rather than industry and country specific variables. Table 6.2 shows that 
the variables of firm size, growth opportunities, non-debt tax shield, tangibility, 
intangibility and distance from bankruptcy have significant impact on the leverage 
level of firms in the Technology sector. Regarding macro-economic conditions, the 
variables of GDP, capital formation, the bond market development are found to be 
significantly related to only one or two of the leverage ratios. It can be inferred that 
the change of macro-economic conditions does not have dramatic effects on the 
firm’s capital structure in the Technology sector of AIM.  
Literature on capital structure has concentrated on the competition between tax 
deductibility of debt and other non-debt tax shields. This competition makes the 
expected relationship between debt and non-debt tax shields inverse. This 
hypothesis has been the subject of empirical testing. However, the contradictions 
found in the results propose a possible explanation that the relationship between 
debt and non-debt tax shields is positive. As Ozkan (2001) indicate, it might be 
because it is a proxy for other things than non-debt tax shields. For example, “firms 
with higher depreciation ratios are also more likely to have relatively fewer growth 
options in their investment opportunities set” and relatively more tangible assets, 
and vice versa. This implies a positive relation between the depreciation ratio and 
the leverage ratio. Further, a very important characteristic of the technology sector 
is that firms have more intangible asset based on knowledge and information. 
Regarding the positive relationship between intangibility and debt level, the 
intangibility can be treated as a tangible asset in this sector. Therefore, firms in this 
sector might have less tangible asset and more growth options in their investment 
opportunities set.  
A remarkable feature of most sectors of AIM is the significant influence of country 
variables on capital structure. In the Technology sector of AIM, it is significant that 
the short term leverage in market value is negatively influenced by the GDP and 
positively related to the capital formation. Further, the long term leverage in market 
value is negatively associated with the bond market development. However, the 
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country variables do not have far-reaching effects on the capital structure of firms 
in this sector over the sample years.  
Table 6. 16 Regression Results on Technology Sector of AIM 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ICB Sectors VARIABLES STDMV STDBV LTDMV LTDBV 
       
Technology SIZE -2.849 -3.308*** 5.207* -4.952*** 
   (3.354) (0.423) (2.976) (1.016) 
  GROWTH -0.126*** -0.00288 -0.137*** -0.0186*** 
   (0.0169) (0.00276) (0.0196) (0.00701) 
  NDTS 0.476*** 0.00370 0.460*** 0.0756** 
   (0.110) (0.0219) (0.113) (0.0359) 
  ROE 0.00406 0.0115*** 0.0168 0.00783 
   (0.0107) (0.00316) (0.0178) (0.00883) 
  TANG 1.001*** 0.0986** 1.232*** 0.250*** 
   (0.105) (0.0427) (0.151) (0.0582) 
  TRATE 0.0149 -0.0292* 0.0862 -0.0197 
   (0.0984) (0.0171) (0.0764) (0.0280) 
  LIQUIDITY -0.334 -0.0148 -0.567* -0.0963* 
   (0.286) (0.0490) (0.304) (0.0487) 
  InTANG 0.562*** 0.0139 0.595*** 0.0974*** 
   (0.0542) (0.0146) (0.0863) (0.0192) 
  DBKRT -0.442 -0.946*** -1.916** -0.904*** 
   (0.696) (0.188) (0.832) (0.292) 
  DIV -0.119* -0.00590 -0.118** -0.0141 
   (0.0671) (0.00710) (0.0512) (0.00925) 
  GDP -1.534*** -0.151 -1.410* -0.448 
   (0.518) (0.113) (0.845) (0.332) 
  CFMT 1.017* -0.0277 0.537 0.499 
   (0.549) (0.129) (0.822) (0.375) 
  BOND -0.102 -0.0222 -0.233** -0.0576 
   (0.0682) (0.0140) (0.109) (0.0506) 
  STK 0.0450 -0.000723 0.0411 0.00772 
   (0.0273) (0.00635) (0.0321) (0.0146) 
  HH 104.3 -81.84** 38.14 -76.98 
   (243.2) (37.88) (377.9) (158.3) 
  Constant 15.98 20.52*** -1.412 17.70* 
   (12.42) (3.378) (22.56) (9.393) 
       
  R2 0.1647 0.1647 0.1647 0.1647 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
Technology sector based on the SMEs  
For the Technology sector in the SMEs, the fixed effect regression performed better 
than for the Technology sector in AIM. Except for the firm size which has 
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significant influence on leverage in most of the sectors, growth opportunities, 
profitability, tangibility, liquidity, intangibility and distance from bankruptcy are 
indicated to be significantly related to some of the leverage measures. Comparing 
the coefficient of liquidity to other significant firm characteristics, it can be seen 
that Liquidity has the largest, and thus liquidity greatly affects the debt ratio. As 
liquidity can be interpreted as a measure of ability to pay debt, a firm with higher 
liquidity has a stronger ability to borrow debt especially short term debt. However, 
in the Technology sector, firms with stronger debt capacity are more negative 
towards debt financing. This result might come from the fact that the Technology 
firms are more reliant on equity financing due to the lower cost of equity financing. 
Furthermore, the Technology sector as a whole has a higher profitability coefficient 
which would indicate that it follows the pecking order prediction that internal funds 
play the dominant role in financing. Other characteristics such as tangibility and 
distance from bankruptcy have a significant relationship with long term debt while 
the characteristic of intangibility has a significant influence on short term leverage. 
Though the Technology firms are considered to have relatively less fixed assets, the 
fixed asset has influence on long term leverage. Considering the positive influence 
of financial health on long term leverage, it appears that firm characteristics would 
have greater significant influence on long term capital structure decisions of 
Technology sector firms. In addition, the intangible assets in the sector increase long 
term debt but reduce short term debt. This is probably because the collateralization 
of intangibles has significantly increased over the period of sample time. This trend 
is related to a lender’s demand for high yielding assets and changes in markets for 
intangibles.  
In the Technology sector of the SMEs board market, the firm variable effects are 
greater than the influences of country variables. Capital formation has a significant 
correlation with the long term debt measuring market ratio and book ratio though 
the coefficient enters into a negative relationship to market ratio and a positive 
relationship to book ratio. Based on Kayo and Kimura (2011), when the stock 
market is developed, firm leverage is lower because the broader supply of funds 
decreases the cost of equity. The results obtained in the section show that stock 
market development increases leverage especially long term leverage. This is 
probably because when companies in the Technology sector have an alternative to 
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finance investment and growth through a more flexible source of capital, they prefer 
to raise debt financing.  
 
Table 6. 17 Regression Results on Technology Sector of SMEs 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ICB Sectors VARIABLES STDMV STDBV LTDMV LTDBV 
Technology 
 
SIZE 16.07*** 0.874 29.81*** 3.374*** 
   (4.620) (1.092) (6.341) (0.497) 
  GROWTH -0.743*** 0.0509 -1.466*** -0.000131 
   (0.242) (0.0538) (0.453) (0.0321) 
  NDTS -0.248 -0.106** 0.204 -0.00526 
   (0.219) (0.0426) (0.212) (0.0146) 
  ROE -0.292** -0.0154 -0.475 -0.117*** 
   (0.137) (0.0438) (0.294) (0.0370) 
  TANG 0.200 0.0645 1.005*** 0.0817*** 
   (0.177) (0.0434) (0.130) (0.0170) 
  TRATE -0.0195 -0.0396*** 0.0760 -0.00288 
   (0.0574) (0.0145) (0.0999) (0.0109) 
  LIQUIDITY -4.301*** -0.958*** -1.801*** -0.00422 
   (0.294) (0.161) (0.352) (0.0233) 
  InTANG -0.348** -0.194*** 0.269* 0.0317 
   (0.132) (0.0280) (0.135) (0.0220) 
  DBKRT 2.544 -0.861 21.22*** 2.869*** 
   (3.307) (1.140) (7.096) (0.687) 
  DIV -0.0475 -0.0184 -0.180*** -0.0137** 
   (0.0403) (0.0128) (0.0535) (0.00610) 
  GDP 0.0134 0.00719 0.00623 -0.00419 
   (0.0234) (0.00681) (0.0399) (0.00334) 
  CFMT -4.854 -1.290 -19.08*** 1.047** 
   (3.872) (0.942) (4.529) (0.496) 
  BOND -0.172 -0.0514 -0.193 0.0396* 
   (0.241) (0.0577) (0.254) (0.0205) 
  STK 0.177 0.0427 0.808** 0.0702** 
   (0.220) (0.0685) (0.305) (0.0268) 
  HH -81.48 -19.08 -446.3** 11.77 
   (139.5) (36.80) (169.5) (17.01) 
  Constant 58.93 26.20** 41.19 -38.10*** 
   (40.99) (12.01) (71.31) (7.604) 
       
  R2 0.1228 0.1228 0.1228 0.1228 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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6.3.9 The Econometric Model  
This study further analyses the relationship of capital structure and the factors 
affecting it in the country in addition to the sectorial analyses presented above. The 
table below shows the results of the capital structure and its determinants. The 
objective of this section is mainly to present the overall outcome of pooling all the 
sectors of AIM and the SMEs board market. In AIM, it is observed that the short 
term leverage and long term leverage are significantly positively related to Firm 
Size, Non-debt tax shield, Asset tangibility and Intangibility but significantly 
negatively correlated with Liquidity, Dividend payment, GDP and Bond market 
development. Also, it can be noted that the Industry concentration tends to correlate 
significantly and negatively with long-term leverage but non-significantly and 
negatively with short-term leverage. This might suggest that firms with greater 
industry concentration tend to use less long-term leverage. This finding probably 
reflects the fact that firms in high market concentration industries prefer to use 
retained profit or equity financing rather than long-term debt. Moreover, the Capital 
formation which was expected in this thesis to be negatively related to the leverage 
ratios in market value measure leverage (short-term and long term). This is probably 
because the leverage in market value are greatly affected by economic conditions. 
Other variables of profitability, the effective tax rate, the distance from bankruptcy 
and the stock market development do not present significant and regular influences 
on the leverage ratio over the sample year.  
In the SMEs board market, short-term leverage and long-term leverage are 
significantly positively related to the firm size, the asset tangibility, the stock market 
development and the industry concentration but significantly negatively related to 
the effective tax rate, the liquidity, the dividend payment ratio and the bond market 
development. Further, the growth opportunities and the capital formation are 
significantly negatively related to short-term leverage while Profitability is 
significant and positively related to long term leverage. This difference in the 
growth opportunities, according to Titman and Wessels (1988), indicates that the 
agency cost of the shareholder-debt holder is likely to be higher for firms in growing 
industries, which have more flexibility in their choice of future investments. 
Moreover, Intangibility is strongly negatively correlated to short-term leverage in 
book value but strongly positively related to long-term leverage. Similarly, the 
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Distance from bankruptcy has a strong and negative influence on short-term 
leverage while it has a strong and significant positive influence on long term 
leverage in market value.  
It is undeniable from the results that the role of the country variable of Capital 
formation is significant for a firm’s capital structure in both samples when the short-
term leverage in market value, the short-term leverage in book value, the long-term 
leverage in market value and the long term leverage in book value are used as 
proxies. Similarly, evidence is presented that the leverage ratios are strongly 
sensitive to bond market development. In general, a further increase in capital 
formation and bond market development causes the leverage level of firms in both 
markets to increase. Further, Table 6.4 shows that the GDP has a more significant 
influence in AIM than in the SMEs board market. In a word, firms in AIM tend to 
have higher leverage ratios when the UK GDP decreases. Though the direction of 
the GDP and the leverage ratio relationships in SMEs are all positive, the evidence 
is not strong enough to be worth noting.  Moreover, the influence of the Industry 
concentration in AIM is stronger than that in the SMEs board market. Firms in 
higher market concentration industries are more likely to borrow higher, both short-
term and long-term, based on AIM.  A similar result is also shown by the Stock 
market development. Though the Stock market development in AIM shows a 
significant and positive relationship with long term leverage in book value, the 
effect of the stock market development in the SMEs board market is found to be 
strongly positive when related to short term leverage ratios and strongly negative 
when linked to long term leverage in book value.  
In brief, firms in AIM are more likely to use long term debt after controlling for 
country-specific effects. According to Daskalakis and Psillaki (2008), this is 
probably because the attitude of banks towards firms in AIM are driven by 
consideration of long-term benefits. It may also reflect unwillingness on the part of 
firms in AIM to accept short term debt at prohibitively high transaction costs of debt 
service. Firms in the SMEs board tend to borrow short-term debt rather than long 
term probably due to the risk considerations of banks or the high cost of debt 
services in the country.    
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In addition to the country-specific variables, the variables with firm characteristic 
consideration are also very important for both AIM and SMEs. It is widely accepted 
that Firm size is a significant factor in the capital structure of firms. The results for 
AIM indicate that the leverage in book value is negatively impacted by firm size 
while the leverage in market value shows a positive link to firm size. For the SMEs, 
the effects of firm size on leverage are positive. Similarly, there is evidences are 
observed that the other firm variables of Liquidity, tangibility, intangibly and 
dividend payment are also the major drivers for a firm’s capital structure decisions 
in both markets.  
Though the other variables with firm characteristics are widely accepted by past 
studies to have significant influence on capital structure, there is not sufficient 
evidence to be worth noting. For instance, growth opportunities, non-debt tax shield 
and profitability are considered as important factors for capital structure. In this 
study, the effect of these factors on leverage is not significant in both panel 
regressions. A possible explanation is that firms in both markets may have found a 
stable source of financing which make these factors less important.  
It appears that the variables of unexpected winner which are not widely accepted in 
the literature are found to significantly link with the capital structure of firms in 
both markets. For instance, intangibility and dividend payment in this research show 
a significant effect on a firm’s leverage level in both the short term and the long 
term. A similar negative association is shown between dividend payment and 
leverage and a positive relationship between intangibility and leverage. It can be 
inferred from this result that the measure of appraising the value of asset structure 
and the source of financing for those firms has been changing which has affected 
the overall sample in this study. In this research, the relationship should be analysed 
from a sectoral perspective based on industrial dummy variables and year dummy 
variables rather than collectively as was done in previous studies to get a clearer 
understanding and insight on the different actions and reactions in the sector.  
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Table 6.18 The Consolidated Regression Results of AIM and SMEs Board Market 
 (1) (1)  (2) (2) (3) (3) (4) (4) 
VARIABLES STLVM 
(AIM)  
STLVM 
(SMEs Board 
Market) 
 STLVB 
(AIM) 
STLVB 
(SMEs Board 
Market) 
LTLVM 
(AIM) 
LTLVM 
(SMEs Board 
Market) 
LTLVB 
(AIM) 
LTLVB 
(SMEs Board 
Market) 
          
SIZE 11.39*** 6.921***  -2.049*** 0.550 10.49*** 29.25*** -1.108* 3.928*** 
 (1.668) (2.234)  (0.416) (0.889) (1.910) (7.382) (0.587) (0.691) 
GROWTH -0.0169 -0.122***  0.00115 -0.0397*** -0.0270** -0.108 -0.00219 -0.00900 
 (0.0134) (0.0279)  (0.00434) (0.0147) (0.0128) (0.0705) (0.00326) (0.00800) 
NDTS 0.0630* -0.102  0.00273 -0.0520** 0.109** -0.199 0.0491*** 0.00212 
 (0.0377) (0.0971)  (0.0102) (0.0252) (0.0429) (0.185) (0.0142) (0.0262) 
ROE 0.000967 -0.0173  0.000285*** -0.00134 4.95e-05 -0.0928** -4.18e-05 -0.0240*** 
 (0.000620) (0.0175)  (0.000102) (0.00726) (0.000625) (0.0458) (0.000147) (0.00702) 
TANG 0.522*** 0.153***  0.0584*** -0.00146 0.470*** 0.331*** 0.101*** 0.0863*** 
 (0.0479) (0.0280)  (0.00713) (0.0192) (0.0470) (0.0679) (0.0112) (0.0102) 
TRATE 0.0187 -0.0310  -0.0121 -0.0486*** 0.0858* -0.253*** -0.00598 -0.0159*** 
 (0.0468) (0.0414)  (0.00801) (0.00673) (0.0463) (0.0661) (0.0113) (0.00498) 
LIQUIDITY -0.0864** -1.656***  -0.0110** -0.357*** -0.0505* -0.683*** -0.00338 -0.0217** 
 (0.0396) (0.277)  (0.00523) (0.0804) (0.0264) (0.146) (0.00381) (0.00861) 
INTANG 0.197*** 0.0662  0.00963** -0.116*** 0.161** 0.215** 0.0408*** 0.0284** 
 (0.0581) (0.0574)  (0.00440) (0.0183) (0.0663) (0.100) (0.0119) (0.0123) 
DBKRT -0.0103 -2.445***  -0.0384* -3.265*** -0.0462** 3.998* -0.0322 0.419 
 (0.0201) (0.682)  (0.0213) (0.233) (0.0204) (2.045) (0.0234) (0.311) 
DIV -0.128*** -0.0637***  -0.0205*** -0.0369*** -0.126*** -0.214*** -0.0423*** -0.0184*** 
 (0.0341) (0.0156)  (0.00448) (0.00580) (0.0253) (0.0379) (0.00336) (0.00315) 
GDP -0.919*** -0.00486  -0.279*** 0.00617 -0.874*** 0.00749 -0.134*** 0.00407 
 (0.264) (0.0144)  (0.0703) (0.00457) (0.204) (0.0351) (0.0422) (0.00380) 
CFMT -1.653*** -0.135**  -0.0613 -0.0843*** -0.566** -0.448*** 0.0471 -0.0489*** 
 (0.246) (0.0556)  (0.129) (0.0203) (0.232) (0.146) (0.0432) (0.0130) 
BOND -0.177*** 0.282***  -0.00817 0.0599** -0.184*** 0.918*** -0.0246*** 0.0742*** 
 (0.0233) (0.0944)  (0.00605) (0.0284) (0.0141) (0.255) (0.00432) (0.0217) 
STK -0.00964 39.01***  0.000553 7.024** 0.0298** 22.05 -0.00123 -5.583*** 
 (0.0240) (11.96)  (0.00544) (2.723) (0.0138) (24.17) (0.00301) (1.887) 
HH -3.589 50.91***  -0.137 20.70*** -5.405*** -132.4*** -1.139*** -22.07*** 
 (3.085) (12.90)  (0.762) (5.344) (0.743) (42.48) (0.194) (3.939) 
Constant 32.33***       20.70***  13.87*** 0.550 11.25* 29.25*** 9.089*** 3.928*** 
 (9.290) (5.344)  (2.867) (0.889) (6.470) (7.382) (2.165) (0.691) 
          
Observations 18703 25122  18,703 25122 18,703 25122 18,703 25122 
Number of groups 510 759  510 759 510 759 510 759 
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6.3.10 Discussion of Sectional Results  
The starting point for this section is an analysis of whether industry dependency 
affects the capital structure of a company in these two countries. The separate 
regressions on each sector which are exhibited in Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 indicate 
that the industries studied are influenced differently. The capital structure in various 
sectors reflect differently to the firm-specific variables and country-specific 
variables. With the R2 ranging from 0.09 to 0.24, the indication is that using the 
same model for each industry may not be fair in the sense that the debt ratio could 
be governed by different factors for different industries (Talberg et al. 2008). The 
Financial sector and the Utilities sector, for instance, are known to have a number 
of mandatory regulations and heavy governance on capital requirement from 
government to protect their financial stability (Frank and Goyal 2003; Korajczyk 
and Levy 2003). This is clearly indicated in the current analysis that the Oil &Gas 
sector, the Basic material sector and the Industrial sector are known as being 
sensitive to general market conditions, since they are associated with high initial 
expenses. Further, the Oil & Gas sector is a capital-intensive industry with high 
operating margins (Talberg et al. 2008). The Consumer goods sector is assumed to 
be more stable, owing to the fact that the daily necessities such as food is a basic 
need. Also, the Telecommunication sector and the Technology industry are 
representative of the new economy. The firms in these sectors have a relatively 
small amount of fixed assets compared to the other industries but have a strong 
market outlook. Thus, the industry dummies may measure the degree of interaction 
between product market characteristics and debt level.  
In AIM, the leverage level in the Oil & Gas sector and the Basic Material sector are 
found to be greatly influenced by the firm variable of firm size and the industry 
variable of market concentration as the coefficient of firm size and industry 
concentration is much higher than other variables. As can be seen from Figure 51 
and Figure 52 in the appendix, leverage level in these two sectors is positively 
related to firm size while industry concentration play a role in decreasing the 
leverage level. Besides, macro-economic conditions appear to be more important in 
the Oil & Gas sector and the Basic Material Sector. Compared to firms in AIM, one 
most interesting result for these two sectors in the SMEs is the large covariate of 
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industry concentration. It can be seen from Figure 59 and Figure 60 that the 
coefficient of industry market concentration in both the Oil & Gas sector and the 
Basic Material sector are significantly higher than for other variables. This indicates 
that the leverage level is heavily affected by industry concentration in these two 
sectors, especially in long term debt ratios. Further, the coefficient of firm variables 
in the sectors of Oil & Gas and Basic Material of SMEs does not have a big value. 
Overall, the fixed assets in the Oil & Gas industry is considered to be higher 
specificity compared to the other industries. However, this proposition might not be 
supported by the empirical results in this section. 
The Industrial sector is one of the secondary sectors with higher technical progress 
than the primary sector. In the Industrial sector of AIM, the firm variable of firm 
size and the industry variable of concentration show a large effect on the leverage 
level of firms. Figure 53 shows an outline including all the explanatory variables of 
leverage ratios in the Industrial sector. Other variables do not show a much stronger 
effect on debt ratios. In the SMEs board, the regression coefficient of firm size and 
industry market concentration in the Industrial sector retains a strong role in 
affecting debt level. This is especially shown by the large coefficient of industry 
concentration in Figure 61. Besides this, the leverage level in this sector is also 
heavily correlated to liquidity, distance from bankruptcy, capital formation and 
bond market development. It can be inferred that the change in debt level in the 
Industrial sector of SMEs is more reliant on economic factors than on firm specific 
variables.  
In the Consumer goods sector of AIM and the SMEs board market, the average 
effect of firm size on leverage ratio is smaller than that in the Industrial sector. 
However, firm size and industry market concentration still have a great effect on 
leverage in this sector, this is especially so for the influence of industry market 
concentration on the market ratio of long term debt. In AIM, the liquidity and capital 
formation are found to be greatly relevant in affecting leverage level though only 
short term leverage in market value is significantly higher than other measures of 
capital structure. In SMEs, the liquidity also greatly affects short term leverage in 
market value. The results also suggest that a rise in financial stability of firms in the 
sector causes short term leverage to be decreased. It appears that apart from liquidity 
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and distance from bankruptcy, country variables of capital formation greatly 
influences leverage except for the long term leverage in book value.  
Besides the great effect of firm size and industry market concentration on debt 
ratios, there is also evidence that the country variable of capital formation has 
influence on leverage ratios in both markets. In SMEs, distance from bankruptcy is 
also shown to be greatly related to leverage while in AIM, the effect of GDP on 
short term leverage in market value is significantly higher than other variables. As 
the Health Care sector is defined as a post-secondary sector with a significant 
knowledge base, the sub-sector under Health Care is relatively simple. Further, the 
Health Care sector is one of the fast growing industries and thus it is reasonable that 
in AIM the average effect of country variables is stronger than firm variables.  
The Consumer services sector belongs to the service industry comprising of 
banking, communication, wholesale and retail trade. Similar to the sectors which 
have already been discussed, firm size and industry concentration in AIM and the 
SMEs board market also have a great effect on leverage ratios. As can be seen from 
Figure 56 and Figure 64, the debt ratios of the consumer services sector in two 
markets are also greatly affected by capital formation and this effect in SMEs is 
much higher than that in AIM. Also, the liquidity and distance from bankruptcy play 
a significant role in affecting the leverage ratio of consumer services sector of the 
SMEs board market. Considering country variables, the effects of GDP and stock 
market development in AIM is higher than that in SMEs while the capital formation 
and bond market development in SMEs have a deeper impact.  
As the Telecommunication sector in these two markets is based on fewer 
companies, the results probably are representative in explaining the factors of 
capital structure decisions. In AIM, the effect of firm size in the sector is much 
greater on the firm’s short term leverage in market value and long term leverage in 
book value. This effect on long term leverage in book value is significant smaller 
than other measures in the SMEs board. Apart from firm size, the influence of 
industry concentration on the long term leverage market in AIM is sharply 
decreased. Also, growth opportunities is found to be greatly related to short term 
leverage in market value in these two markets. These findings are reasonable and 
support the hypothesis of agency theory. Further, the profitability, effective tax rate, 
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liquidity and distance from bankruptcy are heavily linked to leverage ratios in 
SMEs. However, the covariates of country variables in AIM play a more significant 
role in capital structure decisions. It seems that the sectors of the SMEs Market 
relies more on firm variables while the Telecommunication sector of AIM is more 
determined by country variables.  
In the Technology sector, the model performs similarly with significant results 
regarding firm size and industry market concentration. The largest value coefficient 
of firm size in SMEs is much bigger than that in AIM. Also, the effects of industry 
market concentration in SMEs are larger than those in AIM. Compared to these, 
tangibility, capital formation and GDP in AIM play a significant role in influencing 
the market ratio of leverage. In the SMEs board, the leverage is more affected by 
non-debt tax shield, liquidity, financial default risk and capital formation. The 
Figures 58 and 64 show that the country variables in AIM are more important and 
the value of coefficients of firm variables is bigger in SMEs.   
In conclusion, firm size and industry concentration occupy very significant 
positions in capital structure decisions in each sector of both markets. In AIM, the 
coefficient of firm size in the Technology sector is the smallest and that in the 
Consumer Goods sector is the largest. Additionally, the coefficient of industry 
market concentration in the Oil & Gas sector is the smallest while the Health Care 
sector is the largest. The coefficient of industry concentration in the Consumer 
goods sector is the smallest and that in the Oil & Gas sector is the largest. For firm 
size, the Health Care sector in SMEs has the largest coefficient while the Heath Care 
in AIM is the smallest. Talberg et al. (2008) suggest that size can be interpreted as 
a measure of asymmetric information; when a larger company is more transparent, 
more stakeholders have access to information. Also, large size firms can also be 
assumed to be more diversified and have more stable financial heath and, thus, can 
afford higher level of leverage. In this way, creditors might consider firm size as an 
important factor for lending money. This might be especially significant in the 
Consumer Goods sector of AIM and the Health Care sector of SMEs. Moreover, a 
clear distinction between competitive and monopolistic firms is also important for 
creditors because industry concentration influences performance which might be 
considered as industry profitability.  
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6.4 Dummy Variables Results Analysis  
6.4.1 The Industry Effect 
Firstly, the fixed effect models outlined in Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 below include a 
number of industry dummy variables of AIM and the SMEs board market, which 
replace the intercept. These are regression coefficients and t-statistics of the industry 
dummies. From Table 6.5, it can be seen that almost all of the industry dummy 
coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of 
significance, indicating that industry excepting the Telecommunication sector 
exhibits a significant effect on the capital structure of firms in AIM though the 
directions of coefficient are mixed. The value of the Telecommunication sector is 
not shown as this is the omitted industry in the fixed effect model. Table 6.6 shows 
that, in the SMEs board, the short term leverage is found to be very relevant in the 
industry effect while this effect does not strongly affect the long-term leverage.  
Table 6. 19 Regression Coefficients of Industry Dummies (AIM) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES STLVM STLVB LTLVM LTLVB 
     
     
1.Oil*Gas -14.61*** 2.005*** -36.11*** -15.83*** 
 (3.118) (0.354) (2.877) (0.938) 
2.Basic Material -10.74*** 1.403*** -29.88*** -15.52*** 
 (3.127) (0.331) (2.891) (0.933) 
3.Industrial 25.19*** 4.318*** 8.797*** -9.778*** 
 (3.135) (0.307) (2.913) (0.939) 
4.Consumer Goods 24.80*** 6.751*** -2.546 -10.06*** 
 (3.324) (0.404) (3.141) (0.989) 
5.Health Care -0.531 2.135*** -14.53*** -12.52*** 
 (3.201) (0.352) (2.974) (0.952) 
6.Consumer Services 10.36*** 2.506*** -6.651** -10.78*** 
 (3.101) (0.305) (2.871) (0.939) 
7.Telecommunication Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted 
     
8.Technology 7.435** 2.363*** -2.899 -11.20*** 
 (3.087) (0.304) (2.863) (0.934) 
R-squared 0.207 0.092 0.241 0.141 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.20 Regression Coefficients of Industry Dummies (SMEs) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES STLVM STLVB LTLVM LTLVB 
     
     
1.Energy 53.05*** 7.300*** 20.47 0.0900 
 (9.769) (2.736) (12.91) (1.152) 
2.Material 62.92*** 11.84*** 22.14 -2.224 
 (11.00) (2.712) (20.47) (1.824) 
3.Industrials 59.35*** 7.497*** 20.08 -2.160 
 (11.24) (2.751) (20.86) (1.824) 
4.Consumer Staple 55.54*** 8.356*** 18.17 -2.295 
 (10.95) (2.678) (20.04) (1.746) 
5.Heath Care 52.86*** 7.835*** 16.92 -2.313 
 (10.79) (2.682) (19.66) (1.727) 
6.Consumer Discretionary 43.96*** 5.967** 12.26 -0.839 
 (9.506) (2.851) (13.90) (1.477) 
7.Telecommunication Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted 
     
8.Technogy 50.87*** 4.322 12.40 -2.428 
 (11.33) (2.727) (20.27) (1.756) 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Moreover, in Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2, the coefficients of the industry dummies 
which were obtained in analysis of short-term leverage and long-term leverage are 
presented. By looking at Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2, it can be seen that in AIM, 
industry has an effect on short-term leverage as well as long-term leverage while 
industry only has an effect on short term leverage in the SMEs board market. It is 
concluded that the difference between the magnitude of the industry effect on short 
term and long term debts varies across industries. This provides strong support for 
hypothesis 16 which predicts that the industry difference is relevant in firms’ capital 
structure level. It is also interesting to point out that, the industry effect in AIM is 
less on short-term debt ratios compared to long term debt ratios in the Oil & Gas 
sector, the Basic Materials sector, the Industrial sector, the Consumer Goods sector, 
the Health Care sector and the Technology sector but the industry effect is bigger 
on short term leverage in the Consumer services sector. In SMEs, although the 
industry effect on long term leverage is not significant in the regression model, the 
industry effect is bigger on short term debt ratios than long term debt ratios in all 
industries.  
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Figure 6.1: Coefficient of Industry Dummy Variables for Leverage (AIM) 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Coefficient of Industry Dummies Variables for Leverage (SMEs) 
 
 
According to Talberg et al. (2008), the industry dummies is used to measure the 
extent of interaction between product market characteristics and the debt level. 
Firms in product market where the industrial dummy effect is found, firms are 
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expected to have lower level of debt, ceteris paribus, than firms in product market 
which the industrial dummy effect is less significant.  
6.4.2 The Time Effect 
In Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4, the coefficients of the time dummies which obtained 
in the analyses of the period from 2007 to 2016 are plotted. On the other axis of 
these two figures the percentage change in real GDP over the period is plotted. In 
Figure 6.3, there is a distinct pattern in the value of the time dummy coefficients for 
the short-term and long term debts. This pattern exhibits a negative relationship with 
the percentage change of real GDP. It is noted that this negative relationship is more 
evident for time dummies of short term debts. Additionally, the effect of time 
dummies is contrasting on short term debts and long term debts over the sample 
years. The observed time structure in the value of the time dummies indicates that 
the economic boom (2007 to 2008) had a negative effect on long term debts. After 
2008, the long term debts significantly increased during the economic recession but, 
on the whole, they were decreasing after 2009. It is clear that there is a complicated 
positive relationship between the values of time coefficient of long term debts and 
economic growth. This suggests that firms of AIM tend to raise higher levels of 
long term debt when economic conditions improve. However, this tendency has not 
been significant since 2013. In effect, as can be seen from the results, the time effect 
is not significant on both short term and long term debts. This is especially true for 
the recession period.   
The average short term debt ratios in the sample firms of AIM appear to be 
increasing during economic boom periods and decreasing during period of 
economic recession, though the effect of the time dummy on short term debts 
recovered slightly in the period of 2013 to 2015. It appears that the firms of AIM 
are sensitive to temporary micro-economic changes. Integrating the results 
displayed in Figure 6.3, the firms of AIM appear to be relying less on long term 
debt and more on short term debt at the beginning of economic booms. During the 
periods of economic recession, firms tend to borrow more long term debts than short 
term debts. With the stability of economic development, the tendency to borrow 
short term debts has been increasing while long term debts have been decreasing. 
Ultimately, the tendency to borrow both short term and long term is equal. 
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According to Michaelas et al. (1999) and Diamond and Rajan (2001) , firms might 
have to raise short term debt to fill the financial gap when economic booms occur. 
However, during the early period of economic recession, major investments would 
require long term finance and this would push the long term debt ratio up. 
Subsequent to this, firms might have accumulated retained profit and the short term 
debts probably would be paid off. In this circumstance, in the process of being 
established and this may results in the need for long term debt. As the economic 
started to steady, demand for short term and long term debts returned to a normal 
level.  
 
Figure 6.3: Coefficients of Time Dummy Variables for Leverage (AIM) 
 
 
Figure 6.4 exhibits the time dummy coefficients for the short term and long term 
debts in the SMEs board market. As can be seen from the results, the effects of time 
dummy on leverage ratios in Figure 6.4 are more significant than those in Figure 6.3. 
However, the distinct pattern in the values of the time dummy coefficients for short 
term and long term debts is not as evident as they are in AIM. In the SMEs board 
market, the short term debt ratios in Figure 6.4 are more affected by time dummies 
than the long term debt ratios.  
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The observed time structure in the values of the time dummies of short term debt 
ratios indicates that the initial stage of an economic boom has a negative effect on 
gearing ratios of firms in the SMEs market. During the period of economic recession 
(2009 to 2010), the average short term leverage ratios in the sample firms appear to 
be decreasing. Since 2010, the economic conditions have declined overall and this 
has positively affected the short term debt ratios. The amount of fluctuation on short 
term leverage ratios during the period of economic boom and recession were in 
narrow range, indicating that the degree of sensitivity with which firms in SMEs react 
to micro-economic change was not strong.  
Figure 6.4 also indicates the opposite situation of long term debt. It is clear that there 
is a positive relationship between the values of the time coefficients of long term debt 
and economic conditions. This positive relationship is especially significant for the 
long term debt ratio in book value. At the beginning of the economic crisis, the time 
coefficient of long term debt in market value sharply declined but largely increased 
in 2008 as the firms in the SMEs market could not raise a higher level of long term 
debt to start new investment. Since 2008, the time coefficient of long term debt in 
book value has been steadily falling. For the long-term leverage in book value, the 
time coefficient does not show a significant change over the sample years regardless 
of economic growth.  
The firms in the SMEs market seem to be relying more on long term leverage and 
less on short term debt over the sample years. At the early stage of the economic 
boom, the importance of short term leverage was less than that of long term leverage. 
This was probably due to the shortage of financing; firms would have to reduce the 
short-term debt level to react to the economic crisis. As the economy begins to grow, 
influence of the short-term leverage (book value) starts to increase. In the long term, 
the time coefficients of short term leverage (book value) and long-term leverage 
(book value) are within a narrow range. For the leverage in market value, the 
tendency was to follow the change of economic conditions during the sample years. 
As the overall trend of the economy was decreasing in China in the period of 2007 
to 2016, the time coefficients of short-term and long-term debt ratio in market value 
was showing a downward trend. It can be observed that there were time specific 
effects on the gearing ratios of firms in SMEs.  
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Figure 6.4: Coefficients of Time Dummy Variables for Leverage (SMEs) 
 
The regression results of time dummies variable, Table 6.8 and Table 6.9 for both 
AIM and SMEs Board are presented in Appendix.  
 
6.4.3 Financial System Effect  
Table 6.7 presents the coefficients of the financial system dummies, obtained in 
analyse of short term and long-term leverage. As can be seen in Table 6.7 almost all 
the financial system dummy coefficients are at the 1% or 10% of significance, 
meaning that the financial system exhibits a great effect on the capital structure of 
firms in both countries. The table shows that the coefficients of the financial system 
that are market based have a positive effect on a firm’s leverage while the bank-based 
system has a negative effect on market effect leverage ratios. This provides strong 
support for Hypothesis 13 that firms in market-based countries might have less 
concentrated ownership due to the financing channel, while in bank-based countries 
the concentration is higher (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 1999; Beck and Levine 
2002). As explained by Antoniou et al. (2008) and De Jong et al. (2008) , from the 
perspective of agency theory, debt plays a disciplinary role against the a manager’s 
opportunistic behaviour, and a firm’s leverage is higher in market-based countries. 
The long-term leverage in market value is most affected by the financial system.  
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It also needs to be pointed out that, although the effect of a bank based market on 
short-term debt ratio in market value and the effect of the market based on short term 
leverage in book value are not in line with the hypothesis (Beck and Levine 2002), it 
can be deduced that firms in AIM tend to have more leverage as the UK is considered 
as a market-based country and the firms in SMEs would have less debt.  
Table 6. 21 Regression Coefficients of Financial System Dummies 
                                                       
 
 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
The results of the regression indicate a number of significant relationships between 
most of the independent variables and measures of capital structure. However, their 
significance varies dependent on the market involved and the sector in which the firm 
resides. For example, liquidity is found to be significantly related to the capital 
structure in the Health Care, Consumer Goods and Basic Material Sectors (the First 
and Secondary industries) of AIM whilst it does not have any significant influence 
on the knowledge-based sectors (i.e. the Technology sector). Furthermore, in the 
context of SMEs Board, bond market development is positively significant in relation 
to capital structure measures in the Health Care sector but shows a negatively 
relationship with the leverage ratio in the Material, Industrial and Consumer sectors. 
The majority of insignificant relationships could imply a failure in the protocols 
involved in the capital structure decisions making process when changes are required.  
When all the sectors were aggregated, the majority of significant firm specific 
variables could possibly indicate the impact of firms’ business activities and 
managements in relation to the financing decisions taken. This conclusion is 
supported by the fact that firm characteristics including firm size, growth 
 (1) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES STLVM STLVB LTLVM LTLVB 
     
SMEs (BANK) -2.997 3.063* -44.84*** -5.634*** 
 (6.710) (1.593) (8.246) (1.830) 
AIM (Market) 2.997 
(-6.71) 
-3.063* 
(-1.593) 
44.84*** 
(-8.246) 
5.634*** 
(-1.83) 
     
R-squared 0.267 0.255 0.148 0.122 
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opportunities, tangibility, liquidity, intangibility and default risk have statistically 
significant coefficients in majority of regression models. Furthermore, the results in 
relation to the country specific variables of GDP, capital formation, bonds, and the 
stock market show varying degrees of positivity and negativity which are often 
predicted on the whether firms are on AIM or SME board. The only universal results 
relate to GDP and capital formation which are negative for all firms which supports 
the pecking order theory that debt ratios are lowered when firms can reply on internal 
resources brought about by favourable market conditions. Also, the industry-specific 
variables which relate to the market concentration of particular sectors are found to 
have a strong influence on capital structure possibly due to the different market 
characteristics prevalent in each. Overall, the results show differing significant 
relationships when capital structure is measured across short- and long-term market 
and book values. There are key issues which influence the significance of the various 
determinants. On AIM short- and long-term leverage relate positively but negatively 
to liquidity and dividend payments. On the SMEs board market, short term and long 
term leverage are also relate positively to firm size and to country specific variables 
but negatively to the effective tax rate, the liquidity and dividend payments.  
Furthermore, the results show that industry, time and country dummy variables have 
a significantly positive effect on both market value and book value leverage in period 
of 2007 to 2017.   
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Chapter Seven: Results And Discussion Of Alternative 
Appraoches To Capital Structure Analysis And Their Use 
As A Robustness Test 
7.0 Introduction  
This chapter serves as a robustness check but also covers three further sets of 
analysis, namely an examination of non-linear relationships, the use of a balanced 
panel based on a reduced sample size and an evaluation of any cumulative effect of 
each determinant on capital structure. The analyses are restricted to the full data 
samples of the AIM market and SMEs Board and run separately to allow comparisons 
to be made. The complexity of the process of constructing a capital structure together 
with the complex interaction of market conditions and agency issues may results in 
any relationship being non-linear which predicates the decision to include this 
analysis. The use of restricted data forming a balanced panel was taken to provide a 
robustness test and provide reassurance that missing data in the unbalanced panel had 
not caused a distortionary effect. The cumulative effect was measure using lagged 
explanatory variables to observe whether there was a time dimension to the formation 
of capital structure. The results indicate that firm-specific variables can influence the 
linearity of the results and create a non-linear effect. The balanced panel and the 
cumulative effect results reveal no significant differences in the results seen in 
chapter six thus providing a robustness check which confirms the previous findings.  
 
7.1 Non-Linear Relationship  
The other objective of this section is to explore the non-linear relationship of capital 
structure and its determinants in both AIM and the SMEs board market. The study 
supports the argument by Fattouh et al. (2005)  that the capital structure and its 
determinants can be a negative or positive linear or can be a U-shaped or an inverted 
U-shaped. Thus, a linear relationship might not always allow for insight into any 
existing relationship.  
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7.1.1 Non-Linearity of Independent Variables 
To test the robustness of the results, this section performs a number of additional 
regression to analyses the robustness of the results obtained in this research. Firstly, 
the previous section uses an alternative measure of the explanatory variables. 
Specifically, the logarithm of firm variables such as the logarithm of total assets as a 
measure of size (LogSIZE^2), the market to book ratio (LogGROWTH^2), the return 
on equity (LogROE^2), the ratio of tangible asset to total asset (LogTANG^2), the 
effective tax rate (LogTRATE^2), the current ratio (Log LIQUIDITY^2), the ratio 
of intangible asset to total asset (LogInTANG^2), the value of distance from 
bankruptcy (LogDBKRT^2) and the ratio of dividend pay-out (LogDIV^2), are used 
as alternative indicators of firm size, growth opportunities, non-debt tax shield, 
profitability, tangibility, effective tax rate, liquidity, intangibility, distance from 
bankruptcy and dividend payment. As can be seen from Table 7.1 and Table 7.2, the 
regression results of non-linearity are similar to those obtained in linearity, except 
for the coefficients of logarithms of variables that show greater value than the 
coefficient of the original variables. Most of the empirical studies tests the 
determinants of capital structure by using regression model of a linear relationship. 
Due to the complex interaction of market conditions, agency problems and 
bankruptcy cost, the relationship may in fact be non-linear (Guney et al. 2011). 
Further, factors in different quartiles have different degrees of sensitivity to change 
in the capital structure.  
 
7.1.2 Non-Linear Relationship in AIM and SMEs  
Table 7.1 and Table 7.2 respectively present the non-linear relationship starting with 
the relationship between capital structure and firm-specific variables on the basis of 
measuring market value and book value for the AIM and the SMEs board market. 
From both tables, it is apparent that the relationship between capital structure and its 
factors is statistically significant and non-linear. Further, Figures in the appendices 
provide a series of graphs of the U-shaped and inverted U-shaped relationships to 
explain the data in both tables.  
Figure 1 to Figure 40 in the appendix show the pictorial link between leverage ratios 
and their firm specific variables in AIM and the SMEs board market. It can be seen 
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that a non-linear relationship exists among firms in both markets. In the Figures, 
firms in AIM tend to experience less short-term leverage in market value when firm 
size increases in the short-term but not in the long-term. It appears that firms with a 
size greater than an Index of 1 continue to experience an increase in short term 
leverage in market value. However, the short-term leverage in market value of firms 
in the SMEs board market remains a positive growth trend with an increase in firm 
size.  The non-linear relationship between long term leverage in book value and firm 
size presents a similar curve. When a different measure of capital structure (book 
value) is tested, a U-Shaped curve is found to suggest a negative relationship where 
a continuous increase in firm size results in a fall in short term leverage in book value 
in AIM, while the U-Shape shows close to a linear and positive relationship between 
the firm size and short term leverage in book value in the SMEs board market. The 
long-term leverage in book value for both markets presents different curves 
compared to other leverage ratios. In AIM, the U-Shape is found to present a positive 
relationship when the long-term leverage in book value is increased with the growth 
of firm size but the firm size in the SMEs board initially shows a negative impact on 
long term leverage in book value. When the firm size gets closer to an index of 18, 
the long-term leverage in book value starts growing.  
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Table 7. 1: Non-linear Relationship with Capital Structure in Market Value 
 Short Term 
Leverage 
Market value 
 Long Term 
Leverage 
Market Value 
 
VARIABLES AIM SMEs Board 
Market 
AIM SMEs Board 
Market 
     
SIZE 11.39*** 7.747*** 10.49*** 31.33*** 
 (1.668) (2.495) (1.910) (8.058) 
LogSIZE^2 137.6*** 53.03*** 128.5*** 313.4*** 
 (21.78) (10.04) (20.83) (36.82) 
GROWTH -0.0169 -0.122*** -0.0270** -0.107 
 (0.0134) (0.0276) (0.0128) (0.0705) 
LogGROWTH^2 -3.909*** -5.059*** 1.093 -0.351 
 (1.385) (0.745) (1.880) (1.359) 
NDTS 0.0630* -0.0872 0.109** -0.162 
 (0.0377) (0.0987) (0.0429) (0.186) 
LogNDTS^2 3.219 1.544 0.373 -2.778*** 
 (2.301) (0.948) (2.120) (1.020) 
ROE 0.000967 -0.0182 4.95e-05 -0.0949** 
 (0.000620) (0.0174) (0.000625) (0.0455) 
LogROE^2 -6.878*** -3.690*** -8.985*** 2.632** 
 (2.504) (0.432) (1.776) (1.305) 
TANG 0.522*** 0.156*** 0.470*** 0.340*** 
 (0.0479) (0.0269) (0.0470) (0.0665) 
LogTANG^2 5.433** -0.735 6.472*** 6.714*** 
 (2.170) (0.791) (2.198) (0.931) 
TRATE 0.0187 -0.0291 0.0858* -0.248*** 
 (0.0468) (0.0414) (0.0463) (0.0647) 
LogTRATE^2 -0.445 0.670** 1.063 -2.760*** 
 (0.882) (0.340) (0.988) (0.671) 
LIQUIDITY -0.0864** -1.654*** -0.0505* -0.678*** 
 (0.0396) (0.275) (0.0264) (0.144) 
LogLIQUIDITY^2 -33.64*** -26.09*** -14.55*** -1.270 
 (3.253) (0.868) (3.338) (1.258) 
InTANG 0.197*** 0.0639 0.161** 0.209** 
 (0.0581) (0.0573) (0.0663) (0.0993) 
LogInTANG^2 1.694** 1.439*** 5.180*** 0.286 
 (0.857) (0.208) (1.418) (0.443) 
DBKRT -0.0103 -2.448*** -0.0462** 3.988* 
 (0.0201) (0.686) (0.0204) (2.089) 
LogDBKRT^2 -2.703 11.43*** -7.777 -14.07*** 
 (3.332) (0.801) (4.721) (3.105) 
DIV -0.128*** -0.0647*** -0.126*** -0.216*** 
 (0.0341) (0.0153) (0.0253) (0.0375) 
LogDIV^2 -8.617*** -0.511 -13.70*** -4.635*** 
 (2.533) (0.326) (2.267) (0.582) 
GDP -0.919*** 0.0271** -0.874*** 0.0458* 
 (0.264) (0.0119) (0.204) (0.0260) 
CFMT -1.653*** -1.105 -0.566** -4.025* 
 (0.246) (0.928) (0.232) (2.149) 
BOND -0.177*** -0.145*** -0.184*** -0.486*** 
 (0.0233) (0.0469) (0.0141) (0.158) 
STK -0.00964 0.250** 0.0298** 0.330** 
 (0.0240) (0.101) (0.0138) (0.135) 
HH -3.589 49.05*** -5.405*** -52.90*** 
 (3.085) (9.793) (0.743) (15.31) 
Constant 32.33*** 30.21* 11.25* -467.8*** 
 (9.290) (15.43) (6.470) (53.58) 
     
Observations 18,703 16,369 18,703 16,369 
                                                   Standard errors in parentheses 
                                                   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7.2: Non-linear Relationship in Capital structure in Book Value 
 Short Term 
Leverage Book 
value 
 Long Term 
Leverage Book 
Value 
 
VARIABLES AIM SMEs Board 
Market 
AIM SMEs Board 
Market 
     
SIZE -2.049*** 1.024 -1.108* 3.968*** 
 (0.416) (0.996) (0.587) (0.754) 
LogSIZE^2 -0.0750 5.039 11.81*** 35.74*** 
 (2.068) (4.116) (3.372) (3.718) 
GROWTH 0.00115 -0.0394*** -0.00219 -0.00898 
 (0.00434) (0.0146) (0.00326) (0.00801) 
LogGROWTH^2 -0.0314 0.437** 0.385 0.465*** 
 (0.205) (0.210) (0.250) (0.133) 
NDTS 0.00273 -0.0435* 0.0491*** 0.00285 
 (0.0102) (0.0237) (0.0142) (0.0262) 
LogNDTS^2 -0.186 1.519*** -0.928** -0.611*** 
 (0.281) (0.150) (0.386) (0.107) 
ROE 0.000285*** -0.00182 -4.18e-05 -0.0241*** 
 (0.000102) (0.00732) (0.000147) (0.00697) 
LogROE^2 -0.0496 0.180 0.0451 0.360** 
 (0.163) (0.240) (0.385) (0.170) 
TANG 0.0584*** 0.000577 0.101*** 0.0864*** 
 (0.00713) (0.0185) (0.0112) (0.00995) 
LogTANG^2 -0.234 -0.489*** 2.067*** 1.107*** 
 (0.193) (0.142) (0.272) (0.0770) 
TRATE -0.0121 -0.0475*** -0.00598 -0.0158*** 
 (0.00801) (0.00671) (0.0113) (0.00493) 
LogTRATE^2 -0.345** -0.240*** -0.422* -0.435*** 
 (0.136) (0.0721) (0.233) (0.0469) 
LIQUIDITY -0.0110** -0.356*** -0.00338 -0.0216** 
 (0.00523) (0.0794) (0.00381) (0.00866) 
LogLIQUIDITY^2 -4.976*** -7.468*** -0.677** 0.977*** 
 (0.416) (0.479) (0.283) (0.150) 
InTANG 0.00963** -0.117*** 0.0408*** 0.0283** 
 (0.00440) (0.0186) (0.0119) (0.0124) 
LogInTANG^2 -0.429*** -0.557*** 0.672*** -0.180*** 
 (0.0824) (0.127) (0.175) (0.0687) 
DBKRT -0.0384* -3.267*** -0.0322 0.418 
 (0.0213) (0.242) (0.0234) (0.312) 
LogDBKRT^2 0.557 -2.254*** -1.495** -1.651*** 
 (0.439) (0.851) (0.619) (0.402) 
DIV -0.0205*** -0.0375*** -0.0423*** -0.0184*** 
 (0.00448) (0.00570) (0.00336) (0.00311) 
LogDIV^2 -0.0643 0.282*** -0.738** -0.499*** 
 (0.106) (0.0685) (0.329) (0.118) 
GDP -0.279*** 0.00843*** -0.134*** 0.00228 
 (0.0703) (0.00318) (0.0422) (0.00342) 
CFMT -0.0613 -0.499** 0.0471 -0.114 
 (0.129) (0.229) (0.0432) (0.146) 
BOND -0.00817 -0.0970*** -0.0246*** -0.0498*** 
 (0.00605) (0.0224) (0.00432) (0.0156) 
STK 0.000553 -0.0219 -0.00123 0.0155 
 (0.00544) (0.0299) (0.00301) (0.0185) 
HH -0.137 2.436 -1.139*** -9.672*** 
 (0.762) (2.066) (0.194) (1.921) 
Constant 13.87*** 17.77*** 9.089*** -60.36*** 
 (2.867) (5.897) (2.165) (6.252) 
     
Observations 18,703 16,369 18,703 16,369 
                                                 Standard errors in parentheses 
                                                 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Such non-linear relationships could be due to the applications of both trade-off and 
pecking order models. There is an argument suggesting that firm size is related to the 
information asymmetry problems on which the pecking order theory depends. Larger 
firms tend to have lower information asymmetries because they are required to 
submit information to the financial monitors whereas smaller firms are only required 
to produce a straightforward annual report (González and González 2012). Therefore, 
the greater the information asymmetry, the greater the validity of the propositions of 
pecking order theory where the level of debt decreases with the growth of the firm 
size. With an increase in firm size, the direct bankruptcy cost is relatively less than 
the cost of external equity financing. This explains the uptrend in the U-Shape curve 
which indicates a positive relationship between the debt ratio and firm size.  
Growth opportunity is found to have a non-linear relationship among firms in AIM 
and the SMEs board market. For firms in AIM, an inverted U-Shape is shown in both 
short-term and long term leverage in market value. This implies that firms with more 
investment opportunities have less leverage probably because “greater investment 
opportunities are associated with a lower free cash flow and less need for the 
disciplinary role of debt over manager behaviour” (González and González 2012). 
Also, from agency cost perspective, firms with more growth opportunities have more 
agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors as shareholders of these firms 
are likely to underinvest and greater possibilities of risk-shifting substitution. For 
firms in the SMEs board market, a U-shaped relationship implies that, in both the 
short term and the long term, great investment opportunities lead to strong financing 
needs resulting in the issuing of more debt. Considering the measure of leverage in 
book value, a U-shaped curve is observed in short term leverage for both market. The 
long term leverage in book value has similar results with the leverage ratio in market 
value.  
Profitability is found to only have a significant non-linear relationship in 
market value for both markets. This is probably because the reaction of market value 
of firms in both markets are sensitive to the change in profitability. Though both 
markets have a non-linear connection in the short term, those in AIM firms have a 
U-shaped curve while in the SMEs board market firms show an inverted U-shaped 
relationship. The profitability in both markets starts with a negative and significant 
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coefficient in all parts of the distribution with the scale of the coefficient increasing 
in absolute value when the debt moves up to capital distribution.  This suggests that, 
in both markets, an increase in internal funds is related to a decrease in short term 
leverage especially for highly leveraged firms (Fattouh et al. 2005). However, when 
the measure of long term leverage in market value is tested, the U-shape is found in 
firms in the SMEs board market while in AIM firms present an inverted U-shape. 
Such non-linear relationships in the SMEs board are probably because the taxes, 
agency cost and bankruptcy costs push more profitable firms towards higher 
leverage. Profitable firms will have more free cash flow and more marginal benefit 
of using debt to discipline managers (González and González 2012). In Figure 24, 
the coefficient between SMEs firms’ profitability and long term leverage in market 
value in the distribution eventually turns positive.  
An intriguing result is found when the non-linear relationship between the 
non-debt tax shield and leverage ratios are tested. From the results, it can be seen that 
the estimated coefficient on measures of non-debt tax shield is not significant for the 
leverage ratio in market value. In the measure of book value, an inverted U-shape is 
found over short term leverage in the SMEs board and long term leverage in both 
markets when the non-debt tax shield increased. This implies that firms which have 
a non-debt tax shield such as depreciation, would have a stronger incentive to use 
debt from a tax shield point within a certain range. With further growth of non-debt 
tax shield, firms start to use less the debt because the benefit gained from the non-
debt tax shield might decrease.  
For asset tangibility and leverage in market value, it is found that tangibility 
in AIM shows a linear relationship with leverage in both the short term and the long 
term. The short term leverage in the market value of the SMEs board market starts at 
the highest point when asset tangibility starts to increase. After a while, the impact 
on short term and long term leverage in market value starts to be eliminated as the 
value of tangibility increases. The return then drops to a critical point and rises when 
tangibility continuously increases. However, for tangibility and leverage in book 
value, the non-linear relationship is observed among the firms in both markets. An 
inverted U-shaped relationship is found between the asset tangibility and short term 
leverage in AIM while in the SMEs board market, the relationship between them is 
245 
 
U-shaped. The long term leverage in book value and tangibility for both markets 
show a U-shaped. The non-linear relationship with the U-shaped curve relates to the 
fact that asset tangibility starts with a significant and positive coefficient in most parts 
of the distribution but becomes negative after a point. As Fattouh et al. (2005) 
present, this is probably because the availability of fixed assets can be treated as 
collateral to reduce the marginal cost of debt but eventually, this effect may cease to 
be valid for high values of debt when collateral may be provided insufficient to 
ensure that the firm is able to borrow short term or long term funds.  
The intangibility of assets is also found to have a significant non-linear 
relationship with both short term leverage and long term leverage among firms in 
AIM and SMEs board markets. From Figure 8 7, it is observed that a U-shaped non-
linear relationship between short term leverage in market value and intangibility 
exists in AIM while the relationship between them in SMEs shows an inverted U-
shape. However, the relationship of long term leverage in market value and 
intangibility shows a linear curve for both markets. For the leverage in book value 
and intangibility, it is also examined that a non-linear relationship exists in both 
markets. The intangibility is found to have an inverted U-shaped relationship with 
short term leverage in AIM but a U-shaped relationship with short term leverage in 
the SMEs board market. Equivalently, the tangibility relationship with long term 
showed U-shaped in both markets. Though the surface camber of the figures is 
different, the coefficient of intangibility on leverage in market value is negative and 
significant for most of the distribution for both markets but finally becomes positive. 
This supports the fact that intangible asset might have a lower value than fixed asset 
when there is bankruptcy and this would increase the cost of financial distress 
associated with the use of debt. Also, agency costs arising from conflicts between 
shareholders and bond holders will be greater if the firm does not have tangible assets 
because the probability of risk-shifting by shareholders will be greater. As González 
and González (2012) support, the results indicate that with the increase in 
intangibility, firms are more subject to information asymmetries, and may issue debt 
rather than equity when there is need for external financing.  
Figure 7, Figure 17, Figure 27 and Figure 37 in the appendix also show a pictorial 
link between capital structure and liquidity in AIM and SMEs board market firms. It 
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can be seen that a non-linear relationship exists among firms involved in both 
markets. Based on the measure of market value, the AIM firms tend to borrow less 
with liquidity increases in both the short term and the long term. Though the non-
linear relationship between leverage and liquidity in SMEs is U-shaped in the short 
run and an inverted U-shape in the long run, the SMEs board firms would experience 
less leverage in both the short term and the long run with the effect of liquidity 
increases. It appears that firms with more liquidity have lower leverage and prefer 
internal retained profit or equity financing when raising capital. It seems that firms 
with more liquidity may have a stronger ability or willingness to pay short term 
leverage. Regarding the measure of book value, liquidity shows a negative and 
significant coefficient in all parts of the distribution for both markets though the 
direction of the parabola is contracting in both the short-term and the long term. The 
short term leverage in book value in both markets shows a U-shaped relationship 
with liquidity but in the SMEs board market, an inverted U-shape is found linked to 
long term leverage. As Ozkan (2001) infers, liquidity may have a mixed impact on 
the capital structure. After the breakthrough point, firms with more liquidity may 
begin to support a relatively higher leverage because they have ability to suffer the 
cost of short term obligations when they fall due.  
A significant result is found when the non-linear relationship between 
effective tax rates and leverage measuring in book value for both markets are tested. 
Though firms in both markets have a non-linear relationship in both short term and 
long term, those in AIM firms have an inverted U-shaped link between effective tax 
rates and short-term leverage while the SMEs firms show a U-shaped relationship. 
In the table, effective tax rate starts with a negative and significant coefficient in all 
parts of the distribution with the value of the coefficient increasing in absolute value 
as the debt moves up to capital distribution. This suggests that firms with a higher 
level of effective tax in both markets would use less short-term debt. The non-linear 
relationship between effective tax rate and long-term leverage for both markets 
reveals an inverted U-shaped curve in normal distribution. In Figure 36, the leverage 
starts at the lowest point when effective tax rate increases. After a while, the effect 
on the long-term leverage reaches the highest point and starts to decrease as effective 
tax rate increase. It can be inferred that firms with a higher effective tax rate should 
use more debt to obtain a tax shield gain within limits. However, the benefit resulting 
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from the tax shield would be eliminated if the long-term leverage continues to 
increase and the desirability of debt financing at the margin varies negatively with 
the effective marginal tax rate.  
Regarding the relationship between distance from bankruptcy and capital structure, the 
findings for the impact of distance from bankruptcy on leverage in market value are 
not significant for either market while distance from bankruptcy and leverage in book 
value are observed to have a significant non-linear relationship. Short term leverage in 
book value in the AIM firms has a U-shaped link while the SMEs board firms reveal 
an inverted U-shaped relationship. In Figure 19, the distance from bankruptcy starts 
with a significant and negative coefficient in the distribution in AIM but a significant 
and positive coefficient in the distribution in the SMEs board market. This means, in 
the short term, that firms in AIM tend to hold a higher level of leverage with an 
increase of distance from bankruptcy. However, firms in the SMEs board start at a 
higher level of short term leverage with the distance from bankruptcy. After a 
breakthrough point, the effect on short term leverage appears to be decreased as the 
value of distance from bankruptcy increases. It is a similar story in the distance from 
bankruptcy and long-term leverage in book value for both market. As Figure 39 shows, 
the firms in AIM and the SMEs board market show an inverted U-shaped curve and 
the estimated coefficients on measures of distance from bankruptcy are all negative in 
most parts of the distribution. This may occur because at higher levels of leverage the 
probability of bankruptcy is high but, when the effect of distance from bankruptcy 
increases, the working capital associated with short-term financial health also 
increases, leading to an increase in the ability to pay short term debt.  
The final firm specific variables that significantly affect the capital structure 
of firms in AIM and the SMEs board market is dividend payment. However, both 
market firms show a sharp decline in leverage in both the short term and the long 
term at the increase in dividend payment ratio. This can be related to the fact that 
firms paying more dividend have less leverage. Figure 10, Figure 20, Figure 30 and 
Figure 40 in the appendix show the pictorial curve of the relationship between 
dividend payment and capital structure and there is slight non-linearity among firms 
in both markets. Based upon further consideration of the Figures, an inference could 
be made that a possible U-Shaped relationship could be occur if the value of dividend 
248 
 
payments stayed negative for longer among the firms in AIM and the SMEs board. 
This can be explained by the conflict between stock holders and debt holders causing 
the agency cost of debt as the dividend pay-out should be determined in terms of its 
impact on the shareholder value. The issue of dividend pay-out is important in that 
firms use dividends as a mechanism for financial signalling to outsiders concerning 
the stability and growth prospects of the firm. Grounded in the agency costs of 
shareholders and debt holders, the ability of firms to issue debt instruments is limited 
when shareholders are over over-protected. Further, it can also be inferred that 
profitable firms or firms with fewer investments are likely to incur higher cost of debt 
resulting from dividend payments than from interest income payments. From the 
inverted U-Shapes which are approximated by a linear relationship in the Figures, it 
seems firms in both markets do not tend to balance the cost and benefit when deciding 
on equity and debt financing.  
 
7.1.3 Non-Linearity in Capital Intensive and Non Capital-Intensive Sectors 
To identify the sectors as capital intensive or non-capital intensive, this section uses 
the percentage of asset tangibility as the measure. Due to the difference in the amount 
of capital held by firms or sectors that are categorised from studies Shaw et al. (2005), 
Rumelt (1982) to be capital intensive such as sectors with heavy investment in 
marketable plant and equipment, this research observes the medium asset tangibility 
of sectors as the yardstick for capital intensive and non-capital intensive. The medium 
asset tangibility for the sectors in AIM is 20.7%. Based upon this, the sectors of Oil 
& Gas (27.79%), Basic Materials (19.84%), Consumer Goods (22.15%), 
Telecommunications (27.97%) and Consumer Services (21.59%) are defined as 
capital intensive industries. Other sectors of the Industrials (15.24%), Health Care 
(7.94%) and Technology (7.01%) are non-capital intensive sectors. Considering the 
difference in capital capacity in both markets, the boundary in the SMEs Board is 
25.87%. The Energy sector, the Material sector, the Consumer Goods sector and the 
Consumer Services sector are characterised as capital intensive industries while the 
Industrial sector, the Health Care sector, the Telecommunications sector and the 
Technology sector are non-capital intensive. With the use of bivariate analysis, each 
firm specific variable corresponding with a capital structure measure. The pictorial 
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diagrams are shown in the appendix and this indicates the non-linear relationship in 
a simple intuitive way.  
Table7.3 and Table 7.4 in appendix show the results of the link between capital 
structure and its factors in AIM and the SMEs board market with demarcation of the 
capital intensive and non-capital intensive firms. The results show that the non-linear 
relationships among firms that are respectively capital and non-capital intensive are 
significantly different. However, the significance of regression coefficients for both 
markets is not statistically marked, meaning that the impact of firm-specific factors 
on leverage ratios when separated into capital intensive and non-capital intensive is 
less than expected. For instance, there are tangibility, liquidity and intangibility and 
distance from bankruptcy in the AIM showing a non-significant relationship with 
most of the leverage ratio of firms, both capital intensive and non-capital intensive.  
In AIM, the coefficient of firm size in firms that are non-capital intensive is greater 
than in capital intensive firms. In the SMEs board, firm size, growth opportunities, 
non-debt tax shield, profitability, liquidity, distance from bankruptcy and dividend 
pay-out ratio are presented with significant evidence of non-linear relationships.  
The Figure in Part 2 of the appendix shows that there is a distinct pattern in the value 
of coefficients for capital intensive and non-capital intensive firms in both AIM and 
the SMEs board market. In AIM, the results indicate that firm size heavily affects the 
leverage ratio in the market value of non-capital intensive firms and this effect is 
much bigger than in capital intensive firms. However, there is no obvious distinction 
between the coefficient of firm size on the leverage of firms in capital intensive and 
non-capital intensive sectors for SMEs. It can be seen that, in both capital intensive 
and non-capital intensive firms, the effects of firm size on long term leverage in 
market value are far greater than the effects of firm size on other proxies of capital 
structure.  
In AIM, firms with more growth opportunities in capital intensive sectors tend to use 
less short term debt but have a higher long term debt level. In non-capital intensive 
sectors, although there is a positive relationship between growth opportunities and 
long term leverage in market value, other measures of capital structure are negatively 
impacted by the increase of growth opportunities. Overall, the effect of growth 
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opportunities on leverage is bigger in capital intensive than non-capital intensive 
firms. This might be related to the fact that fast growing capital intensive firms have 
relatively higher tangible assets that cannot support a high leverage ratio in the short 
term due to the fear of debt holders that firms might pass up valuable investment 
opportunities. In SMEs, the results of growth opportunities are the opposite to AIM. 
Figure 42 shows that the effect of growth opportunities on leverage is significantly 
more far-reaching in the non-capital intensive sector than in the capital intensive 
sector. It also indicates that firms which have a relatively large proportion of 
intangible assets tend to have a higher long term leverage.  
The non-relationship of non-debt tax shield and capital structure is another point that 
has been the concern of this section. In AIM, the non-debt tax shield in non-capital 
intensive firms is found to have a positive non-linear relationship with leverage in 
market value but a negative non-linear relationship with leverage in book value. In 
capital intensive firms, the negative non-linear relationship exists in short term 
leverage in market value. This probably because capital intensive firms have higher 
tangible assets and thus have higher depreciation ratio. In SMEs, the non-debt tax 
shield is strongly negatively related to long term leverage in the capital intensive sector 
while, in the non-capital intensive, the non-relationship between them is positive. This 
huge difference indicates that, though capital intensive firms have a relatively large 
proportion of tangible assets, the advantage of resorting to debt as a tax shield might 
be stronger. However, non-capital intensive firms might not have a large proportion of 
tangible asset but probably have relatively more growth options in their investment 
opportunity sets, implying a positive relation between the non-debt tax shield and 
leverage ratios.  
In AIM, profitability starts with a negative coefficient in most parts of the distribution 
with the size of the coefficient increasing in absolute value as the debt to capital 
distribution in non-capital intensive firms grows. When the profitability in capital 
intensive firms increases, the leverage in market value would increase but the 
leverage in book value would decrease. From Figure 44, it can be asserted that firms 
in the non-intensive sector will choose retained earnings as their main source of 
financing investment rather than external financing probably due to the conditions of 
asymmetric information. In the capital intensive sector, the preference of retained 
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earnings is explained by the negative relationship between profitability and leverage 
in book value. In SMEs, the difference between capital intensive and non-capital 
intensive firms is not significant except for the effect of profitability on long term 
leverage in market value. The coefficient of profitability in the capital intensive 
sector shows a negative value on long term leverage in market value, indicating an 
inverted U-shaped curve while the coefficient of profitability shows a positive value 
that indicates a U-shaped curve. In general, firms with more profit in the capital 
intensive sector would have less debt in both the short term and the long term but 
firms in non-capital intensive sector will borrow more, especially highly profitable 
firms.   
The non-linear relationship between intangibility of asset and leverage in capital 
intensive and non-capital intensive firms is also analysed in this section. In AIM, the 
intangibility has a negative influence on short term leverage but it has a positive 
impact on long term leverage of firms in the non-capital intensive sector. The effect 
of intangibility in the capital intensive sector relates positively to most measures of 
capital structure except for the short term leverage in book value. From Figure 48 it 
can be asserted that firms with more intangible assets in the capital intensive sectors 
tend to borrow more while those in the non-capital intensive sectors are likely to have 
less debt in the short term. This is probably related to the fact that intangible assets 
play an increasingly important role in the economy, especially in a knowledge based 
economy. Non-capital intensive firms are technology-related and hold plenty of 
patents, intellectual property rights and knowledge based assets. This might result in 
an increase in leverage, particularly for long term leverage. In SMEs, firms with more 
intangibility in the capital intensive sector are more likely to have higher leverage in 
market value but less leverage in book value, whereas firms in the non-capital 
intensive sector are more likely to reduce leverage. In other words, the influence of 
intangibility in capital intensive firms is greater than for those that are non-capital 
intensive.  
Regarding the impact of probability of bankruptcy on the firm’s capital structure 
choice, there is large variation in the magnitude and sign of the estimated coefficients 
for both markets as the conditional distribution increases. In the capital intensive 
sector of AIM, firms with less possibility of bankruptcy tend to have higher leverage 
252 
 
in market value but less leverage in book value. This tendency occurs in the firms in 
the non-capital intensive sector of SMEs. Figure 49 in the appendix shows that the 
overall situation of firms in the non-capital intensive sector of AIM and the capital 
intensive sector of the SMEs board is similar to that firms with a lower default risk 
will have lower levels of debt in both the short term and the long term. In other words, 
the non-linear relationships of distance from bankruptcy and capital structure of 
capital intensive and non-capital intensive firms is different in each market. This is 
probably because the financially health firms might have sufficient capital surplus 
and thus internal financing will be the preference. However, firms with good 
financial health might still have higher levels of debt because they have a greater 
ability to the cost of the debt. Overall, the difference in the effect of distance from 
bankruptcy between the firms in capital intensive and non-capital intensive sectors is 
more significant in AIM than in the SMEs board.  
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7.2 Dependent variables 
Empirical studies on capital structure generally use in different measures of leverage 
to be dependent variables. According to Kayo and Kimura (2011), one “important 
difference between the alternative measures refers to which equity value (market or 
book) should be used as the proxy of the leverage ratio”. A number of empirical 
studies use market value leverage (Balakrishnan and Fox 1993; De Jong et al. 2008) 
and others focus on book value leverage alone (MacKay and Phillips 2005). Studies 
such as Booth et al. (2001); Byoun (2008) Lemmon et al. (2008) use both measures 
of market value and book value to present capital structure.  
As Barclay et al. (2006) show, leverage in book value can be a better measure 
because it captures the assets’ value in place rather than growth options which 
reflected by present market value. It is an appropriate way to recognize a negative 
marginal debt capacity of growth options. A similar proposition is also asserted by 
Antoniou et al. (2008); Kayo and Kimura (2011), that the decision of debt issue 
based on market value can distort future investment decisions. As these studies point 
out, it is vital to understand that funding needs to raise assets in place rather than 
indicate growth option investments which may occur in the future. However, the 
use of book value may rely on distortions rooted in accounting rules, the fact that 
equity in book value could be negative as the correlation between book and market 
value could be weak if the firm’s size is small. In this case, market value provides 
a realistic measure of leverage as market value relies on the intrinsic firm value 
(Kayo and Kimura 2011). In a word, book leverage reflects that “the debt used to 
finance assets in place, while market value shows the level of the firm’s financial 
slack” (Kayo and Kimura 2011).  
To address this issue, this research adopts both market value and book value 
leverage as the dependent variables. As can be seen from Table 6.4, there are several 
differences in coefficient estimation. In the fixed effect model of the AIM sample, 
for instance, a change is observed in the role of growth opportunities, effective tax 
rate and stock market development in short term leverage in market value and short 
term leverage in book value, and a contrasting role for firm size, profitability, 
effective tax rate, capital formation and stock market development in long term 
leverage in market value and long term leverage in book value. Similar results 
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appear in the fixed effect model of the SMEs board, the variables of tangibility and 
GDP having a different impact on short term leverage in market value and book 
value while the role of non-debt tax shield and stock market development is the 
opposite in market value and book value for long term leverage. As the discussion 
above explain, the book value of leverage is tantamount to funding for asset in place, 
market value of leverage suggesting the level of the firm’s financial slack, it is 
reasonable to find a different relationship.  
For instance, based on a trade-off assumption, a given firm of large size in AIM 
may increase the level of debt so as to operate business projects. By contrast, a 
negative relationship with market value may be expected. According to the “extent 
that market value incorporates the present value of potential financial distress”, 
firms of large size might reflect a high present value of financial distress thereby 
resulting in deduction of the firm’s value and decrease in the market value of 
leverage (Kayo and Kimura 2011; Kurshev and Strebulaev 2015) 
7.3 Balance data 
A panel data set, especially on individuals or firms with missing years for at least 
some cross-sectional units in the sample, is called an unbalanced panel. The panel 
regression in this study resorted to an unbalanced panel regression method so as to 
maximize the use of all available data. A number of studies use a balanced panel 
data model to simplify the analysis (Daskalakis and Psillaki 2008; Chen et al. 2011) 
as using a balanced panel sample could introduce certain biases in the sense that 
only firms operating for the whole period would make up the sample. As 
summarized in Table 7.5 and Table 7.6, this section employs balanced panels to 
examine the stability of the relationship between leverage and the explanatory 
variables.  The firms that went public before 2007 and related data between 2007 
and 2017 which all available to the explanatory variables as well as the measure of 
leverage, are chosen in samples. To gain an impression as to whether balanced and 
unbalanced panels convey different or similar information, Tables 7.5 and 7.6 
compare descriptive statistics and report the results of fixed effects regression over 
different measures of leverage based on balanced and unbalanced panels.  
The findings in 7.5 show that the coefficient associated with explanatory variables 
and the significance of the coefficients are different between balanced and 
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unbalanced panel. Firstly, the effect of firm size on book ratio of short term and 
long term debt are significantly negative for an unbalanced panel but significantly 
positive for a balanced in panel. Also, profitability is found to be significant and 
positively related to book ratio of short term debt based on unbalanced panels while 
it shows a positive relationship for balanced panels. For country variables, capital 
formation plays a different role in market ratio of long term debt depending on 
whether the panel is balanced or unbalanced. Besides, the stock market development 
shows a positive influence on book ratio of short term debt with unbalanced panel 
data but a negative influence on book ratio for short term leverage with balanced 
panel data. Similar results also occur to the coefficient of industry concentration on 
book ratio of short term leverage. The second interesting finding from Table 7.5 is 
that the coefficient of explanatory variables associated with balanced panel data is 
more significant than the coefficient of explanatory variables relating to unbalanced 
panel data.    
In balanced panel regression based on the SMEs board market, 456 firms are deleted 
due to the missing cross section unit. From Table 7.6, it can be seen that firm 
variables of growth opportunities, profitability, tangibility, liquidity and 
intangibility in the SMEs board market show different effect when balanced and 
unbalanced panels are compared. Growth opportunities in the SMEs board have a 
significant and negative relationship with book value of short term leverage for an 
unbalanced panel but a positive correlation with book value of short term leverage 
in a balanced panel. Further, profitability in unbalanced panels is found to be 
negatively linked with market ratio of short term and long term debt and these links 
are positive and significant in a balanced panel. Tangibility is positively related to 
short term leverage in market value and book value in an unbalanced panel and 
negatively related to these two measures of leverage in a balanced panel. In an 
unbalanced panel, liquidity decreases the effect of affecting book ratio of long term 
leverage. In a balanced panel, liquidity increases the role of influencing the book 
ratio of long term leverage. For intangibility, it is found that the market ratio of short 
term debt is inversely influenced in a balanced and unbalanced panels. The Table 
also indicates that the country variable of GDP, stock market development and the 
industry variable of market concentration have opposite roles in influencing the 
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capital structure in these two panels. However, the effect of these micro-factors are 
not significant, indicating that the role of these variables in borrowing are limited, 
both in balanced and unbalanced panels. To conclude, the overall effect of variables 
on the measure of leverage in both panels are similar.  
7.4 Explanatory Variables Measures Lagged Back 1 Year (4 Quarters) Based 
on UK Sample  
Another robustness test is to test the power of lagged values of capital structure. The 
lag values for the proxies of leverage are used to replace the non-lag values in order 
to ensure that there is an extended effect on leverage. First, the capital structure 
measures are lagged 4 quarters (1 year) back to investigate whether explanatory 
variables of the previous year would have a different impact on current capital 
structure. Based on results presented in Table 7.7 and Table 7.8 below, it is found 
that in AIM, though lagged back a year, firm variables of non-debt tax shield, 
tangibility, intangibility, distance from bankruptcy, dividend pay-out significant 
affect the leverage. It is notable that these firm variables were also found to be 
significantly related to leverage before they were lagged. This could imply that the 
effect of them on leverage is persistent. Another variable, firm size, which formerly 
was found to be significantly related to leverage has a non-significant relationship 
with book ratios of short term and long term leverage after it was lagged. Similar 
results are also observed with liquidity which is significantly negatively correlated 
to leverage before it is lagged but, after it is lagged, this correlation become 
insignificant. It seems that firm size and liquidity only have influence on leverage 
in the current year and the effects are not persistent over time.  
When compared to micro factors in AIM from Table 7.7, it can be seen that GDP, 
capital formation, bond market development and stock market development 
significantly influence leverage after they are lagged back. This is related to the fact 
that the roles of lagged country variables in adjusting current capital structure are 
all significant. However, the effects of these microeconomic variables on a firm’s 
choice of leverage are not great before they were lagged. It can be inferred that the 
change in micro-economic conditions has no great effect on the current financing 
decisions of firms but, taking the long-term perspective, the micro economic 
conditions could be highly significant drivers of a firm’s financing choice. 
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7.5 Explanatory Variables Measures Lagged Back 1 Year (4 Quarters) Based on 
China Sample  
The findings in the SMEs board market is different from the case in AIM. As Table 
7.8 exhibits, the coefficient of the lagged firm variables of size, non-debt tax shield, 
liquidity, intangibility and dividend pay-out start at a significant level. Further, these 
factors in the current year are also found to be significantly associated with current 
leverage. This could be explained in that capital structure is the cumulative outcome 
of past valuations of these factors. Some measures of firm variables would not 
significantly affect the measures of leverage after they are lagged. For instance, 
tangibility of asset which was used to be significant and positively associated with 
market ratios and book ratios of leverage has positive and significant influence on 
market ratio of short term leverage and book ratio of long term leverage. Though 
the hypothesis relationship is found for two measures of leverage, the study cannot 
assert that the effects of tangibility completely disappear. Further, the significant 
impact of distance from bankruptcy on measures of leverage does not apply in the 
case of distance from bankruptcy which is lagged back. The significant result of 
lagged value only exists for the book ratio of long term leverage. Finally, effective 
tax rates eliminates its influence on measures of leverage with the lagging effect. 
According to accounting rules, the effective tax rate for the annual fiscal period 
must be estimated at the end of each interim period and applied to year-to-date 
interim income from ordinary continuing operations. Thus, the effective tax rate 
might not have a persistent effect on a firm’s future financing decisions.  
The influences of past microeconomic valuations on capital structure are persistent. 
Considering capital formation, the relationships with market ratios and book ratios 
of short term leverage are found to be significant based on the lagged value. After 
lagging the value of capital formation, the influences on leverage are all 
significantly negative. This is probably related to the fact that the capital formation 
of a country can foster the long term trend of economic growth and, thus, capital 
structure is the cumulative influence of past capital accumulation.  
Further, the bond market is found to have a significant negative impact on the 
measures of leverage before it was lagged. Though the observed negative 
relationship is only significant for book ratios of short term and long term leverage, 
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it still indicates a relevant insight into the change of capital structure when bond 
market value is lagged back for one year. Stock market development, however, is 
only significantly related to the book ratio of long term leverage with lagged effect, 
though the effects of stock market development on leverage are significant and 
positive before it was lagged. This is slightly different from Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) who suggest that the equity market in past time attempts to accumulatively 
affect the capital structure.  
Industry concentration recorded a significant and positive relationship with leverage 
excluding the market ratio of long term leverage in lagged effect, and it shows a 
negative and significant relationship with long term leverage in non-lagged effect. 
The empirical lagged effect of industry concentration suggests that the lagging of 
concentration to the current long term leverage can be responsible for the long term 
leverage dynamic.  
 
7.6 Leverage Measures Leading Forward 1 Year (4 Quarters) based on UK 
Sample 
Due to the significant findings after a lag in the explanatory variables measures, it 
became relevant for the reverse situation to be considered as well. This is when 
leverage ratios are moved a year forward to investigate whether the current year’s 
factors have a significant impact on the future financing decisions of firms. The 
findings are presented in Table 7.9 and Table 7.10 below where it appears that, even 
after 1 year, some measures of leverage are significantly affected by factors including 
firm specific variables and macroeconomic conditions. With regard to Lemmon and 
Zender (2010), a firm’s initial factors in determining the future value of leverage firstly 
suggests that an important component missing from existing specifications is a time-
invariant factor. Secondly, most existing determinants seem to contain relatively little 
information about leverage which is associated with time-invariant factor.  
Firstly, it was found in Table 7.9 that firm size would only have a significant and 
positive impact on the leading market value of short term and long term leverage but 
it also has a significant relationship with leverage in both market value and book value 
before leverage were led. Both Table 7.9 and Table 7.10 show that the relationship 
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between firm size and leverage is positive. This could imply that the effect of the firm’s 
size obtaining from the current year would be constant over time. Further, the findings 
for non-debt tax shield, liquidity and distance from bankruptcy are similar to firm size 
when led leverage measures are used. For instance, the non-debt tax shield is originally 
significantly positively related to leverage while liquidity and distance from 
bankruptcy are significantly negatively related to leverage. However, the significant 
effect of these factors does not persist when leverage is lead forward 1 year. The results 
could imply that future long term leverage would increase when the non-debt tax shield 
in the current year increases and when distance from bankruptcy decreases. Also, an 
increase in current liquidity would decrease the future market of short term leverage. 
Other firm variables of tangibility, intangibility and dividend pay-out remain 
significant influences on measures of leverage after leading forward the leverage.  This 
suggests that future capital structure choice is strongly related to historical values of 
tangibility, intangibility and dividend pay-out.  
For the country variables, it can be seen that the GDP which is initially found to 
negatively influence leverage, has a significant and positive impact on leading 
leverage. This indicates that GDP on leverage in the current year and leverage in the 
future are opposite effects. Previously, De Jong et al. (2008), Booth et al. (2001) 
analysed the influence of several macroeconomic variables including GDP on leverage 
and found mixed results. One possible explanation could be that the accumulative 
growth of the gross domestic product suggests that a better economic market would 
increase a firm’s debt paying ability. Thus, the long term growth of GDP would 
increase motivation for debt financing. Another explanation could be that the findings 
for bond market development are the same for the original results when leading 
leverage measures are used. The bond market development in AIM shows a negative 
influence on leverage on both market and book value and these significant and 
negative influences on leading leverage. One interpretation is that, compared with 
other micro factors, the financing decisions of firms in the SMEs market are sensitive 
to the change of in bond market development.  
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7.7 Leverage Measures Leading Forward 1 Year (4 Quarters) based on China 
Sample 
The results for the effects of explanatory variables on leading leverage in the SMEs 
board are shown in Table 7.10. It illustrates that some determinants are highly 
statistically significant related to the leading dependent variable. For instance, firm 
size which is formerly found to have a significantly positive link to the market ratio 
and book ratio of the leverage, has a significant and positive impact on leverage after 
leading it forward. Further, the long term impacts of firm size on short term leverage 
are relatively larger when compared to the results of the initial effect on leverage, 
suggesting a degree of stability and continuity of firm size in the SMEs board. Also, 
the coefficient estimates on tangibility and intangibility experience an increase in the 
market and book leverage both before and after the dependent variables of leverage. 
However, the effects of tangibility and intangibility on future leverage becomes 
smaller and this might suggest a gradually dissipated influence of them. The findings 
for liquidity are similar when leading leverage measures are used. It can be seen from 
Table 7.10 that the negative impact of liquidity extends to leverage in future year. The 
dividend pay-out is another firm specific factor that remains a significant and negative 
role in influencing all the dependent variables after leverage is lead forward.   
 
However, it can be seen from Table 7.10 that firm variables of effective tax rate and 
dividend from bankruptcy do not remain a persistent influence on dependent variables 
after leading forward the measures. In particular, the effects of distance from 
bankruptcy on future capital decisions are mixed as the short term debts are negatively 
linked to distance from bankruptcy but long term leverage has a positive influence on 
it. This could indicate that, though the effective tax rate and the firm’s financial health 
play a significant role in impacting current capital structure choice of firms in the 
SMEs board market, this significance would be gradually eliminated in subsequent 
years.  
 
The findings for country variables are different when leading measures of leverage are 
used. For instance, originally, capital formation is negatively associated with all 
dependent variables but only significantly related to short term leverage. After leading 
forward 1 year, all leverage ratios are significantly affected by capital formation. This 
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could indicate that the influences of capital formation on future leverage are stronger 
than that on current leverage. Also, bond market development is the only country 
variable in SMEs that remains significant effect on leading measures of leverage 
excepting the market long term leverage ratio. Different to bond market development, 
stock market development only retains a significant relationship with book long term 
leverage where a negative relationship is established between stock market 
development and all leading measures of leverage ratios. However, the coefficient of 
stock market development is originally significant and negative. The finding could be 
explained by hypothesising that a continuation of stock market development in the 
long term suggests less asymmetric information in the market, and lower cost of equity 
financing provides motivation for firms in AIM to reduce debt financing. Another 
important result in this Table is the significant and positive effect of industry 
concentration on a firm’s debt level. This significant effect is only present where a 
positive relationship is found between industry concentration and short term leverage 
in market value, and a negative relationship between industry concentration and long 
term leverage in book value. It can be inferred that the long-term impact of industry 
concentration is relatively small on the future decision of capital structure when 
compared to that on current debt level.  
 
In conclusion, the explanatory variables in AIM do not have a strong and persistent 
influence on future leverage in SMEs; the persistence of explanatory variables in future 
capital structure choice is slightly more than that in SMEs. The firm variables of firm 
size, liquidity, intangibility and dividend pay-out and the macro-factors of capital 
formation and bond market development in both markets greatly impact current and 
future leverage ratios. Further, the difference between these countries, sample 
selection concerns, and other potential founding effects would limit the explanatory 
power of inferences. Following studies by Huang and Ritter (2009), Lemmon et al. 
(2008), González and González (2012) and Daskalakis and Psillaki (2008), the 
analysis of lagged explanatory variables and leading dependent variables can provide 
new insight into the tendency of capital structure for firms in AIM and SMEs, as well 
as a sample robustness check for results based on both markets.  
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However, as Michaelas et al. (1999) mention, while the “variable has an economically 
small impact of its own, the existing influences as a whole would have an economically 
important impact on capital structure”. Further, the extent of variables’ effect in the 
future is uncertain, beyond its importance relative to other measureable variables 
(Lemmon et al. 2008).  
 
7.8 Developed and emerging countries  
Table 4.13 shows the complete fixed effect coefficient model that applies to two 
samples: developed countries (AIM) and emerging countries (the SMEs board). For 
the sample of the developed country, this research analyses the UK Alternative 
Investment Market. The sample of the emerging country is based on the Chinese SMEs 
board market. By analysing these two countries separately, this thesis intends to verify 
whether the similar drivers of firm leverage can apply to developed as well as emerging 
countries. In other words, it is interesting to observe if theories of capital structure 
which developed in the UK might apply to other environments.  In the section on 
Economic Models, the analysis of country effects were shown in Table 6.6. In brief, it 
is observed that there is only one covariate regarding with the firm characteristic of 
liquidity which shows the same signs and statistical significance between two 
countries. Other covariates of firm specific variables show different effects on different 
measures of leverage. For instance, the coefficient of firm size has the same significant 
and positive relationship with market short term leverage and long term leverage in 
both developed and emerging countries. Covariates of non-debt tax shield have the 
opposite effect as it is positively related to leverage in the developed country but 
negatively linked to leverage ratios in the emerging country.  
The covariates regarding country variables and bond market development, show 
differing effects depending on the country’s development level. In the developed 
country, the bond market development is significant in explaining a decrease in a 
firm’s leverage. For the emerging country, however, in turn, bond market development 
plays a significant role in increasing the leverage level. Further, the GDP in the 
developed country is negatively associated with a firm’s leverage while in the 
emerging country, these relationships are positive. It can be seen from Table 5.24 that 
the effect of GDP in the developed country is much more significant than that in the 
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emerging country. Another important difference relates to capital formation, which 
has a significant and negative influence on the market ratio of leverage in both 
countries. However, capital formation is no longer significant in accounting for book 
leverage. This probably related to the fact that market ratio incorporates a more precise 
perspective of the leverage corresponding to potential micro-economic conditions. A 
significant effect for market ratio indicates a degree of sensitivity to adjustment in 
target debt level when firms cope with the change of economic environment in both 
countries.  
The most important difference between the two countries bears on the country variable 
of stock market development. Though the covariates of stock market development 
show different effects on the country specific level, the absolute value of coefficient 
of stock market development in the emerging market is much higher than that in the 
developed country. This is an important issue that raised in this research that future 
studies might further analyse. For instance, in countries with advanced stock market 
development, firms are rely more heavily on debt. The industry variable shows 
different effects when developed and emerging countries are compared. In results, 
industry market concentration shows a significant role in emerging country.  
 
7.9 Conclusion  
Regarding the robustness tests provided in the chapter, the comprehensive insight into 
how capital structure variance depending on its determinants under different 
circumstances. Firstly, the findings in the non-relationship regression models suggest 
that firms’ activities in place can improve or decrease their marginal benefit of 
changes. The impact of firm characteristic has marginal effect on capital structure 
which the effect of its determinants depends on the level of their coefficient.  
Furthermore, the regression results based on balanced data that shows the significant 
effect on factors with firm-specific, industry-specific and country level on leverage of 
firms in AIM and SMEs board. This proves the stability of regression results of panel 
data in the research.  
A third test for robust test is to look at the power of lagged values of the leverage. It is 
noted from results that although this chapter subtract the four-quarters lagged value 
from the current value of the explanatory variables, leverages of firms in AIM and 
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SMEs board were still significant affected by firm, industry and country level 
variables. This proves that past value of the explanatory variables are still correlated 
with debt ratio of firms in both market in future one year.  
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Chapter Eight: Summary, Conclusion and 
Recommendations 
8.0 Introduction  
The selection of capital structure in the context of corporate finance which is allied to 
“asset values, bank solvency, and the availability of credit to the business community” 
(Agarwal 2013), has received wide attention from a variety of practioner and 
academics in recent years . The trade-off between debt and equity in a firm’s financing 
structure is the primary cause of influencing the value of the firm. For this reason, 
firms need to choose a financing-mix assists in maximising the value of equity. 
However, there are a large number of studies which find that a financing mix or the 
combination of debt and equity financing does not impact the value of shareholder’s 
equity and that financing decisions in relation to capital structure is irrelevant.  
Most of the empirical literature on capital structure examines the relationship between 
the factors of firm characteristics and leverage ratios. The majority of published 
findings from this area of research line, is the positive relationship between firm size 
and leverage ratios together with the positive relationship between tangibility and 
leverage. This suggests that larger firms with more tangible assets tend to use more 
debt in their capital structure. Furthermore, firms with stronger profitability, higher 
market-to-book ratios (growth opportunities) and higher intangible assets use less debt. 
Other area of studies (Booth et al. 2001; Antoniou et al. 2008; De Jong et al. 2008) 
analyse the role of macroeconomic conditions in affecting the financing decisions of 
firms, suggesting that, apart from firm characteristics, country-specific factors can also 
influence a firm’s capital structure. However, comparing the majority of studies that 
analyse firm-specific factors as determinants of capital structure, most of the literature 
does not explore the roles of country and industry. Although several studies add 
dummy variables representing different countries and industries, only a few of them 
include variables with country characteristics and, these include studies from Hall et 
al. (2000); MacKay and Phillips (2005); Kayo and Kimura (2011); Fan et al. (2012).  
The current study develops the work on capital structure by utilising panel data to 
investigate the influence of firm, industry and country level determinants and the 
dummy effects of time, industry and financial systems on the leverage of firms on AIM 
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and the SMEs board markets. Due to the multi-level nature of these determinants, this 
study uses multi-dimensional analysis in order to address all levels simultaneously. 
The main element includes a sectoral analysis which indicates how capital structure is 
constructed in each sector over the time period of the sample. Furthermore, the 
comparison of capital structure in the UK and China is included to determine financing 
behaviour when different macroeconomic conditions are present. The third part looks 
at the effects of time, industry and financial system which demonstrates that capital 
structure decisions vary when time periods, firm type and marketplaces change.  
A summary, conclusion and recommendations resulting from the current study are 
presented in this section. Furthermore, a discussion on financial policy implications, 
limitations of the research and suggestions for future research are also provided. This 
chapter is structured as followed: Section 6.1 shows a summary of the research 
methodology and data analysis performed. Section 6.2 provides a brief discussion of 
the findings and contributions of the research. Section 6.3 presents the financial policy 
implications. The contribution of the study with reference to the findings is presented 
in section 6.4 and section 6.5 provides a summary of limitations and a discussion of 
the potential for future research.  
8.1 Data and Research Methodology  
The study uses secondary data to investigate the research questions which are (i) what 
are the determinants of corporate capital structure decisions from a sectoral 
perspective. In this research, secondary data is used to assess the influence of time, 
firm, industry and country on firm leverage’s variance. (ii) Is the relationship between 
capital structure and the factors affecting it in a non-linear curve in samples of AIM 
and SME Board? (iii) What are the direct and indirect influences of the characteristics 
of firm, industry and country on firm leverage? To determine the hierarchical 
relationship between these different levels, the research uses a multi-level dimensional 
analysis by estimating panel fixed effects with the use of secondary data. The 
construction of the secondary data is developed by using some of the major elements 
of corporate financial performance, industry market competitiveness and macro-
economic conditions in the period including the economic crisis (2007 to 2017).   
One of the samples consists of 510 firms filtered from a population of 718 firms from 
the FTSE AIM All Share index. The other sample consists of 759 firms drawn from a 
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population of 884 firms from the Shenzhen SMEs board market. There are three 
selection criteria that are applied in this study. Firstly, firms with inadequate financial 
data which cover more than three financial years are excluded from the sample. 
Secondly, firms without relevant data of financial performance are also deleted from 
the sample. Finally, utilities and financial services firms are excluded. After these 
criteria have been applied, 510 firms from AIM and 718 firms from the SMEs board 
qualified providing unbalanced panel data based with the necessary financial 
performance and macroeconomic variables.  
8.2 Finding and Context  
The descriptive statistics indicate that, overall, the FTSE AIM All Share and the SZSE 
SMEs Board companies have both the similarities and differences in their behavioural 
characteristics. This is determined by the coefficients’ signs and the magnitude of the 
independent variables. On average, 71% of the total 718 firms in AIM and 85.9% of 
the 884 firms in SMEs Board are investigated in an empirical analysis over an 11-year 
period. Empirical evidence is found to support the arguments in the studies that there 
are both positive and negative influences of firm specific and country specific factors 
on a firm’s capital structure. This thesis attributes similarities and differences in the 
factors determining capital structure to the commonality of the institutional 
characteristics of the UK and Chinese’ market. This may be related to the fact that 
AIM and SMEs Board are similar with regard to firm size, growth opportunities, 
tangibility, liquidity, intangibility, dividend, capital formation and stock market 
development but different with regard to non-debt tax shield, profitability, GDP and 
bond market development. The current research argues that, based on the measures of 
firm specific and macroeconomic variables used, the influence of these variables on a 
firm’s leverage is supported in literature. The observed results in this thesis are 
consistent with prior studies (Modigliani and Miller 1963; Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Myers 1984). For example, some of the results that are supported by the existing 
literature include the firm specific factors of size (Titman and Wessels 1988; Chen 
2004), growth opportunities (Myers 1984; Michaelas et al. 1999), non-debt tax shield 
(DeAngelo and Masulis 1980), profitability (Myers and Majluf 1984), effective tax 
shield (Michaelas et al. 1999), tangibility (De Jong et al. 2008), liquidity (Ozkan 2001; 
Lipson and Mortal 2009), intangibility (Balakrishnan and Fox 1993), distance from 
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bankruptcy (Kayo and Kimura 2011), macroeconomic factors of GDP, capital 
formation, bond market and stock market development (Antoniou et al. 2008; Bokpin 
2009; Cook and Tang 2010) and industry concentration (Kayo and Kimura 2011; Xu 
2012).  
Regression estimates, in literature, using AIM and the SMEs board market data show 
the non- linearity of the relationship between a firm’s capital structure and factors 
arising from firm specific and macroeconomic conditions. There is evidence of U-
shaped and inverted U-shaped relationships. For example, the link between growth 
opportunities and short term leverage in book values in AIM and the SMEs board 
market are all U-shaped but the link between tangibility and short term leverage in 
book value is U-shaped on the SMEs Board and inverted U-shaped on AIM.  
Additionally, it is observed that a linear relationship is evident between measures of 
leverage ratio and firm sand country specific factor when firms are classified into 
capital intensive and non-capital intensive groups. The results are mixed, some being 
U-shaped and others inverted U-shaped. For example, in AIM, the non-linear 
relationship between non-debt tax shield and short term leverage in market value is U-
shaped in capital and non-capital intensive firms while in relation to book value it is 
inverted U-shaped in capital intensive firms and U-shaped in non-capital intensive 
firms. The results are similar to the findings found by Fattouh et al. (2005)where the 
estimated effect of the explanatory variables at different quantiles of the distribution 
are vary.  
The non-significance of independent and control variables probably indicates that 
there could be mediation or substitution variables that catalyse the effects of those 
variables on measures of capital structure. Also, the relationship between capital 
structure and its elements of influence cannot be generalised as positive or negative 
without consideration of the magnitude of the variables, types of firms and the sectors 
with which firms are engaged.  
8.3 Policy Implications and Recommendations  
The policy implications of this thesis emanate from the results debate on what needs 
to be established to ensure the borrowing facilities available to SMEs meet their 
liquidity requirements. First, financial policy makers and equity providers need to 
recognize that the borrowing requirements of SME businesses are not consistent over 
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the sample time or across sectors. From the results, there are several variations in the 
borrowing of SMEs on AIM and the SMEs board, and this may be related to changes 
in the wider economic condition of the marketplace, particularly in the period of 
economic crisis, or related to specific industry characteristics. Therefore, it can be the 
situation that financial policies relating to SMEs and the lending policies of creditors 
change over time and across countries to match the variation in the borrowing 
requirement of SMEs.  
8.3.1 The Policy of Financing Channels  
It is noted that SMEs tend to firstly use retained profit followed by debt finance when 
additional funds are needed. This course of action follows the pecking order hypothesis 
of Myers (1984) and can be “constrained by the availability of funds which is partly 
determined by the asset structure and the financial position of the firm as well as 
macroeconomic factor”. Thus, the challenge for policy makers could be the provision 
of an environment in which firms are able to earn and retain sufficient profit in their 
business to raise a greater number of economically viable projects (Michaelas et al. 
1999). Additionally, it is found that SME firms are also highly reliant on equity 
financing and their debt structure is also prone to floating debt financing making long 
term planning difficult. This is probably because the main channels where SMEs can 
obtain external debt financing such as bank loans, are restricted due to the structural 
problems in the bond market which is a big limitation. Therefore, it is a further 
implication for policy makers, who advise regulatory authorities to ensure the 
provision of an active and sustainable strategy in benchmarking the cost of debt (i.e, 
interest rate) or alternatively direct financing channels. Furthermore, as Bank (2012) 
indicates, the corporate credit fixed-income market in China faces a challenges in 
establishing a sub-market where debt issuers accept with lower credit ratings to reduce 
the barriers of entry for small and medium companies. These firms with a lower credit 
rating or are smaller in size that are subject to market failure have to rely on higher-
cost bank loans to access the fixed-income market raise money (Bank 2012). SMEs 
with lower credit ratings would have legal restrictions on risks stipulated by regulators 
if they plan to enter the market. This market failure demands a more flexible policy 
which will enable SME firms with lower ratings to be accepted by the market and have 
the ability to issue bonds when necessary.  
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However, AIM firms can increase borrowing to the extent that higher profitability 
leads to an increase in leverage. Since the 2008/2009 banking crisis, the Bank of 
England has decreased the base rate. By the end of 2016, the interest rate was 0.25% 
and raised to 0.5% in 2017.  The decreasing interest rate in the UK primarily influenced 
the AIM firms’ capital structure by affecting the cost of debt capital. As a rule, 
economic crises are associated with lower economic growth and inflation rate and this 
would result in a lowering of interest rates. During a period of economic recovery or 
expansion, loan providers have a tendency to increase loans to the private sector if 
interest rates are rising, and this would positively affect the speed of adjustment to 
capital structure (Wanzenried 2006). Thus, the main goal for policy makers in this 
situation is to adjust the amount of money supply or interest rates in a timely manner 
to stabilize the economy dependant on economic conditions, particularly for small and 
medium companies which are sensitive to changes in the cost of capital.  
AIM firms would reduce borrowing as the bond market developed and increase the 
debt ratio as the stock market developed. This could be related to the influence of the 
inflation rate which is fixed by central banks and influences interest rate changes 
together with other monetary tools because changes in inflation rate influences the 
credit and reinvestment risk. As noted by Mokhova and Zinecker (2014), the higher 
inflation rate is hypothesised to negatively affect both the debt market and stock 
market and, thus, the returns on debt and equity should be high, which adversely 
affects the cost of capital. The UK annual rate of inflation rose to its highest level in 
2011 and then sharply decreased to 0% in 2015. The UK annual inflation rates during 
the period of economic crisis and recovery are much higher than in the period before 
the crisis. This is probably related to the policy of monetary easing. Therefore, this is 
another implication for policy makers responsible for providing an environment in 
which AIM firms are able to benefit from monetary policy which affects the demand 
for money.   
8.3.2 The Tax Policy  
It can be inferred that tax and bankruptcy considerations are the significant drivers of 
the SMEs board firms’ capital structure choice. However, referring to tax based 
theories (Modigliani and Miller 1963; Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999; Fama and 
French 2002; Leary and Roberts 2010), the influence of a tax shield is negative as SME 
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firms would use less debt when the effective tax rate increases. Furthermore, there is 
little evidence to support any impact of the non-debt tax shield on SMEs choice of 
capital structure. Though the Enterprises Income Law came into force since 2008 
which attempts to create a fair environment, it seems that the current Chinese tax 
regime does not provide any incentives or compensation to SME firms for retained 
profit, as corporation tax or income tax is charged on retained profit. Though corporate 
income tax remains at 25%, unchanged for many years, a number of “stealth” taxes, 
transaction costs associated with taxes and other miscellaneous tariffs, are charged, 
and many “minor” taxes gradually increased which boost, significantly, the overall tax 
burden. Such a heavy tax burden seems to reduce the motivation for borrowing, 
especially for small and medium firms which are not easily able to repay debt. 
According to an investigation into the Chinese Entrepreneurs Survey System, 36.1% 
of medium-sized entrepreneurs and 49.5% of small entrepreneurs over the first quarter 
of 2010, were operating at a profit-making level much lower than average. 
Additionally, 15.7% of medium-sized entrepreneurs and 17.6% of small entrepreneurs 
were running at a loss (Xingyuan et al. 2015). These figures suggest that policy makers 
should provide tax incentives for small and medium firms. For example, small and 
medium companies, especially newly established firms, could be encouraged by 
reducing the effective tax rate or excepting various additional taxes levied. 
Furthermore, tax policies for small and medium firms could be introduced in term of 
depreciation relief, reduction in certain deductions and, overall a more favourable 
regime could be introduced. Additionally, the industrial structure and regional 
development for SMEs board firms are different and this should be recognised by 
policy makers who could tailor business strategies to take into account.  
The current U.K. tax regime is seen as appropriate because it provides little incentive 
or compensation to AIM firms in relation to retained profit. As the most direct method 
of financial assistance, which is conducive to capital formation, the impact of tax 
shields on AIM firms was minimal over the period of the economic crisis and recovery. 
This gives scope for fiscal policies that provide incentives, probably in the form of tax 
allowances, to retain the profit of firms and encourage firms’ investment in growth 
oriented strategies. As noted by Michaelas et al. (1999), this initiative can enable small 
and medium firms to provide a contribution to economic performance. During the 
period of economic recovery, it is more appropriate for government to introduce fiscal 
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policies based on tax returns that encourage small business owners to expand their 
investments, especially in the long term, rather than use tax cuts that could directly 
accelerate consumer spending (Devereux et al. 2018).  
8.3.3 Industry Policy  
Categorising firms into capital and non-capital intensive in the AIM and the SMEs 
Board market is another step for policy makers to provide bespoke financing as they 
have different degrees of sensitivity to changes in the explanatory variables. Capital 
intensive refers to industries that require a large amount of capital investment and 
therefore have a high degree of fixed assets. Thus, firm size, measured by scale of 
assets, non-debt tax shields (depreciation), tangibility and the financial situation are 
shown to significantly affect firms’ capital structure decisions. However, for those 
firms in non-capital intensive sectors based on services and knowledge, profitability, 
liquidity and macroeconomic factors have a significant impact on financing decisions, 
especially in the case of short term funding. Regulators could consider grouping firms 
into capital or non-capital intensive categories to offer regulations that accord to their 
specific financing needs. It may also be helpful to the management of firms to identify 
how the change in internal and external environments affect corporate funding 
activities.  Policy makers could consider providing a broader capital market with 
different financial sources to allow for capital intensive firms to raise sufficient 
funding.  
8.3.4 Legal System  
In relation to policy implications, it cannot be overlooked that the legal system relating 
to shareholder and creditor rights might explain differences in firms’ capital structure 
in both markets. As noted in this study, small and medium firms are sensitive to the 
country-specific factors that shows a heterogeneity in institutional features of 
macroeconomic environments, in particular, bond market development. Therefore, a 
better legal environment which provides for the stability and development of capital 
markets and, enables small and medium firms in both markets operate in a virtuous 
circle. For example, the balance of control rights between creditors and shareholders 
as a means of mitigating any conflict relating to incentivisation entails changes in 
financing policy (Daher 2017). Similarly, legal systems relating to the legal 
enforcement of a country’s of the financial contract and, consequently, the supply of 
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debt capital should be addressed. With better legal enforcement, “creditors are able to 
contain the risk of borrowers because of the assurance that in the event of default they 
will be able to claim collateralized assets and preserve the value of their claim” (Daher 
2017). Therefore, the challenge for policy makers is to improve public governance and 
strengthen laws which enable firms to achieve better financing outcomes including in 
the long term, in both markets, especially in a developing market where firms need 
more long term loans for their operations.    
8.3.5 Public policy  
From a public policy perspective the conclusion of this research is that, in general, the 
policy of financial restraint has played a key role in the financial market development 
in China. This is consistent with finding of Stiglitz and Uy (1996) that in the East 
Asian, financial restraint enhance the ability of firms to increase their equity, and hence 
their level of investment and their ability and willingness to take prudent risk. 
However, as Zhang et al. (2015), Wu and Yue (2009) and Allen et al. (2005), although 
China is still regarded as a transition economy moving from a planned towards to 
market-based economy, the supply of financing sources is usually limited. As the 
primary source of financing in financial market in China is bank loan and the majority 
of the banking industry in China are owned by central state and local governments, 
firms are extremely sensitive to variation in government policy. It can be seen that 
public policies implemented in China, to some extent, should be classified as financial 
repression rather than financial constraints.  
Thus, the challenge for policy maker is to aim at increasing financial supply rather 
than extracting rent from the SMEs in private sector. The policy of financial restraint 
to enhance the ability of firm in increasing their equity should create rent opportunities 
for the SMEs, and reduce the bank’s moral hazard, encouraging financial 
intermediaries to provide goods and services that undersupplied in purely competitive 
markets such as regulating loans and absorbing more deposits (Zhao and Zhu 2017).  
Furthermore, the approach used to implement financial policies should be financial 
restraint tools, such as interest margin protection to maintain positive real interest, 
rather than controlling the interest rate to keep the nominal interest rate below the 
inflation. Also, the policy associating with the financial system, including state-owned 
financial institutions should provide loose environment that make those institutions 
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become more commercially with indirect or moderate government intervention. This 
would provide development space and policy support for SMEs in China.  
According to Stiglitz and Uy (1996), the public policies in East Asia are far more stable 
than those in most other developing countries. Another challenging for policy maker 
in China is to provide stable macroeconomic environment with low and predictable 
inflation rate, and no high tax.  
8.4 Contribution  
The primary contribution of this thesis to the financial and economic literature is the 
analysis of the hierarchical and dimensional construct of corporate capital structure 
choice. The study promotes the idea that the influence of firm, industry and country 
determinants together with the dummy effect of time, industrial and financial system 
on financing choice differ depending on the measure used. The suggestion is that 
capital structure should be measured with various proxies from a multiple rather than 
only one dimension of the construct of the debt to equity ratio. This study supports the 
argument by Titman and Wessels (1988) that “some of the theories of capital structure 
have different implications for the different types of debt, and the coefficients in the 
structural model may differ according to whether debt ratios are measured in terms of 
book and market value”. The methodology of Kayo and Kimura (2011) is strongly 
supported in this study, and that is the basis upon which financial leverage is measured 
in this research. It is noted that there is a cross-sectional correlation between the book 
value and market value of debt and thereby any misspecification due to using book or 
market value is probably fairly small. Nonetheless, such cross-sectional correlation 
does not indicate a substitutional relationship between these two measures where one 
could simply be the most preferred indicator for analysis. As noted by Kayo and 
Kimura (2011) and Cook and Tang (2010), the book value leverage ratios are less the 
subject of non-controllable firm factors. It is also found that the book leverage ratio 
has a lower degree of fluctuation than the market leverage ratio over the sample period. 
Both the market-based and book valued-based leverage ratios are relatively low in the 
stock market expansion periods of the sample. These findings are similar to the study, 
confirming that those existing conclusions are supported by the different methodology 
used in this research.   
275 
 
There is also sufficient evidence that both the short-term and long term leverage 
measures are, to some extent, are significantly affected by time, firm, industry and 
country specific determinants when both market and book value measures are used. 
The measure of short and long term debt is only covered in a narrower sense such as 
that which is interest-bearing and excludes any allowance for default provisions (Baker 
and Martin 2011). However, it incorporates the fact that assets can be offset by specific 
non-debt liabilities. For instance, as Rajan and Zingales (1995) indicate, “an increase 
in the gross amount of trade credit leads to a reduction in this leverage, and given that 
the level of accounts payable and accounts receivable may jointly be influenced by 
industry consideration, it seems appropriate to use a measure of leverage”. In this 
study, the analysis is in line with Mokhova and Zinecker (2014) that long term leverage 
is more significantly influenced by country variables. In general terms, the average 
short-term debt ratio of small and medium firms appears to increase during periods of 
economic recession and decreases as the economic conditions in the marketplace 
improve. This indicates the sensitivity of small and medium firms to macro-economic 
changes. Also, average long term debt ratios change in relation to economic growth.   
The study also provides statistical evidence to support existing literature by 
emphasizing the impact of time, firm, industry and country on the variance of firm 
leverage and analyses the direct and indirect influences of these characteristics. The 
samples includes all non-financial and utility firms of a small and medium size listed 
on AIM and SMEs board that have more than 10 years’ observations after the 
economic crisis. The groups comprise more than 1500 small and medium firms from 
the UK and Chinese stock markets, with data from 2007 through to 2017. The more 
recent data, provides the opportunity to evaluate firms’ capital structure with post 
financial crisis information and consequently makes a major contribution to the debate. 
It is found that the impact of several firm-specific factors such as firm size, tangibility, 
growth opportunities, liquidity, intangibility and dividend pay-out on a cross-country 
capital structure is significant. In particular, the impact of intangibility observed in the 
samples is not consistent with a conventional prediction of capital structure theories 
promulgated in theories such as trade-off and agency. The analysis of country-specific 
and industry factors on leverage indicates that GDP, capital formation, bond market 
development and market concentration have a significant influence on capital 
structure. The central conclusion from the empirical analysis is that capital structure 
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of small and medium sized businesses is dependent on the sectors’ context and, 
consequently, any analysis should be undertaken within the sectors related to those 
firms. A random selection of firms across sectors would be meaningless. The most 
notable features that were observed in the research include the high asset structure 
variable coefficient of primary industries and the overall high debt ratio for the 
Technology sector in AIM. The differences in the influence of industry on capital 
structure is not significant in the SMEs market. It is inferred in the study that the capital 
structure of small and medium firms based on AIM and the SMEs board markets is 
time and industry dependent.  
Finally, the study also adds a new dimension to the knowledge of AIM firms and SME 
Board firms’ financing behaviour by analysing the non-linear relationship that has not 
received at degree of focus in capital structure research. This suggests that research on 
the relationship between capital structure and its drivers of variance can benefit from 
using this non-linear approach in the field of corporate finance. As suggested by 
Fattouh et al. (2005), the use of non-linear relationship regression estimators 
demonstrates empirically to how capital structure variance differs between firms at 
different segments of the leverage distribution. Thus, after running the linear 
regression model, the current study explores the non-linear relationship that may exist 
based on the samples. It is found that firms in both the developed and emerging market, 
show a non-linear U-shaped or inverted U-shaped relationship (Bokpin 2009; 
Margaritis and Psillaki 2010; Hewa Wellalage and Locke 2015). The results in this 
research are significantly wider-reaching than that of Fattouh et al. (2005) which was 
based on UK firms. It is imperative for firms’ capital structure decision makers in both 
AIM and the SMEs board markets to build up their financing models and financing 
channels to suit the impact of a firm’s characteristics on the debt ratio. It cannot be 
asserted that firm characteristics must be either positively or negatively related to the 
change in debt when there is a marginal effect for each element to vary over time. In 
this instance, it is essential for firms to manage time lags as the change in firm 
characteristics may not immediately influence the financing mode but would have a 
reverse effect on leverage in future years.  
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8.5 Limitations and Future Studies   
Although the research has endeavoured to ensure a deep, thorough and robust analysis, 
there are inevitably some limitations that cannot be overlooked. Firstly, samples of 
firms are taken from two specific markets, AIM UK and the SMEs Board, China; both 
contain what are referred to as small and medium firms. There are different types of 
marketplaces in the UK and China and the selected samples in this research might not 
be significantly representative of other markets. Furthermore, the current study 
identifies several firm-specific determinants of a firm’s leverage primarily based on 
the most accepted theoretical frameworks of capital structure, such as trade-off 
models, pecking order theory, agency cost theory and signalling theory. A large 
number of studies conducted to date investigate the extent to which these factors 
influence the capital structure of firms. In the future, the role of microeconomic 
determinants in financing choice is another avenue for exploration. Furthermore, 
studies in this area can also depend on an expansion of industries, other markets, 
market comparison, or inclusion of other variables, for example, the other significant 
corporate operating variables including CEO compensation, CEO tenure, audit fees 
and nominating committees which could all affect capital structure (Talberg et al. 
2008). Dasilas and Papasyriopoulos (2015) show that corporate governance was one 
of the determinants of the debt levels in the crisis period. A further example, is the 
reputation of auditors and credit rating agencies which provide firms with the 
necessary certification to support any increase in debt requirement. Furthermore, the 
influence of financial policy and legal systems can be examined in future 
investigations as firms in the private sector, especially in the small business sector 
might be sensitive to changes in these two areas. The fiscal policies of corporate tax 
rates, base interest rates and inflation rates together with any changes to legal systems 
relating to creditor or shareholder rights protections can also be the subject of future 
lines of research.  
Furthermore, the lack of sufficient financial data from companies listed on AIM and 
the SMEs board market, and the absence of other macro-economic factors are one of 
the major limitations in this thesis. At the outset, this research attempted to gain 
specific data on firm characteristics such as Research & Development expense, 
earnings per share, market share, investment credit and the firm’s age in the period 
2007 to 2017. However, it was found that only a few AIM firms and SMEs Board 
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report on this data and thus the thesis was compelled to drop the hypothesis associated 
with these specific area or to use alternative measures with proxy data. Furthermore, 
the major macroeconomic factors of GDP, capital formation, bond and stock market 
development is measured by annual rather than quarterly data due to the limitation of 
the source. The drawbacks in the data complicated the data filtering process and made 
it difficult to investigate the relationship between capital structure and these particular 
factors. Future research in capital structure might select more than one database to 
acquire relevant data for their variables.  
Another limitation in this study is the fact that causality tests including Granger 
causality, were not performed in depth due to length constraints. This technique, in the 
context of capital structure, was developed by Guo and Suliman (2010) to address the 
issue of whether corporate operating characteristics including time-invariant and firm-
specific effects caused any changes. Though the causality tests for explaining the 
variables arising from agency cost, trade-off and pecking order theories is not, 
according to previous studies, comprehensive, it is more revealing than correlation-
based analysis. Nonetheless, it is a limitation that the causal relationship for macro-
economic markets is not widely covered by existing studies. In other word, 
investigating a causal relationship might be better than concentrating only on 
correlation. Therefore, future research could use causality test to assess the impact of 
macroeconomic conditional variables on capital structure.  
As presented in chapter 4, the current research utilised the fixed effect regression 
model using lagged explanatory and dependent variables to investigate whether there 
was any delayed effect which influenced current capital structure and by inference 
whether the current variables would influence future capital structure. The variable 
were lagged quarterly at on year intervals thereby limiting the lagged period to twelve 
month. No attempt was made to extend the lagged time period.  
The study uses secondary data to examine the relationship between capital structure 
and its determinants. However, the findings in the current research might be explained 
from different perspectives by using primary data, as data collection in this form can 
be designed to match the objectives of the research in question. According to Smith 
and Smith (2008), using both secondary and primary data increases the opportunity to 
conduct comprehensive research in the field of corporate capital structure choice. 
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whilst this approach may serve to explain some of the contradictions seen in this 
research using secondary data, the use of primary data gleaned from questionnaires or 
interviews with decision making managers might discover some more specific. 
Nevertheless, this research provides a significant contribution to knowledge with a 
comprehensive analysis of the variance between listed SMEs on UK and Chinese stock 
markets and their behaviour in relation to capital structure formation. Additionally, it 
provides a holistic interpretation of a significant number of firm characteristic, 
industry, market and macro-economic variables providing new insight in how firms 
determine their capital structure in both the UK and China, identifying any variations 
and covering the important sector of small and medium enterprises. 
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Appendixes  
Part 1: Descriptive Analysis Table  
Table 5. 4: AIM Consolidated Descriptive Statistics 
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ICB Sectors   SIZE GROWTH NDTS      ROE TANG TRATE LIQUIDITY InTANG DBKRT DIV GDP CFMT BOND STK HH STDMV STDBV LTDMV LTDBV 
Oil & Gas 
                   
Obs. 2320.00 2320.00 2320.00 2320.00 2320.00 2320.00 2320.00 2320.00 2320.00 2320.00 2320.00 2320.00 2320.00 2320.00 2320.00 2320.00 2320.00 2320.00 2320.00 
Mean 4.42 1.19 8.37 -52.75 27.79 2.02 10.53 31.37 -3.87 1.29 0.31 16.15 70.78 110.66 0.10 40.10 4.23 32.87 4.39 
Std. Dev. 0.74 24.20 14.04 296.02 30.65 7.79 50.05 30.68 39.72 8.04 0.66 0.75 16.33 10.72 0.30 46.77 11.07 45.65 10.95 
Min 1.00 -819.28 0.00 -5429.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -699.61 0.00 -2.20 14.80 34.50 81.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 7.63 174.04 100.00 1810.96 99.72 74.82 843.64 99.74 13.27 88.64 1.20 18.10 87.00 125.77 1.11 100.00 98.64 100.00 95.07 
                    
Basic Material 
                   
Obs. 2870.00 2870.00 2870.00 2870.00 2870.00 2870.00 2870.00 2870.00 2870.00 2870.00 2870.00 2870.00 2870.00 2870.00 2870.00 2870.00 2870.00 2870.00 2870.00 
Mean 4.19 2.44 8.91 -141.84 19.84 3.47 8.21 30.97 -1.58 1.96 0.33 16.17 71.22 110.74 0.22 35.97 3.32 29.30 3.18 
Std. Dev. 0.82 19.45 16.70 1504.69 28.56 17.75 20.93 33.33 5.96 11.01 0.64 0.74 16.28 10.54 0.29 46.02 8.08 44.02 8.10 
Min 1.26 -635.34 0.00 -26234.80 0.00 -0.87 0.00 0.00 -82.83 0.00 -2.20 14.80 34.50 81.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 7.88 271.77 100.00 104.60 97.91 322.26 446.24 99.83 9.25 97.64 1.20 18.10 87.00 125.77 1.02 100.00 80.81 100.00 83.13 
                    
Industrial 
                   
Obs. 4100.00 4100.00 4100.00 4100.00 4100.00 4100.00 4100.00 4100.00 4100.00 4100.00 4100.00 4100.00 4100.00 4100.00 4100.00 4100.00 4100.00 4100.00 4100.00 
Mean 4.42 1.79 11.85 -8.97 15.24 9.54 2.45 27.02 0.24 15.53 0.32 16.17 70.82 110.68 0.33 70.18 5.24 66.52 7.31 
Std. Dev. 0.60 17.43 13.71 107.14 17.42 10.77 7.28 22.67 33.30 23.13 0.65 0.75 16.49 10.72 0.21 42.13 7.15 44.87 9.47 
Min 1.15 -497.38 0.00 -2533.77 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 -1062.13 0.00 -2.20 14.80 34.50 81.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 5.93 398.48 100.00 385.00 81.77 70.19 214.78 95.42 9.81 98.84 1.20 18.10 87.00 125.77 0.51 100.00 53.36 100.00 48.73 
                    
Consumer Goods 
                
Obs. 1528.00 1528.00 1528.00 1528.00 1528.00 1528.00 1528.00 1528.00 1528.00 1528.00 1528.00 1528.00 1528.00 1528.00 1528.00 1528.00 1528.00 1528.00 1528.00 
Mean 4.42 0.54 12.69 -8.68 22.15 9.05 2.51 16.45 0.77 15.95 0.34 16.18 71.60 110.77 0.46 70.82 7.73 57.91 7.58 
Std. Dev. 0.67 26.12 12.92 106.90 20.04 9.61 2.95 19.23 4.48 22.89 0.63 0.73 16.18 10.38 0.03 43.04 10.13 47.73 12.48 
Min 1.76 -885.85 0.00 -1270.37 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 -70.22 0.00 -2.20 14.80 34.50 81.93 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 5.90 63.36 100.00 938.36 98.16 54.42 43.62 92.17 3.95 97.90 1.20 18.10 87.00 125.77 0.51 100.00 64.50 100.00 81.76 
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Heath 
                   
 
Obs. 2091.00 2091.00 2091.00 2091.00 2091.00 2091.00 2091.00 2091.00 2091.00 2091.00 2091.00 2091.00 2091.00 2091.00 2091.00 2091.00 2091.00 2091.00 2091.00 
 
Mean 4.07 1.50 13.54 -40.65 7.94 2.97 5.37 31.86 -0.53 6.05 0.32 16.17 70.68 110.70 0.01 41.46 3.69 37.65 4.53 
 
Std. Dev. 0.67 60.72 15.79 161.66 13.60 6.58 6.97 27.59 2.55 16.34 0.65 0.76 16.51 10.75 0.00 45.42 9.58 45.94 10.12 
 
Min 2.06 -1599.51 0.00 -2727.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -19.73 0.00 -2.20 14.80 34.50 81.93 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Max 5.71 596.90 100.00 945.45 93.39 41.59 47.90 99.01 5.56 97.72 1.20 18.10 87.00 125.77 0.02 100.00 65.53 100.00 67.54                     
Telecommunication 
               
Obs. 153.00 153.00 153.00 153.00 153.00 153.00 153.00 153.00 153.00 153.00 153.00 153.00 153.00 153.00 153.00 153.00 153.00 153.00 153.00 
Mean 4.67 1.79 13.41 -3.16 27.97 9.36 1.66 37.48 2.28 10.80 0.32 16.15 70.72 110.73 0.01 62.26 1.77 76.31 20.56 
Std. Dev. 0.81 1.69 16.23 38.38 31.60 16.72 1.27 33.14 5.73 23.12 0.64 0.76 16.42 10.66 0.02 44.23 2.87 42.47 13.41 
Min 3.21 0.00 0.45 -101.62 0.19 0.00 0.48 0.00 -3.18 0.00 -2.20 14.80 34.50 81.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 5.84 12.42 74.68 116.28 86.46 65.60 5.64 98.56 30.10 74.02 1.20 18.10 87.00 125.77 0.11 100.00 14.41 100.00 43.27 
                    
Consumer service 
                   
Obs 2465.00 2465.00 2465.00 2465.00 2465.00 2465.00 2465.00 2465.00 2465.00 2465.00 2465.00 2465.00 2465.00 2465.00 2465.00 2465.00 2465.00 2465.00 2465.00 
Mean 4.43 4.00 10.44 -11.89 21.59 8.25 2.00 30.56 0.40 11.10 0.34 16.17 72.00 110.63 0.04 63.24 4.07 59.04 7.99 
Std. Dev. 0.74 44.33 14.34 98.48 28.39 10.66 3.85 27.96 9.84 21.02 0.62 0.73 15.92 10.26 0.01 44.52 7.47 47.30 11.69 
Min 1.69 -81.16 0.00 -1666.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -223.07 0.00 -2.20 14.80 34.50 81.93 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 6.49 1310.66 100.00 455.67 98.68 72.55 48.67 95.16 8.11 98.58 1.20 18.10 87.00 125.77 0.07 100.00 65.94 100.00 77.21 
                    
Technology 
                   
Obs. 3262.00 3262.00 3262.00 3262.00 3262.00 3262.00 3262.00 3262.00 3262.00 3262.00 3262.00 3262.00 3262.00 3262.00 3262.00 3262.00 3262.00 3262.00 3262.00 
Mean 4.21 4.91 14.92 -17.62 7.01 4.53 2.41 39.31 0.43 11.48 0.32 16.16 70.88 110.64 0.01 52.44 3.70 52.14 6.04 
Std. Dev. 0.60 33.86 14.12 82.21 9.53 8.22 4.12 24.40 2.50 21.40 0.65 0.75 16.40 10.69 0.01 45.93 7.27 47.12 10.56 
Min 1.56 -200.95 0.00 -1591.42 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 -19.86 0.00 -2.20 14.80 34.50 81.93 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 5.95 774.20 100.00 277.73 76.46 63.81 81.58 91.85 7.88 100.00 1.20 18.10 87.00 125.77 0.03 100.00 65.63 100.00 74.27 
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Table 5. 5: SMEs Consolidated Descriptive Statistic 
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CNI SECTORS SIZE GROWTH NDTS ROE TANG TRATE LIQUIDITY InTANG DBKRT DIV GDP CFMT BOND STK HH STDMV STDBV LTDMV LTDBV 
Energy 
                   
Obs. 450.00 450.00 450.00 450.00 450.00 450.00 450.00 450.00 450.00 450.00 450.00 450.00 450.00 450.00 450.00 450.00 450.00 450.00 450.00 
Mean 6.55 3.29 6.91 4.04 29.04 9.25 2.25 4.30 1.13 22.43 3.50 11.00 52.63 14.72 0.25 93.01 13.95 58.72 5.77 
Std. Dev. 0.51 2.66 4.92 37.82 19.13 9.54 2.02 3.47 0.80 22.00 10.79 0.41 7.91 3.90 0.06 20.97 9.17 46.36 7.26 
Min 5.68 -12.99 0.00 -368.76 4.56 0.00 0.24 0.15 -1.23 0.00 -16.67 9.72 43.12 9.67 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 7.85 14.96 33.69 41.89 87.58 76.54 15.49 16.50 5.22 91.68 13.89 11.38 68.75 31.52 0.37 100.00 39.76 100.00 26.10 
                    
Material 
                   
Obs. 4655.00 4655.00 4655.00 4655.00 4655.00 4631.00 4655.00 4655.00 4655.00 4655.00 4655.00 4655.00 4655.00 4655.00 4655.00 4655.00 4655.00 4655.00 4655.00 
Mean 6.39 3.27 6.61 6.88 36.80 8.74 2.31 6.85 1.29 21.21 3.51 10.97 52.56 15.08 0.02 95.03 17.26 57.80 4.52 
Std. Dev. 0.39 3.11 2.66 14.11 16.18 6.59 3.56 7.08 0.90 22.60 10.78 0.44 7.92 4.43 0.01 16.67 9.57 46.73 5.94 
Min 5.41 -79.24 0.00 -271.42 0.29 0.00 0.18 0.00 -1.94 0.00 -16.67 9.72 43.12 9.67 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 7.79 61.10 44.88 55.66 89.64 89.64 53.13 53.34 8.56 99.46 13.89 11.38 68.75 31.52 0.06 100.00 46.96 100.00 30.15 
                    
Industrial 
                   
Obs. 9704.00 9704.00 9704.00 9704.00 9704.00 9543.00 9704.00 9704.00 9704.00 9704.00 9704.00 9704.00 9704.00 9704.00 9704.00 9704.00 9704.00 9704.00 9704.00 
Mean 6.33 3.79 6.93 7.52 24.90 10.53 2.78 6.96 1.20 23.33 3.48 10.97 52.72 15.00 0.01 88.58 12.28 47.09 3.30 
Std. Dev. 0.40 15.34 3.83 10.31 14.37 9.85 3.10 8.43 0.63 22.55 10.79 0.43 7.97 4.28 0.00 26.15 9.37 47.00 5.24 
Min 5.32 -0.95 0.00 -193.53 0.01 0.00 0.23 0.00 -12.04 0.00 -16.67 9.72 43.12 9.67 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 7.76 834.46 79.03 48.69 76.38 92.20 50.14 87.99 4.04 100.00 13.89 11.38 68.75 31.52 0.02 100.00 50.00 100.00 31.47 
                    
Consumer staple 
                   
Obs. 5976.00 5976.00 5976.00 5976.00 5976.00 5867.00 5976.00 5976.00 5976.00 5976.00 5976.00 5976.00 5976.00 5976.00 5976.00 5976.00 5976.00 5976.00 5976.00 
Mean 6.33 3.62 7.45 7.45 29.79 10.49 2.94 7.65 1.33 24.48 3.47 10.97 52.85 15.01 0.03 85.50 12.89 47.16 3.40 
Std. Dev. 0.38 5.93 4.46 21.51 14.84 9.70 5.01 9.41 0.78 24.30 10.78 0.43 8.02 4.25 0.02 30.92 10.02 47.35 5.36 
Min 5.04 -36.91 0.00 -591.18 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 -9.52 0.00 -16.67 9.72 43.12 9.67 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 7.63 200.64 65.95 161.50 77.35 99.66 104.67 89.85 4.53 99.70 13.89 11.38 68.75 31.52 0.10 100.00 55.49 100.00 26.80 
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Heath  
                   
Obs. 1534.00 1534.00 1534.00 1534.00 1534.00 1511.00 1534.00 1534.00 1534.00 1534.00 1534.00 1534.00 1534.00 1534.00 1534.00 1534.00 1534.00 1534.00 1534.00 
Mean 6.32 4.51 5.58 11.73 24.64 11.42 6.20 10.55 1.47 27.41 3.50 10.98 52.90 14.98 0.05 74.00 9.52 38.37 2.37 
Std. Dev. 0.40 3.20 2.34 9.84 11.24 6.46 12.20 10.41 0.66 25.47 10.76 0.42 8.01 4.13 0.03 38.68 9.14 45.01 4.58 
Min 5.37 0.00 0.89 -52.46 1.29 0.00 0.52 0.19 -1.50 0.00 -16.67 9.72 43.12 9.67 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 7.46 25.81 14.48 51.16 69.22 83.63 190.87 59.81 5.67 99.44 13.89 11.38 68.75 31.52 0.24 100.00 36.12 100.00 21.29 
                    
Consumer 
discretionary 
                   
Obs. 1033.00 1033.00 1033.00 1033.00 1033.00 994.00 1033.00 1033.00 1033.00 1033.00 1033.00 1033.00 1033.00 1033.00 1033.00 1033.00 1033.00 1033.00 1033.00 
Mean 6.50 4.63 10.01 7.51 26.85 13.91 1.90 8.58 1.52 26.80 3.49 10.97 52.96 14.97 0.23 80.90 9.85 45.02 3.69 
Std. Dev. 0.48 30.40 8.30 19.98 17.86 8.12 1.76 8.21 0.96 24.42 10.76 0.43 8.07 4.20 0.09 33.60 9.74 48.16 6.48 
Min 5.00 -229.82 0.44 -265.38 0.15 0.00 0.23 0.00 -2.43 0.00 -16.67 9.72 43.12 9.67 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 8.19 422.89 73.70 55.62 85.97 57.96 19.11 47.96 6.17 98.20 13.89 11.38 68.75 31.52 0.63 100.00 39.27 100.00 35.41 
                    
Telecommunication 
                   
Obs. 78.00 78.00 78.00 78.00 78.00 74.00 78.00 78.00 78.00 78.00 78.00 78.00 78.00 78.00 78.00 78.00 78.00 78.00 78.00 
Mean 5.99 4.99 7.29 7.89 16.58 8.78 13.69 11.62 1.38 23.11 3.56 11.00 52.15 14.70 0.57 22.82 0.57 8.59 0.08 
Std. Dev. 0.33 1.92 5.25 4.90 15.23 4.79 13.95 18.81 0.50 12.79 10.92 0.42 7.62 3.75 0.05 36.04 1.15 21.27 0.21 
Min 5.55 1.90 1.63 -1.87 4.84 0.00 2.25 0.05 0.49 0.00 -16.67 9.72 44.43 9.67 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 6.64 14.02 18.72 22.43 53.09 23.24 48.47 56.97 2.04 43.83 13.89 11.38 68.75 31.52 0.68 93.05 3.91 85.19 0.90 
                    
Information 
Technology 
                   
Obs. 2076.00 2076.00 2076.00 2076.00 2076.00 2052.00 2076.00 2076.00 2076.00 2076.00 2076.00 2076.00 2076.00 2076.00 2076.00 2076.00 2076.00 2076.00 2076.00 
Mean 6.31 4.49 8.83 8.47 17.95 9.27 3.35 9.51 1.31 23.57 3.50 10.98 52.61 14.96 0.04 77.52 8.12 35.66 2.33 
Std. Dev. 0.40 3.23 6.99 10.04 13.74 9.60 2.64 10.52 0.52 22.46 10.77 0.43 7.94 4.29 0.01 35.31 7.81 45.30 4.51 
Min 5.19 0.00 0.18 -56.22 0.07 0.00 0.61 0.00 -1.02 0.00 -16.67 9.72 43.12 9.67 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 7.49 35.75 59.44 70.71 63.13 91.96 29.92 62.53 3.70 100.00 13.89 11.38 68.75 31.52 0.09 100.00 33.60 100.00 23.15 
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Table 5. 6: AIM Pearson Correlation Metrix 
VARIABLES SIZE GROWTH NDTS ROE TANG TRATE LIQUIDITY InTANG DBKRT DIV GDP CFMT 
SIZE 1 
           
GROWTH -0.0172*   1 
          
NDTS -0.103*** 0.0104 1 
         
ROE 0.0762*** -0.0430*** -0.00117 1 
        
TANG -0.00997 -0.00476 0.329*** 0.00767 1 
       
TRATE 0.00714 -0.00297 0.00324 0.00271 0.00133 1 
      
LIQUIDITY 0.00506 -0.00438 -0.0230**  0.0069 -0.0174*   -0.00685 1 
     
InTANG -
0.0930*** 
0.0225**  0.250*** -0.0181*   -0.0226**  0.00379 -0.0352*** 1 
    
DBKRT 0.202*** 0.000542 -0.467*** 0.0477*** 0.168*** 0.0117 0.00134 0.0167*   1 
   
DIV -0.00851 -0.0222**  0.00283 0.0211**  0.00145 0.00237 -0.0267*** 0.00573 0.0135 1 
  
GDP 0.0505*** -0.00044 0.0159*   -0.00489 0.0095 -0.00036 -0.00997 0.0232**  0.0153*   -0.00412 1 
 
CFMT 0.0242**  -0.00487 0.0131 -0.0141 -0.00243 0.0145 -0.0255*** 0.0127 0.00571 -0.00887 -0.0243**  1 
BOND 0.127*** 0.00125 0.0368*** -0.0157*   0.0264*** -0.00162 -0.0433*** 0.0740*** 0.0180*   -0.00999 0.356*** -0.296*** 
STK -0.0148 0.00172 -0.00939 0.0106 0.000156 -0.00559 0.0246**  -0.0159*   0.00308 0.00559 0.569*** -0.225*** 
HH 0.0300*** -0.00906 -0.0216**  0.0204**  0.00964 0.0127 -0.00808 -
0.0616*** 
0.0484*** 0.0471*** -0.106*** 0.0276*** 
STDMV 0.246*** -0.0380*** 0.0585*** 0.0356*** 0.0720*** 0.0263*** -0.136*** 0.0292*** 0.0402*** 0.0182*   -0.00551 0.00936 
STDBV -0.127*** -0.0525*** 0.256*** 0.00433 0.249*** 0.0044 -0.0556*** 0.0781*** -0.135*** 0.0109 -0.0221**  0.0102 
LTDMV 0.299*** -0.0141 0.0397*** 0.0408*** 0.0857*** 0.0152*   -0.111*** 0.0282*** 0.0906*** 0.0261*** 0.00398 0.0171*   
LTDBV 0.0631*** 0.000994 0.142*** 0.0102 0.280*** 0.00731 -0.0515*** 0.113*** 0.0898*** 0.00982 0.00671 0.00329 
             
t statistics in parentheses 
         
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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VARIABLES BOND STK HH STDMV STDBV LTDMV LTDBV 
STK 0.0896*** 1 
     
HH -0.134*** -0.134*** 1 
    
STDMV -0.00157 -0.0105 0.0692*** 1 
   
STDBV -0.0116 -0.0197*   0.0574*** 0.477*** 1 
  
LTDMV 0.00806 -0.00138 0.0462*** 0.663*** 0.190*** 1 
 
LTDBV 0.0200** -0.0033 0.0192*   0.358*** 0.291*** 0.574*** 1 
        
t statistics in parentheses 
    
* p<0.05, 
** 
p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 5. 7: SMEs Pearson Correlation Matrix 
VRRIABLES SIZE GROWTH NDTS ROE TANG TRATE LIQUIDITY InTANG DBKRT DIV GDP CFMT 
SIZE 1 
           
GROWTH -0.0484*** 1 
          
NDTS -0.0874*** 0.0996*** 1 
         
ROE 0.0965*** -0.107*** -0.0373*** 1 
        
TANG -0.0698*** -0.0488*** -0.151*** -0.114*** 1 
       
TRATE 0.00939 -0.0251*** -0.0339*** 0.185*** -0.208*** 1 
      
LIQUIDITY -0.132*** 0.000694 -0.0145*   0.0414*** -0.186*** 0.0896*** 1 
     
InTANG 0.0986*** 0.0336*** -0.282*** -0.0230*** -0.184*** -0.0143*   -0.0672*** 1 
    
DBKRT -0.0899*** -0.183*** 0.141*** 0.469*** -0.271*** 0.235*** 0.137*** -0.184*** 1   
  
DIV 0.0346*** -0.0195**  -0.0154*   0.146*** -0.0582*** 0.152*** 0.155*** -
0.0754*** 
0.165*** 1    
 
GDP -0.0342*** 0.00929 0.00253 0.0117 -0.00565 0.00576 0.0135*   -0.0201**  0.0216*** 0.00652 1 
 
CFMT -0.0495*** -0.0438*** 0.00361 -0.0127*   0.0126*   0.0263*** 0.0897*** -0.102*** 0.0409*** 0.0487*** -0.0143*   1 
BOND 0.391*** 0.0724*** -0.0187**  -0.0424*** -0.106*** -0.0183**  -0.0789*** 0.249*** -0.154*** -
0.0318*** 
0.0661*** -0.461*** 
STK 0.0512*** 0.0440*** 0.0180**  0.0326*** -0.0145*   -0.00332 -0.0845*** 0.0865*** -0.0406*** -
0.0758*** 
0.0232*** -0.560*** 
HH 0.0204**  0.00943 0.0827*** 0.00577 -0.0023 0.0500*** 0.0313*** 0.00316 0.0658*** 0.00714 0.00974 -0.0836*** 
STDMV 0.172*** -0.0891*** -0.0446*** -0.0702*** 0.180*** -0.119*** -0.458*** -0.0113 -0.146*** -0.167*** -0.0132*   -0.0736*** 
STDBV 0.157*** -0.0387*** -0.0207**  -0.162*** 0.241*** -0.244*** -0.374*** -0.102*** -0.251*** -0.230*** -0.00423 -0.0572*** 
LTDMV 0.269*** -0.0750*** -0.0865*** -0.0208*** 0.233*** -0.165*** -0.208*** -0.00647 -0.167*** -0.178*** -0.0149*   -0.0736*** 
LTDBV 0.261*** -0.0475*** -0.0969*** -0.0685*** 0.274*** -0.151*** -0.140*** -0.0111 -0.200*** -0.154*** -0.0103 -0.0258*** 
             
N 25122 
           
t statistics in parentheses 
         
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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VARIABLES BOND STK HH STDMV STDBV LTDMV LTDBV 
BOND 1 
      
STK 0.367*** 1 
     
HH -0.0392*** 0.0330*** 1 
    
STDMV 0.0367*** 0.0760*** -0.0761*** 1 
   
STDBV -0.0387*** 0.0442*** -0.0601*** 0.541*** 1    
 
LTDMV 0.0540*** 0.0955*** -0.0152*   0.344*** 0.365*** 1 
 
LTDBV 0.0509*** 0.0569*** 0.00377 0.216*** 0.189*** 0.678*** 1 
        
N 25122 
      
t statistics in parentheses 
    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Part 2: Robustness Test Tables 
Table 7. 3: AIM Non-linear Relationship in Capital and Non-Capital intensive  
 Short Term 
Leverage Market 
Value 
 Short Term 
Leverage Book 
Value 
 Long Term 
Leverage Market 
Value 
 Long Term 
Leverage Book 
Value 
 
VARIABLES Capital Intensive Non-Capital 
Intensive 
Capital 
Intensive 
Non-Capital 
Intensive 
Capital Intensive Non-Capital 
Intensive 
Capital Intensive Non-Capital 
Intensive 
         
SIZE 17.58*** 7.794*** -0.358 -2.994*** 14.17*** 9.133*** 1.429** -2.965*** 
 (2.570) (2.698) (0.706) (0.660) (1.756) (3.313) (0.564) (1.042) 
LogSIZE^2 -8.982** 78.20*** (5.553) -2.275 (90.65) 80.35*** (13.30) 3.513 
 (63.11) (29.42) 0.230 (2.795) -2.367 (16.77) 1.383** (3.361) 
GROWTH -0.00946 -0.0211 -0.00628*** 0.00614 0.00418 -0.0512** 0.00502 -0.00730 
 (0.0100) (0.0211) (0.00223) (0.00483) (0.00837) (0.0227) (0.00405) (0.00449) 
LogGROWTH^2 -8.982** -1.318 0.230 -0.199 -2.367 3.401* 1.383** -0.0219 
 (3.734) (1.836) (0.227) (0.231) (3.464) (1.984) (0.633) (0.194) 
NDTS 0.101** 0.0756 -0.00143 0.00123 0.170*** 0.0652 0.0470** 0.0419** 
 (0.0480) (0.0520) (0.0128) (0.0147) (0.0468) (0.0459) (0.0229) (0.0210) 
LogNDTS^2 -0.477 4.933** 0.0346 -0.140 2.196 0.748 0.473 -0.907** 
 (5.425) (2.175) (0.440) (0.227) (2.905) (2.269) (0.549) (0.426) 
ROE 0.000825 0.00604** 0.000274*** -0.000142 0.000326 -0.00921*** -4.97e-05 -0.000494 
 (0.000604) (0.00295) (0.000101) (0.000736) (0.000469) (0.00293) (9.45e-05) (0.00149) 
LogROE^2 3.161 -14.79*** 0.379 -0.389** -5.521 -12.27*** -0.702 0.621 
 (5.322) (3.422) (0.361) (0.168) (5.180) (3.277) (0.644) (0.519) 
TANG 0.494*** 0.449*** 0.0380*** 0.0890*** 0.427*** 0.558*** 0.0649*** 0.166*** 
 (0.0305) (0.131) (0.00608) (0.0170) (0.0325) (0.105) (0.00826) (0.0229) 
LogTANG^2 -12.30*** 9.588*** -1.060*** -0.313 -2.788 8.348*** 0.546* 2.473*** 
 (2.659) (2.397) (0.244) (0.244) (2.483) (2.806) (0.312) (0.283) 
TRATE 0.0529 -0.0762 0.0118 -0.0492*** 0.120** 0.0432 0.00748 -0.0276* 
 (0.0550) (0.0824) (0.00955) (0.00917) (0.0592) (0.0679) (0.0129) (0.0162) 
LogTRATE^2 2.023 -1.775 -0.163 -0.441*** 0.443 1.318* -0.0608 -0.462* 
 (2.838) (1.141) (0.181) (0.135) (3.855) (0.739) (0.418) (0.256) 
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LIQUIDITY 
 
-0.0413* 
 
-0.671*** 
 
-0.00709* 
 
-0.0615*** 
 
-0.0261* 
 
-0.467*** 
 
-0.00226 
 
-0.0499** 
 (0.0231) (0.111) (0.00376) (0.0195) (0.0152) (0.0959) (0.00238) (0.0205) 
LogLIQUIDITY^2 -33.91*** -36.36*** -2.085*** -7.012*** -18.15*** -8.439** -0.153 0.0422 
 (6.880) (2.421) (0.486) (0.494) (5.814) (4.104) (0.671) (0.544) 
InTANG 0.270*** 0.125* 0.00725 0.00887 0.165*** 0.144 0.0185* 0.0557** 
 (0.0297) (0.0723) (0.00877) (0.00687) (0.0380) (0.0940) (0.00956) (0.0238) 
LogInTANG^2 5.273*** -1.491 -0.250 -0.745*** 5.725*** 5.753** 0.170 1.283*** 
 (1.082) (1.185) (0.162) (0.232) (1.349) (2.341) (0.210) (0.426) 
DBKRT -0.0971*** 0.0455** -0.109*** 0.00775*** -0.0846*** -0.0233*** -0.0901*** 0.00387 
 (0.0297) (0.0192) (0.0221) (0.00284) (0.0309) (0.00630) (0.0329) (0.00239) 
LogDBKRT^2 4.666 -7.714** -4.383*** 2.122*** 0.510 -13.78*** -4.364*** -1.483* 
 (9.328) (3.548) (0.729) (0.465) (11.89) (5.135) (1.141) (0.864) 
 
 
DIV 
 
 
-0.150** 
(0.0682) 
 
 
-0.0978** 
(0.0399) 
 
 
-0.0319*** 
(0.00697) 
 
 
-0.0112** 
(0.00485) 
 
 
-0.121*** 
(0.0431) 
 
 
0.121*** 
(0.0229)- 
 
 
-0.0568*** 
(0.00492) 
 
 
-0.0315*** 
(0.00499) 
LogDIV^2 6.188 -17.97*** 0.0327 -0.241 0.103 -22.15*** -1.133*** -0.542 
 (3.781) (2.728) (0.236) (0.154) (2.794) (2.911) (0.372) (0.362) 
GDP -0.658 -1.202*** -0.220* -0.321*** -0.816*** -0.954*** -0.0310 -0.257*** 
 (0.541) (0.197) (0.113) (0.0614) (0.304) (0.308) (0.0481) (0.0810) 
CFMT -0.992 -2.605*** 0.292 -0.321*** -0.913** -0.762** 0.0666 -0.0647 
 (0.640) (0.316) (0.238) (0.0800) (0.405) (0.363) (0.0629) (0.125) 
BOND -0.00659 -0.374*** 0.0158 -0.0280*** -0.130*** -0.261*** -0.00725 -0.0489*** 
 (0.0388) (0.0277) (0.0113) (0.00660) (0.0208) (0.0294) (0.00538) (0.00771) 
STK -0.0243 0.0116 -0.00477 0.00391 0.0540** 0.00138 0.00235 -0.00752* 
 (0.0368) (0.0282) (0.00964) (0.00426) (0.0256) (0.0228) (0.00475) (0.00412) 
HH -1.052 -75.68* 0.0376 4.175 -4.042*** -69.48** -0.792** -25.94*** 
 (3.827) (44.72) (0.823) (5.885) (1.405) (29.91) (0.333) (8.022) 
Constant -25.92 98.18*** -0.234 22.73*** -15.13 49.30*** -3.408 25.00*** 
 (16.02) (13.03) (4.711) (3.825) (9.944) (17.86) (2.483) (5.608) 
         
Observations 9,335 9,368 9,335 9,368 9,335 9,368 9,335 9,368 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7. 4: SMEs Non-linear Relationship in Capital and Non-Capital Intensive Sectors 
 Short Term 
Leverage Market 
Value 
 Short Term 
Leverage Book 
Value 
 Long Term 
Leverage Market 
Value 
 Long Term 
Leverage Book 
Value 
 
VARIABLES Capital Intensive Non-Capital 
Intensive 
Capital Intensive Non-Capital 
Intensive 
Capital Intensive Non-Capital 
Intensive 
Capital 
Intensive 
Non-Capital 
Intensive 
         
SIZE 7.387*** 7.322** 0.643 0.850 35.61*** 29.74*** 4.650*** 3.594*** 
 (2.412) (3.006) (1.189) (0.839) (8.054) (9.040) (0.736) (0.931) 
LogSIZE^2 44.41*** 57.99*** 1.911 7.134* 391.4*** 271.2*** 48.81*** 27.66*** 
 (8.029) (15.91) (4.419) (4.198) (33.71) (43.10) (4.516) (3.348) 
GROWTH -0.0783 -0.173*** 0.00217 -0.0605*** -0.209** -0.0973* -0.0201* -0.00910 
 (0.0495) (0.0292) (0.0180) (0.00619) (0.0873) (0.0527) (0.0116) (0.00559) 
LogGROWTH^2 -3.327*** -6.588*** 0.0663 0.512* 0.881 -1.753 0.790*** 0.189* 
 (0.811) (1.003) (0.199) (0.269) (1.456) (1.474) (0.178) (0.107) 
NDTS -0.196*** -0.0329 -0.0373** -0.0887*** -0.393** 0.141 -0.0188 0.0326 
 (0.0674) (0.163) (0.0181) (0.0301) (0.165) (0.223) (0.0219) (0.0308) 
LogNDTS^2 2.397*** 1.067 1.397*** 1.474*** -8.754*** 0.864 -1.525*** -0.0151 
 (0.678) (1.863) (0.215) (0.296) (1.621) (1.083) (0.177) (0.0887) 
ROE -0.0166 -0.0683 -0.00519 0.0186 -0.0655* -0.323** -0.0291*** -0.0156 
 (0.0174) (0.0444) (0.00794) (0.0169) (0.0346) (0.137) (0.00580) (0.0179) 
LogROE^2 -3.620*** -3.566*** -0.228 0.446* -1.969* 5.982*** 0.0573 0.559*** 
 (0.334) (0.849) (0.308) (0.265) (1.084) (1.832) (0.214) (0.165) 
TANG 0.163*** 0.118** -0.00242 -0.0202 0.382*** 0.314*** 0.0886*** 0.0907*** 
 (0.0340) (0.0549) (0.0225) (0.0164) (0.0736) (0.0734) (0.00959) (0.0155) 
LogTANG^2 -0.660 -0.546 -1.461*** 0.0484 4.741*** 7.861*** 1.146*** 1.078*** 
 (0.931) (0.902) (0.177) (0.184) (1.548) (0.663) (0.131) (0.0887) 
TRATE 0.0107 -0.0508 -0.0564*** -0.0429*** -0.456*** -0.111** -0.0248*** -0.0123*** 
 (0.0378) (0.0513) (0.0109) (0.00712) (0.0947) (0.0457) (0.00812) (0.00305) 
LogTRATE^2 0.671* 0.608 0.0299 -0.389*** -6.390*** -1.140** -0.923*** -0.193*** 
 (0.353) (0.610) (0.138) (0.0994) (1.238) (0.560) (0.124) (0.0429) 
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LIQUIDITY -1.811*** -1.584*** -0.469*** -0.299*** -0.596*** -0.729*** -0.000203 -0.0336*** 
 (0.196) (0.380) (0.0818) (0.0868) (0.161) (0.176) (0.0201) (0.0129) 
LogLIQUIDITY^2 -25.18*** -27.05*** -8.230*** -7.002*** -2.025 0.182 1.316*** 0.813*** 
 (1.445) (0.974) (0.498) (0.509) (1.549) (1.878) (0.227) (0.200) 
 
 
 
InTANG 
 
 
 
0.00840 
 
 
 
0.0810 
 
 
 
-0.148*** 
 
 
 
-0.115*** 
 
 
 
0.437*** 
 
 
 
0.119 
 
 
 
0.0561*** 
 
 
 
0.0125 
 (0.0438) (0.0730) (0.0181) (0.0223) (0.105) (0.124) (0.0118) (0.0171) 
LogInTANG^2 1.476** 1.172** -0.711*** -0.552*** 1.675 -0.104 -0.101 -0.113 
 (0.607) (0.493) (0.138) (0.164) (1.080) (0.673) (0.158) (0.0849) 
DBKRT -1.971** -3.441*** -3.513*** -3.546*** 5.734*** 4.729* 0.863*** -0.0380 
 (0.867) (1.235) (0.398) (0.323) (1.909) (2.819) (0.270) (0.459) 
LogDBKRT^2 12.88*** 9.081*** -2.255*** -2.203** -2.418 -23.88*** -1.052** -2.045*** 
 (1.046) (1.592) (0.747) (0.991) (2.832) (3.141) (0.524) (0.409) 
DIV -0.0676*** -0.0597** -0.0415*** -0.0338*** -0.240*** -0.191*** -0.0231*** -0.0149*** 
 (0.0131) (0.0232) (0.00531) (0.00735) (0.0339) (0.0474) (0.00340) (0.00432) 
LogDIV^2 -0.544 -0.415 0.0857 0.395*** -5.293*** -4.225*** -0.645*** -0.417*** 
 (0.595) (0.528) (0.0987) (0.103) (0.956) (0.864) (0.137) (0.151) 
GDP 0.00264 -0.00387 0.0104 0.00579 0.0231 0.0174 0.00393 0.00502 
 (0.0141) (0.0183) (0.00676) (0.00416) (0.0399) (0.0406) (0.00372) (0.00439) 
CFMT -1.474 -3.011** -1.381** -0.952** -5.516 -3.861 0.0830 -0.350 
 (0.923) (1.531) (0.616) (0.407) (3.446) (3.540) (0.224) (0.288) 
BOND -0.206*** -0.179** -0.147*** -0.0831*** -0.656*** -0.568** -0.0537*** -0.0545** 
 (0.0686) (0.0846) (0.0375) (0.0186) (0.178) (0.224) (0.0140) (0.0227) 
STK 0.241*** 0.206 0.0292 0.0100 0.939*** 0.586* 0.0677*** 0.0804*** 
 (0.0868) (0.148) (0.0458) (0.0316) (0.346) (0.331) (0.0249) (0.0301) 
HH 31.33*** -39.80 1.159 -5.337 6.026 78.46 -4.427*** -17.79*** 
 (11.20) (58.97) (2.070) (17.04) (19.02) (60.10) (1.675) (4.557) 
Constant 69.00*** 88.53*** 41.61*** 29.57*** -101.7*** -86.17** -27.74*** -15.48*** 
 (10.23) (17.52) (6.388) (4.707) (37.95) (37.69) (3.467) (4.284) 
         
Observations 11,942 13,180 11,942 13,180 11,942 13,180 11,942 13,180 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7.5: AIM Fixed Effect Regression Results based on Balanced Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES STDMV STDBV LTDMV LTDBV 
     
SIZE 19.02*** 1.350*** 15.58*** 1.702*** 
 (0.918) (0.232) (1.632) (0.597) 
SIZE (UB) 11.39*** -2.049*** 10.49*** -1.108* 
 (1.668) (0.416) (1.910) (0.587) 
GROWTH -0.0172 0.000786 -0.0311** -0.00215 
 (0.0145) (0.00493) (0.0150) (0.00366) 
GROWTH (U) -0.0169 0.00115 -0.0270** -0.00219 
 (0.0134) (0.00434) (0.0128) (0.00326) 
NDTS 0.173*** 0.0225** 0.209*** 0.0721*** 
 (0.0458) (0.00901) (0.0344) (0.0146) 
NDTS (U) 0.0630* 0.00273 0.109** 0.0491*** 
 (0.0377) (0.0102) (0.0429) (0.0142) 
ROE -0.00180*** -4.23e-05 -0.00169* -0.000150 
 (0.000610) (0.000103) (0.000925) (0.000218) 
ROE (U) 0.000967 0.000285*** 4.95e-05 -4.18e-05 
 (0.000620) (0.000102) (0.000625) (0.000147) 
TANG 0.535*** 0.0458*** 0.469*** 0.0893*** 
 (0.0297) (0.00724) (0.0486) (0.0110) 
TANG( U) 0.522*** 0.0584*** 0.470*** 0.101*** 
 (0.0479) (0.00713) (0.0470) (0.0112) 
TRATE 0.00927 -0.0105 0.119** 0.00189 
 (0.0555) (0.00883) (0.0530) (0.00820) 
TRATE (U) 0.0187 -0.0121 0.0858* -0.00598 
 (0.0468) (0.00801) (0.0463) (0.0113) 
LIQUIDITY -0.0579* -0.00974** -0.0275 -0.000373 
 (0.0307) (0.00381) (0.0196) (0.00230) 
LIQUIDITY (U) -0.0864** -0.0110** -0.0505* -0.00338 
 (0.0396) (0.00523) (0.0264) (0.00381) 
InTANG 0.287*** 0.00395 0.254*** 0.0489*** 
 (0.0329) (0.00714) (0.0420) (0.00726) 
InTANG 0.197*** 0.00963** 0.161** 0.0408*** 
 (0.0581) (0.00440) (0.0663) (0.0119) 
DBKRT -0.208*** -0.177*** -0.211*** -0.252*** 
 (0.0501) (0.0365) (0.0593) (0.0376) 
DBKRT (U) -0.0103 -0.0384* -0.0462** -0.0322 
 (0.0201) (0.0213) (0.0204) (0.0234) 
DIV -0.124*** -0.0206*** -0.130*** -0.0364*** 
 (0.0408) (0.00348) (0.0281) (0.00457) 
DIV (U) -0.128*** -0.0205*** -0.126*** -0.0423*** 
 (0.0341) (0.00448) (0.0253) (0.00336) 
GDP -1.357*** -0.325*** -1.042*** -0.159*** 
 (0.267) (0.0589) (0.282) (0.0542) 
GDP (U) -0.919*** -0.279*** -0.874*** -0.134*** 
 (0.264) (0.0703) (0.204) (0.0422) 
CFMT -0.924*** -0.117 0.215 0.285** 
 (0.340) (0.114) (0.448) (0.112) 
CFMT (U) -1.653*** -0.0613 -0.566** 0.0471 
 (0.246) (0.129) (0.232) (0.0432) 
BOND -0.199*** -0.0290*** -0.176*** -0.0342*** 
 (0.0216) (0.00534) (0.0197) (0.00514) 
BOND (U) -0.177*** -0.00817 -0.184*** -0.0246*** 
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 (0.0233) (0.00605) (0.0141) (0.00432) 
STK 0.00259 -4.02e-06 0.0200 -0.00655* 
 (0.0254) (0.00536) (0.0175) (0.00377) 
STK (U) -0.00964 0.000553 0.0298** -0.00123 
 (0.0240) (0.00544) (0.0138) (0.00301) 
HH -0.389 0.0186 -4.870*** -1.182*** 
 (2.184) (0.713) (1.140) (0.244) 
HH (U) -3.589 -0.137 -5.405*** -1.139*** 
 (3.085) (0.762) (0.743) (0.194) 
Constant -17.60** 1.477 -27.25** -6.544** 
 (7.697) (2.553) (11.02) (3.166) 
     
Observations 14,395 14,395 14,395 14,395 
Number of groups 338 338 338 338 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7.6: SMEs Fixed Effect Regression Results based on Balanced Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES STDMV STDBV LTDMV LTDBV 
     
SIZE 1.853 0.607 35.00*** 4.454*** 
 (1.470) (0.889) (4.952) (0.428) 
    SIZE (U) 7.747*** 1.024 31.33*** 3.968*** 
 (2.495) (0.996) (8.058) (0.754) 
GROWTH -0.580*** 0.0228 -1.402*** -0.0585 
 (0.0832) (0.0296) (0.439) (0.0406) 
GROWTH (U) -0.122*** -0.0394*** -0.107 -0.00898 
 (0.0276) (0.0146) (0.0705) (0.00801) 
NDTS -0.111 -0.195*** -0.0925 0.0435 
 (0.0726) (0.0243) (0.284) (0.0462) 
NDTS (U) -0.0872 -0.0435* -0.162 0.00285 
 (0.0987) (0.0237) (0.186) (0.0262) 
ROE 0.0523*** -0.0129** 0.0863** -0.0125*** 
 (0.0129) (0.00631) (0.0349) (0.00395) 
ROE (U) -0.0182 -0.00182 -0.0949** -0.0241*** 
 (0.0174) (0.00732) (0.0455) (0.00697) 
TANG -0.103*** -0.0896*** 0.153* 0.108*** 
 (0.0396) (0.0127) (0.0908) (0.0102) 
TANG (U) 0.156*** 0.000577 0.340*** 0.0864*** 
 (0.0269) (0.0185) (0.0665) (0.00995) 
TRATE -0.00863 -0.0434*** -0.264*** -0.0242*** 
 (0.0442) (0.0104) (0.0878) (0.00666) 
TRATE (U) -0.0291 -0.0475*** -0.248*** -0.0158*** 
 (0.0414) (0.00671) (0.0647) (0.00493) 
LIQUIDITY -3.025*** -1.002*** -1.179*** 0.0450 
 (0.647) (0.139) (0.376) (0.0366) 
LIQUIDITY (U) -1.654*** -0.356*** -0.678*** -0.0216** 
 (0.275) (0.0794) (0.144) (0.00866) 
InTANG -0.0164 -0.201*** 0.194* 0.0694*** 
 (0.0464) (0.0138) (0.110) (0.0157) 
InTANG (U) 0.0639 -0.117*** 0.209** 0.0283** 
 (0.0573) (0.0186) (0.0993) (0.0124) 
DBKRT -3.346*** -4.087*** 0.991 0.648*** 
 (0.697) (0.233) (1.183) (0.182) 
DBKRT (U) -2.448*** -3.267*** 3.988* 0.418 
 (0.686) (0.242) (2.089) (0.312) 
DIV  -0.0450*** -0.0281*** -0.162*** -0.0151*** 
 (0.0144) (0.00415) (0.0223) (0.00267) 
DIV (U) -0.0647*** -0.0375*** -0.216*** -0.0184*** 
 (0.0153) (0.00570) (0.0375) (0.00311) 
GDP 0.00752 0.0127*** 0.0589* 0.00650 
 (0.00938) (0.00444) (0.0306) (0.00404) 
GDP (U) -0.000960 0.00841 0.0173 0.00426 
 (0.0157) (0.00519) (0.0396) (0.00388) 
CFMT -0.411 -0.888** -5.276** -0.0778 
 (0.810) (0.389) (2.258) (0.148) 
CFMT (U) -1.980* -1.135** -4.974 -0.0968 
 (1.202) (0.497) (3.362) (0.245) 
BOND -0.133*** -0.159*** -0.752*** -0.0769*** 
 (0.0496) (0.0236) (0.130) (0.0125) 
BOND (U) -0.192*** -0.117*** -0.591*** -0.0517*** 
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 (0.0721) (0.0263) (0.187) (0.0169) 
STK 0.0778 -0.00923 0.630*** 0.0692*** 
 (0.0781) (0.0279) (0.178) (0.0157) 
STK (U) 0.215* 0.0213 0.749** 0.0710*** 
 (0.116) (0.0374) (0.323) (0.0265) 
HH 35.67*** -0.304 -16.80 -6.465*** 
 (10.99) (2.669) (10.44) (1.543) 
HH (U) 31.40*** 2.660** 2.934 -5.955*** 
 (8.712) (1.236) (17.74) (1.355) 
Constant 105.5*** 42.98*** -75.02*** -24.44*** 
 (8.157) (3.675) (22.40) (2.082) 
     
Observations 11,640 11,640 11,640 11,640 
Number of groups 303 303 303 303 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7. 7: AIM Leverage Measures Lagged Back 4 Quarters (1 Year) 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES STDMV STDBV LTDMV LTDBV 
     
SIZE (LAG) 5.312** -0.103 3.384** 0.0539 
 (2.617) (0.275) (1.506) (0.233) 
SIZE  11.39*** -2.049*** 10.49*** -1.108* 
 (1.668) (0.416) (1.910) (0.587) 
GROWTH (LAG) 0.00889 0.00407 0.000127 0.00146 
 (0.00968) (0.00389) (0.00599) (0.00304) 
GROWTH  -0.0169 0.00115 -0.0270** -0.00219 
 (0.0134) (0.00434) (0.0128) (0.00326) 
NDTS (LAG) -0.00560 0.0213** 0.135*** 0.0591*** 
 (0.0511) (0.0107) (0.0256) (0.0117) 
NDTS  0.0630* 0.00273 0.109** 0.0491*** 
 (0.0377) (0.0102) (0.0429) (0.0142) 
ROE (LAG) 0.00310*** 0.000492** 0.000464 -0.000103 
 (0.000388) (0.000210) (0.000996) (0.000226) 
ROE 0.000967 0.000285*** 4.95e-05 -4.18e-05 
 (0.000620) (0.000102) (0.000625) (0.000147) 
TANG (LAG) 0.301*** 0.0340*** 0.331*** 0.0703*** 
 (0.0439) (0.00927) (0.0481) (0.0130) 
TANG 0.522*** 0.0584*** 0.470*** 0.101*** 
 (0.0479) (0.00713) (0.0470) (0.0112) 
TRATE (LAG) -0.0866*** -0.0269*** 0.0113 -0.00414 
 (0.0271) (0.00856) (0.0494) (0.00851) 
TRATE  0.0187 -0.0121 0.0858* -0.00598 
 (0.0468) (0.00801) (0.0463) (0.0113) 
LIQUIDITY (LAG) -0.0513* -0.00684 -0.0211 -0.00278 
 (0.0295) (0.00451) (0.0179) (0.00320) 
LIQUIDITY -0.0864** -0.0110** -0.0505* -0.00338 
 (0.0396) (0.00523) (0.0264) (0.00381) 
InTANG (LAG) 0.0993** 0.0174** 0.167*** 0.0377*** 
 (0.0404) (0.00675) (0.0343) (0.00711) 
InTANG 0.197*** 0.00963** 0.161** 0.0408*** 
 (0.0581) (0.00440) (0.0663) (0.0119) 
DBKRT (LAG) 0.0550 0.0627*** 0.0631** 0.0415* 
 (0.0579) (0.00938) (0.0264) (0.0224) 
DBKRT -0.0103 -0.0384* -0.0462** -0.0322 
 (0.0201) (0.0213) (0.0204) (0.0234) 
DIV (LAG) -0.120*** -0.00697*** -0.0721*** -0.0174*** 
 (0.0277) (0.00210) (0.0233) (0.00477) 
DIV -0.128*** -0.0205*** -0.126*** -0.0423*** 
 (0.0341) (0.00448) (0.0253) (0.00336) 
GDP (LAG) 0.629*** 0.0394 0.900*** 0.207*** 
 (0.217) (0.0374) (0.202) (0.0546) 
GDP -0.919*** -0.279*** -0.874*** -0.134*** 
 (0.264) (0.0703) (0.204) (0.0422) 
CFMT (LAG) 0.282 0.187*** 0.890*** 0.256** 
 (0.295) (0.0654) (0.282) (0.101) 
CFMT -1.653*** -0.0613 -0.566** 0.0471 
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 (0.246) (0.129) (0.232) (0.0432) 
BOND (LAG) -0.112*** -0.0216*** -0.0860*** -0.0191*** 
 (0.0242) (0.00547) (0.0188) (0.00551) 
BOND -0.177*** -0.00817 -0.184*** -0.0246*** 
 (0.0233) (0.00605) (0.0141) (0.00432) 
STK (LAG) -0.00487 -0.00724* -0.0558*** -0.00900* 
 (0.0143) (0.00416) (0.0150) (0.00459) 
STK -0.00964 0.000553 0.0298** -0.00123 
 (0.0240) (0.00544) (0.0138) (0.00301) 
HH (LAG) 0.430 0.163 0.602 -0.644 
 (2.570) (0.418) (0.950) (0.486) 
HH -3.589 -0.137 -5.405*** -1.139*** 
 (3.085) (0.762) (0.743) (0.194) 
Constant 24.01** 9.614*** 17.94 9.772*** 
 (9.552) (2.635) (12.37) (3.711) 
     
Observations 17,556 17,556 17,556 17,556 
Number of groups 510 510 510 510 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7.8: SMEs Explanatory Variables Measures Lagged Back 4 Quarters (1 
Year) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES STDMV STDBV LTDMV LTDBV 
     
SIZE (LAG) 8.253*** 2.801*** 24.92*** 3.509*** 
 (1.743) (0.497) (5.266) (0.466) 
SIZE 7.747*** 1.024 31.33*** 3.968*** 
 (2.495) (0.996) (8.058) (0.754) 
GROWTH (LAG) 0.0330 0.0291*** -0.0518 0.00909 
 (0.0574) (0.00879) (0.0682) (0.0118) 
GROWTH -0.122*** -0.0394*** -0.107 -0.00898 
 (0.0276) (0.0146) (0.0705) (0.00801) 
NDTS (LAG) -0.311*** -0.138*** -0.361* -0.0547** 
 (0.0796) (0.0158) (0.210) (0.0213) 
NDTS -0.0872 -0.0435* -0.162 0.00285 
 (0.0987) (0.0237) (0.186) (0.0262) 
ROE (LAG) -0.0379 -0.0145 0.0598 0.00457 
 (0.0319) (0.0116) (0.0422) (0.00424) 
ROE -0.0182 -0.00182 -0.0949** -0.0241*** 
 (0.0174) (0.00732) (0.0455) (0.00697) 
TANG (LAG) 0.152*** -0.0122 0.158 0.0302** 
 (0.0566) (0.0169) (0.163) (0.0142) 
TANG 0.156*** 0.000577 0.340*** 0.0864*** 
 (0.0269) (0.0185) (0.0665) (0.00995) 
TRATE (LAG) 0.0189 -0.0149 0.0451 -0.000261 
 (0.0406) (0.00917) (0.0379) (0.00321) 
TRATE -0.0291 -0.0475*** -0.248*** -0.0158*** 
 (0.0414) (0.00671) (0.0647) (0.00493) 
LIQUIDITY (LAG) -0.807*** -0.186*** -0.584*** -0.0468*** 
 (0.197) (0.0432) (0.103) (0.00881) 
LIQUIDITY -1.654*** -0.356*** -0.678*** -0.0216** 
 (0.275) (0.0794) (0.144) (0.00866) 
InTANG (LAG) -0.0128 -0.0825*** 0.246** 0.0152* 
 (0.0631) (0.00978) (0.121) (0.00905) 
InTANG 0.0639 -0.117*** 0.209** 0.0283** 
 (0.0573) (0.0186) (0.0993) (0.0124) 
DBKRT (LAG) -0.0413 -1.239** 1.231 -0.0153 
 (0.801) (0.543) (1.583) (0.0826) 
DBKRT -2.448*** -3.267*** 3.988* 0.418 
 (0.686) (0.242) (2.089) (0.312) 
DIV (LAG) -0.0244** -0.00751** -0.122*** -0.00728*** 
 (0.0118) (0.00337) (0.0189) (0.00136) 
DIV -0.0647*** -0.0375*** -0.216*** -0.0184*** 
 (0.0153) (0.00570) (0.0375) (0.00311) 
GDP (LAG) -0.0186 0.00630 -0.0456 0.000538 
 (0.0215) (0.00593) (0.0312) (0.00257) 
GDP -0.000960 0.00841 0.0173 0.00426 
 (0.0157) (0.00519) (0.0396) (0.00388) 
CFMT (LAG) -3.165*** -1.278*** -3.327* -0.310** 
 (0.733) (0.363) (1.718) (0.143) 
CFMT -1.980* -1.135** -4.974 -0.0968 
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 (1.202) (0.497) (3.362) (0.245) 
BOND (LAG) -0.0737 -0.0939*** -0.104 -0.0377*** 
 (0.0485) (0.0227) (0.0997) (0.00554) 
BOND -0.192*** -0.117*** -0.591*** -0.0517*** 
 (0.0721) (0.0263) (0.187) (0.0169) 
STK (LAG) 0.000226 -0.0165 -0.0501 -0.0446*** 
 (0.0658) (0.0370) (0.136) (0.00787) 
STK 0.215* 0.0213 0.749** 0.0710*** 
 (0.116) (0.0374) (0.323) (0.0265) 
HH (LAG) 8.983 -1.036 -27.72** -2.186* 
 (11.40) (1.855) (12.76) (1.204) 
HH 31.40*** 2.660** 2.934 -5.955*** 
 (8.712) (1.236) (17.74) (1.355) 
Constant 48.23*** -0.574 -22.60 -13.72*** 
 (16.37) (9.202) (31.30) (2.840) 
     
Observations 22,541 22,541 22,541 22,541 
Number of groups 756 756 756 756 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7.9: AIM Leverage Measures Lead Forward 4 Quarters (1 Year) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES STDMV+1 STDBV+1 LTDMV+1 LTDBV+1 
     
SIZE (LEAD) 9.330*** 0.328 5.727*** 0.0761 
 (2.230) (0.254) (1.356) (0.364) 
SIZE 11.39*** -2.049*** 10.49*** -1.108* 
 (1.668) (0.416) (1.910) (0.587) 
GROWTH (LEAD) 0.00605 0.00270 0.000735 0.00150 
 (0.00893) (0.00409) (0.00618) (0.00319) 
GROWTH -0.0169 0.00115 -0.0270** -0.00219 
 (0.0134) (0.00434) (0.0128) (0.00326) 
NDTS (LEAD) -0.00670 0.0201 0.128*** 0.0553*** 
 (0.0447) (0.0123) (0.0245) (0.0134) 
NDTS 0.0630* 0.00273 0.109** 0.0491*** 
 (0.0377) (0.0102) (0.0429) (0.0142) 
ROE (LEAD) 0.00206** 0.000277 0.00126 0.000114 
 (0.000838) (0.000198) (0.000817) (0.000227) 
ROE 0.000967 0.000285*** 4.95e-05 -4.18e-05 
 (0.000620) (0.000102) (0.000625) (0.000147) 
TANG (LEAD) 0.368*** 0.0504*** 0.371*** 0.0836*** 
 (0.0485) (0.00658) (0.0664) (0.0129) 
TANG 0.522*** 0.0584*** 0.470*** 0.101*** 
 (0.0479) (0.00713) (0.0470) (0.0112) 
TRATE (LEAD) -0.0992*** -0.0315*** 0.0190 -0.0140* 
 (0.0379) (0.00743) (0.0548) (0.00842) 
TEATE 0.0187 -0.0121 0.0858* -0.00598 
 (0.0468) (0.00801) (0.0463) (0.0113) 
LIQUIDITY (LEAD) -0.0566* -0.00697 -0.0244 -0.00283 
 (0.0327) (0.00477) (0.0195) (0.00344) 
LIQUIDITY -0.0864** -0.0110** -0.0505* -0.00338 
 (0.0396) (0.00523) (0.0264) (0.00381) 
InTANG (LEAD) 0.103* 0.0209** 0.167*** 0.0402*** 
 (0.0544) (0.00972) (0.0431) (0.0106) 
InTANG 0.197*** 0.00963** 0.161** 0.0408*** 
 (0.0581) (0.00440) (0.0663) (0.0119) 
DBKRT (LEAD) 0.0113 0.0329 0.0474** 0.0323* 
 (0.0568) (0.0213) (0.0221) (0.0183) 
DBKRT -0.0103 -0.0384* -0.0462** -0.0322 
 (0.0201) (0.0213) (0.0204) (0.0234) 
DIV (LEAD) -0.129*** -0.0126*** -0.107*** -0.0265*** 
 (0.0312) (0.00406) (0.0156) (0.00533) 
DIV -0.128*** -0.0205*** -0.126*** -0.0423*** 
 (0.0341) (0.00448) (0.0253) (0.00336) 
GDP (LEAD) 0.589** 0.0314 0.920*** 0.221*** 
 (0.229) (0.0399) (0.209) (0.0557) 
GDP -0.919*** -0.279*** -0.874*** -0.134*** 
 (0.264) (0.0703) (0.204) (0.0422) 
CFMT (LEAD) -0.0744 0.109 0.689*** 0.164 
 (0.362) (0.0686) (0.186) (0.113) 
CFMT -1.653*** -0.0613 -0.566** 0.0471 
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 (0.246) (0.129) (0.232) (0.0432) 
BOND (LEAD) -0.159*** -0.0277*** -0.117*** -0.0268*** 
 (0.0239) (0.00480) (0.0133) (0.00513) 
BOND -0.177*** -0.00817 -0.184*** -0.0246*** 
 (0.0233) (0.00605) (0.0141) (0.00432) 
STK (LEAD) 0.00637 -0.00363 -0.0413*** -0.00607 
 (0.0135) (0.00384) (0.0117) (0.00379) 
STK -0.00964 0.000553 0.0298** -0.00123 
 (0.0240) (0.00544) (0.0138) (0.00301) 
HH (LEAD) -0.892 0.175 -0.278 -1.261*** 
 (2.847) (0.442) (1.421) (0.242) 
HH -3.589 -0.137 -5.405*** -1.139*** 
 (3.085) (0.762) (0.743) (0.194) 
Constant 18.28* 2.096 14.45** 2.678 
 (10.89) (1.870) (6.054) (2.924) 
     
Observations 17,556 17,556 17,556 17,556 
Number of groups 510 510 510 510 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7. 10: SMEs Leverage Measures Lead Forward 4 Quarters (1 Year) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES STDMV STDBV LTDMV LTDBV 
     
SIZE (LEAD) 10.04*** 3.435*** 27.25*** 3.740*** 
 (1.083) (0.496) (5.172) (0.392) 
SIZE 7.747*** 1.024 31.33*** 3.968*** 
 (2.495) (0.996) (8.058) (0.754) 
GROWTH (LEAD) 0.0369 0.0261*** -0.0861 0.00453 
 (0.0589) (0.00892) (0.0713) (0.0112) 
GROWTH -0.122*** -0.0394*** -0.107 -0.00898 
 (0.0276) (0.0146) (0.0705) (0.00801) 
NDTS (LEAD) -0.299*** -0.129*** -0.224 -0.0314 
 (0.0834) (0.0163) (0.216) (0.0218) 
NDTS -0.0872 -0.0435* -0.162 0.00285 
 (0.0987) (0.0237) (0.186) (0.0262) 
ROE (LEAD) -0.00632 -0.00859 0.0304 0.00361 
 (0.0244) (0.0118) (0.0529) (0.00463) 
ROE -0.0182 -0.00182 -0.0949** -0.0241*** 
 (0.0174) (0.00732) (0.0455) (0.00697) 
TANG (LEAD) 0.193*** -0.00270 0.327*** 0.0450*** 
 (0.0519) (0.0158) (0.107) (0.00858) 
TANG 0.156*** 0.000577 0.340*** 0.0864*** 
 (0.0269) (0.0185) (0.0665) (0.00995) 
TRATE (LEAD) 0.0321 -0.0143* 0.0607 0.000625 
 (0.0395) (0.00823) (0.0374) (0.00275) 
TRATE -0.0291 -0.0475*** -0.248*** -0.0158*** 
 (0.0414) (0.00671) (0.0647) (0.00493) 
LIQUIDITY (LEAD) -0.811*** -0.201*** -0.557*** -0.0451*** 
 (0.197) (0.0463) (0.0982) (0.00901) 
LIQUIDITY -1.654*** -0.356*** -0.678*** -0.0216** 
 (0.275) (0.0794) (0.144) (0.00866) 
InTANG (LAED) 0.00343 -0.0853*** 0.360*** 0.0241** 
 (0.0657) (0.0113) (0.106) (0.0100) 
InTANG 0.0639 -0.117*** 0.209** 0.0283** 
 (0.0573) (0.0186) (0.0993) (0.0124) 
DBKRT (LEAD) -0.281 -1.313** 2.660* 0.0519 
 (0.939) (0.641) (1.516) (0.0832) 
DBKRT -2.448*** -3.267*** 3.988* 0.418 
 (0.686) (0.242) (2.089) (0.312) 
DIV (LAED) -0.0254** -0.00746** -0.113*** -0.00559*** 
 (0.0107) (0.00328) (0.0229) (0.00201) 
DIV -0.0647*** -0.0375*** -0.216*** -0.0184*** 
 (0.0153) (0.00570) (0.0375) (0.00311) 
GDP (LEAD) -0.0163 0.00703 -0.0461 0.000706 
 (0.0215) (0.00668) (0.0318) (0.00241) 
GDP -0.000960 0.00841 0.0173 0.00426 
 (0.0157) (0.00519) (0.0396) (0.00388) 
CFMT (LEAD) -3.212*** -1.532*** -3.822** -0.383*** 
 (0.790) (0.440) (1.743) (0.113) 
CFMT -1.980* -1.135** -4.974 -0.0968 
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 (1.202) (0.497) (3.362) (0.245) 
BOND (LEAD) -0.0934* -0.0942*** -0.0814 -0.0384*** 
 (0.0549) (0.0298) (0.136) (0.00692) 
BOND -0.192*** -0.117*** -0.591*** -0.0517*** 
 (0.0721) (0.0263) (0.187) (0.0169) 
STK (LEAD) -5.85e-05 -0.0173 -0.0373 -0.0430*** 
 (0.0716) (0.0437) (0.148) (0.00837) 
STK 0.215* 0.0213 0.749** 0.0710*** 
 (0.116) (0.0374) (0.323) (0.0265) 
HH (LEAD) 30.01*** 1.753 -19.80 -2.870** 
 (7.492) (1.410) (15.24) (1.321) 
HH 31.40*** 2.660** 2.934 -5.955*** 
 (8.712) (1.236) (17.74) (1.355) 
Constant 48.23*** -0.574 -22.60 -13.72*** 
 (16.37) (9.202) (31.30) (2.840) 
     
Observations 22,541 22,541 22,541 22,541 
Number of groups 756 756 756 756 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Part 3: Panel Regression Analysis Results  
Table 6.22: Time Dummy Effect in AIM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Year STMV STBV LTMV LTBV 
     
2007Q1 5.790 1.156 3.432 -5.289 
 (24.49) (3.537) (24.66) (4.599) 
2007Q2 10.48 2.211 -0.266 -6.916 
 (28.57) (4.233) (28.10) (5.295) 
2007Q3 3.264 -0.395 7.699 -3.097 
 (20.67) (2.850) (21.05) (3.857) 
2007Q4 11.83 2.211 -1.158 -7.231 
 (29.46) (4.435) (28.78) (5.453) 
2008Q1 5.815 4.814 -18.25 -6.835 
 (28.12) (4.380) (28.61) (6.046) 
2008Q2 11.15 4.806 -16.35 -6.796 
 (28.89) (4.422) (29.13) (6.099) 
2008Q3 7.454 2.150 -5.631 -2.182 
 (19.13) (2.765) (19.62) (4.050) 
2008Q4 8.198 1.269 -0.353 -0.438 
 (16.37) (2.506) (16.54) (3.477) 
2009Q1 2.544 -3.563 23.35** 4.370 
 (13.41) (3.066) (11.86) (2.879) 
2009Q2 -5.017 -4.096 22.98* 5.723* 
 (15.06) (3.292) (12.55) (3.029) 
2009Q3 -8.601 -4.456 20.50 5.312* 
 (15.09) (3.248) (12.55) (2.997) 
2009Q4 -10.47 -4.766 22.27 6.568* 
 (17.61) (3.707) (14.70) (3.463) 
2010Q1 -8.179 -5.553 22.38 5.766 
 (16.29) (3.548) (14.31) (3.571) 
2010Q2 -7.558 -5.061 21.71 5.339 
 (15.42) (3.256) (13.60) (3.341) 
2010Q3 -3.316 -4.170 19.44* 4.151 
 (11.17) (2.533) (10.23) (2.650) 
2010Q4 -3.153 -4.884* 21.49* 5.014* 
 (12.65) (2.925) (11.56) (3.036) 
2011Q1 -10.20 -4.748* 15.17 4.759* 
 (13.81) (2.823) (11.80) (2.707) 
2011Q2 -8.181 -5.303* 16.70 5.377* 
 (14.38) (3.092) (12.37) (2.964) 
2011Q3 -6.256 -4.189* 12.38 3.806* 
 (10.65) (2.335) (9.254) (2.199) 
2011Q4 -3.953 -3.661* 11.33 3.273* 
 (8.922) (2.029) (7.819) (1.897) 
2012Q1 -2.055 -1.649 4.753 1.610 
 (5.211) (1.141) (4.577) (1.015) 
2012Q2 -4.562 -3.193 9.416 3.681* 
 (9.873) (2.226) (8.602) (2.036) 
2012Q3 -9.268 -3.037 7.548 3.670* 
 (12.35) (2.313) (10.69) (2.187) 
2012Q4 -2.505 -2.634 7.724 2.831 
 (8.232) (1.915) (7.219) (1.738) 
2013Q1 -8.179 -5.049 19.05 5.387* 
 (14.76) (3.090) (13.57) (3.231) 
2013Q2 -8.157 -4.805* 17.58 4.852* 
 (12.95) (2.780) (12.05) (2.927) 
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2013Q3 -3.392 -2.571** 10.50** 1.639 
 (4.971) (1.172) (5.323) (1.346) 
2013Q4 -3.494 -2.867** 10.64* 1.922 
 (5.217) (1.284) (5.534) (1.436) 
2014Q1 0.450 -0.386 0.340 -0.667 
 (2.770) (0.479) (2.854) (0.618) 
2014Q2 -1.052 -0.912* 2.328 0.208 
 (2.221) (0.526) (2.413) (0.559) 
2014Q3 -0.525 -0.803 2.884 0.339 
 (2.271) (0.564) (2.360) (0.594) 
20147Q4 -0.379 -0.551 2.377 -0.0550 
 (1.923) (0.451) (2.082) (0.511) 
2015Q1 3.836 0.932 -2.672 -1.936* 
 (5.789) (0.933) (5.320) (1.137) 
2015Q2 2.105 0.664 -1.461 -1.306 
 (3.907) (0.659) (3.568) (0.827) 
2015Q3 -1.058 -0.715 1.488 0.311 
 (2.237) (0.518) (1.937) (0.454) 
2015Q4 -0.261 -0.0349 -0.822 -0.441 
 (1.646) (0.320) (1.555) (0.402) 
2016Q1 0.00817 -0.745 2.706 0.916* 
 (2.490) (0.608) (2.160) (0.527) 
2016Q2 2.422 -0.305 1.718 0.419 
 (1.504) (0.359) (1.390) (0.296) 
2016Q3 1.946 0.451 -0.433 -0.547 
 (2.258) (0.346) (2.131) (0.406) 
2016Q4 - - - - 
     
2017Q1 - - - - 
     
2017Q2 - - - - 
     
2017Q3 - - - - 
     
2017Q4 - - - - 
     
Constant 135.4 44.97 -73.75 -42.76 
 (159.0) (29.61) (133.7) (27.23) 
     
Observations 18,703 18,703 18,703 18,703 
R-squared 0.062 0.049 0.048 0.047 
Number of Firm 510 510 510 510 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
350 
 
Table 6. 23: Time Dummy Effect on SMEs Board 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Year STMV STBV LTMV LTBV 
     
2007Q1 -2.433 -1.110 20.56* 3.969*** 
 (6.193) (1.691) (11.04) (1.368) 
2007Q2 -1.982 -1.225 17.54 3.808*** 
 (6.194) (1.687) (11.02) (1.366) 
2007Q3 -2.986 -1.151 15.17 3.736*** 
 (6.218) (1.685) (11.01) (1.359) 
2007Q4 -4.428 -1.195 11.19 3.584*** 
 (6.232) (1.679) (11.00) (1.349) 
2008Q1 20.07*** 8.610*** 41.32*** 1.987*** 
 (4.312) (1.191) (7.146) (0.762) 
2008Q2 20.73*** 8.436*** 41.32*** 1.912** 
 (4.317) (1.202) (7.164) (0.762) 
2008Q3 20.08*** 8.229*** 39.92*** 1.982*** 
 (4.388) (1.195) (7.104) (0.757) 
2008Q4 20.60*** 8.128*** 39.70*** 2.004*** 
 (4.400) (1.197) (7.066) (0.757) 
2009Q1 10.92*** 4.506*** 34.64*** 2.839*** 
 (2.017) (0.565) (3.610) (0.435) 
2009Q2 11.25*** 4.503*** 34.88*** 2.831*** 
 (2.023) (0.560) (3.597) (0.435) 
2009Q3 10.78*** 4.542*** 34.59*** 2.845*** 
 (2.021) (0.556) (3.572) (0.434) 
2009Q4 10.53*** 4.352*** 32.76*** 2.775*** 
 (2.007) (0.548) (3.525) (0.428) 
2010Q1 8.182*** 3.442*** 28.92*** 1.732*** 
 (1.923) (0.520) (3.502) (0.402) 
2010Q2 7.289*** 3.238*** 27.00*** 1.689*** 
 (1.950) (0.510) (3.431) (0.394) 
2010Q3 6.248*** 2.948*** 24.42*** 1.597*** 
 (1.965) (0.509) (3.410) (0.389) 
2010Q4 4.958** 2.718*** 22.14*** 1.542*** 
 (1.964) (0.508) (3.395) (0.385) 
2011Q1 10.94*** 4.932*** 21.98*** 0.582 
 (2.992) (0.745) (5.427) (0.583) 
2011Q2 11.48*** 4.734*** 21.35*** 0.551 
 (2.985) (0.750) (5.451) (0.584) 
2011Q3 11.73*** 4.754*** 20.67*** 0.540 
 (2.976) (0.754) (5.488) (0.585) 
2011Q4 11.80*** 4.640*** 20.23*** 0.509 
 (2.983) (0.756) (5.490) (0.585) 
2012Q1 9.114*** 4.542*** 18.12*** 0.514 
 (3.129) (0.783) (5.874) (0.631) 
2012Q2 9.803*** 4.457*** 17.98*** 0.445 
 (3.133) (0.787) (5.909) (0.633) 
2012Q3 9.364*** 4.481*** 17.53*** 0.450 
 (3.138) (0.780) (5.865) (0.631) 
2012Q4 9.482*** 4.452*** 17.46*** 0.438 
 (3.126) (0.780) (5.844) (0.631) 
2013Q1 8.378** 4.426*** 20.61*** 0.715 
 (3.286) (0.815) (6.150) (0.670) 
2013Q2 8.939*** 4.394*** 21.05*** 0.700 
 (3.287) (0.817) (6.163) (0.671) 
2013Q3 8.815*** 4.398*** 20.96*** 0.702 
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 (3.287) (0.817) (6.165) (0.671) 
2013Q4 8.574*** 4.408*** 20.74*** 0.702 
 (3.283) (0.814) (6.164) (0.671) 
2014Q1 5.406*** 2.174*** 10.74*** 0.377 
 (1.919) (0.478) (3.656) (0.389) 
2014Q2 5.983*** 2.117*** 10.98*** 0.350 
 (1.912) (0.477) (3.647) (0.389) 
2014Q3 5.557*** 2.148*** 10.76*** 0.362 
 (1.905) (0.470) (3.615) (0.388) 
20147Q4 4.971*** 2.167*** 10.35*** 0.372 
 (1.900) (0.464) (3.605) (0.389) 
2015Q1 0.745*** -0.0834 1.112* 0.0117 
 (0.280) (0.0856) (0.634) (0.0306) 
2015Q2 0.103 -0.0469 0.152 -0.00725 
 (0.169) (0.0475) (0.462) (0.0299) 
2015Q3 -1.034*** 0.0273 -1.102*** -0.00239 
 (0.117) (0.0303) (0.217) (0.0119) 
2015Q4 - - - - 
     
2016Q1 -0.920*** -0.00199 -0.840* 0.00677 
 (0.236) (0.0275) (0.466) (0.0149) 
2016Q2 0.329*** -0.0330 0.351* -0.00389 
 (0.0690) (0.0224) (0.182) (0.0133) 
2016Q3 -0.117** 0.00117 0.0255 0.000772 
 (0.0498) (0.00438) (0.118) (0.00109) 
2016Q4 - - - - 
     
2017Q1 -0.626*** 0.0426*** -0.345 0.0157 
 (0.138) (0.0159) (0.342) (0.0123) 
2017Q2 - - - - 
     
2017Q3 - - - - 
     
2017Q4 - - - - 
     
Constant -35.74 -10.59 -306.7*** -37.16*** 
 (35.96) (10.52) (57.22) (7.910) 
     
Observations 25,122 25,122 25,122 25,122 
R-squared 0.162 0.214 0.107 0.107 
Number of Firm 759 759 759 759 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Part 4: Non-Linear Relationship in AIM and SMEs Board 
 
Figure 1: Firm Size and Short Term Leverage Market Value 
 
 
Figure 2: Growth Opportunities and Short Term Leverage Market Value 
  
Figure 3: Non debt tax shield and Short Term Leverage Market Value   
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 Figure 4: Profitability and Short Term Leverage Market Value 
  
 
Figure 5: Intangibility and Short Term Leverage Market Value 
   
 
Figure 6: Effective tax rate and Short Term Leverage Market Value 
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Figure 7: Liquidity and Short Term Leverage Market Value   
   
 
  Figure 8: Intangibility and Short Term Leverage Market Value 
   
 
 
Figure 9: Distance from bankruptcy and Short Term Leverage Market Value 
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Figure 10: Dividend and Short Term Leverage Market Value 
    
 
Figure 11: SIZE and Short Term Leverage Book Value 
  
 
Figure 12: Growth opportunities and Short Term Leverage Book Value 
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Figure 13: Non-debt tax shield and Short Term Leverage Book Value 
   
 
Figure 14: Profitability and Short Term Leverage Book Value 
  
 
Figure 15: Tangibility and Short Term Leverage Book Value 
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Figure 16: Effective tax rate and Short Term Leverage Book Value 
  
 
Figure 17: Liquidity and Short Term Leverage Book Value 
  
 
Figure 18: Intangibility and Short Term Leverage Book Value 
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Figure 19: Distance from bankruptcy and Short Term Leverage Book Value 
  
 
Figure 20: Dividend pay-out ratio and Short Term Leverage Book Value 
   
Figure 21: SIZE and Long Term Leverage Market Value 
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Figure 22: Growth opportunities and Long Term Leverage Market Value 
  
 
Figure 23: Non-debt tax shield and Long Term Leverage Market Value 
  
 
Figure 24: Profitability and Long Term Leverage Market Value 
   
 
 
-2
0
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
L
o
n
g
 T
e
rm
 L
e
v
e
ra
g
e
 i
n
 M
a
rk
e
t 
V
a
lu
e
-5 0 5 10
Growth opportunities
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
S
h
o
rt
 T
e
rm
 L
e
v
e
ra
g
e
 M
a
rk
e
t 
V
a
lu
e
-2 0 2 4 6
lnGrowth(SMEs Board Market)
-1
5
0
-1
0
0
-5
0
0
5
0
L
o
n
g
 T
e
rm
 L
e
v
e
ra
g
e
 i
n
 M
a
rk
e
t 
V
a
lu
e
-10 -5 0 5
Non Debt Tax Shield
-2
0
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
S
h
o
rt
 T
e
rm
 L
e
v
e
ra
g
e
 M
a
rk
e
t 
V
a
lu
e
-4 -2 0 2 4
lnNDTS (SMEs Board Market)
4
5
5
0
5
5
6
0
6
5
L
o
n
g
 T
e
rm
 L
e
v
e
ra
g
e
 i
n
 M
a
rk
e
t 
V
a
lu
e
-5 0 5 10
Profitability
4
5
5
0
5
5
6
0
6
5
7
0
S
h
o
rt
 T
e
rm
 L
e
v
e
ra
g
e
 M
a
rk
e
t 
V
a
lu
e
-4 -2 0 2 4 6
InPro (SMEs Board Market)
360 
 
Figure 25: Tangibility and Long Term Leverage Market Value 
   
 
Figure 26: Effective tax rate and Long Term Leverage Market Value 
   
 
Figure 27: Liquidity and Long Term Leverage Market Value 
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Figure 28: Intangibility and Long Term Leverage Market Value  
  
 
Figure 29: Distance from Bankruptcy and Long Term Leverage Market Value 
  
 
Figure 30: Dividend pay-out ratio and Long Term Leverage Market Value 
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Figure 31: SIZE Long Term Leverage Book Value 
   
 
Figure 32: Growth opportunities Long Term Leverage Book Value 
   
 
Figure 33: Non-debt tax shield Long Term Leverage Book Value 
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Figure 34: Profitability and Long Term Leverage Book Value 
   
 
Figure 35: Asset Tangibility and Long Term Leverage Book Value 
   
 
Figure 36: Effective Tax Rate and Long Term Leverage Book Value 
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Figure 37: Liquidity and Long Term Leverage Book Value 
  
 
Figure 38: Intangibility and Long Term Leverage Book Value 
   
 
Figure 39: Distance from bankruptcy and Long Term Leverage Book Value 
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Figure 40: Dividend pay-out ratio and Long Term Leverage Book Value 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
.6
4
.7
4
.8
4
.9
5
L
o
n
g
 T
e
rm
 L
e
v
e
ra
g
e
 B
o
o
k
 V
a
lu
e
1 2 3 4 5
Dividend Pay-out Ratio
2
4
6
8
L
o
n
g
 T
e
rm
 L
e
v
e
ra
g
e
 B
o
o
k
 V
a
lu
e
0 1 2 3 4 5
lnDiv (SMEs Board Market)
366 
 
Part 5: Coefficient of Non-linear relationship in Capital Intensive 
and Non-Capital Intensive 
Figure 41: Firm Size 
AIM 
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Figure 42: Growth opportunities 
AIM 
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Figure 43: Non-debt tax shield  
AIM 
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Figure 44: Profitability  
AIM 
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Figure 45: Tangibility  
AIM 
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Figure 46: Effective tax rate 
AIM 
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Figure 47: Liquidity  
AIM 
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Figure 48: Intangibility  
AIM 
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Figure 49: Distance from bankruptcy  
AIM 
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Figure 50: Dividend  
AIM 
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